Volume 9, Number 2 (May 2014)

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Table of contents

Articles

An algorithm for two-player repeated games with perfect monitoring
        Dilip Abreu and Yuliy Sannikov
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
 Supplementary Appendix
313–338
Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules
        Tilman Börgers and Doug Smith
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
339–360
Strategy-proofness and Pareto-efficiency in quasi-linear exchange economies
        Mridu Prabal Goswami, Manipushpak Mitra, and Arunava Sen
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
361–381
Stochastic stability in monotone economies
        Takashi Kamihigashi and John Stachurski
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
383–407
Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games
        Riccardo Calcagno, Yuichiro Kamada, Stefano Lovo, and Takuo Sugaya
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
409–434
The transfer problem: A complete characterization
        Yves Balasko
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
435–444
Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
        Vincent Anesi and Daniel J. Seidmann
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
 Supplementary Appendix
445–482
Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information
        Ying Chen and Hulya Eraslan
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
 Supplementary Appendix
483–513
A dynamic theory of electoral competition
        Marco Battaglini
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
515–554
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