A dynamic theory of electoral competition

MARCO BATTAGLINI
Department of Economics, Princeton University

We present a dynamic theory of electoral competition to study the determinants of fiscal policy. In each period, two parties choose electoral platforms to maximize the expected number of elected representatives. The platforms include public expenditure, redistributive transfers, the tax rate, and the level of public debt. Voters cast their vote after seeing the platforms and elect representatives according to a majoritarian winner take all system. The level of debt, by affecting the budget constraint in future periods, creates a strategic linkage between electoral cycles. We characterize the Markov equilibrium of this game when public debt is the state variable and study how Pareto efficiency depends on the electoral rule and the underlying fundamentals of the economy.

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1. INTRODUCTION

There is a large literature that studies the effect of electoral competition on fiscal policy. Among other achievements, this literature has characterized conditions under which the competition for votes induces office-motivated politicians to choose Pareto optimal policies, and it has contributed to the understanding of how electoral rules determine public good provision, taxation, and the shape of the income distribution. With a few notable exceptions, the models that have guided this research are static.¹ A number of important questions, therefore, remain open. Under what conditions is electoral competition sufficient to generate efficient policies even in dynamic environments? When these conditions are not satisfied, what types of distortions characterize political choices and how do they depend on the electoral rule? To what extent can the insights developed in static environments be applied in dynamic contexts as well?

In this paper, we present a dynamic theory of elections to study these questions. The basic framework is a natural extension of the standard probabilistic voting model

¹We discuss the literature in greater detail in the next section.
to an infinite horizon environment. In each period, two parties choose electoral platforms to maximize the expected number of elected representatives. The electoral platform includes public expenditure, redistributive transfers, the tax rate, and the level of public debt. Voters cast their votes after seeing the platforms and elect representatives according to a majoritarian winner take all system. The level of debt, by affecting the budget constraint in future periods, creates a strategic linkage between electoral cycles. We characterize the Markov equilibrium of this game when public debt is the state variable, and study how Pareto efficiency depends on the electoral rule and the underlying fundamentals of the economy.

To see why it is important to take a dynamic perspective when studying elections, consider the issue of Pareto efficiency. In static models, Pareto efficiency is achieved because the competition for votes induces the parties to choose policies that maximize the utility of swing voters: the electoral outcome, therefore, can always be rationalized as maximizing a weighted sum of the citizens’ utilities, where the weights depend on the ex ante distribution of citizens’ preferences (see, for example, Coughlin and Nitzan 1981 and Lindbeck and Weibull 1987). A similar phenomenon occurs in a dynamic model. Still, as we show in the analysis below, in a dynamic model, electoral competition typically induces a Pareto inefficient allocation. In a Pareto efficient allocation, policies are chosen so that the marginal cost of public funds at time $t$, a key measure of the inefficiency of taxation, is equalized to the corresponding expected value at $t + 1$. In a political equilibrium, instead, electoral competition induces the marginal cost of public funds to be systematically smaller than the corresponding expected value at $t + 1$. This distortion limits the ability of society to store resources and self-insure against shocks to the economy: this induces steady state policies that are inefficiently volatile.

The intuition for why electoral competition induces inefficiently volatile policies is as follows. As in static models, to win an electoral district, the parties identify the municipalities that are most contestable and choose policies that maximize the expected value functions of their citizens, underweighting the welfare of the citizens of the other municipalities. The favored municipalities, however, are unlikely to remain in this condition in the future: as preferences change over time, other municipalities will be more likely to be targeted by the parties. The municipalities that are targeted, therefore, realize that they can appropriate a larger fraction of resources in the present than they expect in any period in the future. This makes the preferences of their citizens time inconsistent. Since in every period, parties choose policies that pander to time inconsistent districts, policies tend to be time inconsistent.

The strength with which electoral competition pushes toward inefficient policies depends on the electoral rule. The dynamic theory of elections described above, therefore, provides new insights on how electoral rules shape fiscal policy that could not be grasped in static models. To study this issue, we first consider a world in which municipalities are ex ante symmetric: i.e., they all have the same ex ante distribution of citizens’ preferences and in each of them, parties have the same ex ante likelihood of victory. In

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2Here and in the reminder of the paper, we assume that each electoral district comprises one or more municipalities.
this case, the analysis suggests that the smaller the electoral district is (in terms of the number of municipalities it comprises), the smaller the dynamic distortion is. Small districts reduce the parties’ freedom to choose municipalities to target with pork barrel transfers, so they reduce time inconsistency. Indeed, we show that even in the presence of preference shocks, policies can be Pareto efficient if electoral districts are sufficiently small.

When municipalities are ex ante heterogeneous, the choice of the optimal size of the electoral district is more complicated because an additional factor—which was previously pointed out in the static literature—becomes important. To study this point, we consider a simple case in which municipalities can be divided into three categories: neutrals, in which both parties have the same probability of winning; rightists, in which the right wing party has a large advantage; and leftists, in which the left wing party has a symmetric advantage. As first pointed out by Persson and Tabellini (1999), when electoral districts are small, the parties are incentivized to always ignore all municipalities except the neutrals: in the “extremist” municipalities, the probability of winning a majority is either 0 or 1, so the marginal value of an additional vote is 0. With large districts, in contrast, voters in all municipalities are valuable at the margin to the parties, since they likely all contribute to the total vote count. This effect, combined with the dynamic effect described above, creates a trade-off: the optimal size of the electoral district depends on the size of the neutrals, as well as the expected distribution of the preference shocks and other factors that determine the dynamic inefficiency. Our theory therefore leads to the novel prediction that countries that have homogeneous constituencies should find it optimal to choose a majoritarian system with small districts. Countries with heterogeneous constituencies have a stronger incentive to choose larger districts. The fact that small districts are optimal with homogeneous preferences, and the existence of trade-offs between small and large districts with heterogeneous preferences are new results that cannot be anticipated from static environments since they depend on the dynamic properties of the electoral systems.

The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 1.1 explains how our paper relates to prior research on electoral rules and fiscal policy. Section 2 outlines the model, Section 3 establishes a benchmark by characterizing the Pareto optimal allocations. Sections 4 and 5 characterize the political equilibrium under the assumption that electoral districts are symmetric and no party has an electoral advantage in any district. In these sections, we discuss how the dynamic inefficiency changes with the size of the electoral college. In Section 6, we consider the case in which districts are heterogeneous with respect to the ex ante preference for the parties. For this environment, we compare the equilibrium in a majoritarian system with one large electoral district to the equilibrium in a majoritarian system with many small districts. Section 7 concludes. The proofs that are omitted in the text are presented in the Appendix.

1.1 Related literature

This paper attempts to bring together two literatures in political economy: the literature on probabilistic voting, which has mostly focused attention on static environments, and
the literature on dynamic political distortions, which has considered electoral systems only in the context of simple economic environments.

With respect to the first literature, Pareto efficiency of the electoral outcome in static probabilistic models has been established by Ledyard (1984), Coughlin and Nitzan (1981), Coughlin (1982), and Lindbeck and Weibull (1987). The basic model of electoral competition that we adopt in this paper is taken from a special version of Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) that was proposed by Persson and Tabellini (1999). Persson and Tabellini (1999) are one of the first to study the effects of electoral rules on fiscal policy. An empirical test of these theories is presented by Stromberg (2008).

With respect to the second literature, Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina and Tabellini (1990) presented the first political economy theories of dynamic fiscal policy. These papers either do not formally model the election or focus on simple unidimensional policy spaces and do not study the effect of alternative electoral rules. They also limit the analysis to two-period environments, and so cannot compare the steady state effects of the equilibria. In our paper, we adopt a probabilistic voting model to extend the analysis of these papers to a more sophisticated policy space and electoral environments (more suitable to the study of fiscal policy), and we adopt a more general dynamic environment to analyze the long-term effects of voting rules.

The effect of alternative electoral rules has been studied by Lizzeri (1999) in a two-period model. This paper studies a purely redistributive environment with lump sum taxation: policies, therefore, do not affect welfare (that is the main focus of the comparison of electoral rules in our work). A number of recent papers have studied probabilistic voting models in macroeconomic models. These papers, however, have assumed that voters’ preferences remain constant over time, so they arrive at the conclusion that policies solve a “virtual planning problem,” that is, they maximize a weighted sum of the agents’ lifetime utilities. Our results allow us to clarify the special conditions under which these results hold. None of these models studies political equilibria under alternative voting rules.

A recent literature has studied Markov equilibria in sophisticated political economy models in which decisions are not taken in elections. All the papers in this literature

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3See Section 7.5 in Austen-Smith and Banks (2005) and Coughlin (2011) for discussions of these results.
4A contemporaneous study of voting rules on fiscal policy is Lizzeri and Persico (2001). Rather than adopting a probabilistic voting framework, Lizzeri and Persico consider a simpler policy environment (in which the public good is indivisible) and characterize the mixed strategy equilibrium. In addition to this, an important literature in political science has studied a wide range of electoral rules, focusing on static settings with no Pareto inefficiencies: a purely distributive environment (Myerson 1993, 1999) or an abstract one-dimensional policy space (Cox 1987, Morelli 2004).
5See Azzimonti (2011), Bachmann and Bai (2010), and Sleet and Yeltekin (2008), among others.
6Different types of models of elections in infinite horizons with moral hazard, adverse selection, or both are presented by Ferejohn (1986), Banks and Sundaram (1993), Duggan (2000), Bernhardt et al. (2004), Schwabe (2009), and Camara (2012), among others. In these, model policy making periods are not strategically linked by a state variable that affects the set of feasible policies as public debt. None of these papers, moreover, studies alternative voting rules.
focus on only one political system and do not study how fiscal policy varies across alternative electoral rules.

2. The model

2.1 The economy

A continuum of infinitely lived citizens reside in \( n \) identical municipalities indexed by \( i = 1, \ldots, n \), with \( n \) odd. The size of the population in each municipality is normalized to be 1. There are three goods: a public good \( g \), consumption \( c \), and labor \( l \). The consumption good is produced from labor according to the technology \( c = wl \) and the public good can be produced from the consumption good according to the technology \( g = c \). Each citizen’s per period utility function is

\[
c + Ag^\alpha - \frac{l(1+1/\varepsilon)}{1+\varepsilon},
\]

where \( \alpha \in (0, 1) \), \( \varepsilon > 0 \) is a measure of the elasticity of labor supply, and \( A \) is a measure of the relative importance of the public good \( g \) with respect to consumption and leisure. Citizens discount future per period utilities at rate \( \delta \). The parameter \( A \) may change across periods in a random way, capturing changes in preferences. We assume \( A \) is a realization from an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) process. Specifically, in each period, \( A \) is the realization of a random variable with range \( [A, \overline{A}] \) (where \( 0 < A < \overline{A} \)) and cumulative distribution function \( G(A) \). The function \( G \) is continuously differentiable and its associated density is bounded uniformly below by some positive constant \( \xi > 0 \), so that for any pair of realizations such that \( A < A' \), the difference \( G(A') - G(A) \) is at least as large as \( \xi (A' - A) \).

Public policies are chosen by an elected government. The way the election is conducted is presented in the next two sections; here we focus on the description of the policy space. The government can raise revenues in two ways: via a proportional tax on labor income and via borrowing in the capital market. Borrowing takes the form of issuing one-period bonds with interest rate \( \rho \). Thus, if the government borrows an amount \( b \) in period \( t \), it must repay \( b(1+\rho) \) in period \( t+1 \). Public revenues can be used to finance the provision of the public good \( g \), but they can also be diverted to finance targeted municipality-specific transfers \( s = (s_1, \ldots, s_n) \), which are interpreted as (nondistortionary) pork-barrel spending. The legislature can also hold bonds if it so chooses, so that \( b \) can be negative. A public policy is, therefore, described by an \( n+3 \)-tuple \((r, g, x, s_1, \ldots, s_n)\), where \( r \) is the proposed income tax rate, \( g \) is the proposed amount of the public good provided, \( x \) is the proposed level of public debt, and \( s_i \) is the proposed transfer to municipality \( i \)’s residents.

There are competitive markets for the consumption good, labor, and the public good. The consumption good is the numeraire and its price is set to 1. The assumptions on technology imply that the competitive equilibrium price of the public good is 1 and the wage rate is \( w \). Moreover, the quasilinear utility specification implies that the market interest rate is \( \rho = 1/\delta - 1 \). At this interest rate, citizens are indifferent to their
allocations of consumption across time: thus, their welfare is equal to what they would obtain if they simply consumed their net earnings each period. The consumer chooses $c$ and $l$ to maximize her utility given the private budget constraint $c = (1 - r)wl$, taking $(r, g, x, s_1, \ldots, s_n)$ and $\rho$ as given. At net wage rate $(1 - r)w$, each citizen works an amount $l^*((1 - r)w) = (\varepsilon(1 - r)w)^\varepsilon$ each period, so that $\varepsilon$ is the elasticity of labor supply. The associated per period indirect utility function is given by

$$u(r, g; A) = (1 - r)^{\varepsilon + 1} \frac{\varepsilon w^{\varepsilon + 1}}{1 + \varepsilon} + Ag^\varepsilon.$$

The public policy must satisfy the budget constraint that requires that revenues are sufficient to cover expenditures. The revenues raised under the proposal are $x + R(r)$, where $R(r) = nrw(l^*((1 - r)w)) = nrw(\varepsilon w(1 - r))^\varepsilon$ is the tax revenue function. Letting $B(r, g, x; b) = x + R(r) - g - (1 + \rho)b$ denote the difference between revenues and spending on public goods and debt repayment, the budget constraint requires that

$$B(r, g, x; b) \geq \sum_j s_j. \quad (1)$$

The set of constraints is completed by the nonnegativity constraints: $s_j \geq 0$ for each municipality $j$ (which rules out financing public spending via municipality-specific lump-sum taxes).

There are limits on both the amount the government can borrow and the amount of bonds it can hold; thus, $x \in [\bar{x}, \overline{x}]$, where $\overline{x}$ is the maximum amount that the government can borrow and $-\bar{x} > 0$ is the maximum amount of bonds that it can hold. The limit on borrowing is determined by the unwillingness of borrowers to hold government bonds that they know will not be repaid. If the government were borrowing an amount $x$ such that the interest payments exceeded the maximum possible tax revenues (i.e., $\rho x > \max R(r)$), then it would be unable to repay the debt even if it provided no public goods or pork. Thus, the maximum level of debt cannot exceed $\max R(r)/\rho$. For technical reasons, it is convenient to assume that $\overline{x}$ is close to $\max R(r)/\rho$, but strictly smaller. The limit on the amount of bonds that the government can hold is determined constitutionally. Without loss of generality, we assume that the government is allowed to hold no more than the amount of bonds that would allow it to finance the Samuelson level of the public good from interest earnings. Thus, $\bar{x} = -gs(\overline{A})/\rho$, where $gs(A)$ is the level of the public good that satisfies the Samuelson rule when the value of the public good is $A$.

2.2 A model of electoral politics

In every period, the ruling government is chosen by a national election. Electoral competition is modelled as a probabilistic voting game in a way similar to Persson and Tabellini (1999). Two parties, $L$ and $R$, run for office. Before the election,

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8The Samuelson rule requires that the sum of marginal benefits of the public good be equal to the marginal cost, which implies that $gs(A)$ satisfies the first-order condition that $naAg^{a-1} = 1$. 

