Theoretical Economics 8 (2013), 193–231
Tweet
Managing pessimistic expectations and fiscal policy
Anastasios Karantounias
Abstract
This paper studies the design of optimal fiscal policy when a
government that fully trusts the probability model of government
expenditures faces a fearful public that forms pessimistic
expectations. We identify two forces that shape our results. On the
one hand, the government has an incentive to
concentrate tax distortions on events that it considers
unlikely relative to the pessimistic public. On the other hand,
the endogeneity of the public's expectations gives rise to a novel motive
for expectation management that aims towards the manipulation of equilibrium
prices of government debt in a favorable way. These motives typically act in opposite
directions and induce persistence to the optimal allocation and the tax
rate.
Keywords: Fiscal policy, misspecification, robustness, taxes, debt, martingale
JEL classification: D80, E62, H21, H63
Full Text: PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix