We consider general asset market environments in which agents with quasilinear payoffs are endowed with objects and have demands for other agents' objects. We show that if all agents have a maximum demand of one object and are endowed with at most one object, the VCG transfer of each agent is equal to the largest net Walrasian price of this agent. Consequently, the VCG deficit is equal to the sum of the largest net Walrasian prices over all agents. Generally, whenever Walrasian prices exist, the sum of the largest net Walrasian prices is a nonnegative lower bound for the deficit, implying that no dominant-strategy mechanism runs a budget surplus while respecting agents' ex post individual rationality constraints.

Keywords. Asset markets, efficient trade, VCG deficit, largest net Walrasian prices.

JEL classification. C72, D44, D47, D61.

1. Introduction

The prices set by a Walrasian auctioneer, who by assumption knows the demand and supply functions, are the same for the buyer and the seller of any given object traded. They balance supply and demand by ensuring that the agents’ optimal trades lead to an efficient allocation. In other words, Walrasian prices satisfy complete-information incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints for all agents while always balancing both supply and demand, as well as the budget. However, as they rest on the
assumption that the market maker knows the agents’ supply and demand functions, a long standing criticism has been that they fail to provide the agents with the incentives to reveal the information about values that is required to set market clearing prices in the first place.¹

The Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism achieves this feat by endowing all agents with dominant strategies to report their valuations truthfully. In general, VCG transfers are nonuniform and do not balance across agents that trade objects with each other. Moreover, for a large domain of problems, the VCG mechanism, while inducing an efficient allocation, also generates a deficit for the market maker. These fundamental differences between Walrasian and VCG prices are not surprising, given that they solve fundamentally different problems—market clearing under complete information about values and truthful revelation of values under private information, respectively.

In this paper, we show that there is a deep and tight connection between Walrasian prices and VCG transfers. We study general trading environments in which agents with quasilinear payoffs may be endowed with objects that they value and have demands for other agents’ objects; hence, each agent may sell some objects and buy other ones. Define the net price of an agent in any Walrasian price vector as the sum of prices of the objects he sells minus the sum of prices of the objects he buys. If all agents are single-object traders, that is, have a maximum demand of one object and are endowed with at most one object, our first main result—Theorem 1—states that the largest net price that an agent receives in any Walrasian price vector is equal to the VCG transfer he receives. As a consequence, the sum of the largest net Walrasian prices over all agents equals the VCG deficit. Intuitively, for each agent, the largest net Walrasian price is equal to his externality on the other agents, which by definition is his VCG transfer.

Unless all agents have additive payoffs, Theorem 1 does not extend to environments with multiobject traders because Walrasian prices are individual to each object and, unlike VCG transfers, do not necessarily represent the social value of a bundle of objects. However, our second main result—Theorem 2—states that, as long as a Walrasian equilibrium exists, the relationship remains as a lower bound: each agent’s VCG transfer is weakly greater than his largest net Walrasian price; hence, the sum of largest net Walrasian prices over all agents constitutes a nonnegative lower bound for the VCG deficit.

These general results have several insightful corollaries in more specialized settings. Consider first what, following Shapley and Shubik (1972), may be called two-sided allocation problems. These are problems in which every agent’s trading position is independent of types and determined a priori: agents without endowments either buy or do not trade and agents with endowments either sell or do not trade. Two-sided allocation problems include the problems that motivated the papers by Vickrey (1961) and Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).² The bilateral trade problem of Myerson and Satterthwaite is the simplest possible setting in this domain. Assuming the buyer’s value and

¹See, for example, Arrow (1959).
²Shapley and Shubik (1972) call these problems two-sided market games, but as the term “two-sided market” now has a very specific and different meaning in the Industrial Organization literature, our terminology seems preferable.
the seller’s value are elements of the same compact interval, the deficit under the VCG mechanism is equal to the difference between the buyer’s and the seller’s value whenever trade is ex post efficient. Any price between the seller’s and the buyer’s value is a Walrasian price; hence, the deficit is equal to the difference between the largest and the smallest Walrasian prices. With a homogeneous good market (in which every agent sees all objects as identical) and multiple single-object buyers and sellers, this result generalizes; the deficit under the VCG mechanism is equal to the Walrasian price gap times the quantity traded.

An implication of Theorem 1 is that these insights generalize beyond the narrow confines of homogeneous good markets. Specifically, for two-sided allocation problems with single-object traders, the result implies that the deficit under the VCG mechanism is equal to the sum of the Walrasian gaps over the objects that are traded under efficiency. The reason is that in two-sided allocation problems the largest net Walrasian price of every buyer (seller) is equal to the lowest (highest) Walrasian price for the object he trades. Put differently, for these two-sided environments with single-object traders, the—extremal—Walrasian prices provide the traders with precisely the right incentives to reveal their valuations. The subtle but important twist is that incentive compatible information revelation requires the use of two different Walrasian prices for every object that is traded, one on each side of the market, thereby generating a deficit on every object that is traded. If we still assume two-sided allocation problems but allow for buyers to have demand for multiple objects and for sellers to be endowed with more than one object, Theorem 2 implies that the sum of the Walrasian price gaps over the objects traded under efficiency is a lower bound for the deficit under VCG.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an illustrative example. Section 3 presents the general setup and basic concepts such as asset markets and the deficit under the VCG mechanism. Section 4 introduces the concept of largest net Walrasian prices. Sections 5 and 6 contain the main results for single-object and multi-object traders, respectively. Section 7 analyzes in detail two important special cases, namely two-sided allocation problems and homogeneous good markets. Section 8 provides a comprehensive discussion of the related literature. Section 9 concludes the paper. Proofs are in Appendix A and additional background material is in Appendix B.

2. An illustrative example

An example is useful to illustrate how largest net Walrasian prices are calculated and how they relate to VCG transfers. Suppose there are two agents, Leon and William. Leon owns a rare book and William is endowed with a collection of stamps. Leon’s value for the book is 5 and his value for the stamp collection is 7 while William’s value for the book

3See, for example, Krishna (2002) for a proof along these lines. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) implicitly noted an implication of this result when they observed that, with identical supports, the subsidy that would be required for efficiency is equal to the ex ante expected welfare under efficiency.

4Our results on homogeneous good markets in Section 7 generalize those of Tatur (2005) and Loertscher and Mezzetti (2019).
is 3 and his value for the stamp collection is 2. Neither of them gets additional value from a second object. Welfare is therefore maximized when the book is allocated to William and the stamp collection to Leon, which generates a welfare of 10. The situation is summarized in the following matrix. The endowment is shown in bold face and the efficient allocation is shown with square boxes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>book</th>
<th>stamps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leon</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The VCG transfer made to Leon is the difference between the welfare and his value for the good he obtains under the efficient allocation, which is 10 minus 7, and the maximum welfare without him and his endowment, which is 2. Thus, the VCG transfer Leon obtains is 1. Applying the same logic, William receives a VCG transfer of 2. Hence, the resulting deficit is 3.

Consider now the set of Walrasian prices. It is not hard to see that it takes the form depicted in Figure 1, where $p_1$ is the price of the book and $p_2$ is the price of the stamp collection. Leon’s largest net Walrasian price is the largest difference, among all the Walrasian price vectors, between the price of the book he sells ($p_1$) and the price of the stamp collection he acquires ($p_2$). In Figure 1, it is equal to the vertical (or equivalently the horizontal) distance between the lowest line of slope 1 that touches the set of Walrasian prices (displayed in red) and the 45-degree line, which is equal to 1.

Likewise, William’s largest net Walrasian price is the largest difference between the price for the stamp collection William sells and the book he acquires. In Figure 1,

---

5We generalize this in Section 5 (Example 1) and provide full details in Appendix B.1. As we show there, $p = (p_1, p_2)$ is a Walrasian price if and only if $0 \leq p_1 \leq 3$ and $\max\{0, p_1 - 1\} \leq p_2 \leq p_1 + 2$. 

---
William’s largest net Walrasian price is equal to the horizontal or vertical distance between the highest line of slope 1 that touches the set of Walrasian prices, which is displayed in blue, and the 45-degree line. This difference is 2. It follows that each agent’s largest net Walrasian price is equal to his VCG transfer, and consequently, the sum of the largest net Walrasian prices is equal to the deficit under VCG.

3. Preliminaries

We consider an asset market with a finite set of agents $A$ with typical element $a$ and a finite set of objects $O$ with typical element $o$. An allocation $X = (X_a)_{a \in A}$ assigns to each agent $a \in A$ a bundle $X_a \subseteq O$. An allocation $X$ is feasible if $\bigcup_{a \in A} X_a \subseteq O$ and $X_a \cap X_{a'} = \emptyset$ for any $a, a' \in A$ with $a \neq a'$. We denote by $\mathcal{X}$ the set of all feasible allocations. Each object, or asset, is indivisible and is initially owned by an agent. Formally, an endowment $E = (E_a)_{a \in A}$ is a feasible allocation such that, for every $a \in A$, $E_a$ is the bundle endowed to agent $a$ with $E$ satisfying $\bigcup_{a \in A} E_a = O$. That is, under $E$ every object is allocated to exactly one agent. Being endowed with $E_a$ means that $a$ has complete property rights over the objects in $E_a$, so that $a$ can exclude all other agents from consuming these objects.

For every agent $a \in A$, let $\Theta_a$, with typical element $\theta_a$, be agent $a$’s type space. Denote the type space by $\Theta = \times_{a \in A} \Theta_a$, with typical element $\theta$. The valuation (or willingness to pay) of agent $a$ with type $\theta_a$ for any bundle of objects $Y \subseteq O$ is denoted by

$$v_a(Y, \theta_a).$$

We normalize the value of the empty bundle to zero, that is, $v_a(\emptyset, \theta_a) = 0$ for every $a \in A$ and every $\theta_a \in \Theta_a$, and assume that for each type $\theta_a$ valuations are monotone; that is, for every $a \in A$, any $Y, Z \subseteq O$ with $Y \subseteq Z$, and any $\theta_a \in \Theta_a$,

$$v_a(Y, \theta_a) \leq v_a(Z, \theta_a).$$

This assumption is often referred to as “free-disposal,” as it captures the idea that agents can freely dispose of any unwanted objects. Because valuations are monotone, without loss of generality we can restrict, as do Gul and Stacchetti (1999), the set of feasible allocations $\mathcal{X}$ to allocations $X$ in which each object is assigned to exactly one agent, that is, $\bigcup_{a \in A} X_a = O$.\(^6\) As each agent $a$ has complete property rights over the objects in $E_a$, it follows that $v_a(E_a, \theta_a)$ is the value of $a$’s outside option when $a$’s type is $\theta_a$.

We also assume that each agent $a \in A$ has a sufficiently large amount of money, say more than $\max_{\theta_a \in \Theta_a} v_a(O, \theta_a)$, and that payoffs are quasilinear in money: if $a$ is allocated a bundle $Y \subseteq O$ and receives an additional money transfer $t \in \mathbb{R}$, then his payoff is\(^7\)

$$v_a(Y, \theta_a) + t.$$

\(^6\)All of our results would go through if we assumed instead, like Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997), that some objects may not be allocated. In a nutshell, the reason is that any object that is not allocated in a Walrasian equilibrium must have a zero Walrasian price, and by the monotonicity of valuations, must also have a zero Walrasian price if it has to be allocated to some agent.

\(^7\)The assumption that each agent has a sufficiently large money endowment is standard; see, for example, Gul and Stacchetti (1999) and Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997). The latter observed that it guarantees that the initial endowment of objects to the agents is “irrelevant for the existence of market clearing prices.”
Fixing a type vector $\theta \in \Theta$, the **welfare** created by the allocation $X \in \mathcal{X}$ is

$$W(X, \theta) = \sum_{a \in A} v_a(X_a, \theta_a).$$

We denote by

$$X^*(\theta) = \arg \max_{X \in \mathcal{X}} W(X, \theta)$$

the set of **efficient allocations**. As $\mathcal{X}$ is finite, the existence of an efficient allocation is guaranteed; however, it may not be unique. We denote a typical efficient allocation by $X^*(\theta) \in \mathcal{X}^*(\theta)$. If $X^*(\theta)$ contains multiple elements, then $X^*(\theta)$ may be chosen arbitrarily among them. We denote by

$$W^*(\theta) = W(X^*(\theta), \theta)$$

the **efficient level of welfare**. When there is no risk of confusion, we drop the dependency on types and write $v_a(Y)$ for the value that agent $a$ assigns to bundle $Y$, $X^* \in X^*$ for a typical efficient allocation, and $W^*$ for the efficient level of welfare.

For any $\mathcal{I} \subseteq A$ and any $\mathcal{K} \subseteq O$, let $W^*_{\mathcal{I}, \mathcal{K}}$ denote the level of welfare achieved among the agents in $A \setminus \mathcal{I}$ when the objects in $O \setminus \mathcal{K}$ are efficiently allocated to these agents. Then

$$W^* - W^*_{\mathcal{I}, \mathcal{K}}$$

represents the joint **marginal contribution** of the agents in $\mathcal{I}$ and the objects in $\mathcal{K}$.

A **mechanism** is a pair $\langle \chi, t \rangle$, where $\chi : \Theta \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$ is the **allocation rule** and $t : \Theta \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^{|A|}$ is the **payment rule**. Thus, given reports $\theta$, $\chi(\theta)$ is the allocation and each agent $a \in A$ receives $t_a(\theta)$, which may be positive or negative. The social planner incurs a **deficit** from mechanism $\langle \chi, t \rangle$ equal to the sum of the transfers that the social planner makes to the agents, that is, the deficit is $^8$

$$D(\chi, t)(\theta) = \sum_{a \in A} t_a(\theta).$$

A mechanism $\langle \chi, t \rangle$ is **efficient** if it always selects an efficient allocation, that is, if $\chi(\theta)$ is efficient for every $\theta \in \Theta$, and **ex post individually rational (EIR)** if every agent has an incentive to participate, that is, if for all $\theta \in \Theta$ and all $a \in A$,

$$v_a(\chi_a(\theta), \theta_a) + t_a(\theta) \geq v_a(\mathcal{E}_a, \theta_a)$$

holds. A mechanism $\langle \chi, t \rangle$ is **dominant strategy incentive compatible (DIC)** if every agent has a dominant strategy to report his true type; that is, for every agent $a \in A$ with true type $\theta_a \in \Theta_a$, every report $\hat{\theta}_a \in \Theta_a$, and every vector of reports $\theta_{-a} \in \Theta_{-a}$ from other agents,

$$v_a(\chi_a(\theta_a, \theta_{-a}), \theta_a) + t_a(\theta_a, \theta_{-a}) \geq v_a(\chi_a(\hat{\theta}_a, \theta_{-a}), \theta_a) + t_a(\hat{\theta}_a, \theta_{-a}).$$

$^8$The **revenue** to the social planner from the mechanism is then $-D(\chi, t)(\theta)$. As the paper focuses on settings in which the deficit is positive (hence, the revenue is negative), we refer throughout to the deficit (rather than the revenue) for simplicity.
Fixing a type vector $\theta$, the VCG mechanism $(\chi^{\text{VCG}}, t^{\text{VCG}})$ selects an efficient allocation $\chi^{\text{VCG}} \in X^*$ and makes a transfer to each agent equal to his externality on other agents, that is, for all $a \in A$,

$$t^{\text{VCG}}_a(\chi^{\text{VCG}}) = W^*_{-a,-\chi^{\text{VCG}}} - W^*_{-a,-\varepsilon_a}.$$ 

When $a$ is present, he is efficiently assigned the bundle of objects $\chi^{\text{VCG}}_a$ and the remaining objects in $O \setminus \chi^{\text{VCG}}_a$ are efficiently allocated among the remaining agents in $A \setminus \{a\}$. Therefore, the first term $W^*_{-a,-\chi^{\text{VCG}}}$ represents the level of welfare that agents other than $a$ achieve when $a$ is present. When agent $a$ is absent, so are the objects in his endowment, and the remaining objects in $O \setminus \varepsilon_a$ are efficiently allocated among the remaining agents in $A \setminus \{a\}$. Therefore, the second term $W^*_{-a,-\varepsilon_a}$ represents the level of welfare that agents other than $a$ achieve when $a$ is absent. The difference between the two is $a$’s externality on other agents. In the VCG mechanism, the payoff of agent $a$ is equal to his marginal contribution: $v_a(\chi^{\text{VCG}}_a) + t^{\text{VCG}}_a(\chi^{\text{VCG}}_a) = W^*_{-a,\chi^{\text{VCG}}_a} - W^*_{-a,-\varepsilon_a}.$

Note that in the VCG mechanism, if $a$ does not trade, then $\chi^{\text{VCG}}_a = \varepsilon_a$ so $W^*_{-a,\chi^{\text{VCG}}_a} = W^*_{-a,-\varepsilon_a}$ and $a$ receives a transfer of 0. If $a$ only sells, then $\chi^{\text{VCG}}_a \subset \varepsilon_a$ so $W^*_{-a,\chi^{\text{VCG}}_a} \geq W^*_{-a,-\varepsilon_a}$ and $a$ receives a weakly positive transfer. If $a$ only buys, then $\varepsilon_a \subset \chi^{\text{VCG}}_a$ so $W^*_{-a,\chi^{\text{VCG}}_a} \leq W^*_{-a,-\varepsilon_a}$ and $a$ receives a weakly negative transfer. Otherwise, the sign of the VCG transfer that $a$ receives depends on whether the bundle that $a$ sells or the bundle that $a$ buys has the larger value to other agents.