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both parties simultaneously and non-cooperatively commit to policy platforms \( p^i = (r^i, g^i, x^i, s^i_1, \ldots, s^i_n), \ i = L, R, \) that satisfy the budget constraint (1). Voters are subdivided in \( m \leq n \) electoral districts, each comprising \( n/m \) municipalities. One representative is elected in each district by majority rule and the policy platform of the party with the largest number of representatives is chosen. A key difference with the previous literature is that the election is embedded in a dynamic game. Because the level of debt affects the budget constraint in future periods, it creates a strategic linkage between electoral cycles.

The per-period utility of voter \( \nu \) in municipality \( j \) when party \( i \) is elected depends on the tax rate \( r^i \), the level of the public good \( g^i \), the transfer \( s^i_j \) received in municipality \( j \), and the identity of party \( i \):

\[
\nu(r^i, g^i; A) + s^i_j + e^{\nu i},
\]

where \( e^{\nu i} \) is a preference shock that affects voter \( \nu \). We assume that \( e^{\nu R} = (\tilde{\vartheta}^\nu + \tilde{\varphi}^G)/2 \) and \( e^{\nu L} = -(\tilde{\vartheta}^\nu + \tilde{\varphi}^G)/2 \). The term \( \tilde{\vartheta}^\nu \) is individual ideology of voter \( \nu \); the term \( \tilde{\varphi}^G \) represents the general popularity of party \( R \) in period \( i \) and is common to all citizens in all municipalities. Both \( \tilde{\vartheta}^\nu \) and \( \tilde{\varphi}^G \) are independent random variables with respective densities \( \tilde{\varphi}(\cdot) \) and \( \tilde{\varphi}^G(\cdot) \). We assume that \( \tilde{\varphi}^G \) is a random variable with uniform distribution on \([-1/(2\tilde{\varphi}^G), 1/(2\tilde{\varphi}^G)]\), while \( \tilde{\vartheta}^\nu \) are random variables with uniform distributions on \([-1/(2\tilde{\vartheta}^\nu), 1/(2\tilde{\vartheta}^\nu)]\). It should be noted that the distribution of the idiosyncratic shock may depend on the municipality \( (j \ in \ this \ example) \) where the citizen resides. In the following discussion, it is useful to define \( e^\nu = e^{\nu R} - e^{\nu L} = \tilde{\vartheta}^\nu + \tilde{\varphi}^G \) to be the net preference shock of citizen \( \nu \) for party \( R \).

The variance of the distribution of the ideological components is described by the vector of parameters \( \theta = (\theta^G, (\theta^i)_i) \). We assume that \( \theta \) is known by all players at the beginning of every period (\( \theta \) may, however, change over time), and \( \theta^G \) and each \( \theta^i \) are independent random variables with respective densities \( \tilde{\varphi}(\cdot) \) and \( \tilde{\varphi}_i(\cdot) \). We assume that \( \tilde{\varphi}(\cdot) \) and \( \tilde{\varphi}^G(\cdot) \) have full support on a finite set with respective minimal and maximal elements \( \theta^G, \theta^G \) and \( \theta, \theta^i \). For future reference, we denote a shock to the economy by \( z = (A, \theta) \) and the distribution of \( \theta \) by \( \varphi(\theta) = \tilde{\varphi}^G(\theta^G) \prod_i \tilde{\varphi}(\theta^i) \).

In what follows, we focus on symmetric Markov equilibria in which strategies depend only on \( z \) and \( b \). In this case, the expected value of choosing a level \( b \) of debt can be represented as a function \( v \) with \( v(b) = E[v(b; z)], \) where \( v(b; z) \) is the value function given the state \( z \) and the expectation is taken with respect to \( z \).

The expected continuation value of a voter in municipality \( j \) for a policy \( p^i = (r^i, g^i, x^i, s^i_1, \ldots, s^i_n) \) in a state \( A \) net of the preference shock is \( W^j(p^i; v, A) = u(r^i, g^i; A) + s^i_j + \delta v(x^i) \). Because there are only two candidates, voters find it optimal to vote for the candidate who promises the highest expected continuation value. Voter \( \nu \) in municipality \( j \) votes for party \( L \) if and only if

\[
W^j(p_L; v, A) \geq W^j(p_R; v, A) + e^\nu. \tag{2}
\]

The fraction of votes received by party \( L \) in municipality \( j \) when political platforms are \( p_L \) and \( p_R \) is easily computed. Given (2), the voter in municipality \( j \) who is indifferent
between $L$ and $R$ is characterized by $\theta^*_j(p_L, p_R; \tilde{\theta}^G) = W^j(p_L; v, A) - W^j(p_R; v, A) - \tilde{\theta}^G$; party $L$ receives the votes of all voters $\nu$ with $\tilde{\theta}^\nu \leq \theta^*_j(p_L, p_R; \tilde{\theta}^G)$. Given $\theta^j$ and $\tilde{\theta}^G$, as illustrated in Figure 1, the fraction of votes received by $L$ when policy platforms are $(p_L, p_R)$ in municipality $j$ is

$$\frac{1}{2} + \theta^j[W^j(p_L; v, A) - W^j(p_R; v, A) - \tilde{\theta}^G].$$

(3)

The votes received by party $R$ are 1 minus (3). For simplicity, we assume that for all platforms $(p_L, p_R)$, there is sufficient uncertainty about the citizens’ preferences that both the fraction of votes received by a party and the probability that a party receives more than 50% of the votes are interior in $(0, 1)$. It can be shown that the absolute value $|W^j(p_L; v, A) - W^j(p_R; v, A)|$ is bounded above by a constant $\Delta W^*$ (explicitly defined in the Appendix). As we show in the Appendix, a sufficient condition for interior probabilities is that $\tilde{\theta}$ and $\tilde{\theta}^G$ are sufficiently small.

**Assumption 1.** We assume $1/(2\tilde{\theta}) > \Delta W^* + 1/(2\tilde{\theta}^G)$ and $1/(2\tilde{\theta}^G) > \Delta W^*$.

The first condition guarantees that no policy platform can guarantee a party 100% of the votes in a municipality. The second condition guarantees that there is always a positive probability that each party receives a vote share of at least 50% in a municipality. Assuming $1/(2\tilde{\theta})$ and $1/(2\tilde{\theta}^G)$ sufficiently large implies that the distribution of the shocks has sufficiently high variance that the outcome is sometimes driven by the shocks regardless of the policies.

### 2.3 Discussion

To what extent does the model capture important features of real world elections? Probabilistic voting has been extensively studied both theoretically and empirically in static models.\(^9\) Our model is an extension of this class of models that introduces public debt

\(^9\)Stromberg (2008) uses a probabilistic voting model to study presidential races in the United States, and shows that the model does a remarkable job in explaining candidates’ behavior.
and extends the time horizon to multiple periods. To make the dynamic extension of the model tractable, we have made a number of assumptions. In the following discourse, we discuss some of these assumptions.

**Changing preferences** A key assumption is that voters’ preferences for parties change stochastically over time. The idea behind this assumption is that the emergence of new issues at either the national or the local level (a diplomatic crisis, emergence of a new technology with social implications, closure of a local factory, environmental problems, etc.) may shift the voters’ party identification and partisanship. Are these changes in partisanship a first-order effect, and do they matter for elections and parties’ strategies? There is a large literature in political science that studies this issue.10 As Abramowitz and Saunders (1998) put it, “political scientists have long recognized that party identification has a dynamic component. Major realignments, or shifts in the partisanship orientation of the electorate, have occurred periodically throughout American history.” The more recent literature on “macropartisanship” has shown that changes in voters’ orientation toward parties are not only long-term phenomena, but have a systematic and recurrent nature.11 Does the model capture these changes? The key parameters that describe the distribution of preferences for parties in the model are \( \theta^i \) (at the local level) and \( \theta^G \) (at the national level): they describe the dispersion of partisanship, that is, the preferences for the right- or left-wing party. These variables seem to capture (at least to a first approximation) the phenomena described in the political science literature. Periods with low partisanship correspond to periods with relatively high \( \theta^i \) and \( \theta^G \), in which shocks are concentrated around zero (in \([-1/(2\theta^i), 1/(2\theta^i)]\) and \([-1/(2\theta^G), 1/(2\theta^G)]\)) and voters care little about party labels. Periods of high partisanship correspond to periods with low \( \theta^i \) and \( \theta^G \), in which a larger mass of the population has strong party preferences (since the extremes \( \pm 1/(2\theta^i) \) and \( \pm 1/(2\theta^G) \) have larger absolute values).12

**Symmetric and serially uncorrelated preference shocks** In the model, parties are ex ante symmetric because the shocks \( \tilde{\theta}^i \) and \( \tilde{\theta}^G \) have mean zero; the shocks, moreover, are serially uncorrelated: the fact that a party has a favorable realization at time \( t \) does not imply that it will continue to be favored. These assumptions keep the analysis tractable. If we had persistence, then the players’ equilibrium strategies would depend on the past

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10 Changes in voters’ preferences have been studied both at the micro level, i.e., following individual voters (Jackson 1975, Franklyn and Jackson 1983), and at the aggregate level (MacKuen et al. 1989, Allsop and Weisberg 1988).

11 As MacKuen et al. (1989) say, changes in party affiliation “appear to be a midrange phenomenon, one that appears and disappears in a time frame of a year or two rather than a month or two or alternatively, a decade or two. The movements within this stable alignment period appear substantial, both in magnitude and duration.”

12 The political science literature has also identified some of the sources for these fluctuations in party attitudes. They may depend on unforeseen events like wars or economic crises (Ladd and Hadley 1978, Beck and Sorauf 1992, for example), emergence of new political issues (Ladd and Hadley 1978, Carmines and Stimson 1989), geographic mobility and cohort replacement (Converse 1976), and mobilization of previously disenfranchised voters (Carmines and Stimson 1989).
realizations of $\tilde{\theta}^j$ and $\tilde{\theta}^G$, and we also would not be able to focus on symmetric equilibria, since parties would have asymmetric expectations about the future.\footnote{In a previous version of this paper\cite{Battaglini2009}, the shocks $A$, $\theta^i$, and $\theta^G$ were assumed to be positively correlated over time.}

**Quasilinear preferences** We are assuming quasilinear preferences that are linear in pork transfers. This helps in two ways. With quasilinear preferences, the equilibrium interest rate is only a function of $\delta$ because the marginal utility of consumption is constant. Without quasilinearity, the interest rate would depend on consumption, and, hence, on current and expected fiscal policy.\footnote{An analysis of the case with more general nonlinear utility functions (for a simpler political decision process) is presented in Battaglini and Barseghyan\cite{BattagliniBarseghyan2012}.} Quasilinearity also helps us to characterize how the politicians choose to distribute pork; we discuss this aspect in Section 4.1.

**Uniform distribution of the preference shocks and Assumption 1** As in static models, the assumption of a uniform distribution of the shocks guarantees that the parties' objective functions are concave with respect to the policy variables and, therefore, it is instrumental in obtaining a pure strategy equilibrium.\footnote{See Lindbeck and Weibull\cite{LindbeckWeibull1987} and Persson and Tabellini\cite{PerssonTabellini1999} for a discussion of this aspect in static models.} Assumption 1 is used to avoid dealing with corner solutions in which a party wins all the votes in a municipality. A limitation of the assumption is that it implies that some voters would not change their vote for any policy platforms, and that the preferences of a significant fraction of voters have a strong bias for one party or the other. This strong assumption is made only to make the model tractable.\footnote{It is, however, unclear the extent to which this assumption is unrealistic. First, as noted above, it is natural to rule out situations in which a candidate obtains 100% of the votes: it seems realistic to assume that shocks have sufficiently high variance to rule this out. Second, it does not seem implausible to assume that a large fraction of voters have strong party biases and vote on that basis.} Assumption 1 would be unnecessary with an unbounded distribution of shocks, for example, with a normal distribution. Assuming an unbounded distribution of the shocks that satisfies the condition for existence by Lindbeck and Weibull\cite{LindbeckWeibull1987}, however, would likely make the analysis intractable without adding very much to the basic results of the paper.

**Unobservable ($\tilde{\theta}^j$) and $\tilde{\theta}^G$** In line with the static literature on probabilistic voting, we assume that parties do not know ($\tilde{\theta}^j$) and $\tilde{\theta}^G$. As in the static version of the model, lack of knowledge of these variables is important so as to obtain an equilibrium in pure strategies.

### 3. The normative benchmark

Before turning to the analysis of the political equilibrium, it is useful to discuss the Pareto efficient solution that would be chosen by a benevolent government.\footnote{A similar discussion of the benevolent planner's case is presented in Aiyagari et al.\cite{Aiyagari2002} and Battaglini and Coate\cite{BattagliniCoate2008}. These papers, however, assume a utilitarian planner. In what follows, we will characterize the entire Pareto efficient solution. This will prove useful in Section 6 when we discuss the equilibrium with heterogeneous municipalities.} In

a Pareto efficient allocation, policies are chosen to maximize a weighted sum of the citizens’ utilities. The government’s problem and the corresponding equilibrium can be formulated recursively. Let \( v_i^e(b; A) \) denote the expected value function of a citizen of municipality \( i \) in a state in which the current level of public debt is \( b \) and the preference parameter is \( A \). The government chooses a policy \( (r, g, x, s_1, \ldots, s_n) \) to solve

\[
\max_{(r,g,x,s)} \sum_i \mu_i [u(r, g; A) + s_i + \delta v_i^e(x; A')] \\
\text{s.t.} \quad s_i \geq 0 \quad \text{for all } i, \quad \sum_i s_i \leq B(r, g, x; b), \quad \text{and } x \in [x, \bar{x}],
\]

where \( \mu_i \geq 0 \) is the weight associated with municipality \( i \) (we assume without loss of generality that \( \sum_i \mu_i = 1 \) and the expectation is taken with respect to \( A' \). Given the government choice \( (r^e(b; A), g^e(b; A), x^e(b; A), (s_i^e(b; A))_{i=1}^n) \), the value function of a municipality is immediately defined by

\[
v_i^e(b; A) = u(r^e(b; A), g^e(b; A); A) + s_i^e(b; A) + \delta E v_i^e(x^e(b; A); A').
\]

A Pareto efficient solution consists of a collection of policy functions \( (r^e(b; A), g^e(b; A), x^e(b; A), (s_i^e(b; A))_{i=1}^n) \) and value functions \( (v_i^e(b; A))_{i=1}^n \) such that \( (r^e(b; A), g^e(b; A), x^e(b; A), (s_i^e(b; A))_{i=1}^n) \) solve (4) for some choice of weights \( \mu \), given \( (v_i^e(b; A))_{i=1}^n \), and, for any \( i \), \( v_i^e(b; A) \) satisfies (5) given \( (r^e(b; A), g^e(b; A), x^e(b; A), (s_i^e(b; A))_{i=1}^n) \).

