Table of contents
Articles
|
Exploiting social influence in networks
Vladyslav Nora and Eyal Winter |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1–27 |
|
A dynamic model of censorship
Yiman Sun |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 29–60 |
|
Worst-case equilibria in first-price auctions
Vitali Gretschko and Helene Mass |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 61–93 |
|
Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs
Mengxi Zhang |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 95–129 |
|
Digital currency and privacy
Kee-Youn Kang |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 131–167 |
|
Asymmetric all-pay auctions with spillovers
Maria Betto and Matthew W. Thomas |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 169–206 |
|
Optimal sequential contests
Toomas Hinnosaar |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 207–244 |
|
Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness
Sarah Auster and Nicola Pavoni |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 245–284 |
|
Sophisticated banking contracts and fragility when withdrawal information is public
Xuesong Huang |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 285–324 |
|
Asset bubbles and product market competition
Francisco Queirós |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 325–364 |
|
The dynamics of instability
César Barilla and Duarte Gonçalves |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 365–405 |
|
Data and incentives
Annie Liang and Erik Madsen |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 407–448 |
|
Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game
J. Aislinn Bohren |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 449–498 |
|
Wages as signals of worker mobility
Yu Chen, Matthew Doyle, and Francisco M. Gonzalez |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 499–549 |