It follows that the deficit under the VCG mechanism is

$$\sum_{a \in A} t^{\text{VCG}}_a(\chi^{\text{VCG}}_a) = \sum_{a \in A} [W^*_{-a,\chi^{\text{VCG}}_a} - W^*_{-a,-\varepsilon_a}].$$

We make two assumptions, which guarantee that the type space is “sufficiently rich.” First, for each agent $a$, all $\theta_a, \theta'_a \in \Theta_a$, and all $\lambda \in [0, 1]$, there exists $\theta''_a$ such that $v_a(Y, \theta''_a) = \lambda v_a(Y, \theta'_a) + (1 - \lambda) v_a(Y, \theta'_a)$ for all $Y \subseteq O$. This implies that the set of valuations $V_a = \{v_a(\cdot, \theta_a) | \theta_a \in \Theta_a\}$, and hence, $V = \times_{a \in A} V_a$, is convex so that we can apply Theorem 2 in Holmström (1979), which states that a mechanism is efficient and DIC if and only if it belongs to the class of Groves mechanisms (which includes the VCG mechanism).

The second “richness” assumption we impose on the type space implies that the VCG mechanism is not only efficient and DIC, but also EIR and has the lowest lump-sum transfer to each agent compatible with efficiency, DIC and EIR: For every $a$ and every $\theta_{-a} \in \Theta_{-a}$, there exists a type $\theta_a(\theta_{-a}) \in \Theta_a$ such that $X'_a(\theta_a(\theta_{-a}), \theta_{-a}) = \varepsilon_a$.

The vector of VCG transfers depends on which efficient allocation the mechanism picks because the transfer that $a$ receives depends on the bundle he is allocated, opening the possibility that the VCG deficit depends on the efficient allocation chosen. However, our next result shows that this is not the case, and hence, we may denote the deficit by $D^{\text{VCG}}$ without reference to the efficient allocation selected.
Claim 1. For any two efficient allocations $X^*, X^♯ ∈ X^*$,
\[
\sum_{a ∈ A} [W^*_{-a, -X^*_a} - W^*_{-a, -E_a}] = \sum_{a ∈ A} [W^*_{-a, -X^♯_a} - W^*_{-a, -E_a}] = D^{VCG}.
\]

Claim 1 is a simple consequence of the fact that the deficit can be written as the sum of the marginal values, which are independent of the allocation.

4. Largest net Walrasian prices

In this section, we introduce the concept of the largest net Walrasian price for an agent $a$, which will play a fundamental role in the main results of this paper.

A price vector $p = (p_o)_{o ∈ O}$ is a $|O|$-dimensional vector that assigns a price to each object. The price vector $p = (p_o)_{o ∈ O}$ is a Walrasian price vector if there is an allocation $X = (X_a)_{a ∈ A}$ such that, for all $a ∈ A$ and for all $Y ⊆ O$:
\[
v_a(X_a) - \sum_{o ∈ X_a} p_o ≥ v_a(Y) - \sum_{o ∈ Y} p_o.
\]

If this condition is satisfied, then $X$ is a Walrasian allocation, supported by the Walrasian price vector $p = (p_o)_{o ∈ O}$. In other words, a Walrasian price vector is such that every agent finds it optimal to purchase the bundle that the agent is assigned under the Walrasian allocation.

As shown in Proposition 1 of Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997), if Walrasian prices exist, then the Walrasian allocation is efficient. Thus, the Walrasian price vector $p = (p_o)_{o ∈ O}$ supports an efficient allocation $X^* ∈ X^*$. We verify next that, should there be multiple efficient allocations, Walrasian prices do not depend on which one is chosen.

Claim 2. If a price vector $p$ supports an efficient allocation, then $p$ supports all efficient allocations.

To the best of our knowledge, Claim 2 was first derived by Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997) as Corollary 1 of their main result. For the purpose of keeping the paper self-contained, we provide a direct proof in Appendix A. Claim 2 implies that a Walrasian price vector can be equivalently defined to be a price vector that supports all efficient allocations. Given a type vector $θ ∈ Θ$, we denote by $P^W(θ)$ the set of Walrasian price vectors. Note also that the initial ownership of the objects plays no role in determining the set of Walrasian price vectors, nor does it affect the efficient allocation(s) and welfare. However, the initial ownership will matter in the VCG mechanism because $v^{VCG}_a(X^*_{a}) = W^*_{-a, -X^*_{a}} - W^*_{-a, -E_a}$ depends on $E_a$.

Given a price vector $p = (p_o)_{o ∈ O}$, the net price received by agent $a ∈ A$ is
\[
\sum_{o ∈ E_a \setminus X^*_a} p_o - \sum_{o ∈ X^*_{a} \setminus E_a} p_o.
\]
That is, agent $a$ is paid for the objects he sells and pays for the objects he buys; the net price he receives is the difference between the two (which may be positive or negative).
At an efficient allocation $X^* \in X^*$, the **largest net Walrasian price** received by agent $a \in A$, denoted $\overline{q}_a(X^*)$, is the largest net price that agent $a$ can receive under any Walrasian price vector. Formally,

$$\overline{q}_a(X^*) = \max_{(p_o)_{o \in \mathcal{O} \in \mathcal{P}_W}} \left[ \sum_{o \in \mathcal{E}_a \setminus X^*_a} p_o - \sum_{o \in X^*_a \setminus \mathcal{E}_a} p_o \right].$$

We denote by $\overline{q}(X^*) = (\overline{q}_a(X^*))_{a \in A}$ the vector of largest net Walrasian prices. Clearly, the largest net Walrasian prices are defined if and only if the set of Walrasian prices is nonempty.

An agent’s largest net Walrasian price may depend on which efficient allocation is chosen because this affects which objects the agent buys and sells. However, these differences cancel out when summing over all agents; hence, the sum of the largest net Walrasian prices is the same no matter what efficient allocation is picked.

**Claim 3.** For any $X^*, X^\sharp \in X^*$, $\sum_{a \in A} \overline{q}_a(X^*) = \sum_{a \in A} \overline{q}_a(X^\sharp)$.

Consequently, we can simply denote the sum of the largest net Walrasian prices by $\overline{Q} = \sum_{a \in A} \overline{q}_a(X^*)$.

5. **Single-object traders**

We now consider an asset market where every agent is a single-object trader and derive our first main result, Theorem 1.

An agent is a **single-object trader** if he is endowed with at most one object and is interested in consuming at most one object. The formal definition follows.

**Definition 1.** Agent $a \in A$ is a **single-object trader** if:

(i) $|\mathcal{E}_a| \leq 1$, and

(ii) $v_a(Y, \theta_a) = \max_{o \in Y} v_a(\{o\}, \theta_a)$ for all nonempty $Y \subseteq \mathcal{O}$ and all $\theta_a \in \Theta_a$.

With single-object traders, the set of Walrasian price vectors is nonempty (see Demange, 1982, Leonard, 1983, Gul and Stacchetti, 1999); hence, largest net Walrasian prices are well-defined.

**Theorem 1.** Suppose that all agents are single-object traders. Then, for every efficient allocation $X^* \in X^*$,

$$i^{VCG}(X^*) = \overline{q}(X^*) \quad \text{and} \quad D^{VCG} = \overline{Q} \geq 0.$$

Theorem 1 states that, when all agents are single-object traders, the VCG mechanism pays each agent his largest net Walrasian price. Therefore, the social planner sustains a deficit equal to the sum of the largest net Walrasian prices. While each individual largest net Walrasian price may be positive or negative, their sum is always weakly positive;
The endowment (shown in boldface) is making a series of binding constraints rather than just one. Suppose, for example, that there is a difference being that the largest difference between two prices may be pinned down by a VCG transfer. Walrasian price is equal to his externality on the other agent, which by definition is his presence between a object are neither agent gets additional value from a second object, and the valuations for each object are

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
  v_{a_1}(\{o_1\}) & v_{a_1}(\{o_2\}) \\
v_{a_2}(\{o_1\}) & v_{a_2}(\{o_2\})
\end{pmatrix}.
\]

The endowment (shown in boldface) is \(o_1\) endowed to \(a_1\) and \(o_2\) endowed to \(a_2\). The unique efficient allocation (shown in square boxes) is \(o_1\) allocated to \(a_2\) and \(o_2\) allocated to \(a_1\).

\[\diamond\]

As agents must prefer consuming the efficient allocation to consuming their endowments, Walrasian prices \(p_{o_1}\) and \(p_{o_2}\) satisfy\(v_{a_1}(\{o_2\}) - p_{o_2} \geq v_{a_1}(\{o_1\}) - p_{o_1}\) and \(v_{a_2}(\{o_1\}) - p_{o_1} \geq v_{a_2}(\{o_2\}) - p_{o_2}\), which is equivalent to

\[p_{o_2} - p_{o_1} \leq v_{a_1}(\{o_2\}) - v_{a_1}(\{o_1\}) \quad \text{and} \quad p_{o_1} - p_{o_2} \leq v_{a_2}(\{o_1\}) - v_{a_2}(\{o_2\}).\]

The first inequality provides an upper bound for the difference \(p_{o_2} - p_{o_1}\), which is the net Walrasian price of agent \(a_2\). That upper bound is then the largest net Walrasian price \(\bar{q}_{a_2}(X^*)\) of agent \(a_2\). It is entirely pinned down by the requirement that agent \(a_1\) pick \(o_2\) over \(o_1\), and it is equal to \(a_2\)’s externality on \(a_1\): \(a_1\) consumes \(o_2\) if \(a_2\) is there and \(o_1\) otherwise. Similarly, the second inequality provides an upper bound for \(p_{o_1} - p_{o_2}\), the net Walrasian price of agent \(a_1\). That upper bound is the largest net Walrasian price \(\bar{q}_{a_1}(X^*)\) of agent \(a_1\) and is equal to \(a_1\)’s externality on \(a_2\). It follows that each agent’s largest net Walrasian price is equal to his externality on the other agent, which by definition is his VCG transfer.

This intuition extends to an arbitrary number of single-object traders, the only difference being that the largest difference between two prices may be pinned down by a series of binding constraints rather than just one. Suppose, for example, that there is a third agent \(a_3\) who is endowed with \(o_3\) and that the efficient allocation has \(o_2\) allocated to \(a_1\), \(o_3\) to \(a_2\), and \(o_1\) to \(a_3\). The largest net Walrasian price of \(a_1\) is the largest difference between \(p_{o_1}\) (the price of the object he sells) and \(p_{o_2}\) (the price of the object he buys). That difference may now be pinned down by two binding constraints (instead of one as in Example 1): \(a_3\) is indifferent between acquiring \(o_1\) or keeping \(o_3\) while \(a_2\) is indifferent between acquiring \(o_3\) or keeping \(o_2\). That is, \(v_{a_3}(\{o_1\}) - p_{o_1} = v_{a_3}(\{o_3\}) - p_{o_3}\) and \(v_{a_3}(\{o_3\}) - p_{o_3} = v_{a_2}(\{o_2\}) - p_{o_2}\) and, therefore, the maximum difference between \(p_{o_1}\) and \(p_{o_2}\) is \(v_{a_3}(\{o_1\}) + v_{a_2}(\{o_3\}) - v_{a_3}(\{o_3\}) - v_{a_2}(\{o_2\})\). The two binding constraints pin down the chain of reallocations that occur when \(a_1\) leaves, taking \(o_1\) with him but making \(o_2\) available to other agents: \(o_2\) will efficiently go to \(a_2\) and \(o_3\) will efficiently go to \(a_3\). Thus, \(v_{a_3}(\{o_1\}) + v_{a_2}(\{o_3\}) - v_{a_3}(\{o_3\}) - v_{a_2}(\{o_2\})\) is also \(a_1\)’s externality on other...
agents, which is his VCG transfer. In general, the largest net Walrasian price of an agent is a boundary point of the set of Walrasian prices, defined by up to $|A| - 1$ binding constraints. The constraints that bind are those that prevent agents from choosing the next best allocation.

By Theorem 1, with single-object traders the VCG transfer of each agent coincides with the highest net payment the agent would receive if trade took place at Walrasian prices. This suggests the following two-stage *Walrasian price choice mechanism*. In the first stage, agents report their types. Based on the reports, the planner determines the set of Walrasian prices and chooses an efficient allocation. In the second stage, the planner requires the agents to trade so as to implement the chosen allocation, but allows each of them to choose the Walrasian price vector at which his trades occur.

As the largest net Walrasian price is equal to the VCG transfers associated with the efficient allocation based on reports, truthfully reporting the type and choosing the price vector that yields the largest net Walrasian price is a dominant strategy for each agent. Hence, we have the following corollary of Theorem 1.

**Corollary 1.** Suppose that all agents are single-object traders. Then every efficient allocation $X^* \in X^*$ and its associated VCG transfers $t_{VCG}(X^*) = \overline{q}(X^*)$ can be implemented by the Walrasian price choice mechanism.

It is well known that the VCG mechanism has a two-stage implementation in which the planner determines the transfers for every allocation based on the agents’ reports in the first stage, and in the second stage each agent chooses his preferred allocation. The Walrasian price choice mechanism reverses what the planner does in the first and second stage and has the agents choose prices rather than an allocation. In that sense, it is the “dual” of the two-stage VCG mechanism.

**6. Multiobject traders**

We now drop the assumption that agents are single-object traders and return to the model of a general asset market.

We begin by showing that Theorem 1 extends when payoffs are additive. Formally, the valuation of agent $a \in A$ is *additively separable* if, for every type $\theta_a \in \Theta_a$ and every bundle $Y \subseteq O$, we have that

$$v_a(Y, \theta_a) = \sum_{o \in Y} v_a(\{o\}, \theta_a).$$

**Proposition 1.** Suppose that all agents have additively separable valuations. Then, for every efficient allocation $X^* \in X^*$,

$$t_{VCG}(X^*) = \overline{q}(X^*) \quad \text{and} \quad D_{VCG} = \overline{Q} \geq 0.$$

When all agents have additively separable valuations, each object is efficiently allocated to whichever agent has the highest value for that object, irrespective of how other
objects are allocated. Beyond this special case, largest net Walrasian prices constitute a nonnegative lower bound (as shown in Theorem 2 below) for the VCG transfers but may not be equal to them. The intuition behind the discrepancy is that Walrasian prices are individual to each object while VCG transfers are based on bundles. If all agents are single-object traders, the bundles are irrelevant since agents are efficiently allocated at most one object while if all agents have additively separable valuations, they value bundles just like they value individual objects. However, in general, an agent may be allocated a bundle that he values differently to the individual objects in it, and this may create a difference between largest net Walrasian prices and VCG transfers.

Example 2. There are two agents \(a_1\) and \(a_2\) and two objects \(o_1\) and \(o_2\). The valuations are

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
  v_a(\{o_1\}) & v_a(\{o_2\}) & v_a(\{o_1,o_2\}) \\
  a_1 & 5 & 7 & 12 \\
  a_2 & 3 & 2 & 4
\end{bmatrix}
\]

The endowment (shown in boldface) is both objects endowed to \(a_2\). The (unique) efficient allocation (shown in square boxes) is both objects allocated to \(a_1\).