Using standard methods, one can show that for any \( \mu \), a Pareto efficient solution is associated with a unique well behaved welfare function \( V(b) = \sum_i \mu_i v_i^e(b; A') \). The welfare function is well behaved in the sense that it is continuous, concave, and differentiable in \( b \). The planner’s solution is characterized by two sets of conditions. First, the planner equalizes the marginal benefit of resources across alternative uses. The first-order conditions with respect to \( g, r \), and \( s_i \) imply

\[
\alpha Ag^e(b; A)^{a-1} = \frac{1}{n} \frac{1 - r^e(b; A)}{1 - r^e(b; A)(1 + \epsilon)} \geq \mu^* \quad \text{with equality if } B(r, g, x; b) > 0,
\]

where \( \mu^* = \max_i \mu_i \). The first-order condition with respect to \( x \) implies

\[
\frac{1}{n} \frac{1 - r^e(b; A)}{1 - r^e(b; A)(1 + \epsilon)} \geq -\delta \sum_i \mu_i [v_i^e]’(x) \quad (= \text{if } x^e(b; A) < \bar{x}).
\]

To interpret these conditions, note that the middle term in (6) is the marginal cost of public funds. The marginal cost of public funds is the compensating variation for a marginal increase in tax revenues and, therefore, measures the social cost of taxation. In our economy, it is simply equal to \( (1 - r)/[1 - r(1 + \epsilon)] \geq 1 \) (strict if \( r > 0 \), independently on how the tax rate is chosen). In light of this, the first equation states that the marginal benefit of one extra dollar spent on the public good should be equal to the marginal cost of financing it with discretionary taxation. The second condition states that either transfers are zero (that is, if \( B(r, g, x; b) = 0 \)) or the marginal social benefit to the municipalities that receive them should equal the marginal cost of financing them.
with taxes: the planner would make transfers only to the municipalities with the highest social weight, so that the marginal social benefit is \( \mu^* \). Condition (7) requires that the marginal cost of raising a dollar with taxes is equal to the expected marginal cost of issuing debt (if feasible, that is, if \( x < \bar{x} \)).

Second, the planner equalizes the opportunity cost of resources over time:\(^{18}\)

\[
\frac{1 - r^\circ(b; A)}{1 - r^\circ(b; A)(1 + \epsilon)} \geq E \left[ \frac{1 - r^\circ(x^\circ(b; A); A')}{1 - r^\circ(x^\circ(b; A); A')(1 + \epsilon)} \right] \quad (= \text{if } x^\circ(b; A) < \bar{x}). \tag{8}
\]

The left-hand side of (8) is the marginal cost of public funds in state \( (b, A) \), and the right-hand side is the expected marginal cost of public funds in the following period when the debt is \( x^\circ(b; A) \). Intuitively, if the marginal cost of public funds at \( t \) exceeded the corresponding expected level at \( t + 1 \) and \( x^\circ(b; A) < \bar{x} \), then the planner would find it optimal to reduce taxes and increase debt, thus reducing the average intertemporal cost of taxation.

Together (6), (7), and (8) determine the short- and long-run behavior of the Pareto efficient allocation. Since the marginal cost of public funds is convex in \( r \), the planner wants to smooth taxes over time. This implies saving in periods of low demand and issuing debt in periods of high demand. Moreover, straightforward analysis of (4) reveals the following result.

**Result 1.** Optimal tax and debt increase in \( b \), while the optimal amount of the public good falls in \( b \) and increases in \( A \).

The long-run behavior of equilibrium policies follows from (8). Since the marginal cost of public funds is a convex function of the tax rate, (8) implies that the tax rate is a supermartingale and, therefore, converges to a constant with probability 1.

**Proposition 1.** A benevolent equilibrium converges to a steady state in which the tax rate and the public good level are

\[
r_{\mu^*} = \frac{n\mu^* - 1}{n\mu^*(1 + \epsilon) - 1} \quad \text{and} \quad g_{\mu^*}(A) = \left( \frac{\alpha A}{\mu^*} \right)^{1/(1-\alpha)},
\]

and debt is at most \( x_{\mu^*} \), where \( x_{\mu^*} \) is defined by \( B(r_{\mu^*}, g_{\mu^*}(A), x_{\mu^*}; x_{\mu^*}) = 0 \). Moreover, any policy \( r_{\mu^*}, g_{\mu^*}(A), x \text{ with } x \in [\underline{x}, x_{\mu^*}] \) is a steady state.

The intuition for **Proposition 1** is as follows. To keep the social cost of taxation constant, the planner accumulates resources when \( A \) is low to self-insure against future shocks. This leads to a gradual accumulation of resources. In the steady state, the accumulated resources are sufficiently high that the government can provide transfers after any shock. In this case, (6) holds as equality, implying that the tax rate is \( r_{\mu^*} \); condition (6), moreover, implies that the public good provision is \( g_{\mu^*}(A) \). These policies are possible only if \( B(r_{\mu^*}, g_{\mu^*}(A), x_{\mu^*}; b) \geq 0 \) for any \( A \), so only if \( b \leq x_{\mu^*} \).\(^{19}\)

\(^{18}\)This condition follows from the envelope theorem and (7). Indeed, by the envelope theorem, 
\[-\delta\sum_i \mu_i [v_i^\prime(x^\circ(b, A))] \] is equal to the right-hand side of (8).

\(^{19}\)When \( b \leq x_{\mu^*} \), the government assets are higher than or equal to the amount needed to perfectly self-insure against shocks, i.e., \( x_{\mu^*} \), given the first-best level of expenditure, \( g_{\mu^*} \). Indeed, for any \( b \leq x_{\mu^*} \), taxation
4. A MAJORITARIAN ELECTIONAL SYSTEM

In the majoritarian system, there are \( m \geq 1 \) electoral districts, where \( m \) is odd. Each electoral district elects one representative to parliament. We assume \( m \leq n \), where \( n/m \) is assumed to be an integer. Electoral districts coincide with the municipalities described in the previous sections if and only if \( m = n \). When \( m < n \), each electoral district is divided into \( n/m \) municipalities. A party wins a district if and only if it receives a majority of votes in the district. As is standard in the literature on probabilistic voting, we assume parties are office seeking: they choose policy so as to maximize the expected number of their representatives elected in the parliament.\(^{20}\) When \( m = 1 \), the model can be interpreted as a “presidential” system, in which voters elect the head of the executive branch. The set of municipalities in district \( i \) is denoted \( H_i \).

4.1 Definition and existence of a political equilibrium

We focus on symmetric Markov equilibria (SME) in which voters use weakly staged undominated strategies. In these equilibria, parties find it optimal to use the same strategies when committing to policy platforms, and these strategies depend only on the payoff relevant state variables \( b, z \); voters vote for \( L \) if and only if \( (2) \) is satisfied. A SME can be described by a collection of proposal functions \( (r(b; z), g(b; z), x(b; z), s(b; z)) \) and a value function \( v(b) \). Here \( r(b; z) \) is the proposed tax rate, \( g(b; z) \) is the public good level, \( x(b; z) \) is the new level of public debt, and \( s(b; z) = (s_1(b; z), \ldots, s_n(b; z)) \) is a vector of transfers offered to the municipalities by each candidate. Associated with an equilibrium is a value function \( v \) that specifies the expected future payoff of a citizen in a period in which the debt is \( b \).

In a political equilibrium there is a reciprocal feedback between the policy proposals \( (r(b; z), g(b; z), x(b; z), s(b; z)) \) and the associated expected value function \( v(b) \). The value function \( v(b) \) is determined by the equilibrium policy proposals. A citizen’s expected value function \( v(b) \) can be determined recursively given \( (r(b; z), g(b; z), x(b; z)) \) as

\[
v(b) = E \left[ u(r(b; z'), g(b; z'), A') + \frac{B(r(b; z'), g(b; z'), x(b; z'); b)}{n} + \delta v(x(b; z')) \right], \tag{9}
\]

and public expenditures are unaffected by the level of debt: a marginal change in debt only affects monetary transfers. Because the citizens’ utilities are linear in transfers, and the equilibrium interest rate is such that \( \delta(1 + \rho) = 1 \), the government is indifferent as to when resources that are not needed for self-insurance \( (x_t - b) \) are consumed: this is the reason why multiple steady states of debt are possible.

\(^{20}\)In most parliamentary systems parties desire to maximize the expected number of representatives, since their power in the legislature depends on it even when they are in the minority (in terms of their ability to sustain a filibuster or in terms of the reimbursements they receive, and in terms of providing jobs to local party leaders). With the exception of the case in which \( m = 1 \), assuming that parties choose policy to maximize the expected number of their representatives is not the same as assuming that they maximize the probability of winning a majority of representatives. An analysis of this case is presented in Battaglini (2009). Assuming the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium, the analysis in this case is similar to the analysis presented here. Even in static versions of the model, however, the conditions for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium are more demanding.
where the expectation is taken with respect to \( z' \). Intuitively, citizens are all affected in the same way by the tax rate and the public good. Pork transfers are not generally distributed in uniform ways (since they depend on the realized preference shocks \( \theta \)). However, since citizens are ex ante symmetric, and parties treat them anonymously, they all receive the same amount of transfers in expectation:

\[
B(r(b; z), g(b; z), x(b; z); b)/n.
\]

For a given \( v(b) \), policies are chosen to maximize the expected number of representatives in the parliament. Recall that in electoral district \( i \) there are \( n/m \) municipalities. Municipalities are heterogeneous because they are associated with different realizations of \( \theta^j \) for \( j \in H_i \), so they react differently to \( L \)'s policies: \( L \)'s share of votes received in \( i \) is obtained by integrating over the different municipalities. Party \( L \) wins district \( i \) if

\[
\sum_{j \in H_i} \left[ \frac{1}{2} + \theta^j [W^i(p_L; v, A) - W^i(p_R; v, A) - \tilde{\theta}^G] \right] \geq \frac{1}{2} \frac{n}{m}. \tag{10}
\]

Condition (10) requires that the share of votes received in district \( i \) (the left-hand side) is at least half of the population living in district \( i, n/(2m) \). If we denote the set of municipalities that belong to the same district as \( j \) by \( H(j) \), condition (10) can be rewritten in a way that proves convenient in the analysis:

\[
\tilde{\theta}^G \leq \sum_{j \in H_i} \frac{\theta^j}{\sum_{\iota \in H(j)} \theta^\iota} [W^i(p_L; v, A) - W^i(p_R; v, A)].
\]

The larger is the utility that \( L \) promises to municipality \( j \) (i.e., \( W^i(p_L; v, A) \)), the larger is the probability that \( L \) wins the district where \( j \) is located. The sensitivity of voters in municipality \( j \) is measured by \( \theta^j \); that is, an additional dollar of transfers to municipality \( j \) by party \( L \), ceteris paribus, induces a fraction \( \theta^j \) more voters to vote for party \( L \). The pertinent issue for political parties is the sensitivity of voters in municipality \( j \) relative to the sensitivity of voters in other municipalities from the same district, \( \theta^j/\left(\sum_{\iota \in H(j)} \theta^\iota\right) \).

Given a realized \( z \), the expected number of representatives for party \( L \) is

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{m} E \left[ \text{sign} \left( \sum_{j \in H_i} \frac{\theta^j}{\sum_{\iota \in H(j)} \theta^\iota} [W^i(p_L; v, A) - W^i(p_R; v, A) - \tilde{\theta}^G] \right) \right], \tag{11}
\]

where the function \( \text{sign}(x) \) is equal to 1 if \( x \geq 0 \) and 0 otherwise.\(^{22}\) Using the distribution of \( \tilde{\theta}^G \), this expression can be written as

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{m} \left[ \frac{1}{2} + \theta^G \sum_{j \in H_i} \frac{\theta^j}{\sum_{\iota \in H(j)} \theta^\iota} [W^i(p_L; v, A) - W^i(p_R; v, A)] \right].
\]

---

\(^{21}\)Note that Assumption 1 guarantees that the probability with which a candidate wins district \( i \) is in \((0,1)\) for all \( i = 1, \ldots, m \).

\(^{22}\)The expectation is taken with respect to the random variable \( \tilde{\theta}^G \), since the parameters of the distribution \( \theta^i, \theta^\iota, \) and \( A \) are known by the candidates at this stage.
Simplifying and eliminating irrelevant constraints, party $L$’s best response problem becomes

$$\max_{(r, g, x, s)} \sum_{i=1}^{m} \sum_{j \in H_i} \frac{\theta^i_j}{\sum_{\iota \in H(j)} \theta^\iota} W^j(p_L; v, A)$$

$$\text{s.t. } B(r, g, x; b) \geq \sum_{j \in H_i} s_j, \quad x \in [x, \bar{x}].$$

(12)

Naturally, party $R$ wins an expected number of districts equal to $m$ minus (11): so it chooses $p_R = (r_R, g_R, x_R, s_R)$ to minimize the objective function of (12) given $p_L$ and the same constraints as in (12). By symmetry, $R$’s problem is, therefore, equivalent to $L$’s problem: $R$ finds it optimal to choose the same tax rate, public good level, and vector of transfers as $L$.

**Definition 1.** A political equilibrium consists of a collection of policy functions $(r(b; z), g(b; z), x(b; z), s(b; z))$ and a value function $v(b)$ such that $(r(b; z), g(b; z), x(b; z), s(b; z))$ solves (12) given $v(b)$, and $v(b)$ satisfies (9) given $(r(b; z), g(b; z), x(b; z))$.

Problem (12) can be simplified. Without loss of generality, we can assume $B(r, g, x; b) = \sum_i s_j$. At the margin, a dollar spent in pork transfers in municipality $j$ has a value $\theta^i_j / (\sum_{\iota \in H(j)} \theta^\iota)$. Party $L$ therefore chooses the municipality $i$ with the highest relative weight. Ignoring constant terms and using the fact that $\sum_{j \in H_i} [\theta^i_j / (\sum_{\iota \in H(j)} \theta^\iota)] = 1$, party $L$’s problem can be written as

$$\max_{(r, g, x)} \left[ u(r, g; A) + \max_j \left( \frac{\theta^i_j}{\sum_{\iota \in H(j)} \theta^\iota} \right) \cdot \frac{B(r, g, x; b)}{m} + \delta v(x) \right]$$

$$\text{s.t. } B(r, g, x; b) \geq 0, \quad x \in [x, \bar{x}].$$

(13)

The fact that parties find it optimal to make monetary transfers only to the municipalities that have the highest relative sensitivity follows from the assumption of quasilinear preferences that are linear in monetary transfers. If this were not the case, then all municipalities would receive some transfers, although clearly the municipalities with the highest relative sensitivities would receive more.

We can characterize the equilibrium by focusing only on (13). We say that an equilibrium is **well behaved** if $v(b)$ is continuous and weakly concave on $[x, \bar{x}]$. Without continuity and concavity of the value function, it would be hard to obtain general qualitative results on equilibrium policies. Proving the existence of well behaved equilibria is, therefore, an essential step for the study of fiscal policy. We have the following result.

**Proposition 2.** A well behaved political equilibrium exists in a majoritarian system for any $m$.

The existence problems associated with models of probabilistic voting in static environments are extensively discussed by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), who derive a sufficient condition for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. Since the electoral game
here is embedded in a stochastic game in which debt is the state variable, existence is in no way implied by these results: besides the usual complications associated with stochastic games (for which no general existence theorem is available), the existence proof is complicated by the fact that we are interested in well behaved equilibria.\textsuperscript{23} The strategy to prove Proposition 2 is as follows. Problem (13) defines a correspondence \( T(v) \) that maps a bounded, continuous, and weakly concave function to a subset of bounded, continuous, and weakly concave functions. In general, \( T(v) \) is not convex-valued. Indeed, the parties may be indifferent among a variety of policies: what complicates matters is that these policies may generate different expected utility levels for the citizens, and the convex combination of these utilities is not necessarily in \( T(v) \). The key step in the proof of Proposition 2 consists of proving that we can find a convex-valued sub-correspondence \( T^*(v) \) of \( T(v) \) that maps a compact subset of bounded, continuous, and weakly concave functions to itself. Given this, we can prove that a fixed point \( v^* \in T^*(v^*) \) exists by the Glicksberg–Fan theorem.

