Theoretical Economics publishes leading research in economic theory. It is published by the Econometric Society three times a year, in January, May, and September. All content is freely available. It has been accepted for inclusion in the Social Sciences Citation Index.

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Papers to appear

The following papers have been accepted and will appear in future issues. The links below lead to the final accepted papers in their working paper formats. The papers will be copyedited and typeset for publication.

• Antonio Penta, On the structure of rationalizability for arbitrary spaces of uncertainty
• Steven A. Matthews, Achievable outcomes of dynamic contribution games
• Isa Emin Hafalir, M. Bumin Yenmez, and Muhammed Ali Yildirim, Effective affirmative action in school choice
• Douglas Gale and Tanju Yorulmazer, Liquidity hoarding
• Eduardo M. Azevedo, E. Glen Weyl, and Alexander White, Walrasian equilibrium in large, quasi-linear markets
• Tai Wei Hu and Eran Shmaya, Expressible inspections
• Kiminori Matsuyama, The good, the bad, and the ugly: an inquiry into the causes and nature of credit cycles
• Attila Ambrus, Yuichiro Kamada, and Eduardo M. Azevedo, Hierarchical cheap talk
• Anastasios G. Karantounias, Managing pessimistic expectations and fiscal policy
• Dieter Balkenborg, Josef Hofbauer, and Christoph Kuzmics, Refined best-response correspondence and dynamics
• Jing Chen and Silvio Micali, The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games
• Peter Vida and Francoise Forges, Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case
• Costis Skiadas, Scale-invariant uncertainty-averse preferences and source-dependent constant relative risk aversion
• Luis H. B. Braido, Ergodic Markov equilibrium with incomplete markets and short sales
• Manuel Mueller-Frank, A general framework for rational learning in social networks
• Alexander Reffgen and Lars-Gunnar Svensson, Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods
• Paul J. Healy and Laurent Mathevet, Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments
• Edward Schlee and Hector Chade, Optimal insurance with adverse selection
• Leandro Nascimento, The ex-ante aggregation of opinions under uncertainty
• Ludovic Renou and Tristan Tomala, Mechanism design and communication networks
• Timofiy Mylovanov and Thomas Troeger, Informed principal problems in generalized private values environments
• Dino Gerardi and Lucas Maestri, A principal-agent model of sequential testing
• Olivier Bochet, Rahmi Ilkilic, Hervé Moulin, and Jay Sethuraman, Balancing supply and demand under bilateral constraints
• Ettore Damiano, Hao Li, and Wing Suen, Optimal deadlines for agreements
• Navin Kartik and Olivier Tercieux, Implementation with evidence
• Kristy Buzard and Joel Watson, Contract, renegotiation, and hold up: Results on the technology of trade and investment
• B. Ravikumar and Yuzhe Zhang, Optimal auditing and insurance in a dynamic model of tax compliance
• Thomas Wiseman, A partial folk theorem for games with private learning
• Itzhak Gilboa and Larry Samuelson, Subjectivity in inductive inference

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