In Example 2, \(a_2’s\) valuation is submodular: his value for the bundle \(\{o_1, o_2\}\) is less than the sum of his standalone values for \(o_1\) and \(o_2\). As we now show, this creates a difference between \(a_1’s\) largest net Walrasian prices and VCG transfer.\(^9\) The set of Walrasian price vectors—displayed in Figure 2, which we also use for Examples 3 and 4 below—contains all price vectors \((p_{o_1}, p_{o_2})\) such that \(p_{o_1} \in [3, 5]\) and \(p_{o_2} \in [2, 7]\); as \(a_1\) buys

---

\(^9\)We provide detailed derivations of the net Walrasian prices and VCG transfers for all our examples in Appendix B.1.
both objects from $a_2$, it follows that the largest net Walrasian prices are

$$q_{a_1} = \max_{(p_1, p_2) \in P_W} [-p_1 - p_2] = -5 \quad \text{and} \quad q_{a_2} = \max_{(p_1, p_2) \in P_W} [p_1 + p_2] = 12.$$

As both objects are efficiently allocated to $a_1$, the VCG transfers are

$$t^\text{VCG}_{a_1} = W^* - a_1, -o_1 - W^* - a_1, -o_2 = 0 - 4 = -4 \quad \text{and} \quad t^\text{VCG}_{a_2} = W^* - a_2, -o_1 - W^* - a_2, -o_2 = 12 - 0 = 12.$$

So the VCG deficit is

$$D^\text{VCG} = t^\text{VCG}_{a_1} + t^\text{VCG}_{a_2} = -4 + 12 = 8.$$

Therefore, $a_1$’s largest net Walrasian price is strictly smaller than his VCG transfer and, as a result, the sum of the largest net Walrasian prices ($-5 + 12 = 7$) is strictly smaller than the VCG deficit ($-4 + 12 = 8$).

Example 2 shows that VCG transfers may exceed largest net Walrasian prices when an agent’s valuation is submodular. The next example shows this can also occur when an agent’s valuation is supermodular.

**Example 3.** There are two agents $a_1$ and $a_2$ and two objects $o_1$ and $o_2$. The valuations are

$$a_1 \begin{bmatrix} v_a(\{o_1\}) & v_a(\{o_2\}) & v_a(\{o_1, o_2\}) \\ 3 & 9 & 12 \\ 4 & 4 & 9 \end{bmatrix}.$$

The endowment (shown in boldface) is: object $o_1$ endowed to $a_1$ and object $o_2$ endowed to $a_2$. The (unique) efficient allocation (shown in square boxes) is object $o_2$ allocated to $a_1$ and object $o_1$ allocated to $a_2$.

In Example 3, $a_2$’s valuation is supermodular: his value for the bundle $\{o_1, o_2\}$ is greater than the sum of his values for $o_1$ and $o_2$.

The set of Walrasian price vectors contains all price vectors $(p_1, p_2)$ such that $p_1 \in [3, 4]$ and $p_2 \in [5, 9]$; as $a_1$ buys $o_2$ from $a_2$ and $a_2$ buys $o_1$ from $a_1$, it follows that the largest net Walrasian prices are

$$q_{a_1} = \max_{(p_1, p_2) \in P_W} [p_1 - p_2] = -1 \quad \text{and} \quad q_{a_2} = \max_{(p_1, p_2) \in P_W} [p_2 - p_1] = 6.$$

The VCG transfers are

$$t^\text{VCG}_{a_1} = W^* - a_1, -o_2 - W^* - a_1, -o_1 = 4 - 4 = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad t^\text{VCG}_{a_2} = W^* - a_2, -o_1 - W^* - a_2, -o_2 = 9 - 3 = 6.$$

Therefore, the VCG deficit is $6 (= 0 + 6)$ and exceeds the sum of the largest net Walrasian prices, which is $5 (= -1 + 6)$.

As is well known, an agent’s VCG transfer does not depend on his own valuation; hence, the same is true of an agent’s largest net Walrasian price when the two are equal.
to each other. Examples 2 and 3 might suggest that largest net Walrasian prices conserve this property when they are different from VCG transfers since \( a_1 \)'s largest net Walrasian price is smaller than his VCG transfer but only depends on \( a_2 \)'s valuation. However, our last example shows that an agent’s largest net Walrasian price may depend on his own valuation.

**Example 4.** There are two agents \( a_1 \) and \( a_2 \) and two objects \( o_1 \) and \( o_2 \). Let \( \varepsilon \in (0, 1) \). The valuations are

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
3 & 3 & 4 \\
4 & 6 + \varepsilon & 6 + \varepsilon
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

The endowment (shown in boldface) is objects \( o_1 \) and \( o_2 \) endowed to \( a_1 \). The two efficient allocations are \( o_1 \) allocated to \( a_1 \) and \( o_2 \) allocated to \( a_2 \) as well as \( o_2 \) allocated to \( a_1 \) and \( o_1 \) allocated to \( a_2 \) (shown in square boxes).

The set of Walrasian price vectors contains all price vectors \((p_{o_1}, p_{o_2})\) such that \( p_{o_1} = p_{o_2} \in [2 + \varepsilon, 3] \). As \( a_2 \) buys an object from \( a_1 \), the largest net Walrasian prices are

\[
\bar{q}_{a_1} = \max_{(p_{o_1}, p_{o_2}) \in \mathcal{P}_W} p_{o_1} = 3 \quad \text{and} \quad \bar{q}_{a_2} = \max_{(p_{o_1}, p_{o_2}) \in \mathcal{P}_W} -p_{o_1} = -2 - \varepsilon.
\]

It follows that \( a_2 \)'s largest net Walrasian price depends on his valuation for the bundle containing both objects.

In Examples 2–4, each agent’s largest net Walrasian price is weakly smaller than his VCG transfer. Our second main result shows that this is not a coincidence: As long as the set of Walrasian prices is nonempty, the relationship between largest net Walrasian prices and VCG transfers holds as an inequality.

**Theorem 2.** Suppose that \( \mathcal{P}_W \neq \emptyset \). Then, for every efficient allocation \( X^* \in \mathcal{X}^* \),

\[
i^{\text{VCG}}(X^*) \geq \bar{q}(X^*) \quad \text{and} \quad D^{\text{VCG}} \geq \bar{Q} \geq 0.
\]

The formal proof of Theorem 2 is in Appendix A. In the following, we provide an intuitive sketch of it. The sum of the agents’ net prices at a given Walrasian price vector \( p \) is equal to zero, because each object is bought and sold at the same price. That \( \bar{Q} \geq 0 \) follows from the largest net Walrasian price of each agent being at least as large as the net price at a given \( p \): summing the largest net Walrasian prices of all agents gives \( \sum_{a \in A} \bar{q}_a \geq 0 \). The second to last inequality, that is, \( D^{\text{VCG}} \geq \bar{Q} \), follows from the first by summing up. To complete the argument, it remains to explain the first inequality. Recall that \( X^* \) is an efficient allocation with agent \( a \) and his endowment present and let \( X^\natural \) be an efficient allocation without \( a \) and \( E_a \). If \( p \) is a Walrasian price with \( a \) and \( E_a \) present, it supports \( X^* \). This means that every agent \( a' \neq a \) weakly prefers \( X^*_{a'} \) to \( X^\natural_{a'} \) at \( p \), which is equivalent to

\[
v_{a'}(X^*_{a'}) - v_{a'}(X^\natural_{a'}) \geq \sum_{o \in X^*_{a'}} p_o - \sum_{o \in X^\natural_{a'}} p_o.
\]
Summing up over all agents $a' \neq a$, the left-hand side becomes the VCG transfer $W_{a,-X_3} - W_{a,-E_a}$, while the right-hand side becomes agent $a$’s net price at the Walrasian price vector $p$. Because the inequality holds for all Walrasian price vectors, it holds for the one that maximizes the right-hand side. Thus, we have $t^\text{VCG}_a \geq \tilde{q}_a$.

Theorem 2 provides a lower bound for each agent’s VCG transfer (hence, on the deficit) based on Walrasian prices, which holds as long as Walrasian prices exist, and thus applies to a wide range of settings. Gul and Stacchetti (1999) showed that the gross substitutes condition (a formal definition of which is provided in Appendix B.2) implies that the set of Walrasian price vectors is nonempty (in fact, it forms a nonempty complete lattice). In more general settings, whether the set of Walrasian prices is nonempty (hence, whether Theorem 2 applies) depends on the realization of types; that is, the gross substitutes condition is sufficient but not necessary for the existence of a Walrasian price vector. In Example 3, the valuation of $a_2$ does not satisfy the gross substitutes condition; yet, the set of Walrasian prices is nonempty.\footnote{As $v_{a_2}([\{o_1\}, o_2]) > v_{a_1}([\{o_1\}) + v_{a_2}([o_2]), a_2$’s valuation violates the submodularity condition, which is satisfied by all gross substitutes valuations (Gul and Stacchetti, 1999, Lemma 5).}

7. Two-sided allocations and homogeneous good markets

In this section, we consider two popular special cases of an asset market: two-sided allocations and homogeneous good markets. We will define these formally after defining ex post buyers and sellers and showing how the largest net Walrasian price simplifies for them.

Given an efficient allocation $X^* \in X^*$, an object is traded if it is efficiently assigned to an agent different from the one who is endowed with it, that is, object $o \in O$ is traded if $o \in E_a \cap X^*_a$ for some $a, a' \in A$ with $a \neq a'$. We denote by

$$T(X^*) = \{ o \in O : o \in E_a \cap X^*_a \text{ for some } a, a' \in A \text{ with } a \neq a' \}$$

the set of objects that are traded under the efficient allocation $X^*$. For any traded object $o \in E_a \cap X^*_a$ ($a, a' \in A, a \neq a'$), we say that $a$ sells $o$ and $a'$ buys $o$. For any agent $a \in A$, we say that $a$ trades if he sells or buys at least one object, that is, if $E_a \neq X^*_a$.

Consider an object $o \in T(X^*)$ that is sold by $a \in A$ and bought by $a' \in A$, that is, $o \in E_a \cap X^*_a$. We say that object $o \in O$ is traded vacuously if $o$’s marginal value to $a'$ is zero, that is, if $v_{a'}(X^*_a) = v_{a'}(X^*_a \setminus \{o\})$, in which case we also say that $a$ sells $o$ vacuously and $a'$ buys $o$ vacuously. The term captures the idea that trading $o$ does not contribute to welfare. We denote the set of objects that are traded nonvacuously under the efficient allocation $X^*$ by

$$\tilde{T}(X^*) = \{ o \in O : o \in E_a \cap X^*_a \text{ for some } a, a' \in A \text{ with } a \neq a' \text{ and } v_{a'}(X^*_a) > v_{a'}(X^*_a \setminus \{o\}) \}$$

For every agent $a \in A$, we say that $a$ trades nonvacuously if he either buys or sells at least one object nonvacuously; formally, the set of agents who trade nonvacuously is

$$\tilde{A}(X^*) = \{ a \in A : (E_a \cup X^*_a) \cap \tilde{T}(X^*) \neq \emptyset \}.$$
We say that $a$ is an **ex post buyer** if he buys at least one object nonvacuously and either does not sell, or only sells objects vacuously. Analogously, we say that $a$ is an **ex post seller** if he sells at least one object nonvacuously and either does not buy, or only buys objects vacuously. Formally, the sets of ex post buyers and ex post sellers are, respectively,

\[
\tilde{B}(X^*) = \{a \in A : E_a \cap \tilde{T}(X^*) = \emptyset, X^*_a \cap \tilde{T}(X^*) \neq \emptyset\} \quad \text{and} \\
\tilde{S}(X^*) = \{a \in A : E_a \cap \tilde{T}(X^*) \neq \emptyset, X^*_a \cap \tilde{T}(X^*) = \emptyset\}.
\]

Given a type vector $\theta \in \Theta$, for every object $o \in O$, denote by $p_\theta(o) = \min_{(\hat{p}_o)_{o \in O} \in \mathcal{P}_W(\theta)} p_o$ and $\overline{p}_\theta(o) = \max_{(\hat{p}_o)_{o \in O} \in \mathcal{P}_W(\theta)} p_o$ the smallest and largest prices of object $o$ in any Walrasian price vector. We call the difference $\overline{p}_\theta(o) - p_\theta(o)$ the **Walrasian price gap** of object $o$. The price vectors $\underline{p}(\theta) = (\underline{p}_\theta(o))_{o \in O}$ and $\overline{p}(\theta) = (\overline{p}_\theta(o))_{o \in O}$ constitute a lower and an upper bound for the set of Walrasian price vectors in the sense that, for any Walrasian price vector $p \in \mathcal{P}_W(\theta)$, $\underline{p}(\theta) \leq p \leq \overline{p}(\theta)$. If $\underline{p}(\theta)$ is a Walrasian price vector (i.e., $\underline{p}(\theta) \in \mathcal{P}_W(\theta)$), we call $\underline{p}(\theta)$ the **smallest Walrasian price vector**. Similarly, we call $\overline{p}(\theta)$ the **largest Walrasian price vector** if $\overline{p}(\theta) \in \mathcal{P}_W(\theta)$. A sufficient condition for $\underline{p}(\theta)$ and $\overline{p}(\theta)$ to be Walrasian price vectors is that all valuations satisfy the gross substitutes condition.\(^{12}\) We again drop the dependencies on types whenever there is no risk of confusion.

We now present two results that focus on the largest net Walrasian prices of ex post buyers and sellers.

**Claim 4.** If $p \in \mathcal{P}_W$ then, for every efficient allocation $X^* \in \mathcal{X}^*$ and every ex post buyer $b \in \tilde{B}$, $\overline{q}_b(X^*) = -\sum_{o \in X^*_b \setminus \mathcal{E}_b} \underline{p}_o$.

**Claim 5.** If $\overline{p} \in \mathcal{P}_W$ then, for every efficient allocation $X^* \in \mathcal{X}^*$ and every ex post seller $s \in \tilde{S}$, $\overline{q}_s(X^*) = \sum_{o \in \mathcal{E}_s \setminus X^*_s} \overline{p}_o$.

An ex post seller only buys objects vacuously (if he buys at all). As the price of a vacuously traded object is zero in all Walrasian price vectors (see Lemma A.2 in Appendix A for a formal statement), an ex post seller’s net price is the sum of the prices of the objects he sells. If a largest Walrasian price vector exists, that sum is maximized by individually maximizing the price of each object. An analogous reasoning holds for buyers; however, the sum is negative and is maximized by individually minimizing the price of each object.

\(^{12}\)See Appendix B.2 for a formal definition. As Gul and Stacchetti (1999, Corollary 1) show, if all valuations satisfy the gross substitutes condition, then the set of Walrasian price vectors forms a nonempty complete lattice, which implies that it contains extremal elements.
Two-sided allocations

We say that an efficient allocation $X^* \in \mathcal{X}^*$ is a two-sided efficient allocation if, under $X^*$, every agent who trades nonvacuously is either an ex post buyer or an ex post seller; formally, the set of two-sided efficient allocations is

$$\tilde{\mathcal{X}}^* = \{ X^* \in \mathcal{X}^*: \tilde{B}(X^*) \cup \tilde{S}(X^*) = \tilde{A}(X^*) \}.$$ 

In general, whether or not an efficient allocation is two-sided depends on the realization of types. In fact, it may also depend on which efficient allocation is picked as some may be two-sided while others are not. Define a two-sided allocation problem as an asset market in which every agent is exogenously either a buyer, as he has an empty endowment, or a seller, as he derives zero value from any object that is not in his endowment. Clearly, in a two-sided allocation problem every efficient allocation $X^* \in \mathcal{X}^*$ is a two-sided efficient allocation and all results in this subsection apply. The next proposition follows from Claims 4 and 5 and Theorem 2.

**Proposition 2.** Suppose that $\bar{p}, \bar{p} \in \mathcal{P}^W$. Then, for every two-sided efficient allocation $X^* \in \tilde{\mathcal{X}}^*$,

$$D^{\text{VCG}} \geq \bar{Q} = \sum_{o \in \tilde{T}(X^*)} (\bar{p}_o - p_o).$$

Since a sufficient condition for the existence of a smallest and largest Walrasian price vector (i.e., for $p, \bar{p} \in \mathcal{P}^W$) is that the valuation of every agent satisfies the gross substitutes condition, Proposition 2 applies to all gross substitutes environments.\(^{13}\) Single-object traders satisfy the gross substitutes condition.\(^{14}\) The following proposition shows that if all traders are single-object traders and the efficient allocation is two-sided, then the social planner can charge the buyer of any nonvacuously traded object his smallest Walrasian price, but has to pay the seller of that object his largest Walrasian price. Thus, on each traded object the social planner makes a deficit equal to that object’s Walrasian price gap.