In what follows, we always study well behaved equilibria. Henceforth, when we refer to an equilibrium, it is to be understood that it is a well behaved, symmetric Markov equilibrium.

### 4.2 Characterization

The equilibrium can be understood by observing the objective function in (13). For a given policy platform of party \( R \), party \( L \) chooses the policy that maximizes the expected number of elected representatives. The budget constraint imposes a trade-off. Party \( L \) can offer a more attractive policy by choosing a platform with a generously high \( g \), a low tax \( r \), a low debt level \( x \), or a combination of all of these. These policies increase \( L \)'s popularity uniformly in all municipalities. Alternatively, \( L \) can be more conservative in the choice of \( g \), \( r \), and \( x \), and reserve a higher level of resources for pork transfers. Transfers are less efficient because they do not affect all municipalities. Party \( L \), however, can target them to municipalities with more swing voters. This trade-off is also present in the static versions of the voting games that have been studied by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Persson and Tabellini (1999). A key difference between these models and ours is that, in a dynamic environment, the trade-off depends on the state of the economy, and this changes endogenously over time.

Two cases are possible. First, party \( L \) finds it optimal to provide pork transfers. In this case, taxes are chosen so that the marginal benefit of making a transfer equals the marginal cost of a higher tax rate. From the first-order conditions with respect to \( r \) and \( g \), the optimal tax \( r_m(\theta) \) and level of public expenditure \( g_m(A, \theta) \) are

\[
\frac{1}{n} \left[ \frac{1 - r_m(\theta)}{1 - r_m(\theta)(1 + \varepsilon)} \right] = \frac{1}{m} \max_j \sum_{i \in H(j)} \theta^i = \alpha A g_m(A, \theta)^{\alpha - 1}.
\]

(14)

To interpret this condition, note that the first expression is the marginal cost of public funds, and the last one is the marginal benefit of the public good: both must equal the political benefit of making a pork transfer, as measured by \((\theta^i / (\sum_{i \in H(j)} \theta^i))/m\).

\textsuperscript{23}Note, moreover, that the electoral game described above is not a zero sum game. The voters’ choices depend on their expectations of future policies, as incorporated in their expected value functions.
Similarly, debt \( x_m(\theta) \) is chosen so that
\[
x_m(\theta) \in \arg\max_{x \in [\underline{x}, \overline{x}]} \left\{ \frac{1}{m} \cdot \max_j \left( \frac{\theta_j}{\sum_{i \in H(j)} \theta_i} \right) \cdot x + \delta v(x) \right\}.
\] (15)

The marginal benefit of debt is the political benefit of making a pork transfer; the marginal cost is given by the change in the expected value function \( v(x) \).\(^{24}\)

In this case, as can be seen from (14) and (15), the policies \( (r_m(\theta), g_m(A, \theta), x_m(\theta)) \) are independent of the level of debt. This follows from the fact that at the margin, resources are used for pork transfers and the marginal benefit of pork is independent of \( b \).

Obviously, the policies depend on the preference parameters, \( \theta \) and \( A \).

The second case is when party \( L \) finds it optimal to have no transfers. In this case, \( B(r, g, x; b) = \frac{n}{\underline{x} - \overline{x}} \sum_i x_i = 0 \). It follows that

\[
\max_j \left[ \frac{\theta_j}{\sum_{i \in H(j)} \theta_i} \right] B(r, g, x; b) = \frac{1}{n} B(r, g, x; b)
\]

and both are zero. It is as if the policies in state \( b, z \) are chosen to maximize

\[
\max_{(r, g, x)} \left[ u(r, g; A) + \frac{1}{n} B(r, g, x; b) + \delta v(x) \right]
\]

s.t. \( B(r, g, x; b) \geq 0 \) and \( x \in [\underline{x}, \overline{x}] \). (16)

The solution of (16), \( r(b; A), x(b; A), \) and \( g(b; A) \), depends only on \( b \) and on \( A \): since pork transfers are zero, all agents are treated equally and their preferences for the parties are irrelevant.

The first case is clearly possible whenever the policies defined by (14) and (15) are feasible, so

\[
B(r_m(\theta), g_m(A, \theta), x_m(\theta); b) \geq 0.
\] (17)

Since \( g_m(A, \theta) \) is increasing in \( A \) and since \( B(r_m(\theta), g_m(A, \theta), x_m(\theta); b) \) is decreasing in \( g \), there must be an \( A_m(\theta, b) \) such that (17) is satisfied if and only if \( A \leq A_m(\theta, b) \). We can draw the following conclusion.

**Proposition 3.** There is a threshold \( A_m(\theta, b) \), such that for \( A \geq A_m(\theta, b) \), equilibrium policies \( r(b; z), x(b; z), \) and \( g(b; z) \) are equal to the solution of (16), \( r(b; A), x(b; A), \) and \( g(b; A) \), and expected pork transfers are zero. For \( A < A_m(\theta, b) \), policies \( r(b; z), x(b; z), \) and \( g(b; z) \) are equal to \( r_m(\theta), x_m(\theta), \) and \( g_m(A, \theta), uniquely defined by (14) and (15), \) and expected pork transfers are \( B(r_m(\theta), x_m(\theta), g_m(A, \theta); b)/n > 0. \)

**Proposition 3** provides a clear description of how parties choose policies, and of the resulting equilibrium dynamics. When \( A \leq A_m(\theta, b) \), the level of public good \( g_m(\theta) \) depends on \( A, \theta \), and the specific electoral rule (as measured by \( m \)), but not on \( b \); similarly,

\(^{24}\)As we will see in the next section, \( v(x) \) is differentiable in \( b \). The argument in this section, however, does not need this property.
taxation \( r_m(\theta) \) and debt \( x_m(\theta) \) depend only on \( \theta \) and \( m \). In this case, the parties allocate pork transfers according to the municipalities’ preferences for parties, so it is not surprising that the variation of the citizen’s preferences for the parties (as measured by \( \theta \)) and the voting rule are important. The effect of the citizen’s preferences for the party depends on \( m \): the smaller is \( m \), the larger is the effect of \( \theta \) on these policies. The reason is intuitive. In districts with multiple municipalities, parties can trade off voter share gains in some municipalities against others, since all they care about is the total votes in the district. Hence, the relative density among municipalities affects where pork is directed. In single municipality districts, no trade-off is possible within districts,\(^{25}\) and the margin of victory within a district is irrelevant, since parties are only interested in maximizing the number of districts won.

When \( A > A_m(\theta, b) \), the citizens’ preferences for the individual parties are irrelevant; only \( A \) and \( b \) affect the policies. In this case, because parties do not have enough money to chase the municipalities with cash transfers, they find it optimal to treat citizens equally: given the equilibrium \( v \), parties choose policies as if they were maximizing aggregate welfare.

From this discussion and a straightforward analysis of (16), we have the following result, which parallels Result 1, obtained for the planner’s solution.

**Result 2.** In a political equilibrium with \( m \) districts, the equilibrium levels of tax and debt increase in \( b \), while the equilibrium level of public goods falls in \( b \) and increases in \( A \).

Given the policies described above, the effect of a shock to the economy propagates over time through its impact on debt. An increase in \( A \) at \( t \) induces an increase in \( b \) at \( t \). In subsequent periods, even if \( A \) remains constant, the higher level of debt induces lower public good provision, higher taxes, and higher debt. This occurs for two reasons. First, because whenever \( A > A_m(\theta, b) \), the higher is \( b \), then the higher are \( r(b; A) \) and \( x(b; A) \) (and the lower is \( g(b; A) \)). Second (as can be seen from (17)), because an increase in \( b \) causes \( A_m(\theta, b) \) to decrease, it is more likely that \( A > A_m(\theta, b) \). When \( A \) falls, the state follows similar dynamics, but in reverse. The decrease at \( t \) induces a decrease in \( b \); even if \( A \) remains constant in the following periods, the decrease in \( b \) induces further decreases in the following periods until a positive shock on \( A \) arrives.

The dynamics described above can be very complicated, since shocks hit the economy in every period and their effects accumulate over time. In the long run, the economy converges to a steady state distribution. The properties of the steady state distribution of the policies provide a relatively simple way to describe the effect of political distortion on fiscal policy. To study the properties of this steady state distribution, we need to study how resources are allocated over time in more detail.

5. Long-term distribution and welfare

To study the long-term properties of equilibrium policies, it is useful to characterize how the expected value function changes following a marginal change in \( b \). From (9) and

\(^{25}\)Indeed, when \( m = n \), \( H(j) = \{j\} \) and \( \max_j [\theta^j / \left( \sum_{i \in H(j)} \theta^i \right)] = 1 \forall \theta \).
Proposition 3, we know that when \( A < A_m(\theta, b) \), we have

\[
v(b; z) = u(r_m(\theta), g_m(A, \theta); A) + \frac{1}{n} \cdot B(r_m(\theta), g_m(A, \theta), x_m(\theta'; b) + \delta v(x_m(\theta)));
\]

where \( B(r_m(\theta), g_m(A, \theta), x_m(\theta'; b) = x_m(\theta) + R(r_m(\theta)) - g_m(A, \theta) - (1 + \rho)b \). It follows that \(-\delta v'(b; z) = 1/n \) when \( A < A_m(\theta, b) \), since \( \delta(1 + \rho) = 1 \). Intuitively, when \( A < A_m(\theta, b) \), a reduction in debt frees 1 unit of resources to spend in pork transfers, with an expected benefit of \( 1/n \) in a symmetric equilibrium. When \( A \geq A_m(\theta, b) \), instead, \( v(b; z) \) is given by (16). Using the envelope theorem, we find that in a state \( z \),

\[
-\delta v'(b; z) = \frac{1 - r(b; z)}{n}.
\]

The derivative in this case exceeds \( 1/n \) because the increase in debt not only implies a transfer of resources from \( t + 1 \) to \( t \), but also a social loss. Given that pork transfers are zero at \( t + 1 \), the agents are forced to increase taxes or debt, or to reduce \( g \) at \( t \), all measures that generate a loss in social welfare. We conclude that \( v(x) \) is differentiable with derivative

\[
-\delta v'(x) = \sum_{\theta'} \left[ \frac{1}{n} \cdot G(x, \theta') + E \left[ \frac{1}{n} \frac{1 - r(x'; z')}{1 - r(x; z')(1 + \epsilon)} \right| A' > A_m(\theta', x) \right] \cdot [1 - G(x, \theta')] \phi(\theta'),
\]

where \( G(x, \theta') \) is the probability that \( A' \leq A_m(x, \theta') \).

We can now characterize the first-order necessary and sufficient conditions of (15) and (16) with respect to debt. In both cases, we must have

\[
\frac{1}{n} \left[ \frac{1 - r(b; z)}{1 - r(b; z)(1 + \epsilon)} \right] = -\delta v'(x(b; z))
\]

for any \( b \) such that \( x(b; z) < \bar{x} \). Using (14) and (18), we can rewrite (19) as

\[
\frac{1}{n} \left[ \frac{1 - r(b; z)}{1 - r(b; z)(1 + \epsilon)} \right] = \frac{1}{n} E \left[ \frac{1 - r(x(b; z); z')}{1 - r(x(b; z); A')(1 + \epsilon)} \right]
\]

\[
- \frac{1}{n} E \left[ \left( \frac{n}{m} \max_{j} \sum_{\theta \in H(j)} \theta_j^i \right) - 1 \right] \sum_{\theta'} G(x(b; z), \theta') \phi(\theta').
\]

As long as \( m < n \), then

\[
\frac{n}{m} \max_{j} \sum_{\theta \in H(j)} \theta_j^i > 1,
\]

26To write (20), we add and subtract

\[
\sum_{\theta'} E \left[ \frac{1}{n} \frac{1 - r(x; z')}{1 - r(x; z')(1 + \epsilon)} \right| A' \leq A_m(\theta', x) \right] \cdot G(x, \theta') \phi(\theta')
\]

in (18). The added term contributes to form the first term in (20); the subtracted term contributes to the second term in (20) (as can be seen using (14)).
so that we have the following result.

**Proposition 4.** In a political equilibrium, when \( m < n \),

\[
\frac{1}{n} \frac{1 - r(b; z)}{1 - r(b; z)(1 + \varepsilon)} \leq \frac{1}{n} \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{1 - r(x(b; z); z')}{1 - r(x(b; z); z')(1 + \varepsilon)} \right]
\]

(21)

for any \( b \) such that \( x(b; z) < \bar{x} \). Moreover, there is a positive probability of reaching a state in which the inequality is strict.

Comparing (21) to (8), we can see that resources are inefficiently allocated over time: politicians tend to shift too much of the burden of taxation to the future.

It is interesting to note that the wedge between the marginal cost of public funds at time \( t \) and at time \( t + 1 \) depends on the electoral rule and is state contingent. It is decreasing in \( m \) and is zero when \( m = n \), since \((n/m) \max_{j} \left\{ \theta_j / \left( \sum_{i \in H(j)} \theta_i \right) \right\} = 1 \). When \( m < n \), there is no choice of Pareto weights that could rationalize the allocation, since the parties tend to systematically transfer the burden of taxation to the future. As \( b \) increases, however, the probability that \( A' > A_m(\theta', x(b; z)) \) (i.e., \( G(x(b; z), \theta') \)) decreases, and so the wedge decreases as well. For high levels of \( b \), the marginal cost of public funds starts to behave as in a Pareto efficient solution, so debt tends to go down. This observation has important implications for the steady state distribution of policies in the political equilibrium. Let \( r_m = \min_{\theta} r_m(\theta) \), \( g_m = \max_{\theta, A} g_m(A, \theta) \), and \( x_m = \min_{\theta} x_m(\theta) \).

We say that a stationary distribution of policies is nondegenerate if the policies are not constant. We have the following result.

**Proposition 5.** The political equilibrium is Pareto efficient if and only if \( m = n \). For any initial state \( z_0, b_0 \), the following scenarios occur:

- If \( m = n \), the political equilibrium coincides with the utilitarian optimum in which \( \mu_i = 1/n \) for all \( i = 1, \ldots, n \): \( r(b; z) \) and \( g(b; z) \) converge, respectively, to 0 and \((anA)^{1/(1-\alpha)}\), and public debt converges to \( g \).

- If \( m < n \), \( r(b; z) \) and \( g(b; z) \) converge to nondegenerate stationary distributions with associated supports \([r_m, \overline{r}]\) and \((0, g_m]\), and public debt \( x(b; z) \) converges to a non-degenerate distribution in \([x_m, \overline{x}]\).

