Theoretical Economics, Volume 16, Number 2 (May 2021)

Theoretical Economics 16 (2021), 639–675

Sequential persuasion

Fei Li, Peter Norman


This paper studies sequential Bayesian persuasion games with multiple senders. We provide a tractable characterization of equilibrium outcomes. We apply the model to study how the structure of consultations affects information revelation. Adding a sender who moves first cannot reduce informativeness in equilibrium, and results in a more informative equilibrium in the case of two states. Moreover, with the exception of the first sender, it is without loss of generality to let each sender move only once. Sequential persuasion cannot generate a more informative equilibrium than simultaneous persuasion and is always less informative when there are only two states.

Keywords: Bayesian persuasion, communication, competition in persuasion, multiple senders, sequential persuasion

JEL classification: D82,D83

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