**Proposition 3.** Suppose that all agents are single-object traders. Then, for every two-sided efficient allocation $X^* \in \tilde{\mathcal{X}}^*$ and every object $o \in \tilde{T}(X^*)$ that is nonvacuously sold by an agent $s \in \mathcal{A}$ and nonvacuously bought by an agent $b \in \mathcal{A}$,

$$l^{\text{VCG}}_s(X^*) = \bar{p}_o, \quad l^{\text{VCG}}_b(X^*) = -p_o \quad \text{and} \quad D^{\text{VCG}} = \bar{Q} = \sum_{o \in \tilde{T}(X^*)} (\bar{p}_o - p_o).$$

\(^{13}\)As the sum of the largest net Walrasian prices $\bar{Q}$ is the same under every efficient allocation (by Claim 3), Proposition 2 implies that the sum of the Walrasian gaps over all objects traded is the same for every two-sided efficient allocation.

\(^{14}\)The valuation of a single-object trader satisfies the unit demand condition. As noted by Gul and Stacchetti (1999), the unit demand condition is a special case of the strong no complementarities condition, which implies the gross substitutes condition.
In the example in Section 2, the sum of the Walrasian gaps over all traded objects is \((\overline{P}_{o_1} - \underline{P}_{o_1}) + (\overline{P}_{o_2} - \underline{P}_{o_2}) = (3 - 0) + (5 - 0) = 8\) and exceeds the VCG deficit, which is 3. The reason for the discrepancy is that the efficient allocation is not two-sided: each agent sells an object and buys the other. In Example 2, the efficient allocation is two-sided: \(a_1\) is a buyer and \(a_2\) is a seller. Furthermore, agents’ valuations satisfy the gross substitutes condition and so a smallest and a largest Walrasian price vector exist: \(\underline{p} = (3, 2)\) and \(\overline{p} = (5, 7)\). Therefore, in line with Proposition 2,

\[
D_{\text{VCG}} = 8 \geq 7 = \overline{q}_{a_1} + \overline{q}_{a_2} = (\overline{P}_{o_1} - \underline{P}_{o_1}) + (\overline{P}_{o_2} - \underline{P}_{o_2}).
\]

Homogeneous good markets

We now specialize the model to one with a homogeneous good. Although in principle agents can simultaneously buy and sell, with a homogeneous good there is always an efficient allocation in which each agent either only buys, only sells, or does not trade; that is, at least one two-sided efficient allocation exists. An asset market is a homogeneous good market if, for every agent \(a \in A\), every type \(\theta_a \in \Theta_a\), and any two bundles \(Y, Z \subseteq O\) with \(|Y| = |Z|\), \(v_a(Y, \theta_a) = v_a(Z, \theta_a)\). In other words, in a homogeneous good market, agents care about the number of objects they are allocated but not about the identity of those objects.

Given an efficient allocation \(X^* \in X^*\), we say that agent \(a \in A\) is a net buyer if \(|X^*_a| > |\mathcal{E}_a|\) and a net seller if \(|X^*_a| < |\mathcal{E}_a|\). We denote by \(B^N(X^*) \subseteq A\) the set of net buyers and by \(S^N(X^*) \subseteq A\) the set of net sellers. For every net buyer \(b \in B^N(X^*)\), we say that \(b\) buys \(|X^*_b| - |\mathcal{E}_b|\) units. Similarly, for every net seller \(s \in S^N(X^*)\), we say that \(s\) sells \(|\mathcal{E}_s| - |X^*_s|\) units. We call every agent \(a \in A \setminus (B^N(X^*) \cup S^N(X^*))\) a neutral agent; by definition, \(a\) is a neutral agent if \(|X^*_a| = |\mathcal{E}_a|\). As the number of objects allocated is the same under both \(X^*\) and \(\mathcal{E}\), the number of units bought by net buyers equals the number of units sold by net sellers. We denote that number by \(#(X^*)\):

\[
#(X^*) = \sum_{b \in B^N(X^*)} (|X^*_b| - |\mathcal{E}_b|) = \sum_{s \in S^N(X^*)} (|\mathcal{E}_s| - |X^*_s|).
\]

In a homogeneous good market, because agents do not care about the identity of the objects they are allocated, the smallest and largest price that an object can have in any Walrasian price vector must be the same across all objects. Therefore, the price vectors \(p\) and \(\overline{p}\) are uniform in that each assigns the same price \(p\) and \(\overline{p}\) to every object, that is, \(\overline{p}_o = p\) and \(\underline{p}_o = \overline{p}\) for all \(o \in O\). A direct consequence of this uniformity is that, whenever Walrasian prices exist, each agent’s largest net Walrasian price can be expressed in terms of the net number of units of the homogeneous good that he buys or sells.

**Proposition 4.** Consider a homogeneous good market in which \(p, \overline{p} \in P^W\) and any efficient allocation \(X^* \in X^*\). Then, for every net buyer \(b \in B^N(X^*)\), \(\overline{q}_b(X^*) = -(|X^*_b| - |\mathcal{E}_b|)p\); for every net seller \(s \in S^N(X^*)\), \(\overline{q}_s(X^*) = (|\mathcal{E}_s| - |X^*_s|)\overline{p}\); and for every neutral agent \(a \in A \setminus (B^N(X^*) \cup S^N(X^*))\), \(\overline{q}_a(X^*) = 0\). The sum of the largest net Walrasian prices is

\[
\overline{Q} = #(X^*)(\overline{p} - p).
\]
There is a clear intuition behind Proposition 4: the net price of a net buyer is maximized by setting the price as low as possible and the net price of a net seller is maximized by setting the price as high as possible.\textsuperscript{15}

To appreciate how generally Proposition 4 applies, it is useful to consider conditions under which a smallest and largest Walrasian price vector exist. Recall that the existence of a smallest and largest Walrasian price vector is guaranteed as long as every agent’s valuation satisfies the gross substitutes condition. We show in Appendix B.2 that in a homogeneous good market an equivalent condition is that all agents have decreasing marginal values, that is, the marginal value of their \(n\)th unit is no smaller than the marginal value of their \(n+1\)-st unit.\textsuperscript{16} Therefore, Proposition 4 applies to every homogeneous good market with decreasing marginal values. Beyond decreasing marginal values, the set of Walrasian prices may be empty. However, provided it is nonempty, Proposition 4 applies unless all objects are allocated to the same agent. Suppose that, under at least one efficient allocation, no agent is allocated all objects (i.e., there exists \(X^* \in X^*\) such that \(X^*_a \neq \emptyset\) for all \(a \in A\)). Any Walrasian price vector \(p\) supports \(X^*\) (by Claim 2); hence, as we formally show in Appendix A (Lemma A.4), \(p\) is uniform for otherwise an agent has an incentive to swap one of his objects for a cheaper one. Consequently, the order \(p \leq \hat{p}\) is complete, that is, for any \(p, \hat{p} \in P_W\), either \(p \geq \hat{p}\) or \(p \leq \hat{p}\) holds. Thus, as long as the set of Walrasian price vectors is nonempty, there exists a smallest Walrasian price vector \(p\) and a largest Walrasian price vector \(\overline{p}\), and both of them are uniform.

Proposition 5. Consider a homogeneous good market and suppose that either (i) all agents have decreasing marginal values or (ii) \(P_W \neq \emptyset\) and there exists \(X^* \in X^*\) such that \(X^*_a \neq \emptyset\) for all \(a \in A\). Then \(p, \overline{p} \in P_W\).

Proposition 5 means that Proposition 4 applies to “almost all” homogeneous good markets in which the set of Walrasian prices is nonempty. The only exception occurs when some marginal values are increasing and, under every efficient allocation, all objects are allocated to the same agent.\textsuperscript{17} The following example illustrates how Proposition 4 may fail in this specific case. There are two agents, each of whom is endowed with one object and has the following valuations:

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
    v_a(\{a_1\}) & v_a(\{a_2\}) & v_a(\{a_1, a_2\}) \\
    a_1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\
    a_2 & 0 & 0 & 2
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

\textsuperscript{15}As \(Q\) does not depend on which efficient allocation is chosen (by Claim 3), Proposition 4 implies that, as long as there exist multiple Walrasian prices, \(#(X^*) = #(X^\#)\) for any \(X^*, X^\# \in X^*\). This need not be the case in the presence of a unique Walrasian price vector. For example, suppose there are two agents and one object for which each agent has a value of 1. The unique Walrasian price is 1. One efficient allocation leaves the object with the agent to whom it is endowed (hence, no units are traded in this allocation) while the other efficient allocation gives the object to the other agent (hence, one unit is traded).

\textsuperscript{16}Formally (see Definition B.2 in Appendix B.2), for every agent \(a \in A\) and any bundles \(Y_1, Y_2, Y_3 \subseteq \emptyset\) with \(|Y_1| + 2 = |Y_2| + 1 = |Y_3|\), we have that \(v_a(Y_2) - v_a(Y_1) \geq v_a(Y_3) - v_a(Y_2)\).

\textsuperscript{17}We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this special case to us.
The unique efficient allocation has both objects allocated to $a_2$ and the set of Walrasian price vectors contains all price vectors whose sum lies between 1 and 2; hence, there are no smallest and largest Walrasian price vectors. The net price of $a_1$ is $p_{o_1}$, which is maximized by the vector $(2, 0)$ so $\overline{q}_{a_1} = 2$. Similarly, the net price of $a_2$ is $-p_{o_1}$, which is maximized by the vector $(0, 2)$ so $\overline{q}_{a_2} = 0$.

As single-object traders have decreasing marginal values, Proposition 4 applies to this setting and can be combined with Theorem 1 to obtain the following corollary.

**Corollary 2.** Consider a homogeneous good market and suppose that all agents are single-object traders. Then, for every efficient allocation $X^* \in X^*$, the VCG deficit on each unit traded is $\overline{p} - \underline{p}$, and hence, the VCG deficit is $D_{VCG} = \#(X^*) (\overline{p} - \underline{p})$.

Corollary 2 is a known result for two-sided allocation problems; see, for example, Tatur (2005). When all agents are single-object traders, each net buyer pays a transfer equal to the smallest Walrasian price for the unit he buys and every net seller receives a transfer equal to the largest Walrasian price for the unit he sells. Therefore, the social planner incurs a deficit on each unit traded equal to the Walrasian price gap.

Combining Proposition 4 with Theorem 2, we obtain the following corollary.

**Corollary 3.** Consider a homogeneous good market in which $p, \overline{p} \in \mathcal{P}^W$. Then, for every efficient allocation $X^* \in X^*$, the VCG deficit is $D_{VCG} \geq \#(X^*) (\overline{p} - \underline{p})$.

Corollary 3 generalizes Theorem 1 in Loertscher and Mezzetti (2019) in two ways. First, in our environment whether an agent is a net buyer or a net seller depends on the types whereas in Loertscher and Mezzetti (2019) agents’ trading positions are exogenously given. Second, Loertscher and Mezzetti assume that agents have decreasing marginal values, while Corollary 3 applies beyond decreasing marginal values, as long as the set of Walrasian prices is nonempty and there exists an efficient allocation under which no agent is allocated all objects.

A further implication of Theorem 2 and Corollary 3 is that if the deficit under VCG is zero in a homogeneous good market in which extremal Walrasian price vectors exist, then the Walrasian price gap has to be zero as well, that is, $p = \overline{p}$ has to hold. Note that the condition $p = \overline{p}$, which is nongeneric in two-sided allocation problems with finitely many agents and, say, continuously distributed types, can naturally be satisfied in asset markets because the Walrasian price may need to make a single agent indifferent between buying and selling. This occurs, for example, if all agents have constant marginal values up to some maximum demands and if, under efficiency, one agent with a positive endowment less than his maximum demand consumes exactly the amount he is endowed.\(^\text{18}\) As noted by Loertscher and Marx (2020), in this case the VCG mechanism has a deficit of zero. However, the question under what more general conditions $p = \overline{p}$ implies a VCG deficit of zero remains open and is best left for future research. Related, one may wonder whether the VCG mechanism runs a budget surplus when Walrasian

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\(^\text{18}\)Perhaps the simplest environment has an odd number of agents, each agent with an endowment of one and a maximum demand of two. Then the Walrasian price is equal to the value of the median agent.
prices fail to exist. While a comprehensive answer is beyond the scope of this paper, the following example shows that at least in some cases the answer is affirmative. Consider a homogeneous good market with three agents. Each agent \( a_i, i = 1, 2, 3 \), has an endowment of one, a value of zero for a single unit, and a value of \( v_{a_i} > 0 \) for two or three units (i.e., the marginal value of a second unit is \( v_{a_i} \) and the marginal value of a third unit is 0). Assuming \( v_{a_1} > v_{a_2} > v_{a_3} \), efficiency requires that agent \( a_1 \) be allocated two units and the last unit be allocated to any of the three agents. The VCG mechanism runs a budget surplus as the transfer of agent \( a_1 \) is \(-v_{a_2}\) and the transfer of the other two agents is 0. As Theorem 2 implies, if the VCG mechanism runs a budget surplus, the set of Walrasian prices has to be empty. To see that this is indeed the case, note that if all three units are allocated to agent \( a_1 \), their marginal value to him is zero; therefore, their price must also be zero. If one object is allocated to one of the other agents, by analogous reasoning the price of that unit must be zero. Then the price of the other two units must also be zero as otherwise agent \( a_1 \) would want to swap one of his units for the cheaper one. It follows that the only candidate for a Walrasian price vector is \((0, 0, 0)\); however, this price vector creates excess demand as all agents want to keep their endowment and purchase a second unit.

8. Related literature

This paper brings together different strands of the literature. The first strand uncovers a connection between Walrasian prices and the equilibrium prices in the Vickrey auction. Demange (1982) and Leonard (1983) study a one-sided assignment problem in which each agent must be assigned to a single object, or position. Positions can be viewed as “dummy agents” who do not need to be provided incentives for value revelation, and hence, play no role in the deficit calculation. By postulating that each dummy agent is endowed with an object, that actual agents are not endowed with any objects and adding the assumption that each dummy agent \( d \) has no value for any good (i.e., \( v_d(Y, \theta_d) = 0 \) for all \( Y \subseteq O \), all \( \theta_d \), and all \( d \)), the assignment problem can be viewed as a special case of an asset market with single-object traders. Demange (1982) and Leonard (1983) show that in their setting the smallest Walrasian price vector coincides with the prices in the Vickrey auction and, as a consequence, the aggregate payment of buyers in a Walrasian equilibrium coincides with the revenue in a VCG auction. Their results can be viewed as an extension of the observation that, with a single seller and a single object, the price in a second-price auction coincides with the lowest Walrasian price (any price between the second highest and highest bidder’s value is a Walrasian price).

Gul and Stacchetti (1999) study a more general setting in which buyers demand (i.e., have value for) multiple objects. They focus on the structural properties of the set of Walrasian equilibria when buyers’ preferences satisfy the gross substitutes condition. A by-product of their analysis (their Theorem 8) shows that the aggregate payment of buyers at the smallest Walrasian prices is an upper bound for the total revenue raised by the VCG mechanism; with multiunit demand, equality need not hold. In contrast to

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19 We are thankful to an anonymous referee for having proposed this example.
the present paper, Demange (1982), Leonard (1983), and Gul and Stacchetti (1999) do not consider the issue of incentive compatibility for sellers, and thus provide no direct connection between Walrasian prices and the VCG deficit.

The second strand of the literature focuses on a game-theoretic, mechanism-design conceptualization, and characterization of perfect competition. Makowski and Ostroy (1987) define an exchange economy with quasilinear preferences as perfectly competitive if no agent has price impact: with or without him, the Walrasian prices are the same. More precisely, an exchange economy is perfectly competitive if for any possible valuation of agents, there exists a Walrasian price vector that remains a Walrasian price vector if the valuation of a single agent changes. Under standard technical conditions, they show that an exchange economy is perfectly competitive if and only if the total money transfer each agent receives in a Walrasian equilibrium (i.e., using a Walrasian price vector) coincides with his transfer in the VCG mechanism. Thus, in a perfectly competitive economy the VCG mechanism is budget balanced. Section 2 of Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame (1999) studies a generalization of the finite assignment model analyzed by Demange (1982) and Leonard (1983); besides buyers who value only one object and have no endowment, there are sellers. Each seller is endowed with an object and only has a positive value for the object he owns. Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame (1999) provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the assignment economy to be perfectly competitive in the sense of Makowski and Ostroy (1987), and argue that while “most finite economies are imperfectly competitive, …most continuum economies are perfectly competitive” (p. 60). In contrast, our paper focuses on imperfectly competitive economies and provides a connection between Walrasian prices in such economies and the VCG deficit. Furthermore, even with single-object traders our model is more general than the assignment model.