When \( m < n \), each district comprises more than one municipality and the parties can be opportunistic in making transfers to the municipality that is most susceptible to being influenced. The marginal benefit of this policy is equal to \( \max_{j} \left\{ \theta_j / \left( \sum_{i \in H(j)} \theta_i \right) \right\} / m \), so it changes over time with \( \theta \). Although \( \max_{j} \left\{ \theta_j / \left( \sum_{i \in H(j)} \theta_i \right) \right\} / m \) may go up or down over time, and this changes the incentive to make transfers, (21) shows that this mechanism creates a systematic bias toward shifting the burden of taxation to the future. The reason is that whatever the value of \( \theta \) at \( t \), the marginal benefit of making a transfer at \( t \) is always larger than the expected benefit of making it at \( t + 1 \). This happens because, for almost any realization of \( \theta \), \( \max_{j} \left\{ \theta_j / \left( \sum_{i \in H(j)} \theta_i \right) \right\} / m > 1/n \) (the exception being the event in which \( \theta_j \) is identical for all municipalities in the electoral district); the expected
benefit of a dollar in future transfers to a municipality, however, is $1/n$ (since in expectation all municipalities are equally likely to receive it). As $m$ increases, the number of municipalities per district decreases, and the arbitrage opportunities decrease as well. When $m = n$, we have only one municipality per district, so $\max_j (\theta_j / \sum_{i \in H(j)} \theta_i) / m$ is constant at 1: in this case, the marginal benefit of making a transfer is constant over time, and the benefit of a transfer at $t$ equals the expected benefit at $t + 1$.

Comparing the equilibrium to the steady state reached in a Pareto efficient allocation, we note two differences. First, in the long term, the level of debt may be either higher or lower in a political equilibrium. From Proposition 1 and Proposition 5, we can see that debt is uniformly higher in the political equilibrium only if $x_{\mu^*} < x_m$. As can easily be verified, this is the case if and only if

$$\mu^* < \frac{1}{m} \max_\theta \left( \max_j \frac{\theta_j}{\sum_{i \in H(j)} \theta_i} \right).$$

If this condition is not satisfied, the debt fluctuates above and below the steady state in the Pareto allocation. Although this condition is always satisfied for a utilitarian social welfare function (in which $\mu^* = 1/n$), it does not need to hold for general social weights, leaving open the possibility that high levels of debt can be rationalized as optimal in a Pareto sense.

The second and most important difference is that when $m < n$, the steady state in the political equilibrium is more volatile than the steady state of a Pareto efficient equilibrium. For any set of welfare weights, the Pareto planner always finds it optimal to accumulate sufficient resources to perfectly self-insure. In the political equilibrium, on the contrary, self-insurance is imperfect (except when $m = n$).

There are three lessons to draw from Proposition 5. First, electoral competition is not sufficient per se to guarantee Pareto efficiency. This contrasts with the standard results in static models where electoral outcomes are Pareto efficient for some choice of welfare weights (see Lindbeck and Weibull 1987).

Second, what distinguishes a political equilibrium from a Pareto efficient solution is not necessarily a higher level of debt, but rather more volatile policies in the steady state.

Finally, the political distortion generated by political competition is higher in electoral systems in which the electoral districts are large and comprises municipalities with different distributions of preference shocks that may change over time. The case in which $m = n$ should be seen as a limit case in which the districts are designed to comprise only perfectly homogeneous municipalities with the same distribution of preference shocks: in this case, the arbitrage opportunity is zero and resources are allocated efficiently.

### 5.1 Discussion

Before turning to the analysis of heterogeneous municipalities, it is useful to discuss the inefficiency results presented in this section in the context of the previous literature on the political economy of public debts and the literature on probabilistic voting.
The economy described in Section 2.1 is similar to the economy adopted in Battaglini and Coate (2008), who present a model of public debt in which policies are chosen by a legislature. It is, therefore, not surprising that there are similarities between the two papers. What distinguishes these papers is the political system, which induces important differences in the equilibrium policies and the types of political inefficiencies that characterize the equilibrium. In Battaglini and Coate (2008), the equilibrium is inefficient for any choice of non-unanimous voting rule. This is not the case with probabilistic voting: as Proposition 5 makes clear, the policy may be efficient if electoral districts are sufficiently small. Second, political distortions, when present, are different from the distortions in Battaglini and Coate (2008). In Battaglini and Coate (2008), the equilibrium policy either coincides with the policy that a planner would choose (given the equilibrium value function) or it depends only on $A$. As Proposition 3 makes clear, this is no longer the case when we have elections that are modelled as in this paper. As in Battaglini and Coate (2008), equilibrium policies coincide with the policy that a utilitarian planner would choose when $A \geq A_m(\theta, b)$ (given the equilibrium value function). When $A < A_m(\theta, b)$, however, policies depend on $\theta$. This dependency on the preferences for the parties is the source of an inefficiency that is not present in Battaglini and Coate (2008): changes in $\theta$ induce an inefficient volatility in $r$ and $g$ that all citizens would like to avoid.

The presence of dynamic distortions distinguishes this paper from the previous literature on probabilistic voting, which typically stresses the result that policies are Pareto efficient. This result is always true in static models, but it is true in dynamic models only under the assumption that the distribution of preference shocks is perfectly constant over time, an assumption that is questionable from an empirical point of view. Proposition 5 shows that Pareto efficiency can occur even with changing preference distributions, and characterizes precise conditions for Pareto efficiency and for the size of distortions when Pareto efficiency does not hold.

6. Heterogeneous municipalities

In the analysis presented above, municipalities are ex ante symmetric: they all have the same distribution of preferences for parties, and none of them has an ex ante bias for a party (i.e., $E\epsilon^\nu = 0 \ \forall \nu$). As we have seen, in this case, it is unambiguously optimal to design electoral districts with the smallest number of municipalities. Small districts are optimal because they limit the ability of politicians to target funds opportunistically.

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27In Battaglini and Coate the representatives in the legislature have the same preferences as the citizens in the district they represent, so their election is not modelled.

28In Battaglini and Coate (2008), the legislature deliberates by $q$-rule, so a policy must be approved by $q$ out of $n$ legislators.

29As we will discuss more extensively in the next section, this insight is important for the study of constitutional design with heterogeneous municipalities because it suggests a trade-off between electoral systems with small districts—which induce more efficient policies, but tend to disenfranchise municipalities that are not pivotal—and electoral systems with large districts—which are less efficient, but force candidates to propose policies that benefit all municipalities.
Municipalities are often asymmetric with respect to parties: some municipalities are ex ante neutral and so are easily contestable, while others have strong and persistent biases for one party or the other. In this case, the size of the optimal district is less straightforward. Small electoral districts may allow the parties to focus resources only on municipalities that can be easily swung with targeted transfers, ignoring municipalities where they have an ex ante small (or high) probability of winning. When districts are large, in contrast, even biased municipalities have a marginal value for parties. In districts that comprise only right-wing municipalities, for example, party $L$ never wins. In a district with mixed municipalities, both parties may win and the right-wing municipalities may contribute to the total vote count at the margin, so they should not be ignored. This idea has been exploited by Persson and Tabellini (1999) to argue that a system with one large district may generate a higher level of public good expenditure and lower taxation than a system with many small districts.

To study an environment with heterogeneous municipalities, we consider a setting where the municipalities can be partitioned into three groups: neutral municipalities, that is, municipalities with $E_x^k = 0$, as described in the previous sections; right-wing municipalities, which have a bias for $R$; and left-wing municipalities, which have a bias for $L$. In particular, we assume that for the right-wing municipalities and the left-wing municipalities, the idiosyncratic shocks $\tilde{\theta}_l$ have uniform distributions with respective supports $[-1/(2\theta) + \sigma, 1/(2\theta) + \sigma]$ and $[-1/(2\theta) - \sigma, 1/(2\theta) - \sigma]$. As in the previous sections, we assume that all parties receive an interior fraction of votes in $(0, 1)$ in each municipality, but now we assume that $\sigma$ is sufficiently large that party $R$ (respectively, $L$) never receives more than 50% of the votes in a left-wing (respectively, right-wing) municipality. As we show in the Appendix, the following condition is sufficient for this.

\textbf{Assumption 2.} We have $\sigma > \Delta W^* + 1/(2\theta^G), 1/(2\theta) > \Delta W^* + \sigma + 1/(2\theta^G)$, where $\Delta W^*$ is defined as in Assumption 1.

The first inequality ensures that party $L$ (respectively, $R$) never wins a majority in a right-wing (respectively, left-wing) municipality; the second inequality corresponds to Assumption 1 and guarantees that all parties receive an interior fraction of votes in all municipalities. The fraction of municipalities that are neutral is $\beta$ (whose $\beta n$ is assumed, for simplicity, to be an integer), and the fraction of right- and left-wing municipalities is $(1 - \beta)/2$.

In this section, we compare two alternative voting rules: a rule with $m = 1$ and a rule with $m = n$. We interpret the first rule as a presidential system in which only one executive position is elected; the second rule is a majoritarian system in which $n$ representatives are elected. Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2004) did a similar exercise in a static model with three municipalities (neutral, right-wing, and a left-wing). They concluded that a system with $m = 1$ generates higher $g$, lower $r$, and higher utilitarian welfare. Here we show that another force is at play in a dynamic model and that the opposite result may occur in the steady state. This highlights the importance of a dynamic perspective in the study of institutions.

In the presidential system with $m = 1$, the analysis is very similar to the earlier analysis. Although party $L$ cannot win a majority in the right-wing municipalities, the votes
gained in right-wing municipalities contribute toward the overall vote count. Party $L$, therefore, finds it optimal to direct transfers to the municipalities that are more reactive to the transfers at the margin, regardless of the average ideology. Policies maximize the same objective function as in (13):

$$u(r, g; A) + \max_j \left( \frac{\theta_j}{\sum_{i=1}^n \theta_i} \right) \cdot B(r, g, x; b) + \delta_v(x)$$

(22)

under the same constraints as in (13). Note that this objective function depends on $\theta$ because the party chooses the municipality with the highest $\theta_j$.

In a majoritarian system with $m = n$ districts, the bias $\sigma$ is relevant. By Assumption 2, party $L$ knows that he never wins right-wing municipalities, so all votes received in these municipalities are lost. It is also pointless to target resource to left-wing municipalities, since these are won for sure. This implies that party $L$ maximizes

$$u(r, g; A) + \frac{1}{\beta n} B(r, g, x; b) + \delta_v(x).$$

(23)

The parties care only about the $\beta n$ neutral municipalities. They treat those municipalities symmetrically because, as discussed above, the relative sensitivities $\theta_j/(\sum_{\ell \notin H(j)} \theta_\ell)$ in the municipalities are identical (and equal to 1) when $m = n$. Comparing (22) with (23), we can make two observations. When $1/(\beta n) > \max_j [\theta_j/(\sum_{i=1}^n \theta_i)]$, the parties tend to overestimate the benefit of pork in a majoritarian system (and underestimate the benefit of $g$ and the cost of $r$ and $b$). This point was made by Persson and Tabellini (1999) in their example with three municipalities. In a dynamic model, however, there is another difference between presidential system and majoritarian systems. The objective function (22) depends on the realization of $\theta$, and so it fluctuates over time. As shown in the previous section, the equilibrium is dynamically inefficient. However, when $m = n$, the objective function is independent of $\theta$ and the policy is time consistent. There is, therefore, a trade-off. In a majoritarian system, policies are time consistent, but tend to ignore the fraction $1 - \beta$ of "extremist" municipalities; in a presidential system, municipalities are treated in an ex ante symmetric way, but ex post the allocation depends on $\theta$, because the parties target the more sensitive municipalities for pork transfers.

Let $r_n, g_n$, and $x_n$ be defined as in Proposition 4 of Section 5 when $m = n$. We then can state the following proposition.

**Proposition 6.** Under Assumption 2, there are two scenarios:

- In a simple majoritarian system ($m = n$), $r(b; z)$ and $g(b; z)$ converge, respectively, to $r_\beta = (1 - \beta)/(1 + \epsilon - \beta)$ and $g_\beta(A) = (\alpha \beta n A)^{1/(1 - \alpha)}$, and debt converges to a
level lower than or equal to $\beta \leq x_\beta = [R(r_\beta) - g_\beta(\bar{A})]\rho$. In the steady state, neutral municipalities receive

$$\frac{1}{\beta n} B(r_\beta, g_\beta(A), x_\beta; b)$$

in pork transfers and the other municipalities receive zero. Any policy $r_\beta, g_\beta(A), x$ with $x \in [x_\beta, x]$ is a steady state. Policies are Pareto efficient.

- In a presidential system ($m = 1$), the distributions of $r(b; z)$ and $g(b; z)$ converge to nondegenerate stationary distributions with support, respectively, $[r_n, \bar{r}]$ and $(0, g_n)$, and the distribution of public debt $x(b; z)$ converges to a nondegenerate stationary distribution in $[x_n, \bar{x}]$. Municipalities receive the same expected transfer $B(r_\beta, g_\beta(A), x_\beta; b)/n$. Policies are Pareto inefficient.

This proposition has implications for the comparison of alternative electoral systems. In choosing a political system, there is a trade-off. In the majoritarian system, resources are targeted only to neutral municipalities. This tends to keep tax rates higher and public good provision lower because neutral municipalities like to tax the entire community and appropriate all the tax revenues; they also underestimate the value of the public good because they do not internalize its value for nonneutral municipalities. The policies, however, are Pareto efficient. Because of this, the economy tends to have a low enough level of debt to eliminate any volatility in policy choices. In contrast, in the proportional system, municipalities are treated ex ante symmetrically. However, policies are Pareto inefficient: this reduces the “size of the pie” for everybody. Naturally the larger is $\beta$, the smaller is the inequality in a proportional system and the larger are the benefits of a majoritarian system. When $\beta$ is sufficiently large, even a utilitarian planner would prefer a majoritarian system. From this discussion, we have the following result.

**Proposition 7.** There exists a $\beta^* < 1$ such that for all $\beta > \beta^*$, the expected level of the public good in the invariant distribution is higher in a majoritarian system ($m = n$) than in a presidential system ($m = 1$), while the expected tax rate is lower. When $\beta > \beta^*$, the steady state of a majoritarian system is strictly preferred by a utilitarian planner to the steady state of a presidential system.

The analysis in this section emphasizes the importance of considering dynamic models when studying fiscal policy in political systems, even if the analysis is limited to the comparison of steady states, and so the dynamics of the equilibria are ignored. The phenomena described by Propositions 5 and 6 follow from the fact that a system with $m = 1$ is dynamically inefficient, so it leads to too much debt accumulation. In a system with $m = n$, under Assumption 2, parties ignore a fraction $1 - \beta$ of the electorate, but the allocation is dynamically efficient. In a static environment, both systems would be Pareto efficient since they would differ only with respect to the distribution of resources in the economy.
7. Conclusion

This paper presents a dynamic theory of electoral competition to study the determinants of fiscal policy. We have shown that while fiscal policy is generally Pareto efficient in static environments, Pareto efficiency depends on the electoral rule in dynamic environments. In the benchmark case in which municipalities are symmetric, the smaller are the electoral districts, the more Pareto efficient is the policy outcome. Large electoral districts tend to be more dynamically inefficient because they give parties more discretion to target fiscal policies opportunistically toward the municipalities that are easier to swing. When municipalities are heterogeneous and there are municipalities with ex ante biases toward some candidate, there is a trade-off. While large electoral districts are more Pareto inefficient, they tend to be more inclusive because they do not provide incentives to ignore municipalities with biased preferences (that would not be contestable were the districts smaller). The theory therefore suggests that countries that have homogeneous constituencies should find it optimal to choose a majoritarian system with smaller districts. Countries with heterogeneous municipalities have a stronger incentive to choose larger districts. This result extends the analysis of static models that associate large districts with superior policies. The fact that small districts are optimal with homogeneous preferences, and the trade-off between small and large districts with heterogeneous preferences are results that cannot be anticipated from static analyses since they depend on the dynamic properties of the electoral systems.

