Theoretical Economics, Volume 20, Number 1 (January 2025)

Theoretical Economics 20 (2025), 131–168


In the shadow of shadow banking: a liquidity perspective

Zehao Liu, Ping He, Chengbo Xie

Abstract


Liquidity requirements for commercial banks improve risk-sharing for depositors. Nevertheless, shadow banks, issuing securities with lower liquidity, operate outside such regulatory constraints. In an economy featuring shadow banks with a constant level of liquidity for shadow bank securities, higher liquidity requirements lead to a reduction in aggregate liquidity provision, owing to regulatory arbitrage incentives. Conversely, when the liquidity of shadow bank securities decreases with the market share of shadow banks, the incentive for regulatory arbitrage is reduced, and thus higher liquidity requirements could enhance aggregate liquidity provision.

Keywords: Shadow banking, liquidity requirements, regulatory arbitrage, liquidity shortage, search and matching

JEL classification: E40, E50, G20

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