In the assignment model, each buyer is matched with a seller and the largest net Walrasian price is a single price (for a buyer it is the lowest price of the object he buys and for a seller it is the largest Walrasian price of the object he sells). In our model, even with single-object traders, there could be trading chains of arbitrary length and the largest net Walrasian price can be the difference between two Walrasian prices.

The payoff of each agent \( a \) in a VCG mechanism is equal to his social marginal product, defined as \( W^* - W^*_{-a,-a'} \). Makowski and Ostroy (1995) define the private marginal benefit of an agent in a Walrasian equilibrium as his equilibrium payoff, which is equal to the allocation valuation plus the net trade revenue (or, equivalently and as they write it, minus the net trade expenditure); in our notation and indivisible objects setting: \( v_a(X^*_a, \theta_a) - (\sum_{o \in X^*_a} p_o - \sum_{o \in E_a} p_o) \). Makowski and Ostroy (1995) are interested in deriving and understanding the conceptual significance of the first welfare theorem for their notion of a perfectly competitive economy. Without being particularly interested in the VCG mechanism per se, or in finding a bound in the deficit it generates, their Theorem 1 is closely connected to our Theorem 2. It shows that for all Walrasian price

\[^{20}\text{They do not assume indivisible objects; an exchange economy with indivisible objects is what we call an asset market.}
\[^{21}\text{Makowski and Ostroy (1987) call it the “full appropriation mechanism” to distinguish it from a VCG mechanism with added lump-sum transfers.}\]
vectors the social marginal product of an individual is at least as large as his private marginal product. Given that our setting is substantively different from theirs (e.g., we have indivisible goods and we do not have agents choosing occupations before trading), we provide a simple independent proof in Appendix A (see the paragraph immediately after Theorem 2 for a sketch). That said, Theorem 2 could also be proven in the setting of Makowski and Ostroy (1995) along the following lines: (i) one could choose for each agent \(a\) the Walrasian price vector that generates the largest net trade revenue; (ii) this net revenue would correspond to our largest net Walrasian price for agent \(a\); (iii) by rearranging terms, the inequality in their Theorem 1, that the social marginal product exceeds the private marginal product, could then be stated as saying that the largest net Walrasian price for each agent is less than or equal to his VCG transfer, which is our Theorem 2.

It is also worth mentioning that Theorem 2 could also be proven by adapting the argument in the proof of Theorem 8 in Gul and Stacchetti (1999). To that end, consider an efficient allocation \(X^*\), and a Walrasian price vector \(p\) supporting it. Pick any agent \(a\) and change his valuation to \(v_a(Y, \theta_a) = \sum_{o \in Y} p_o \) for all \(Y \subseteq \mathcal{O}\). As \(a\) is indifferent among all packages, the allocation \(X^*\) is still supported by \(p\) and so remains efficient with an associated welfare of \(\sum_{o \in \mathcal{X}_a} p_o + W_{-a,-X^*}a.\) An alternative is to allocate \(a\) his endowment and efficiently allocate the remaining objects to the other agents, with an associated welfare of \(\sum_{o \in \mathcal{X}_a} p_o + W_{-a,-\mathcal{X}_a} \). As \(X^*\) is efficient, we have that \(\sum_{o \in \mathcal{X}_a} p_o + W_{-a,-X^*} \geq \sum_{o \in \mathcal{E}_a} p_o + W_{-a,-\mathcal{E}_a}\), which can be rearranged as \(W_{-a,-X^*} + \sum_{o \in \mathcal{E}_a} p_o \geq \sum_{o \in \mathcal{X}_a} p_o - \sum_{o \in \mathcal{E}_a} p_o.\) Then, as \(p\) is an arbitrary Walrasian price vector, \(\mathcal{VCG}(X^*) \geq q^*_a(X^*).\)  

Third, dating back to the seminal contributions of Vickrey (1961) and Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), there is a large literature on the (im)possibility of efficient, incentive-compatible, and individually rational trade. General results that do not necessarily relate to markets (i.e., private goods) are in Makowski and Mezzetti (1993, 1994), Williams (1999), and Segal and Whinston (2016). For a recent contribution in market settings and additional references see, for example, Delacrétaz, Loertscher, Marx, and Wilkening (2019). With the exceptions of Tatur (2005) and Loertscher and Mezzetti (2019), which study homogeneous good settings, this literature makes no explicit connection between Walrasian prices and the deficit under the VCG mechanism. Our paper’s contribution to this literature is an impossibility result for general private goods providing a link between the VCG deficit and Walrasian prices.

\[W^* - \left( v_a(X^*_a) + \sum_{o \in \mathcal{E}_a \setminus \mathcal{X}_a} p_o - \sum_{o \in \mathcal{X}_a \setminus \mathcal{E}_a} p_o \right) \geq W_{-a,-\mathcal{E}_a}.\]

Rearranging and recalling that an agent’s payoff under the VCG mechanism is his marginal contribution, we obtain that

\[v_a(X^*_a) + \mathcal{VCG}(X^*) = W^* - W_{-a,-\mathcal{E}_a} \geq v_a(X^*_a) + \sum_{o \in \mathcal{E}_a \setminus \mathcal{X}_a} p_o - \sum_{o \in \mathcal{X}_a \setminus \mathcal{E}_a} p_o.\]

As \(p\) is an arbitrary Walrasian price vector, it follows that \(\mathcal{VCG}(X^*) \geq q^*_a(X^*).\)
Fourth and last, there is a small but growing literature in which agents’ trading positions in a homogeneous good market are endogenously determined as a function of their own values and the values of all other traders. Extending the setup of Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987) to account for limited capacities (or demands) by the agents, Lu and Robert (2001) derive the profit-maximizing market mechanism, while Loertscher and Marx (2020) provide a trade sacrifice mechanism that either allocates efficiently or close to efficiently and never runs a deficit. In Bayesian settings with a homogeneous good such as those of Lu and Robert (2001) and Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987), the allocation problem is always ex post two-sided because every trading agent either only sells or only buys. In the general asset markets that we study in this paper, this is not the case as an agent may simultaneously buy some objects while selling others.

9. Conclusions

For an asset market with quasilinear utilities, we show there is a tight connection between Walrasian prices and VCG transfers. We define an agent’s largest net Walrasian price to be the largest difference between the sum of the prices of the objects he sells and the sum of the prices of the objects he buys in any Walrasian price vector. When every agent is a single-object trader—that is, every agent has a maximum demand of one object and is endowed with at most one object—we show that each agent’s largest net Walrasian price is equal to his VCG transfer; hence, the deficit of the VCG mechanism is equal to the sum of the largest net Walrasian prices of all agents. Beyond single-object traders, we show that, whenever the set of Walrasian prices is nonempty, each agent’s largest net Walrasian price constitutes a lower bound for his VCG transfer; therefore, the sum of the largest net Walrasian prices constitutes a (nonnegative) lower bound for the deficit of the VCG mechanism (and any efficient, ex post individually rational, and dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism). Because these results only require the existence of Walrasian prices, they are as general within this domain as possible.

An interesting avenue for future research is to explore whether these results can be generalized to environments in which the set of Walrasian prices is empty. One could consider a divisible version of the market in which agents may be assigned fractions of bundles. Market clearing prices in this divisible market always exist and are sometimes called pseudo-equilibrium prices. To the best of our knowledge, it is an open question whether the VCG transfers are bounded below or connected in some way with some elements of this set of pseudo-equilibrium prices.

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24 Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997) proved that the set of such market clearing prices is nonempty and coincides with the set of Walrasian prices if the latter set is also nonempty. The properties of these pseudo-equilibrium prices were further investigated by Milgrom and Strulovici (2009).
Appendix A: Proofs

We begin with two lemmas.

Lemma A.1. Let \((X^*_a)_{a \in A}\) be an efficient allocation. If agent \(a\) and \(X^*_a\) are removed from the environment, then \((X^*_{a'})_{a' \in A \setminus \{a\}}\) is an efficient allocation and \(W^* - W^*_{-a,-X^*_a} = v_a(X^*_a)\).

Proof. Consider the allocation problem in which \(a\) and \(X^*_a\) have been removed and, toward a contradiction, suppose that there exists an allocation \((Y_{a'})_{a' \in A \setminus \{a\}}\) such that

\[
\sum_{a' \in A \setminus \{a\}} v_{a'}(Y_{a'}) > \sum_{a' \in A \setminus \{a\}} v_{a'}(X^*_{a'}).
\]

Adding \(v_a(X^*_a)\) on both sides, we obtain that

\[
v_a(X^*_a) + \sum_{a' \in A \setminus \{a\}} v_{a'}(Y_{a'}) > \sum_{a' \in A} v_{a'}(X^*_{a'}),
\]

which contradicts the assumption that \(X^*\) is an efficient allocation when all agents and objects are present and, therefore, proves the first part of the statement. We then have that

\[
W^*_{-a,-X^*_a} = \sum_{a' \in A \setminus \{a\}} v_{a'}(X^*_{a'}) = W^* - v_a(X^*_a),
\]

which proves the second part of the statement.

Lemma A.2. For any efficient allocation \(X^* \in \mathcal{X}^*\), any vacuously traded object \(o \in \mathcal{T}(X^*) \setminus \hat{\mathcal{T}}(X^*)\), and any Walrasian price vector \(p = (p_{\hat{o}})_{\hat{o} \in \hat{\mathcal{O}}} \in \mathcal{P}^W\), we have that \(p_o = 0\).

Proof. Let \(a\) be the agent vacuously buying \(o\). By Claim 2 (which we prove below), \(p = (p_{\hat{o}})_{\hat{o} \in \hat{\mathcal{O}}}\) supports \(X^*\). Hence,

\[
v_a(X^*_a) - \sum_{\hat{o} \in X^*_a} p_{\hat{o}} \geq v_a(X^*_a \setminus \{o\}) - \sum_{\hat{o} \in X^*_a \setminus \{o\}} p_{\hat{o}}
\]

\[
\Leftrightarrow v_a(X^*_a) - p_o \geq v_a(X^*_a \setminus \{o\}).
\]

As \(o\) is traded vacuously, by definition \(v_a(X^*_a) = v_a(X^*_a \setminus \{o\})\); therefore, \(p_o \leq 0\). By our monotonicity assumption, Walrasian prices cannot be negative; therefore, we conclude that \(p_o = 0\).

Proof of Claim 1. By Lemma A.1, for every \(a \in A\), \(W^*_{-a,-X^*_a} = W^* - v_a(X^*_a)\); therefore, we have that

\[
\sum_{a \in A} [W^*_{-a,-X^*_a} - W^*_{-a,-E_a}] = \sum_{a \in A} [W^* - v_a(X^*_a) - W^*_{-a,-E_a}]
\]

\[
= \sum_{a \in A} [W^* - W^*_{-a,-E_a}] - \sum_{a \in A} v_a(X^*_a)
\]

\[
= \sum_{a \in A} [W^* - W^*_{-a,-E_a}] - W^*.
\]
As an analogous reasoning holds for $X^z$, we conclude that
\[
\sum_{a \in A} [W^* - a, -X^z_a] = \sum_{a \in A} [W^* - W^* - \mathcal{E}_a] - W^*;
\]
hence,
\[
\sum_{a \in A} [W^* - a, -X^z_a] = \sum_{a \in A} [W^* - W^* - \mathcal{E}_a],
\]
as required.

Proof of Claim 2 (adapted from Lemma 6 of Gul and Stacchetti (1999)). Toward a contradiction, suppose $X^*$, $X^z \in X^*$ are efficient allocations and $p = (p_o)_{o \in \mathcal{O}}$ supports $X^*$ but not $X^z$. Recall that objects are indivisible and each object $o$ has an individual price $p_o$; agents compare sets of objects and, for each set, each object is either in the set or not in the set.

As $p$ does not support $X^z$, there exist $a' \in A$ and $Y \subseteq \mathcal{O}$ such that
\[
v_{a'}(X^z_{a'}) - \sum_{o \in X^z_{a'}} p_o < v_{a'}(Y) - \sum_{o \in Y} p_o.
\]
As $p$ supports $X^*$, it is optimal for $a'$ to pick $X^*_{a'}$ when facing $p$; hence,
\[
v_{a'}(X^*_{a'}) - \sum_{o \in X^*_{a'}} p_o \geq v_{a'}(Y) - \sum_{o \in Y} p_o.
\]
Combining the two inequalities yields
\[
v_{a'}(X^*_{a'}) - \sum_{o \in X^*_{a'}} p_o > v_{a'}(X^z_{a'}) - \sum_{o \in X^z_{a'}} p_o.
\]
Again, because $p$ supports $X^*$, for every $a \in A$, we have that
\[
v_a(X^*_a) - \sum_{o \in X^*_a} p_o \geq v_a(X^z_a) - \sum_{o \in X^z_a} p_o.
\]
Combining the last two equations, we obtain
\[
\sum_{a \in A} \left[ v_a(X^*_a) - \sum_{o \in X^*_a} p_o \right] > \sum_{a \in A} \left[ v_a(X^z_a) - \sum_{o \in X^z_a} p_o \right]
\]
\[
\Leftrightarrow \sum_{a \in A} v_a(X^*_a) > \sum_{a \in A} v_a(X^z_a),
\]
a contradiction since $X^z$ is an efficient allocation.\(^{25}\)

\(^{25}\)Note that $\sum_{a \in A} \sum_{o \in X^*_a} p_o = \sum_{a \in A} \sum_{o \in X^z_a} p_o$, because any allocation $(X_a)_{a \in A}$ must assign all objects to the agents, that is, $\bigcup_{a \in A} X_a = \mathcal{O}$.
PROOF OF CLAIM 3. Let \((p_o)_{o \in O}\) be any Walrasian price vector and consider any agent \(a \in A\). By Claim 2, \((p_o)_{o \in O}\) supports both \(X^*\) and \(X^\ddagger\); therefore, we have that

\[
v_a(X_a^*) - \sum_{o \in X_a^*} p_o = v_a(X_a^\ddagger) - \sum_{o \in X_a^\ddagger} p_o,
\]

which is equivalent to

\[
\sum_{o \in X_a^\ddagger} p_o - \sum_{o \in X_a^*} p_o = v_a(X_a^\ddagger) - v_a(X_a^*). \tag{1}
\]

Using the definition of a largest net Walrasian price and rearranging, we obtain that

\[
\bar{q}_a(X^*) = \max_{(p_o)_{o \in O} \in \mathcal{P}_W} \left[ \sum_{o \in \mathcal{E}_a \setminus X_a^*} p_o - \sum_{o \in X_a^* \setminus \mathcal{E}_a} p_o \right]
\]

\[
= \max_{(p_o)_{o \in O} \in \mathcal{P}_W} \left[ \sum_{o \in \mathcal{E}_a} p_o - \sum_{o \in X_a^*} p_o \right]
\]

\[
= \max_{(p_o)_{o \in O} \in \mathcal{P}_W} \left[ \sum_{o \in \mathcal{E}_a} p_o - \sum_{o \in X_a^*} p_o + \sum_{o \in X_a^\ddagger} p_o - \sum_{o \in X_a^*} p_o \right].
\]

As every Walrasian price vector satisfies (1), the maximization only occurs over the first two sums; therefore, we have that

\[
\bar{q}_a(X^*) = \sum_{o \in \mathcal{E}_a} p_o - \sum_{o \in X_a^*} p_o + v_a(X_a^\ddagger) - v_a(X_a^*)
\]

\[
= \bar{q}_a(X_a^\ddagger) + v_a(X_a^\ddagger) - v_a(X_a^*).
\]

It follows that \(\bar{q}_a(X^*) - \bar{q}_a(X_a^\ddagger) = v_a(X_a^\ddagger) - v_a(X_a^*)\). Summing over all agents, we obtain that

\[
\sum_{a \in A} [\bar{q}_a(X^*) - \bar{q}_a(X_a^\ddagger)] = \sum_{a \in A} [v_a(X_a^\ddagger) - v_a(X_a^*)]
\]

\[
= \sum_{a \in A} v_a(X_a^\ddagger) - \sum_{a \in A} v_a(X_a^*)
\]

\[
= W^* - W^* = 0.
\]

We conclude that \(\sum_{a \in A} \bar{q}_a(X^*) = \sum_{a \in A} \bar{q}_a(X_a^\ddagger)\), as required. \qed

PROOF OF CLAIM 4. By definition, we have that

\[
\bar{q}_b(X^*) = \max_{(p_o)_{o \in O} \in \mathcal{P}_W} \left[ \sum_{o \in \mathcal{E}_b \setminus X_b^*} p_o - \sum_{o \in X_b^* \setminus \mathcal{E}_b} p_o \right].
\]
As $b$ is an ex post buyer, every object he sells (if any) is traded vacuously. By Lemma A.2, the price of all vacuously-traded objects is zero. Hence, the first term on the right-hand side is zero and
\[
\overline{q}_b(X^*) = \max_{(p_o)_{o \in O} \in \mathcal{P}^W} \left\{ \sum_{o \in X_b^* \setminus \mathcal{E}_b} p_o \right\} = \min_{(p_o)_{o \in O} \in \mathcal{P}^W} \left\{ \sum_{o \in X_b^* \setminus \mathcal{E}_b} p_o \right\},
\]
where the last equality holds because the minimum of the sum is equal to the sum of the minima of each term, as $p \in \mathcal{P}^W$.