The analysis can be extended in several directions. First, we restrict the analysis to a majoritarian electoral system and we consider only changes in the size of electoral districts. Clearly, it would be interesting to develop dynamic theories of electoral competition for a wider range of electoral rules. Second, we restrict the analysis to environments with symmetric municipalities and to environments with a very simple type of heterogeneity in preferences; we also focus on symmetric equilibria. It would be interesting to develop a more general theory that applies to asymmetric environments, for example, in which a party has a dominant position or in which a bias can persist for a while (e.g., autoregressive shocks that have mean zero). Finally, it would be interesting to extend the analysis to study dynamic electoral competition with more than two parties.

Appendix

A.1 Assumptions 1 and 2

In this section, we formally derive the upper bound \( \Delta W^* \) introduced in Section 2.2 and motivate Assumptions 1 and 2. Consider Assumption 1 first. Let \( v^*(b, A) \) be the value function when the policies are chosen by a benevolent utilitarian planner, as discussed in Section 3 (assuming \( \mu_i = 1/n \) for all \( i \)). Define \( W^*(b) \) as the value of the problem

\[
\max_{(r, g, x, s)} \left[ u(r, g; A) + s_i + \delta v^*_i(x) \right]
\]

s.t. \( s_i \geq 0 \) for all \( i \), \( \sum_i s_i \leq B(r, g; b) \), and \( x \in [x, \overline{x}] \),
where $v^*(x) = Evv^*(x, A')$. This is the maximal expected utility a citizen may receive in a symmetric equilibrium. Note that both $v^*(b)$ and $W^*(b)$ are bounded, and $W^j(p_L; v, A) - W^j(p_R; v, A) \leq \Delta W^* = W^*(\varepsilon)$, since $W^*(b)$ is decreasing in $b$. It follows that

$$
\frac{1}{2} - \bar{\theta} \left[ \Delta W^* + \frac{1}{2\bar{\theta}G} \right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \theta^j(\Delta W^j(p; v, A) - \bar{\theta}G) \leq \frac{1}{2} + \bar{\theta} \left[ \Delta W^* + \frac{1}{2\bar{\theta}G} \right],
$$

where $\Delta W^j(p; v, A) = W^j(p_L; v, A) - W^j(p_R; v, A)$. We conclude that $\frac{1}{2} + \theta^j(\Delta W^j(p; v, A) - \bar{\theta}G)$ is in $(0, 1)$ if the first inequality in Assumption 1 is satisfied. Party $L$ wins 50% of the votes if and only if $\bar{\theta}G \leq \Delta W^j(p; v, A)$. The probability of this event is in $(0, 1)$ if $1/(2\bar{\theta}G) > \Delta W^*$, the second inequality in Assumption 1. Consider Assumption 2 presented in Section 6. Following the same steps as above, we can show that party $L$ (respectively, $R$) wins less than $\frac{1}{2}$ of the votes in a right-wing (respectively, left-wing) municipality if $\frac{1}{2} + \bar{\theta}[\Delta W^* - \sigma + 1/(2\bar{\theta}G)] < \frac{1}{2}$, which implies the first inequality in Assumption 2. By a similar logic, we can show that the share of votes received by any party is always nonnegative in any municipality if the second inequality of Assumption 2 is satisfied.

### A.2 Proof of Proposition 1

Since it is relatively standard, the proof that a well behaved Pareto efficient solution exists is omitted. Let $V^o(b) = \sum_i \mu_i v^o_i(x)$ be the social welfare function. To derive conditions (6) and (7), note that from the first-order conditions of (4) with respect to $g$ and $x$, we have

$$\alpha Ag^o(b; A)^{\alpha-1} = \frac{1}{n} \frac{1 - r^o(b; A)}{1 - r^o(b; A)(1 + \varepsilon)}; \quad (24)$$

$$\frac{1}{n} \frac{1 - r^o(b; A)}{1 - r^o(b; A)(1 + \varepsilon)} \geq -\delta[V^o]'(x^o(b; A)) \quad \text{with equality if } x^o(b; A) < x; \quad (25)$$

and from the first-order conditions with respect to $s$, we have

$$\frac{1}{n} \frac{1 - r^o(b; A)}{1 - r^o(b; A)(1 + \varepsilon)} \geq \mu^* \quad \text{with equality if } B(r, g, x; b) > 0. \quad (25)$$

From the envelope theorem applied to (4), we have

$$-\delta[V^o]'(b) = \frac{1}{n} \frac{1 - r^o(b; A)}{1 - r^o(b; A)(1 + \varepsilon)}. \quad (26)$$

Condition (8) follows from (24), (26), and the fact that, in equilibrium, $\delta(1 + \rho) = 1$.

Because $(1 - r)/(1 - r(1 + \varepsilon))$ is a convex function in $r$, condition (8) implies that the tax rate $r^o(b; A)$ defines a supermartingale $(r^o_r)_r \in R$ with $\sup_r |r_r| < \infty$. By Theorem 1 in Shiryaev (1991, Chapter VII.4), the limit $\lim_{r \to \infty} r^o_r = r^o_\infty$ exists with probability 1. From (24), it follows that the limit $\lim_{r \to \infty} g^o_r = g^o_\infty$ exists with probability 1 as well, where the random sequence $(g^o_r)_r \in R$ is defined by $g^o(b; A)$. In these limits, it must be that the sequence
of Lagrangian multipliers \((\lambda_t)_{t \geq 0}\) defined by the Lagrangian multiplier \(\lambda^c(b; A)\) of the\nconstraint \(B(r, g, x; b) \geq 0\) in (4) converges to zero: otherwise, the tax rate would depend on the realization of the shock \(A\) for an arbitrarily large \(\tau\). Conditions (24)–(25) imply that the tax rate converges to \(r_\mu = (n\mu^* - 1)/[n\mu^*(1 + \varepsilon) - 1]\) and that \(g\) converges to a function \(g_\mu(A)\) such that \(\alpha A[g_\mu(A)]^{n-1} = \mu^*\). Such a solution is possible if and only if, in the steady state, debt is lower than or equal to \(x_\mu\), where \(x_\mu\) is defined by \(B(r_\mu, g_\mu(A)), x_\mu; x_\mu) = 0\) and, therefore, is such that \(x_\mu > x_\mu\). Let \(n^*\) be the number of agents who have maximal \(\mu\), and let \(s^*_\mu(A, x) = B(r_\mu, g_\mu(A), x; x)/n^*\) if \(\mu = \mu^*\) and \(s^*_\mu(A, x) = 0\) otherwise. It is easy to verify that any \(r_{\mu_1}, g_{\mu_1}(A)\) and \(x \in [\underline{x}, x_\mu]\) with corresponding pork transfers \(\{s^*_\mu(A, x)\}_{i=1}^n\) is a steady state of the planner’s solution.

A.3 Proof of Proposition 2

We say that a function is \(\kappa\)-Lipschitz if it is Lipschitz continuous with constant of continuity \(\kappa\). In this section, we prove that there is an equilibrium such that the value function \(v(b)\) is uniformly bounded, weakly concave, and \(K\)-Lipschitz with a constant of continuity \(K\) specified below. To define this constant, let \(g(\kappa)\) and \(r(\kappa)\) be such that \(\alpha A[g(\kappa)]^{n-1} = \kappa\) and \((1/n)[1 - r(\kappa)]/[1 - r(\kappa)(1 + \varepsilon)] = \kappa\), and let \(\Delta x = \max_r R(r)/\rho - \bar{x} > 0\). Define, moreover,

\[
B(\kappa) = R(r(\kappa)) - g(\kappa) - \max_r R(r) + \rho \Delta x.
\]

Note that \(B(\kappa)\) is continuous, increasing in \(\kappa\), and such that \(\lim_{\kappa \to \infty} B(\kappa) = \rho \Delta x > 0\) and \(\lim_{\kappa \to 1/(\delta n)} B(\kappa) < 0\) when \(\Delta x\) is small (i.e., \(\Delta x < [\max_r R(r) + g(1/(\delta n))] - R(r(1/(\delta n)))]/\rho\)). Define \(K\) such that \(B(K) = 0\). Note that \(K \in (1/(\delta n), \infty)\) for \(\Delta x > 0\).

Let \(F\) be the metric space of real valued, uniformly bounded, weakly concave, and \(K\)-Lipschitz functions of \(b\) in \([\underline{x}, \bar{x}]\), endowed with the sup norm, \(\|f\| = \sup_{b \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]} |f|\). It is useful to represent a state in the compact form as \(z = (A, (\theta^i)_j, \theta^{G})\). Following the discussion in Section 4.1, the problem of a party or a given value function \(v\) can be expressed as (13). Note that for any \(b\), the policy that solves (13) must be in \(P\), where \(P = [0, 1] \times [0, \bar{\gamma}] \times [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]\).\footnote{We can assume \(g \in [0, \bar{\gamma}]\), with \(\bar{\gamma} < \infty\) without loss of generality, since in every period resources are bounded by \(\max_r R(r) + \bar{x}\).} Let \(P^*(v, z)\) be the correspondence that maps \(v \in F\) to the set of bounded and continuous functions \(p^*(b; v, z) = (r^*(b; v, z), g^*(b; v, z), x^*(b; v, z))\) such that (i) \(p^*(b; v, z)\) is a solution to (13) for all \(b\); (ii) \(p^*(b; v, z)\) is continuous and monotonic in \(b\), where monotonic means that \((r^*(b; v, z), x^*(b; v, z))\) are nondecreasing in \(b\) and \(g^*(b; v, z)\) is nonincreasing in \(b\); (iii) \(p^*(b; v, z)\) is such that \(B(r^*(b; v, z), g^*(b; v, z), x^*(b; v, z); b)\) is weakly convex in \(b\); and (iv) \(p^*(b; v, z)\) is such that \(B(r^*(b; v, z), g^*(b; v, z), x^*(b; v, z); b)\) is \(1/\delta\)-Lipschitz in \(b\).

**Lemma A.1.** The correspondence \(P^*(v, z)\) is nonempty and convex-valued.

**Proof.** We proceed in two steps.

**Step 1.** We first show that \(P^*(v, z)\) is nonempty by constructing a function \(p^*(b; v, z) \in P^*(v, z)\). Fix a state \(z\) and let \(\lambda(b; v, z)\) be the Lagrangian multiplier
associated to the constraint $B(r, g, x; b) \geq 0$ in (13). Let $\Omega_m(\theta) = \max_j [\theta]/(\sum_{i \in H(j)} \theta_i)]/m$ and, for any state $z = (A, \theta)$, define $r^*_z$ and $g^*_z$ as

$$\frac{1}{n} \frac{1 - r^*_z}{1 - r^*_z (1 + \varepsilon)} = \Omega_m(\theta) \quad \text{and} \quad \alpha A(g^*_z)^{\alpha - 1} = \Omega_m(\theta),$$

and let

$$\mathcal{X}_x(v) = \arg \max_{x \in [\underline{x}, \overline{x}]} \{\Omega_m(\theta)x + \delta v(x)\}. \tag{27}$$

If $\lambda(b; v, z) = 0$, then the solution of (13) is $r(b; v, z) = r^*_z$, $g(b; v, z) = g^*_z$, and $x(b; v, z) \in \mathcal{X}_z(v) \cap \{x \mid B(r, g, x; b) \geq 0\}$. Since $v$ is weakly concave, $\mathcal{X}_z(v)$ is a nonempty, compact, and convex set. Let $\overline{\mathcal{X}}(v, z) = \max_{x \in [\underline{x}, \overline{x}]} \{x \mid x \in \mathcal{X}_z(v)\}$. It is immediate to verify that $\lambda(b; v, z) = 0$ for all $b \leq \overline{\mathcal{X}}(v, z)$. Let $\overline{b}(x; z)$ be defined by $B(r^*_z, g^*_z, x; \overline{b}(x; z)) = 0 \forall x \in [\underline{x}, \overline{x}]$. Set $x^*(b; v, z) = \overline{\mathcal{X}}(v, z)$ for $b \leq \overline{\mathcal{X}}(v, z)$. It follows that $\{r^*_z, g^*_z, x^*(b; v, z)\}$ is a solution of (13) in $b \in [\underline{x}, \overline{\mathcal{X}}(v, z); z)$.

Consider now $b > \overline{\mathcal{X}}(v, z); z)$. In this case, $\lambda(b; v, z) > 0$, so (13) can be written as

$$\max_{u, g, x} \left[ u(r, g; A) + \frac{1}{n} B(r, g, x; b) \right] \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \frac{1}{n} B(r, g, x; b) = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad x \in [\underline{x}, \overline{x}].$$

This problem admits a unique solution, so the set of solutions $P(b; v, z)$ is nonempty, convex-valued, and continuous in $b$ for all $b \in (\overline{\mathcal{X}}(v, z); z)$. Since the solution of (13) is upper hemicontinuous in $[\overline{\mathcal{X}}(v, z); z)\]$, it must be that for any sequence $(b_n)_{n=1}^\infty$ with $b_n > \overline{\mathcal{X}}(v, z); z)$ converging to $\overline{\mathcal{X}}(v, z); z)$, we have $\lim_{n \to \infty} p(b_n; v, z) \in P(\overline{\mathcal{X}}(v, z); z); v, z)$. Since $P(\overline{\mathcal{X}}(v, z); z); v, z)$ is a singleton, this implies that $P(b; v, z)$ coincides with

$$(r^*(b; v, z), g^*(b; v, z), x^*(b; v, z))$$

at $\overline{\mathcal{X}}(v, z); z)$. We can, therefore, extend $(r^*(b; v, z), g^*(b; v, z), x^*(b; v, z))$ to $b \in (\overline{\mathcal{X}}(v, z); z)\] by setting it equal to the solution of (28). The resulting policy $(r^*(b; v, z), g^*(b; v, z), x^*(b; v, z))$ is continuous in $[\underline{x}, \overline{x}]$. It can also be verified that $(r^*(b; v, z), x^*(b; v, z))$ are nondecreasing in $b$ and $g^*(b; v, z)$ is nonincreasing in $b$. Finally,

$$B(r^*(b; v, z), g^*(b; v, z), x^*(b; v, z); b) = \max\{0, B(r^*_z, g^*_z, \overline{\mathcal{X}}(v, z); b)\},$$

which is weakly convex in $b$ for any $b \in [\underline{x}, \overline{x}]$. To see that $B(r^*(b; v, z), g^*(b; v, z), x^*(b; v, z); b)$ is also $1/\delta$-Lipschitz in $b$, note that it is differentiable in $b$ for $b > \overline{\mathcal{X}}(v, z); z)$ with the derivative equal to zero, and it is differentiable for $b < \overline{\mathcal{X}}(v, z); z)$ with the derivative equal to $-1/(1 + \rho) = -1/\delta$.\footnote{The fact that (28) admits a unique solution follows from the observation that if we had two different solutions, say $(x_1, r_1, g_1)$ and $(x_2, r_2, g_2)$, we must have $(r_1, g_1) \neq (r_2, g_2)$; otherwise, we would have $(r_1, g_1) = (r_2, g_2)$ and only $x_2 \neq x_1$, implying that, in one of the two solutions, $B(r, g, x; b) = 0$. Given this, the result follows from the fact that $u(r, g; A) + B(r, g, x; b)/n$ is strictly concave in $r$ and $g$, and weakly concave in $x$.}
Step 2. Let \( p^1(b) \in P^*(v, z) \), \( p^2(b) \in P^*(v, z) \), and \( p^\phi(b) = \phi p^1(b) + (1 - \phi) p^2(b) \) for some \( \phi \in (0, 1) \). Since \( v \in F \), it must be that \( p^\phi(b) \) is an optimal reaction function. It can also be easily verified that \( p^\phi(b) \) is continuous and monotonic. Moreover, \( B(r^\phi(b), g^\phi(b), x^\phi(b); b) \) is weakly convex and \( 1/\delta \)-Lipschitz in \( b \). Therefore, \( p^\phi \in P^*(v, z) \).

For a given \( v \in F \) and state \( z \), define \( Y(v, z) \) by

\[
Y(v, z) = \left\{ \tilde{v} \left| \tilde{v}(b) = u(r(b), g(b); A) + \frac{1}{n} B(r(b), g(b), x(b); b) + \delta v(x(b)) \right. \right. \\
\left. \left. \text{for some } (r(b), g(b), x(b)) \in P^*(v, z) \right\} \right.
\]

This expression defines a correspondence with the following properties.

**Lemma A.2.** For any given \( z \) and \( K \)-Lipschitz \( v \), any \( \tilde{v} \in Y(v, z) \) is \( K \)-Lipschitz.

**Proof.** We proceed in three steps.

**Step 1.** Consider first the subset of the support in which \( b \leq \overline{b}(v, z; z) \). From the proof of **Lemma A.1**, we know that for any solution of (13), we must have a \( \overline{b}(v, z; z) \) such that for \( b \leq \overline{b}(v, z; z) \), the value function is

\[
\tilde{v}(b; z) = u(r^*_z, g^*_z; A) + \frac{1}{n} B(r^*_z, g^*_z, x(b; v, z); x) + \delta v(x(b; v, z)),
\]

where \( B(r^*_z, g^*_z, x^*(b; v, z); b) \) is \( 1/\delta \)-Lipschitz and \( x(b; v, z) \in \mathcal{X}_z(v) \). We can write (29) as

\[
\tilde{v}(b; z) = \max \left\{ \left[ u(r, g; A) + \Omega_m(\theta) B(r, g, x; b) + \delta v(x) \right] \right. \\
\left. \text{s.t. } B(r, g, x; b) \geq 0 \quad \text{and} \quad x \in [\underline{x}, \overline{x}] \right\}
\]

\[ - \left[ \Omega_m(\theta) - \frac{1}{n} \right] \cdot B(r^*_z, g^*_z, x(b; v, z); b). \]

The derivative of the first term is (by the envelope theorem) \(-\Omega_m(\theta)(1 + \rho)\). Since \( B(r^*_z, g^*_z, x(b; v, z); b) \) is \( 1/\delta \)-Lipschitz, we have

\[
|\tilde{v}(b_1; z) - \tilde{v}(b_2; z)|/|b_1 - b_2| \leq \left| -(1 + \rho) \Omega_m(\theta) + \frac{1}{\delta} \left( \Omega_m(\theta) - \frac{1}{n} \right) \right| = \frac{1}{\delta n} \leq K
\]

for any \( b_1, b_2 \leq \overline{b}(v, z; z) \).

**Step 2.** Consider the subset of the support in which \( b > \overline{b}(v, z; z) \). When \( b > \overline{b}(v, z; z) \), the value function can be written as (28). By the envelope theorem applied to this maximization problem, we have \( \tilde{v}(b; z) = -(1 + \rho)(1 + \lambda b; z)/n \), where \( \lambda b; z \) is the Lagrangian multiplier of the first constraint. We now prove that \(|\tilde{v}(b; z)| \leq K\) for \( b > \overline{b}(v, z; z) \). Assume by contradiction that \((1 + \rho)(1 + \lambda b; z)/n > K\) for some \( b > \overline{b}(v, z; z) \). Then, from the first-order necessary conditions of (28) with respect to
\( r \) and \( g \), we have \( r(b; z) > r(K) \), \( g(b; z) < g(K) \). Moreover, from the necessary conditions of (28) with respect to \( x \), \( x(b; z) \) must be such that if \( x(b; z) < \bar{x} \), then
\[
\frac{1}{n}(1 + \lambda(b; z)) \leq -\delta v^+(x(b; z)) ,
\]
where \( v^+(x(b; z)) \) is the right derivative of \( v(b) \) at \( x(b; z) \) (well defined since \( v(b) \) is concave). But by the initial assumption that we intend to contradict and the fact that \( v \) is \( K \)-Lipschitz, we have
\[
\frac{1}{n}(1 + \rho)(1 + \lambda(b; z)) > K \geq -v^+(x(b; z)) .
\]
Dividing both sides by \((1 + \rho)\) and remembering that the equilibrium interest rate must be such that \( \delta (1 + \rho) = 1 \), we have \((1 + \lambda(b; z))/n > -\delta v^+(x(b; z))\), implying \( x(b; z) = \bar{x} \).

It follows that the budget is
\[
B(b, z) = x(b; z) + R(r(b; z)) - g(b; z) - (1 + \rho)\bar{x}
\geq R(r(K)) - g(K) - \max R(r) + \rho \Delta x = B(K) \geq 0 ,
\]
where \( \Delta x = \max_r R(r)/\rho - \bar{x} \) and the last inequality follows from the definition of \( K \). We conclude that \( \lambda(b; z) = 0 \), so \((1 + \rho)(1 + \lambda(b; z))/n = 1/\delta n \leq K \), a contradiction.

**Step 3.** We now prove that for any \( b_1, b_2 \) in \([x, \bar{x}]\), we have \(|\tilde{v}(b_1; z) - \tilde{v}(b_2; z)| \leq K \cdot |b_1 - b_2| \). The result was proven above when both \( b_1 \) and \( b_2 \) are less than \( \tilde{b}(\bar{x}(v, z); z) \).

If both \( b_1 \) and \( b_2 \) exceed \( \tilde{b}(\bar{x}(v, z); z) \), the result follows immediately from the fact that \(|\tilde{v}(b; z)| \leq K \) in \([b_1, b_2] \) and the mean value theorem. Assume, therefore, that \( b_1 \leq \tilde{b}(\bar{x}(v, z); z) \) and \( b_2 \geq \tilde{b}(\bar{x}(v, z); z) \), with one of the two inequalities being strict. We can write
\[
|\tilde{v}(b_1; z) - \tilde{v}(b_2; z)| \leq |\tilde{v}(b_1; z) - \tilde{v}(\tilde{b}(\bar{x}(v, z); z); z)| + |\tilde{v}(\tilde{b}(\bar{x}(v, z); z); z) - \tilde{v}(b_2; z)|
\leq K \cdot |b_1 - \tilde{b}(\bar{x}(v, z))| + K \cdot |\tilde{b}(\bar{x}(v, z)) - b_2| = K \cdot |b_1 - b_2| ,
\]
where the last equality follows from the premise that \( b_1 \leq \tilde{b}(\bar{x}(v, z); z) \leq b_2 \). We conclude that for any given \( z \) and any \( K \)-Lipschitz \( v \), any \( \tilde{v} \in Y(v, z) \) is \( K \)-Lipschitz. \( \square \)

Using Lemma A.1, we obtain the following lemma.

**Lemma A.3.** For any given \( z \), \( Y(v, z) \) is a nonempty and convex-valued correspondence from \( F \) into \( F \).

**Proof.** For any given \((r(b), g(b), x(b)) \in P^*(v, z) \), we can write
\[
\tilde{v}(b) = u(r^*(b; v, z), g^*(b; v, z); A) + \frac{1}{n} B(r^*(b; v, z), g^*(b; v, z), x^*(b; v, z); b)
+ \delta v(x^*(b; v, z))
= u(r^*(b; v, z), g^*(b; v, z); A)
\]
\[ + \Omega_m(\theta) B(r^*(b; v, z), g^*(b; v, z), x^*(b; v, z); b) \\
+ \delta v(x^*(b; v, z)) \\
+ \left( \frac{1}{n} - \Omega_m(\theta) \right) B(r^*(b; v, z), g^*(b; v, z), x^*(b; v, z); b) \]

\[
= \left\{ \max_{(r, g, x)} [u(r, g; A) + \Omega_m(\theta) B(r, g, x; b) + \delta v(x)] \right\} \\
\text{s.t. } B(r, g, x; b) \geq 0 \text{ and } x \in [x_1, x_2] \\
+ \left( \frac{1}{n} - \Omega_m(\theta) \right) B(r^*(b; v, z), g^*(b; v, z), x^*(b; v, z); b). \tag{30} \]

It can be verified that the first term of the expression above is concave. By Lemma A.1, \( B(r^*(b; v, z), g^*(b; v, z), x^*(b; v, z); b) \) is weakly convex. Since \((1/n - \Omega_m(\theta)) \leq 0\), the second term of (30) is weakly concave. It follows that \( \tilde{\nu}(b) \) is uniformly bounded, weakly concave, and, by Lemma A.2, \( K \)-Lipschitz in \( b \). Since \( P^*(v, z) \) is nonempty, then \( Y(v, z) \) is an nonempty correspondence of \( F \) into \( F \).

To show that \( Y(v, z) \) is convex-valued, consider two functions \( v_1 \in Y(v, z) \) and \( v_2 \in Y(v, z) \), and let \( v_\alpha = \alpha v_1 + (1 - \alpha) v_2 \). Let \( \lambda(b; v, z) \) be the Lagrangian multiplier associated to the constraint \( B(r, g, x; b) \geq 0 \) in (13). If \( \lambda(b; v, z) > 0 \), then \( v_1 = v_2 = v_\alpha \). If \( \lambda(b; v, z) = 0 \), then

\[
v_\alpha (b) = u(r^*_\alpha, g^*_\alpha; A) + \left( \frac{1}{n} - \Omega_m(\theta) \right) B(r, g, x^*_\alpha; b) \\
+ \alpha \left[ \Omega_m(\theta) B(r^*_\alpha, g^*_\alpha, x^*_\alpha; b) + \delta v(x^*_\alpha) \right] \\
+ (1 - \alpha) \left[ \Omega_m(\theta) B(r^*_\alpha, g^*_\alpha, x^*_\alpha; b) + \delta v(x^*_\alpha) \right],
\]

where, for any \( i = 1, 2 \), \( x^*_i \) is the optimal value of \( x \) associated with \( v_i \), and \( x^*_\alpha = \alpha x^*_1 + (1 - \alpha) x^*_2 \). Since \( v \) is weakly concave, it must be that \( \Omega_m(\theta) B(r^*_\alpha, g^*_\alpha, x; b) + \delta v(x) \) is constant in \([x^*_1, x^*_2]\), so we can write \( v_\alpha (b) = u(r^*_\alpha, g^*_\alpha; A) + B(r^*_\alpha, g^*_\alpha, x^*_\alpha; b)/n + \delta v(x^*_\alpha) \). Since \( (r^*_\alpha, g^*_\alpha, x^*_\alpha) \in P^*(b; v, z) \) by Lemma A.1, we have \( v_\alpha (b) \in Y(v, z) \). \( \square \)

We can also show that the following lemma holds.

**Lemma A.4.** For any given \( z \), \( Y(v, z) \) has a closed graph.

**Proof.** Consider a sequence of functions \( \nu^n \) that uniformly converges to \( \nu^\infty \). Let \( \tilde{\nu}^n \in Y(\nu^n, z) \) be a corresponding sequence and define \( \nu^\infty = \lim_{n \to \infty} \tilde{\nu}^n \). By definition, to each \( \nu^n \), we have an associated policy \( p^n = (r^n, g^n, x^n) \in P^*(\nu^n, z) \). Define \( \nu^\infty = \lim_{n \to \infty} p^n \). We have

\[
\tilde{\nu}^\infty (b; z) = \lim_{n \to \infty} \tilde{\nu}^n (b; z) \\
= \lim_{n \to \infty} \left\{ u(r^n(b; z), g^n(b; z)) \\
+ \frac{1}{n} B(r^n(b; z), g^n(b; z), x^n(b; z); b) + \delta v^n(x^n(b; z)) \right\}
\]

\[ + \Omega_m(\theta) B(r^*(b; v, z), g^*(b; v, z), x^*(b; v, z); b) \\
+ \delta v(x^*(b; v, z)) \\
+ \left( \frac{1}{n} - \Omega_m(\theta) \right) B(r^*(b; v, z), g^*(b; v, z), x^*(b; v, z); b) \]
for any \( b \in [\underline{x}, \overline{x}] \), so we have \( \tilde{v}^\infty \in Y(v^\infty, z) \) if \( p^\infty \in P^*(v^\infty, z) \). Assume by contradiction that \( p^\infty \notin P^*(v^\infty, z) \). It is easy to verify that \( v^\infty \in F \), so \( P^*(v^\infty, z) \) is nonempty by Lemma A.1. Therefore, there exists a \( \eta > 0 \) such that for any solution \( p(b; v^\infty; z) = (r(b; v^\infty; z), g(b; v^\infty; z), x(b; v^\infty; z)) \) such that \( p(b; v^\infty; z) \in P^*(v^\infty, z) \), we have

\[
\begin{align*}
&u(r(b; v^\infty; z), g(b; v^\infty; z); A) + \Omega_m(\theta)B(b; v^\infty, z) + \delta v^\infty(x(b; v^\infty; z)) \\
&\geq u(r^\infty(b; z), g^\infty(b; z); A) + \Omega_m(\theta)B^\infty(b; z) + \delta v^\infty(x^\infty(b; z)) + \eta
\end{align*}
\]

for some \( b \), where \( B(b; v^\infty, z)) = B(r(b; v^\infty, z), g(b; v^\infty; z), x(b; v^\infty; z); b) \) and \( B^\infty(b; z) = B(r^\infty(b; z), g^\infty(b; z), x^\infty(b; z); b) \).