**Proof of Claim 5.** By definition, we have that
\[
\overline{q}_s(X^*) = \max_{(p_o)_{o \in O} \in \mathcal{P}^W} \left[ \sum_{o \in X_s^* \setminus X_s^a} p_o - \sum_{o \in X_s^a \setminus X_s^a} p_o \right].
\]
As $s$ is an ex post seller, all the objects he buys (if any) are traded vacuously, and thus must have a zero price by Lemma A.2. Hence, the second sum on the right-hand side is zero and
\[
\overline{q}_s(X^*) = \max_{(p_o)_{o \in O} \in \mathcal{P}^W} \sum_{o \in X_s^* \setminus X_s^a} p_o = \sum_{o \in X_s^* \setminus X_s^a} \overline{p}_o,
\]
where the last equality holds because the maximum of the sum is equal to the sum of the maxima of each term, as $\overline{p} \in \mathcal{P}^W$.

It is convenient to prove Theorem 2 before proving Theorem 1.

**Proof of Theorem 2.**
- $t^{VCG}(X^*) \geq \overline{q}(X^*)$: Consider any agent $a \in A$. We need to show that $t^{VCG}_a(X^*) \geq \overline{q}_a(X^*)$. By definition, $t^{VCG}_a(X^*) = W_{-a} - X_a^* - W_{-a} - \mathcal{E}_a$. Let $p = (p_o)_{o \in O} \in \mathcal{P}^W$ be any Walrasian price vector ($\mathcal{P}^W$ is nonempty by assumption). We need to show that
\[
W_{-a} - X_a^* - W_{-a} - \mathcal{E}_a = \sum_{o \in \mathcal{E}_a \setminus X_a^* \setminus \mathcal{E}_a} p_o - \sum_{o \in X_a^* \setminus \mathcal{E}_a} p_o.
\]

By Lemma A.1, $(X_{a'}^*)_{a' \in A \setminus \{a\}}$ is an efficient allocation after $a$ and $X_a^*$ have been removed. Let $(X_{a'}^\sharp)_{a' \in A \setminus \{a\}}$ be an efficient allocation after $a$ and $\mathcal{E}_a$ have been removed. Then
\[
W_{-a} - X_a^* - W_{-a} - \mathcal{E}_a = \sum_{a' \in A \setminus \{a\}} \left[ v_{a'}(X_{a'}^*) - v_{a'}(X_{a'}^\sharp) \right].
\]

As $p = (p_o)_{o \in O}$ is a Walrasian price vector, it supports $X^*$ in the problem with all agents and objects present. In particular, all $a' \in A \setminus \{a\}$ weakly prefer $X_{a'}^*$ over $X_{a'}^\sharp$; that is, for all $a' \in A \setminus \{a\}$,
\[
v_{a'}(X_{a'}^*) - \sum_{o \in X_{a'}^*} p_o \geq v_{a'}(X_{a'}^\sharp) - \sum_{o \in X_{a'}^\sharp} p_o.
\]
Rearranging, we obtain that
\[ v_{a'}(X^*_a) - v_{a'}(X^*_a) \geq \sum_{o \in X^*_a} p_o - \sum_{o \in X^*_a} p_o \text{ for all } a' \in A \setminus \{a\}. \]

Summing up over all agents yields
\[ \sum_{a' \in A \setminus \{a\}} \left[ v_{a'}(X^*_a) - v_{a'}(X^*_a) \right] \geq \sum_{a' \in A \setminus \{a\}} \left[ \sum_{o \in X^*_a} p_o - \sum_{o \in X^*_a} p_o \right] \]
\[ = \sum_{a' \in A \setminus \{a\}} \sum_{o \in X^*_a} p_o - \sum_{a' \in A \setminus \{a\}} \sum_{o \in X^*_a} p_o. \]

Using (3) and the fact that \( \bigcup_{a' \in A \setminus \{a\}} X^*_a = O \setminus X^*_a \) and \( \bigcup_{a' \in A \setminus \{a\}} X^*_a = O \setminus \mathcal{E}_a \), we obtain
\[ W^*_a - X^*_a - W^*_a - X^*_a, - \mathcal{E}_a \geq \sum_{o \in O \setminus X^*_a} p_o - \sum_{o \in X^*_a \setminus \mathcal{E}_a} p_o \]
\[ = \sum_{o \in \mathcal{E}_a \setminus X^*_a} p_o - \sum_{o \in X^*_a \setminus \mathcal{E}_a} p_o \]
\[ = \sum_{o \in \mathcal{E}_a \setminus X^*_a} p_o - \sum_{o \in X^*_a \setminus \mathcal{E}_a} p_o, \]

which is inequality (2).

- \( D^{VCG} \geq \overline{Q} \): By definition, \( D^{VCG} = \sum_{a \in A} t^V_a(X^*) \) and \( \overline{Q} = \sum_{a \in A} \overline{q}_a(X^*) \) so our result that \( t^{VCG}(X^*) \geq \overline{q}(X^*) \) implies \( D^{VCG} \geq \overline{Q} \).

- \( \overline{Q} \geq 0 \): Consider an efficient allocation \( X^* \in \mathcal{X}^* \) and a Walrasian price vector \((\hat{p}_o)_{o \in O} \in P^W\). For every agent \( a \in A \), we have that
\[ \overline{q}_a(X^*) = \max_{(p_o)_{o \in O} \in P^W} \left[ \sum_{o \in \mathcal{E}_a \setminus X^*_a} p_o - \sum_{o \in X^*_a \setminus \mathcal{E}_a} p_o \right] \geq \sum_{o \in \mathcal{E}_a \setminus X^*_a} \hat{p}_o - \sum_{o \in X^*_a \setminus \mathcal{E}_a} \hat{p}_o. \]

Summing up over all agents, we obtain that
\[ \overline{Q} = \sum_{a \in A} \overline{q}_a(X^*) \geq \sum_{a \in A} \left[ \sum_{o \in \mathcal{E}_a \setminus X^*_a} \hat{p}_o - \sum_{o \in X^*_a \setminus \mathcal{E}_a} \hat{p}_o \right]. \] (4)

By assumption, every object is assigned to exactly one agent under both \( \mathcal{E} \) and \( X^* \). Hence,
\[ \sum_{a \in A} \left[ \sum_{o \in \mathcal{E}_a \setminus X^*_a} \hat{p}_o - \sum_{o \in X^*_a \setminus \mathcal{E}_a} \hat{p}_o \right] = \sum_{a \in A} \sum_{o \in \mathcal{E}_a} \hat{p}_o - \sum_{a \in A} \sum_{o \in X^*_a} \hat{p}_o = 0. \] (5)

Combining (4) and (5) yields \( \overline{Q} \geq 0 \). \( \square \)
Proof of Theorem 1. By Theorem 2, we have that \( t^{\text{VCG}}(X^*) \geq q(X^*) \) and \( D^{\text{VCG}} \geq \bar{Q} \geq 0 \); therefore, it remains to show that \( t^{\text{VCG}}(X^*) \leq q(X^*) \), which implies that \( t^{\text{VCG}}(X^*) = q(X^*) \) and \( D^{\text{VCG}} = \bar{Q} \).

Consider any agent \( a \in A \). We need to show that
\[
q_a(X^*) \geq t_a^{\text{VCG}}(X^*).
\]

As \( a \) is a single-object trader, he sells at most one object and nonvacuously buys at most one object. Let \( o \in O \cup \{\emptyset\} \) be the object (if any) that \( a \) sells and let \( o' \in O \cup \{\emptyset\} \) be the object (if any) that \( a \) buys nonvacuously. If \( a \) is a single-object trader, he sells at most one object and nonvacuously buys at most one object. Let \( o \in O \cup \{\emptyset\} \) be the object (if any) that \( a \) sells and let \( o' \in O \cup \{\emptyset\} \) be the object (if any) that \( a \) buys nonvacuously. We have that \( q_a(X^*) = \max_{(\hat{p}_o)_{\hat{o} \in O} \in \mathcal{P}_W} [\hat{p}_o - \hat{p}_{o'}] \) and \( t_a^{\text{VCG}}(X^*) = W^*_{-a,-o'} - W^*_{-a,o} \). Therefore, we need to show that
\[
\max_{(\hat{p}_o)_{\hat{o} \in O} \in \mathcal{P}_W} [\hat{p}_o - \hat{p}_{o'}] \geq W^*_{-a,-o'} - W^*_{-a,o}.
\]

We will need to consider markets in which an agent and/or a copy of an object has been added. We denote the welfare of such a market with superscripts; for instance, \( W^{*(+\bar{a},+o)} \) denotes the efficient welfare in the market in which an additional agent \( \bar{a} \) and a copy of object \( o \in O \) has been added. In that market, all agents see \( o \) and its copy as indistinguishable. We need to use the identity in the following lemma, which we prove after the proof of Theorem 1.

Lemma A.3.

\[
W^*_{-a,-o'} - W^*_{-a,o} = W^* - W^{*(+,+o')}.
\]

By Lemma A.3, it remains to show that
\[
\max_{(\hat{p}_o)_{\hat{o} \in O} \in \mathcal{P}_W} [\hat{p}_o - \hat{p}_{o'}] \geq W^* - W^{*(+,+o')}.
\]

We start with our original problem, which contains the set of agents \( A \) and the set of objects \( O \), and add a copy of object \( o' \) as well as an agent \( \bar{a}' \) such that, for every bundle \( Y \subseteq O \),
\[
v_{\bar{a}'}(Y) = \begin{cases} 
W^{*(+,+o')} - W^* & \text{if } o' \in Y, \\
0 & \text{if } o' \notin Y.
\end{cases}
\]

That is, \( \bar{a}' \) has unit demand and only values object \( o' \). Observe that there are at least two efficient allocations in this market: one allocates \( o' \) to \( \bar{a}' \) and continues to allocate \( X^*_{\bar{a}} \) to every \( a \in A \) while another efficient allocation leaves \( \bar{a}' \) with an empty bundle and allocates all objects (including the copy of \( o' \)) efficiently to the other agents. By Lemma A.1, it follows that \( W^{*(+\bar{a}',+o')} = W^{*(+,+o')} \).

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26 If \( a \) does not sell any object, then \( o = \emptyset \) (hence, \( W^*_{-a} = W^* \) and \( p_o = 0 \)) and our proof essentially collapses to that of Theorem 4 of Gul and Stacchetti (1999). If \( a \) does not buy any object (or only buys objects vacuously), then \( o' = \emptyset \) and our proof essentially collapses to that of Theorem 5 of Gul and Stacchetti (1999).
We next add an agent $\tilde{a}$ such that, for every bundle $Y \subseteq O$,

$$v_{\tilde{a}}(Y) = \begin{cases} W^*({+\tilde{a}',+o'}) - W^*_{\tilde{a}',-o'} & \text{if } o \in Y, \\ 0 & \text{if } o \notin Y. \end{cases}$$

Agent $\tilde{a}$ has unit demand and only values $o$. Starting with an efficient allocation in the market in which $\tilde{a}'$ and $o'$ have been added, we can obtain an efficient allocation in the market where $\tilde{a}$ has also been added by allocating the same bundle to every $a \in A$ and allocating the empty bundle to $\tilde{a}$. Therefore, an efficient allocation in this market is $X^\sharp$ such that $X^\sharp_{\tilde{a}} = \emptyset$, $X^\sharp_{\tilde{a}'} = \{o'\}$, and $X^\sharp_a = X_a^*$ for all $a \in A$.

Let $(p_{\tilde{a}})_{\tilde{a} \in O}$ be a Walrasian price vector in the market in which $\tilde{a}$, $\tilde{a}'$, and the copy of $o'$ have been added. (The set of Walrasian price vectors in this market is nonempty since all agents are single-object traders. Moreover, as $o'$ and its copy are identical, their price in any Walrasian price vector is the same;\footnote{If the prices are different, both $\tilde{a}'$ and the agent who is allocated $o'$ under $X^\sharp$ only demand whichever one of $o'$ or its copy is cheaper; hence, such a price vector does not support $X^\sharp$.} therefore, we can define $p_o$ to be the price of both $o'$ and its copy.) By Claim 2, $(p_{\tilde{a}})_{\tilde{a} \in O}$ supports $X^\sharp$. Moreover, by construction, $(p_{\tilde{a}})_{\tilde{a} \in O}$ supports $X^*$ in the original market, meaning that $(p_{\tilde{a}})_{\tilde{a} \in O}$ is a Walrasian price vector in the original market. Therefore, it remains to show that $p_o - p_o' \geq W^* - W^*_{\tilde{a}',-o'}$.

As $(p_{\tilde{a}})_{\tilde{a} \in O}$ supports $X^\sharp$, when facing those prices it is optimal for $\tilde{a}$ not to acquire any object—hence, $p_o \geq W^*({+\tilde{a}',+o'}) - W^*_{\tilde{a}',-o'}$—and for $\tilde{a}'$ to acquire $o'$—hence, $p_o' \leq W^*({+,+o'}) - W^*$. Recalling that $W^*({+\tilde{a}',+o'}) = W^*({+,+o'})$, we conclude that

$$p_o - p_o' \geq W^* - W^*_{\tilde{a}',-o'}.$$ 

By Theorem 2 in Shapley (1962), an agent and an object are complements to each other:

$$(W^*_{\tilde{a}',-o'} - W^*_{\tilde{a}',+o'}) + (W^*_{+,+o'} - W^*_{+,+o'}) \leq W^*({+\tilde{a}',+o'}) - W^*_{+,+o'}.$$ 

Therefore, we have

$$W^*_{\tilde{a}',-o'} - W^*_{\tilde{a}',+o'} \leq W^*({+\tilde{a}',+o'}) - W^*_{+,+o'} = 0.$$ 

It follows that $W^*_{\tilde{a}',-o'} \leq W^*_{+,+o'}$, and hence, as required: $p_o - p_o' \geq W^* - W^*_{\tilde{a}',-o'}$. \hfill $\square$

Proof of Lemma A.3. By Lemma A.1, $W^* = W^*_{-,o'} + v_a(\{o'\})$ so we need to show that $W^*_{-,o'} = W^*_{-,o'} + v_a(\{o'\})$.

Let $\hat{\mathcal{X}}^*$ be an efficient allocation in the original problem such that (i) every agent is allocated at most one object and (ii) $a$ is allocated $o'$. Such an allocation necessarily exists since all agents are single-object traders and $a$ buys $o'$ nonvacuously.\footnote{$\hat{\mathcal{X}}^*$ can be constructed by starting from $X^*$ and, for each agent who is allocated multiple objects, reallocations all but one of them to agents who are allocated the empty bundle.} For every $a' \in A$, let $\hat{\mathcal{o}}_{a'} \in O \cup \emptyset$ be the object (if any) that $a'$ is allocated under $\hat{\mathcal{X}}^*$. Then $W^* = \sum_{a' \in A} v_{a'}(\{\hat{\mathcal{o}}_{a'}\})$. 

Consider now the market in which a copy of $o'$—which we denote by $\hat{o}'$—is added and $o$ is removed. Toward a contradiction, suppose that there is no efficient allocation in this market under which $a$ is allocated $o' = \hat{o}_a^*$. In this market, consider the efficient allocations $\hat{X}_a^*$ such that, again, each agent is allocated at most one object. For every $a' \in A$, we denote by $\hat{o}_{a'}^z \in \mathcal{O} \cup \{\emptyset\}$ the object (if any) that $a'$ is allocated under $\hat{X}_a^z$. Then $W_{\hat{X}_a^z(o')} = \sum_{a' \in A} v_{a'}(\{\hat{o}_{a'}^z\})$.

As every agent is allocated one object, $\hat{X}_a^z$ is defined by: (i) a chain of reallocations $o_0 \to a_1 \to o_1 \to a_2 \to o_2 \to \cdots \to a_n \to o_n$ such that $o_0 = \hat{o}'$, $o_n = o$, $o_i = \hat{o}_{a_i}^*$, and $o_{i-1} = \hat{o}_{a_i}^z$ for all $i = 1, \ldots, n$, and (ii) the property that all agents not in the chain are allocated the same object as in the efficient allocation $\hat{X}_a^*$ of the original problem: $\hat{o}_{a'}^z = \hat{o}_{a'}^*$ for all $a' \in A \setminus \{a_1, \ldots, a_n\}$.

By assumption, $\hat{o}_{a}^z \neq \hat{o}_a^* = o'$; therefore, there exists $m = 1, \ldots, n - 1$ such that $a_m = a$ and $o_m = o'$. Consider now the alternative allocation in which $a_i$ is allocated $o_i$ for all $i = 1, \ldots, m$, $a_{m+1}$ is allocated $o_0 = \hat{o}'$, and every remaining agent $a' \in A \setminus \{a_1, \ldots, a_{m+1}\}$ is allocated $\hat{o}_{a'}^z$. That allocation is not efficient by assumption since it allocates $o'$ to $a$; therefore, the aggregate value it creates is strictly less than that created by $\hat{X}_a^z$, which implies that

$$\sum_{i=1}^{m+1} v_{a_i}(\{o_{i-1}\}) > v_{a_{m+1}}(\{o_0\}) + \sum_{i=1}^{m} v_{a_i}(\{o_i\}).$$

As $o_m = o'$ and $o_0 = \hat{o}'$, we have that $v_{a_{m+1}}(\{o_m\}) = v_{a_{m+1}}(\{o_0\})$ and $v_{a_1}(\{o_0\}) = v_{a_1}(\{o_m\})$. It follows that

$$v_{a_1}(\{o_m\}) + \sum_{i=2}^{m} v_{a_i}(\{o_{i-1}\}) > \sum_{i=1}^{m} v_{a_i}(\{o_i\})$$

$$\Leftrightarrow v_{a_1}(\{o_m\}) + \sum_{i=2}^{m} v_{a_i}(\{o_{i-1}\}) > \sum_{a' \in A \setminus \{a_1, \ldots, a_m\}} v_{a'}(\{\hat{o}_{a'}^z\}) > \sum_{a' \in A} v_{a'}(\{\hat{o}_{a'}^z\}),$$

which contradicts the assumption that $\hat{X}_a^z$ is an efficient allocation in the original market.

We conclude that, in the market in which a copy of $o'$ has been added and $o$ has been removed, there exists an efficient allocation under which $a$ is allocated $o'$. Then, by Lemma A.1, $W_{\hat{X}_a^z(o')} = W_{a, -o} + v_a(\{o'\})$, as required.

**Proof of Proposition 1.** For every object $o \in \mathcal{O}$ and every $k = 1, \ldots, |A|$, let $a^k_o \in A$ be the agent with the $k$th highest valuation for $o$; that is, $v_{a^1_o}(\{o\}) \geq v_{a^2_o}(\{o\}) \geq \cdots \geq v_{a^{|A|}_o}(\{o\})$. Construct an efficient allocation $X^*$ by assigning each object to the agent who values it the most. Since valuations are additively separable, the welfare created by $X^*$ is $W^* = W(X^*) = \sum_{o \in \mathcal{O}} v_{a^*_o}(\{o\})$.

Consider now the allocation problem where some agent $a \in A$ and his endowment $E_a$ have been removed. By an analogous reasoning, welfare is maximized by allocating
each object to the agent who values it the most. Therefore, each object \( o \in \mathcal{O} \setminus (X^*_a \cup \mathcal{E}_a) \) is allocated to \( a^1_o \) and each object \( o \in X^*_a \setminus \mathcal{E}_a \) is assigned to \( a^2_o \) (since \( a^1_o = a \) is unavailable). We conclude that

\[
W_{-a, -\mathcal{E}_a}^* = \sum_{o \in \mathcal{O} \setminus (X^*_a \cup \mathcal{E}_a)} v_{a^1_o}(\{o\}) + \sum_{o \in X^*_a \setminus \mathcal{E}_a} v_{a^2_o}(\{o\}). \tag{6}
\]

By Lemma A.1, the efficient level of welfare when \( a \) and his allocation \( X^*_a \) are removed is

\[
W_{-a, -X^*_a}^* = \sum_{o \in \mathcal{O} \setminus X^*_a} v_{a^1_o}(\{o\}) = \sum_{o \in \mathcal{O} \setminus (X^*_a \cup \mathcal{E}_a)} v_{a^1_o}(\{o\}) + \sum_{o \in \mathcal{E}_a \setminus X^*_a} v_{a^1_o}(\{o\}). \tag{7}
\]

Using (6) and (7), we find that the VCG transfer of any agent \( a \in \mathcal{A} \) is

\[
t_a^{VCG}(X^*) = W_{-a, -X^*_a}^* - W_{-a, -\mathcal{E}_a}^* = \sum_{o \in \mathcal{O} \setminus X^*_a} v_{a^1_o}(\{o\}) - \sum_{o \in \mathcal{E}_a \setminus X^*_a} v_{a^2_o}(\{o\}). \tag{8}
\]

We next show that the set of Walrasian price vectors is

\[
P^W = \{ (p_o)_{o \in \mathcal{O}} \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{O}} : p_o \in [v_{a^2_o}(\{o\}), v_{a^1_o}(\{o\})] \text{ for all } o \in \mathcal{O} \}. \tag{9}
\]

Consider a price vector \( (p_o)_{o \in \mathcal{O}} \). Suppose first that, for some \( \hat{o} \in \mathcal{O} \), \( p_{\hat{o}} < v_{a^2_{\hat{o}}} \). Then it is optimal for \( a^2_{\hat{o}} \) to pick \( \hat{o} \) when he faces \( (p_o)_{o \in \mathcal{O}} \); therefore, \( (p_o)_{o \in \mathcal{O}} \) does not support \( X^* \) and is not a Walrasian price vector. Suppose next that, for some \( \hat{o} \in \mathcal{O} \), \( p_{\hat{o}} > v_{a^1_{\hat{o}}}(\{\hat{o}\}) \). Then it is not optimal for \( a^1_{\hat{o}} \) to pick \( \hat{o} \) when he faces \( (p_o)_{o \in \mathcal{O}} \); again, \( (p_o)_{o \in \mathcal{O}} \) does not support \( X^* \) and is not a Walrasian price vector. Finally, suppose that, for all \( \hat{o} \in \mathcal{O} \), \( p_{\hat{o}} \in [v_{a^2_{\hat{o}}}(\{\hat{o}\}), v_{a^1_{\hat{o}}}(\{\hat{o}\})] \). Then, for all \( \hat{o} \in \mathcal{O} \), when agents face \( (p_o)_{o \in \mathcal{O}} \), it is optimal for \( a^1_{\hat{o}} \) to pick \( \hat{o} \) and optimal for all other agents not to pick \( \hat{o} \). We have therefore established (9).

By definition, the largest net Walrasian price of agent \( a \in \mathcal{A} \) is

\[
\overline{q}_a = \max_{(p_o)_{o \in \mathcal{O}} \in P^W} \left[ \sum_{o \in \mathcal{O} \setminus X^*_a} p_o - \sum_{o \in X^*_a \setminus \mathcal{E}_a} p_o \right],
\]

which combined with (9) yields

\[
\overline{q}_a = \sum_{o \in \mathcal{O} \setminus X^*_a} v_{a^1_o}(\{o\}) - \sum_{o \in X^*_a \setminus \mathcal{E}_a} v_{a^2_o}(\{o\}).
\]

By (8), we obtain that \( t_a^{VCG}(X^*) = \overline{q}_a(X^*) \). As this holds for all \( a \in \mathcal{A} \), we conclude that \( t_a^{VCG}(X^*) = \overline{q}_a(X^*) \). Then, by definition, we have that

\[
D^{VCG} = \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} t_a^{VCG}(X^*) = \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \overline{q}_a(X^*) = \overline{Q}.
\]

Finally, Theorem 2 yields \( \overline{Q} \geq 0 \).

**Proof of Proposition 2.** Theorem 2 yields \( D^{VCG} \geq \overline{Q} \); hence, we need to show that \( \overline{Q} = \sum_{o \in T(X^*)} (\overline{p}_o - p_o) \)
As \( X^* \) is a two-sided efficient allocation (i.e., \( X^* \in \tilde{X}^* \)), \( \tilde{B}(X^*) \cup \tilde{S}(X^*) = \tilde{A}(X^*) \), so

\[
\bar{Q} = \sum_{a \in A \setminus \tilde{A}(X^*)} \bar{q}_a(X^*) + \sum_{b \in \tilde{B}(X^*)} \bar{q}_b(X^*) + \sum_{s \in \tilde{S}(X^*)} \bar{q}_s(X^*).
\]

By Lemma A.2, the price of a vacuously traded object is zero in every Walrasian price vector; therefore, \( \bar{q}_a = 0 \) for all \( a \in A \setminus \tilde{A}(X^*) \) and we have that

\[
\bar{Q} = \sum_{b \in \tilde{B}(X^*)} \bar{q}_b(X^*) + \sum_{s \in \tilde{S}(X^*)} \bar{q}_s(X^*).
\]

Using Claims 4 and 5 and rearranging, we obtain that

\[
\bar{Q} = \sum_{b \in \tilde{B}(X^*)} \left[ - \sum_{o \in X_b^* \setminus E_b} p_o \right] + \sum_{s \in \tilde{S}(X^*)} \left[ \sum_{o \in E_s \setminus X^*_s} p_o \right] = \sum_{o \in \bigcup_{s \in \tilde{S}(X^*)} (E_s \setminus X^*_s)} \bar{p}_o - \sum_{o \in \bigcup_{b \in \tilde{B}(X^*)} (X^*_b \setminus E_b)} p_o.
\]

By Lemma A.2, for any object \( o \in T(X^*) \setminus \tilde{T}(X^*) \), \( p_o = \bar{p}_o = 0 \). It follows that

\[
\bar{Q} = \sum_{o \in \tilde{T}(X^*) \cap (\bigcup_{s \in \tilde{S}(X^*)} (E_s \setminus X^*_s))} \bar{p}_o - \sum_{o \in \tilde{T}(X^*) \cap (\bigcup_{b \in \tilde{B}(X^*)} (X^*_b \setminus E_b))} p_o.
\]  \hspace{1cm} (10)

The set \( \tilde{T}(X^*) \cap (\bigcup_{s \in \tilde{S}(X^*)} (E_s \setminus X^*_s)) \) contains all the objects that are nonvacuously sold by an ex post seller and the set \( \tilde{T}(X^*) \cap (\bigcup_{b \in \tilde{B}(X^*)} (X^*_b \setminus E_b)) \) contains all the objects that are nonvacuously bought by an ex post buyer. By construction, every object that is nonvacuously traded is sold by exactly one seller and bought by exactly one buyer; hence, we have that

\[
\tilde{T}(X^*) \cap \left( \bigcup_{s \in \tilde{S}(X^*)} (E_s \setminus X^*_s) \right) = \tilde{T}(X^*) \cap \left( \bigcup_{b \in \tilde{B}(X^*)} (X^*_b \setminus E_b) \right) = \tilde{T}(X^*). \hspace{1cm} (11)
\]

Combining (10) and (11) and rearranging yields

\[
\bar{Q} = \sum_{o \in \tilde{T}(X^*)} \bar{p}_o - \sum_{o \in \tilde{T}(X^*)} p_o = \sum_{o \in \tilde{T}(X^*)} (\bar{p}_o - p_o).
\]  \hspace{1cm} (12)

Invoking Lemma A.2 again, we have \( \bar{p}_o = p_o = 0 \) for every vacuously-traded object \( o \in T(X^*) \setminus \tilde{T}(X^*) \). By (12), we conclude that \( \bar{Q} = \sum_{o \in T(X^*)} (\bar{p}_o - p_o) \), as required. \hfill \Box

**Proof of Proposition 3.** We show that \( \bar{q}_s(X^*) = \bar{p}_o \) and \( \bar{q}_b = -p_o \), which implies the desired result by Theorem 1 and Proposition 2. The largest net Walrasian price of agent \( s \) is

\[
\bar{q}_s = \max_{(p_o)_{o \in O} \in \mathcal{P}^W} \left[ \sum_{o \in E_s \setminus X^*_s} p_o - \sum_{o \in X^*_s \setminus E_s} p_o \right].
\]
As $s$ is a single-object trader, $s$ cannot sell any object other than $o$ so $E_s \setminus X^*_s = \{o\}$. As $X^*$ is two-sided, $s$ is an ex post seller so any object that he buys is traded vacuously and, by Lemma A.2, has a price of zero in any Walrasian price vector. It follows that $q_s = \max_{\hat{o} \in O} p_{\hat{o}}$. As all agents are single-object traders, the set of Walrasian prices contains a largest element; therefore, $q_s = \bar{p}_o$.

The largest net Walrasian price of agent $b$ is

$$\bar{q}_b = \max_{\hat{o} \in O} \left[ \sum_{\hat{o} \in \mathcal{E}_b \setminus X^*_b} p_{\hat{o}} - \sum_{\hat{o} \in X^*_b \setminus \mathcal{E}_b} p_{\hat{o}} \right].$$

As $b$ is a single-object trader, $b$ buys at most one object, object $o$, nonvacuously. As $X^*$ is two-sided, $b$ is an ex post buyer and any object he sells is traded vacuously. It follows that $o$ is the only object that $b$ trades nonvacuously. By Lemma A.2, $\bar{q}_b = \max_{\hat{o} \in O} p_{\hat{o}}$.

As all agents are single-object traders, the set of Walrasian prices contains a smallest element; therefore, $\bar{q}_b = -\bar{p}_o$.

We next introduce a result that is useful to prove Propositions 4 and 5.

**Lemma A.4.** Consider a homogeneous good market and suppose that there exists an efficient allocation $X^* \in \mathcal{X}^*$ such that $X^*_a \neq \emptyset$, for all $a \in A$. Then every Walrasian price vector is uniform.

**Proof.** Toward a contradiction, suppose there exists a Walrasian price vector $p = (p_o)_{o \in O}$ that is not uniform. As not all objects are allocated to the same agent under $X^*$, there exist two agents $\hat{a}$ and $a'$ and two objects $\hat{o}$ and $o'$ such that $\hat{o} \in X^*_a$, $o' \in X^*_{a'}$, and $p_{\hat{o}} < p_{o'}$. Then, as agents do not care about the identity of the objects they are assigned, we have that

$$v_{a'}(\{X^*_{a'} \setminus \{o'\}\} \cup \{\hat{o}\}) - \sum_{o \in (X^*_{a'} \setminus \{o'\}) \cup \{\hat{o}\}} p_o > v_{a'}(X^*_a) - \sum_{o \in X^*_a} p_o$$

so $p$ does not support the efficient allocation $X^*$, which by Claim 2 contradicts the assumption that $p$ is a Walrasian price vector.

**Proof of Proposition 4.** By assumption, $p, \bar{p} \in \mathcal{P}^W$ so $\mathcal{P}^W$ is nonempty. Then the largest net Walrasian price of each agent $a \in \bar{A}$ is well-defined and equal to

$$\bar{q}_a(X^*) = \max_{(p_o)_{o \in O} \in \mathcal{P}^W} \left[ \sum_{o \in \mathcal{E}_a \setminus X^*_a} p_o - \sum_{o \in X^*_a \setminus \mathcal{E}_a} p_o \right].$$

Suppose first that there exists an efficient allocation under which not all objects are allocated to the same agent; that is, there exists $X^* \in \mathcal{X}^*$ such that $X^*_a \neq \emptyset$, for all $a \in A$. By Lemma A.4, all Walrasian price vectors are uniform so the largest net Walrasian price of each agent $a$ simplifies to

$$\bar{q}_a(X^*) = \max_{p \in [\bar{p}, \bar{p}]} \left[ |(\mathcal{E}_a \setminus X^*_a)| p - |(X^*_a \setminus \mathcal{E}_a)| p \right],$$
which is equivalent to
\[
\bar{q}_a(X^*) = \max_{p \in [\underline{p}, \overline{p}]} \left( |\mathcal{E}_a| - |X_a^*| \right) p.
\] (13)

If \( a \) is a net buyer, \( |\mathcal{E}_a| - |X_a^*| < 0 \), then the maximization problem in (13) is solved by setting \( p = \overline{p} \). Then \( \bar{q}_a(X^*) = (|\mathcal{E}_a| - |X_a^*|) \overline{p} = -(|X_a^*| - |\mathcal{E}_a|) \overline{p} \). If \( a \) is a net seller, \( |\mathcal{E}_a| - |X_a^*| > 0 \), then the maximization problem in (13) is solved by setting \( p = \underline{p} \) and \( \bar{q}_a(X^*) = (|\mathcal{E}_a| - |X_a^*|) \underline{p} \). If \( a \) is a neutral agent, \( |\mathcal{E}_a| - |X_a^*| = 0 \) and the maximization problem in (13) is solved by any \( p \in [\underline{p}, \overline{p}] \) and yields \( \bar{q}_a(X^*) = 0 \).