Since \( v^\infty \in F \), there must be a \( n_1 \) such that for \( n > n_1 \),

\[
\begin{align*}
&u(r^\infty(b; z), g^\infty(b; z); A) + \Omega_m(\theta)B^\infty(b; z) + \delta v^\infty(x^\infty(b; z)) \\
&\geq u(r^n(b; z), g^n(b; z); A) + \Omega_m(\theta)B^n(b; z) + \delta v^n(x^n(b; z)) - \frac{1}{n} \eta,
\end{align*}
\]

where \( B^n(b; z) = B(r^n(b; z), g^n(b; z), x^n(b; z); b) \). Since \( v^n \to v^\infty \) in sup norm, for any \( \eta \), we must have a \( n_2 > n_1 \) such that for \( n > n_2 \), we have

\[
\delta v^\infty(b) - \frac{1}{8} \eta \leq \delta v^n(b) \leq \delta v^\infty(b) + \frac{1}{8} \eta \quad \forall b \in [\underline{x}, \overline{x}].
\]

This implies that for \( n > n_2 \),

\[
\begin{align*}
&u(r(b; v^\infty, z), g(b; v^\infty, z); A) + \Omega_m(\theta)B(b; v^\infty, z) + \delta v^n(x(b; v^\infty; z)) \\
&\geq u(r^n(b; z), g^n(b; z); A) + \Omega_m(\theta)B^n(b; z) + \delta v^n(x^n(b; z)) + \frac{1}{2} \eta.
\end{align*}
\]

But then \( \{r^n(b; z), g^n(b; z), x^n(b; z)\} \notin P^*(v^n, z) \), a contradiction. \( \square \)

Let \( \Gamma(z) \) be the distribution function associated to \( z \) (that is well defined given \( G(A) \) and \( \varphi(\theta) \)). Define the correspondence from \( F \) into \( F \):

\[
T(v) = \left\{ \tilde{v}(b) \mid \exists l(b; z) \in Y(v, z) \text{ s.t. } \tilde{v}(b) = \int l(b; z) \Gamma(dz) \right\}.
\]

We then can state the following lemma.

**Lemma A.5.** The correspondence \( T(v) \) admits a fixed point \( v^* = T(v^*) \).

**Proof.** The fact that for \( v \in F, \tilde{v} \in T(v) \) is a uniformly bounded, weakly concave, and \( K \)-Lipschitz function is immediate. Moreover, since \( Y(v, z) \) is nonempty and convex-valued, then \( T(v) \) has these properties as well. To see that \( T(v) \) has a closed
graph, consider a sequence $v_n$ with $\lim_{n \to \infty} v_n = v$ and the associated sequence $\tilde{v}_n$ such that $\tilde{v}_n = \int l_n(b; z) \Gamma(dz)$ and $l_n(b; z) \in Y(v_n, z)$ for all $n$. Then since $v_n$ are all uniformly bounded, by the Lebesgue’s bounded convergence theorem, we have $\lim_{n \to \infty} \int l_n(b; z) \Gamma(dz) = \int \lim_{n \to \infty} l_n(b; z) \Gamma(dz)$. Define $l(b; z) = \lim_{n \to \infty} l_n(b; z)$. Since $Y(v, z)$ is a correspondence with a closed graph, we have $l(b; z) \in Y(v, z)$. It follows that $\tilde{v} = \lim_{n \to \infty} \tilde{v}_n = \int l(b; z) \Gamma(dz) \in T(v)$. We conclude that $T(v)$ is a nonempty and convex-valued correspondence from $F$ to $F$ with a closed graph (and therefore upper hemicontinuous, since $F$ is compact). The result follows from the Glicksberg–Fan theorem (see Theorem 9.2.2 in Smart 1974).

For any $v^* = T(v^*)$, let $l^*(b; z) \in Y(v^*, z)$ be the associated functions such that for any $A$, $v^*(b) = \int l^*(b; z) \Gamma(dz)$, and let $(r^*(b; v^*, z), g^*(b; v^*, z), x^*(b; v^*, z)) \in P^*(b; v^*, z)$, be the associated policy functions such that

\[
l^*(b; z) = u(r^*(b; v, z), g^*(b; v, z), x^*(b; v, z); A)
\]

\[+ \frac{1}{n} B(r^*(b; v, z), g^*(b; v, z), x^*(b; v, z); b) + \delta v(x^*(b; v, z)).
\]

Moreover, let $\mathcal{H}(\theta) = \{j \mid \theta^j \geq \theta^j \forall i = 1, \ldots, n\}$ with cardinality $|\mathcal{H}(\theta)|$, and define $s(b; v^*, z) = \{s^1(b; v^*, z), \ldots, s^n(b; v^*, z)\}$ with $s^i(b; v^*, z) = 0 \forall j \notin \mathcal{H}(\theta)$ and

\[
s^i(b; v^*, z) = \frac{B(r^*(b; v, z), g^*(b; v, z), x^*(b; v, z); b)}{|\mathcal{H}(\theta)|},
\]

otherwise. Then $(r^*(b; v^*, z), g^*(b; v^*, z), x^*(b; v^*, z), s^*(b; v^*, z))$ is an optimal strategy for a party when $v^*$ is the citizen’s value function. Moreover, when the optimal strategy is

\[
(r^*(b; v^*, z), g^*(b; v^*, z), x^*(b; v^*, z), s^*(b; v^*, z)),
\]

then the expected value function is $v^*$. We conclude that $v^*(b)$ and $(r^*(b; v^*, z), g^*(b; v^*, z), x^*(b; v^*, z), s^*(b; v^*, z))$ constitute a political equilibrium.

### A.4 Proof of Proposition 3

For a given equilibrium value function $v$, the properties of the policy functions depend on the solution of (13). Let $\lambda(b; z)$ be the Lagrangian multiplier of the first constraint in this problem in state $b, z$. If $\lambda(b; z) > 0$, then (13) admits a solution $(r(b; A), g(b; A), x(b; A))$ independent of $\theta^j$, with $r(b; A)$ and $x(b; A)$ increasing in $b$ and $A$, and $g(b; A)$ increasing in $A$ and decreasing in $b$. Consider now the case $\lambda(b; z) = 0$. We start with a preliminary result. For a state $z$, let $\mathcal{X}_z(v)$ be defined as in (27). Then we have the following lemma.

**Lemma A.6.** The set $\mathcal{X}_z(v)$ is a singleton for any $z$.

**Proof.** Assume not. Since $v$ is weakly concave, there must be constants $\beta, \beta'$ such that $\mathcal{X}_z(v) = [\beta, \beta']$. Let $\tilde{x} = \min\{R(r_z^2 - g_z^2)\}/\rho$. Assume first $\tilde{x} < \beta$. Then there must
be a $z'$ such that $R(r^*_z) - g^*_z - \rho B < 0$ and so $R(r^*_z) - g^*_z + x(b; z) - (1 + \rho)B < 0$ for any $x(b; z') \leq B$. Then there is an $\varepsilon > 0$ such that for all $b \in N_\varepsilon(B)$ and $z \in N_{\varepsilon}(z')$, $R(r^*_z) - g^*_z + x(b; z) - (1 + \rho)b < 0$ (where $N_\varepsilon(x)$ is a neighborhood of diameter $\varepsilon$ centered at $x$). It follows that in states $b \in N_\varepsilon(B) \cap [\beta, \bar{B}]$ and $z \in N_{\varepsilon}(z')$, we have $B(r(b; z), g(b; z), x(b; z); b) = 0$, and we can write $v(b; z)$ as the value of

$$
\max_{(r, \beta, x)} [u(r, g; A) + B(r, g, x; b) + \delta v(x)]
$$

s.t. $B(r, g, x; b) \geq 0$ and $x \in [x, \overline{x}]$.

It follows that for any $b \in N_{\varepsilon}(\overline{B}) \cap [\beta, \bar{B}]$ and $z \in N_{\varepsilon}(z')$, we have that $v(x; z)$ is strictly concave and so $\delta v(x)$ is strictly concave in $b \in N_{\varepsilon}(\overline{B}) \cap [\beta, \bar{B}]$ as well. This implies that it is not possible that $N_{\varepsilon}(\overline{B}) \cap [\beta, \bar{B}] \subseteq X_z(v)$, a contradiction.

We conclude that $\hat{x} \geq \bar{B}$. In this case, for all states $z$ and $b \in [\beta, \bar{B}]$, we have that equilibrium debt must be $x(b; z) \in [\beta, \bar{B}]$ and $B(r^*_z, g^*_z, x(b; z); b) \geq 0$ is never binding. Note that since $v(b)$ is concave, it has a right derivative, $v^+(x(b; z))$. Moreover, since $v$ is a fix point of $T(v)$, as defined in the proof of Proposition 2, from Step 1 of Lemma A.2, we have $-v^+(x) \leq (1 + \rho)/n$ or, equivalently, $-\delta v^+(x) \leq 1/n$. Since the previous inequality must be true for all $z$ (and so all $\theta$), we can then choose a $\theta$ such that $1/n < \Omega_{\theta}(\theta)$ (this is always possible since $\theta < \overline{\beta}$). It follows that $-\delta v^+(x) < \Omega_{\theta}(\theta)$ for all $z \in [\beta, \bar{B}]$. This implies that $x(b; z) > \bar{B}$, a contradiction.

By Lemma A.6, the solution $x_m(\theta)$ of (15) is uniquely defined. If $\lambda(b; z) = 0$, the solution of (13) is then $r_m(\theta), g_m(A, \theta), x_m(\theta)$, given by (14) and (15). Note that $r(b; A) \geq r_m(\theta), g(b; A) \leq g_m(A, \theta)$, and $x(b; A) \geq x_m(\theta)$ for any $b, z$. The case $\lambda(b; z) = 0$ is possible if and only if $B(r_m(\theta), g_m(A, \theta), x_m(\theta); b) \geq 0$. If we define $A_m(\theta, b)$ from $B(r_m(\theta), g_m(A_m(\theta, b), \theta), x_m(\theta); b) = 0$, we conclude that the solution will be $r_m(\theta), g_m(A, \theta)$, and $x_m(\theta)$ for $A \leq A_m(\theta, b)$, and $(r(b; A), g(b; A), x(b; A))$ otherwise, as stated in the proposition.

### A.5 Proof of Proposition 4

We show that for any initial state, there is a positive probability of reaching a state $z, b$ in which (21) is strict. From the discussion in Section 5, it is clear that this is proven if we show that for any initial state $A_0, h_0, b_0$, the set $S = \{z \mid B(b; z) > 0\}$ is reached with probability 1 (where $B(b; z) = B(r(b; z), g(b; z), x(b; z); b)$). To this goal, we show that there is an $\varepsilon > 0$ and a $T \geq 1$ such that for any initial state $z_0, b_0$, $\Pr((z_t)_{t=0}^T | B(b_T; z_T) > 0) \geq \varepsilon$. Assume not. Then, since $B(b, z) = 0$ with probability 1, we can recursively write the value function as (28). Note that (28) is a contraction. It admits a unique fixed point $v(b; A)$ that corresponds to the planner’s solution in the case in which $\mu_i = 1/n$ for all $i$. By Proposition 1, then, we have that the tax rate converges to 0, $g$ converges to $g_{1/n}(A)$, and debt converges to $\overline{x}$. In correspondence to this steady state, we have $B(0, g_{1/n}(A), x; \overline{x}) > 0$ for all realizations of $A$, a contradiction.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 5

Define the state space $S = [\bar{x}, \bar{x}]$ with associated $\sigma$-algebra $\mathcal{B}$, where $\mathcal{B}$ is the family of Borel sets that are subsets of $[\bar{x}, \bar{x}]$. For any subset $S \in \mathcal{B}$, let $\mu_t(S)$ denote the probability that $b$ lies in $S$ in period $t$. The probability distribution $\mu_1$ depends on the initial level of debt $b_0$. Let $Q_t(S|b)$ be the probability that a set $S$ is reached in one step if the initial state is $b$. The probability distribution $\mu_t \forall t \geq 2$ is defined inductively as $\mu_t(S) = \int_b Q(S|b)\mu_{t-1}(db)$. The probability distribution $\mu^*$ is an invariant distribution if $\mu^*(S) = \int_b Q(S|b)\mu^*(db)$. We now show that the sequence of distributions $\langle \mu_t \rangle_{t=1}^{\infty}$ converges strongly to a unique invariant distribution. Let $Q^1(S|b) = Q(S|b)$ and recursively define $Q^n(S|b) = \int_b Q(S|b')Q^{n-1}(db'|b)$. Thus, $Q^n(S|b)$ is the probability that a set $S$ is reached in $n$ steps if the initial state is $b$. It is easy to prove that the transition function defined by $Q(S|b)$ has the Feller property and that it is monotonic in $b$ (see Chapter 12.4 in Stokey et al. 1989 for definitions). Following the same steps as in Proposition 3 in Battaglini and Coate (2008), we can, moreover, prove that $Q^n(S|b)$ satisfies the following condition.

**Mixing Condition.** There exists an $\epsilon > 0$ and $m \geq 1$ such that $Q^m([x, x^*]|\bar{x}) \geq \epsilon$ and $Q^m([x^*, \bar{x}]|\bar{x}) \geq \epsilon$.

This condition requires that, for any $\epsilon > 0$, if we start out with the highest level of debt $\bar{x}$, then we will end up at $x^*$ with probability greater than $\epsilon$ after $m$ periods, whereas if we start out with the lowest level of debt $x$, we will end up above $x^*$ with probability greater than $\epsilon$ in $m$ periods. Given these properties, the fact that there is a unique invariant distribution follows by Theorem 11.12 in Stokey et al. (1989).

To characterize the remaining properties of the distribution, there are two cases to consider: $m < n$ and $m = n$. In the first case, the fact that the support of the distribution is as described in the proposition follows from Proposition 3. We only need to show that for all $b \in [\bar{x}, \bar{x}]$ and $A \in [\bar{A}, \bar{A}]$, we have $g(b; A) > 0$ and $r(b, A) < \bar{r}$. To see the first inequality, note first that if $A < A_m(\theta, b)$, then $r(b; z) = r_m(\theta) < \bar{r}$ and $g(b; A) \geq g_m(\mathbf{A}, \theta) > 0$. Assume, therefore, $A > A_m(\theta, b)$. In this case, by the first-order necessary condition, we must have $\alpha A(g(b; z))^{\alpha-1} = 1 + \lambda(b; z)$, where $\lambda(b; z)$ is the Lagrangian multiplier of the budget constraint in (28). As shown in Step 2 of Lemma A.2, $1 + \lambda(b; z) \leq \delta n K$, where $K$ is a constant defined in the proof of Proposition 2. It follows that $g(b; A) \geq [(\alpha A)/K]^{1/(1-\alpha)} > 0$. The proof that $r(b, A) < \bar{r}$ is analogous and, therefore, is omitted. To see that the distribution is nondegenerate when $m < n$, assume by contradiction that it converges to a constant $b^*$. If $A_m(\theta, b^*) < \bar{A}$, then debt is a function of $A$ with probability $1 - G(A_m(\theta, b^*)) > 0$; if $A_m(\theta, b^*) = \bar{A}$, then $-\delta v'(x_m(\theta; A)) = 1/n$. Note that we can always find a $\theta$ such that $\max_i \theta_i/(\sum_{i \in H(j)} \theta_i)/m > 1/n$. It follows that we must have a $\theta$ such that the steady state is $x_m(\theta) = \bar{x}$, and since the steady state is constant, this must be true for all $\theta$. When $b^* = \bar{x}$, however, $A_m(\theta, b^*) < \bar{A}$, a contradiction. For the second case, note that when $m = n$, the policies maximize a welfare function with weights $\mu_i = 1/n \forall i$. The properties of the equilibrium, therefore, follow from Proposition 1.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 6

For the result in the first bullet, note that under Assumption 2, the optimal reaction function of the parties corresponds to the maximization of a welfare function in which $\mu_i = 1/\beta n$ if $i$ is a neutral agent and $\mu_i = 0$ otherwise. The result, therefore, follows from Proposition 1. For the result in the second bullet, note that under Assumption 2, $\sigma$ is irrelevant for the fraction of votes received by a party in a district. The parties, therefore, solve (13) with $m = 1$. The result follows from Proposition 3.

References