Suppose now that, under every efficient allocation, all objects are allocated to the same agent. Let \( X^* \in \mathcal{X}^* \) be any efficient allocation, then there exists an agent \( b \) such that \( X_b^* = \emptyset \) and \( X_s^* = \emptyset \) for every agent \( s \neq b \). As \( X_b^* = \emptyset \), agent \( b \) does not sell any object so his largest net Walrasian price is
\[
\bar{q}_b(X^*) = \max_{(p_o)_{o \in \mathcal{O} \setminus \mathcal{E}_b} \in \mathcal{P}^W} \sum_{o \in \mathcal{X}_b^* \setminus \mathcal{E}_b} p_o.
\]

By assumption, \( \overline{p} \) is the largest Walrasian price vector, and, as we argued in the main text, it is uniform.\(^{29}\) Therefore, the largest net Walrasian price of agent \( b \) is \( \bar{q}_b(X^*) = -(|X_b^*| - |\mathcal{E}_b|) \overline{p} \). For every agent \( s \neq b \), \( X_s^* = \emptyset \) so \( s \) does not buy any object and his largest net Walrasian price is
\[
\bar{q}_s(X^*) = \max_{(p_o)_{o \in \mathcal{O} \setminus \mathcal{E}_s} \in \mathcal{P}^W} \sum_{o \in \mathcal{X}_s^* \setminus \mathcal{E}_s} p_o.
\]

By assumption, \( \underline{p} \) is the largest Walrasian price vector and, as we argued in the main text, it is uniform. Hence, the largest net Walrasian price of agent \( s \) is \( \bar{q}_s(X^*) = (|\mathcal{E}_s| - |X_s^*|) \underline{p} \).

**Proof of Proposition 5.** Suppose first that all agents have decreasing marginal values. By Proposition B.1 in Appendix B.2, the valuation of every agent satisfies the gross substitutes condition; hence, by Corollary 1 of Gul and Stacchetti (1999), \( \mathcal{P}^W \) is a nonempty complete lattice, which implies that \( \underline{p}, \overline{p} \in \mathcal{P}^W \).

Suppose now that \( \mathcal{P}^W \neq \emptyset \) and there exists \( X^* \in \mathcal{X}^* \) such that \( \hat{q}_a(X^*) \neq \emptyset \) for all \( a \in \mathcal{A} \). By Lemma A.4, every Walrasian price vector is uniform, which implies that \( \underline{p}, \overline{p} \in \mathcal{P}^W \). \( \square \)

**Appendix B: Background material**

**B.1 Details of examples**

In this Appendix, we detail the computations of the largest net Walrasian prices and VCG transfers in our examples.

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\(^{29}\)Formally, if there exist two objects \( o \) and \( o' \) such that \( p_{o'} < p_o \), then the vector \((\hat{p}_o)_{o \in \mathcal{O}} \) such that \( \hat{p}_o = p_{o'} \), \( \hat{p}_{o'} = p_o \), and \( \hat{p}_\hat{o} = p_{\hat{o}} \) for all \( \hat{o} \in \mathcal{O} \setminus \{o, o'\} \) is a Walrasian price vector, which contradicts the assumption that \( \underline{p} \) is the smallest Walrasian price vector.
Example 1 A price vector \((p_{o_1}, p_{o_2})\) is a Walrasian price vector if it supports the efficient allocation (i.e., it is optimal for \(a_1\) to choose \(o_2\) and for \(a_2\) to choose \(o_1\)), which requires satisfying the following six conditions:

\[
\begin{align*}
&v_{a_1}(\{o_2\}) - p_{o_2} \geq 0 \quad (a_1 \text{ weakly prefers } \{o_2\} \text{ to } \emptyset) \\
v_{a_1}(\{o_2\}) - p_{o_2} \geq v_{a_1}(\{o_1\}) - p_{o_1} \quad (a_1 \text{ weakly prefers } \{o_2\} \text{ to } \{o_1\}) \\
v_{a_1}(\{o_2\}) - p_{o_2} \geq v_{a_1}(\{o_1, o_2\}) - p_{o_1} - p_{o_2} \quad (a_1 \text{ weakly prefers } \{o_2\} \text{ to } \{o_1, o_2\}) \\
v_{a_1}(\{o_2\}) - p_{o_1} \geq 0 \quad (a_2 \text{ weakly prefers } \{o_1\} \text{ to } \emptyset) \\
v_{a_2}(\{o_1\}) - p_{o_2} \geq v_{a_2}(\{o_2\}) - p_{o_2} \quad (a_2 \text{ weakly prefers } \{o_1\} \text{ to } \{o_2\}) \\
v_{a_2}(\{o_1\}) - p_{o_1} \geq v_{a_2}(\{o_1, o_2\}) - p_{o_1} - p_{o_2} \quad (a_2 \text{ weakly prefers } \{o_1\} \text{ to } \{o_1, o_2\}).
\end{align*}
\]

As agents are single-objects traders, \(v_{a_1}(\{o_1, o_2\}) = \max\{v_{a_1}(\{o_1\}), v_{a_1}(\{o_2\})\}\) so the third condition is equivalent to \(p_{o_1} \geq \max\{0, v_{a_1}(\{o_1\}) - v_{a_1}(\{o_2\})\}\); hence, the third and fourth conditions are jointly equivalent to \(p_{o_1} \in [\max\{0, v_{a_1}(\{o_1\}) - v_{a_1}(\{o_2\})\}, v_{a_2}(\{o_1\})]\). Analogously, the first and last conditions are jointly equivalent to \(p_{o_2} \in [\max\{0, v_{a_2}(\{o_2\}) - v_{a_2}(\{o_1\})\}, v_{a_1}(\{o_2\})]\). Finally, it is easy to see that the second and fifth conditions are jointly equivalent to \(p_{o_1} - p_{o_2} \in [v_{a_1}(\{o_1\}) - v_{a_1}(\{o_2\}), v_{a_2}(\{o_1\}) - v_{a_2}(\{o_2\})]\).

Therefore, a price vector \((p_{o_1}, p_{o_2})\) is a Walrasian price vector if it satisfies the following three conditions:

\[
\begin{align*}
p_{o_1} &\in [\max\{0, v_{a_1}(\{o_1\}) - v_{a_1}(\{o_2\})\}, v_{a_2}(\{o_1\})] \\
p_{o_2} &\in [\max\{0, v_{a_2}(\{o_2\}) - v_{a_2}(\{o_1\})\}, v_{a_1}(\{o_2\})] \\
p_{o_1} - p_{o_2} &\in [v_{a_1}(\{o_1\}) - v_{a_1}(\{o_2\}), v_{a_2}(\{o_1\}) - v_{a_2}(\{o_2\})].
\end{align*}
\]

The price vector \((p_{o_1}, p_{o_2}) = (\max\{0, v_{a_2}(\{o_1\}) - v_{a_2}(\{o_2\})\}, \max\{0, v_{a_2}(\{o_2\}) - v_{a_2}(\{o_1\})\})\) satisfies the first condition since \(v_{a_1}(\{o_1\}) - v_{a_1}(\{o_2\}) \leq v_{a_2}(\{o_1\}) - v_{a_2}(\{o_2\}) \leq v_{a_2}(\{o_1\})\) (as the efficient allocation assigns \(o_1\) to \(a_2\) and \(o_2\) to \(a_1\), and \(v_{a_2}(\{o_2\}) \geq 0\)), the second condition since \(p_{o_2}\) is equal to its lower bound, and the third condition since the difference \(p_{o_1} - p_{o_2}\) is equal to its upper bound \(v_{a_2}(\{o_1\}) - v_{a_2}(\{o_2\})\). Therefore, \((p_{o_1}, p_{o_2})\) is a Walrasian price vector, which means that there exists a Walrasian price vector for which the difference between the prices of \(o_1\) and \(o_2\) is \(v_{a_2}(\{o_1\}) - v_{a_2}(\{o_2\})\). As any price vector with a larger difference violates the third condition, we conclude that the largest net Walrasian price of \(a_1\) is

\[
\bar{q}_{a_1} = \max_{(p_{o_1}, p_{o_2}) \in \mathcal{P}^W} \{p_{o_1} - p_{o_2} = v_{a_2}(\{o_1\}) - v_{a_2}(\{o_2\})\}.
\]

Analogous reasoning establishes that the largest net Walrasian price of \(a_2\) is

\[
\bar{q}_{a_2} = \max_{(p_{o_1}, p_{o_2}) \in \mathcal{P}^W} \{p_{o_2} - p_{o_1} = v_{a_1}(\{o_2\}) - v_{a_1}(\{o_1\})\}.
\]

\(^{30}\) We omit the dependency of largest net Walrasian prices and VCG transfers on an allocation since there is a unique efficient allocation.
The VCG transfer of \(a_1\) is his externality on \(a_2\). When \(a_1\) is present, \(a_2\) is allocated \(o_1\) while when \(a_1\) is removed (with his endowment), \(a_2\) is allocated \(o_2\); therefore, \(a_1\)'s VCG transfer is
\[
q_{a_1}^{\text{VCG}} = W_{-a_1}^* - o_2 - W_{-a_1}^* - o_1 = v_{a_2}([o_1]) - v_{a_2}([o_2]) = q_{a_1}.
\]
Analogously, the VCG transfer of \(a_2\) is his externality on \(a_1\), which is
\[
q_{a_2}^{\text{VCG}} = W_{-a_2}^* - o_1 - W_{-a_2}^* - o_2 = v_{a_1}([o_2]) - v_{a_1}([o_1]) = q_{a_2}.
\]

Our illustrative example from Section 2 is the special case of Example 1 in which \(v_{a_1}([o_1]) = 5\), \(v_{a_1}([o_2]) = 7\), \(v_{a_2}([o_1]) = 3\), and \(v_{a_2}([o_2]) = 2\). The largest net Walrasian price and VCG transfer of \(a_1\) (Leon) are \(3 - 2 = 1\) while the largest net Walrasian price and VCG transfer of \(a_2\) (William) are \(7 - 5 = 2\).

**Example 2** A price vector \((p_{o_1}, p_{o_2})\) is a Walrasian price vector if it supports the efficient allocation \(X^*\), which requires satisfying the following six conditions:

\[
\begin{align*}
12 - p_{o_1} - p_{o_2} &\geq 0 \quad (a_1 \text{ weakly prefers } [o_1, o_2] \text{ to } \emptyset) \\
12 - p_{o_1} - p_{o_2} &\geq 5 - p_{o_1} \quad (a_1 \text{ weakly prefers } [o_1, o_2] \text{ to } [o_1]) \\
12 - p_{o_1} - p_{o_2} &\geq 7 - p_{o_2} \quad (a_1 \text{ weakly prefers } [o_1, o_2] \text{ to } [o_2]) \\
0 &\geq 3 - p_{o_1} \quad (a_2 \text{ weakly prefers } \emptyset \text{ to } [o_1]) \\
0 &\geq 2 - p_{o_2} \quad (a_2 \text{ weakly prefers } \emptyset \text{ to } [o_2]) \\
0 &\geq 4 - p_{o_1} - p_{o_2} \quad (a_2 \text{ weakly prefers } \emptyset \text{ to } [o_1, o_2]).
\end{align*}
\]

The third and fourth conditions imply that \(p_{o_1} \in [3, 5]\). The second and fifth conditions imply that \(p_{o_2} \in [2, 7]\). The first and last conditions imply that \(p_{o_1} + p_{o_2} \in [4, 12]\); however, the lower bounds \(p_{o_1} \geq 3\) and \(p_{o_2} \geq 2\) imply that \(p_{o_1} + p_{o_2} \geq 4\) and the upper bounds \(p_{o_1} \leq 5\) and \(p_{o_2} \leq 7\) imply that \(p_{o_1} + p_{o_2} \leq 12\). Therefore, a price vector \((p_{o_1}, p_{o_2})\) is a Walrasian price vector if \(p_{o_1} \in [3, 5]\) and \(p_{o_2} \in [2, 7]\). As \(a_1\) buys both objects, his largest net Walrasian price is
\[
\overline{q}_{a_1} = \max_{(p_{o_1}, p_{o_2}) \in P^w} [-p_{o_1} - p_{o_2}] = -3 - 2 = -5.
\]

As \(a_2\) sells both objects, his largest net Walrasian price is
\[
\overline{q}_{a_2} = \max_{(p_{o_1}, p_{o_2}) \in P^w} [p_{o_1} + p_{o_2}] = 5 + 7 = 12.
\]

The VCG transfer of \(a_1\) is his externality on \(a_2\). When \(a_1\) is present, \(a_2\) is not allocated any object while when \(a_1\) is removed, \(a_2\) is allocated both objects; therefore, \(a_1\)'s VCG transfer is
\[
q_{a_1}^{\text{VCG}} = W_{-a_1}^* - [o_1, o_2] - W_{-a_1}^* = 0 - 4 = -4 > -5 = \overline{q}_{a_1}.
\]
Analogously, \( a_1 \) is allocated both objects when \( a_2 \) is present and none when \( a_2 \) is absent; hence, \( a_2 \)'s VCG transfer is
\[
i_{VCG}^{a_2} = W^*_{-a_2, \{o_1, o_2\}} - W^*_{-a_2, \{o_1\}} = 12 - 0 = 12 = \overline{q}_{a_2}.
\]

**Example 3**  A price vector \((p_{o_1}, p_{o_2})\) is a Walrasian price vector if it satisfies the following six conditions:

\[
\begin{align*}
9 - p_{o_2} &\geq 0 \quad (a_1 \text{ weakly prefers } \{o_2\} \text{ to } \emptyset) \\
9 - p_{o_2} &\geq 3 - p_{o_1} \quad (a_1 \text{ weakly prefers } \{o_2\} \text{ to } \{o_1\}) \\
9 - p_{o_2} &\geq 12 - p_{o_1} - p_{o_2} \quad (a_1 \text{ weakly prefers } \{o_2\} \text{ to } \{o_1, o_2\}) \\
4 - p_{o_1} &\geq 0 \quad (a_2 \text{ weakly prefers } \{o_1\} \text{ to } \emptyset) \\
4 - p_{o_1} &\geq 4 - p_{o_2} \quad (a_2 \text{ weakly prefers } \{o_1\} \text{ to } \{o_2\}) \\
4 - p_{o_1} &\geq 9 - p_{o_1} - p_{o_2} \quad (a_2 \text{ weakly prefers } \{o_1\} \text{ to } \{o_1, o_2\}).
\end{align*}
\]

The third and fourth conditions imply that \( p_{o_1} \in [3, 4] \). The first and last conditions imply that \( p_{o_2} \in [5, 9] \). The second and fifth conditions imply that \( p_{o_2} - p_{o_1} \in [0, 6] \), which is always satisfied when \( p_{o_1} \in [3, 4] \) and \( p_{o_2} \in [5, 9] \).

Therefore, a price vector \((p_{o_1}, p_{o_2})\) is a Walrasian price vector if \( p_{o_1} \in [3, 4] \) and \( p_{o_2} \in [5, 9] \). As \( a_1 \) sells \( o_1 \) and buys \( o_2 \), his largest net Walrasian price is
\[
\overline{q}_{a_1} = \max_{(p_{o_1}, p_{o_2}) \in \mathcal{P}_W} [p_{o_1} - p_{o_2}] = 4 - 5 = -1.
\]
As \( a_2 \) sells \( o_2 \) and buys \( o_1 \), his largest net Walrasian price is
\[
\overline{q}_{a_2} = \max_{(p_{o_1}, p_{o_2}) \in \mathcal{P}_W} [p_{o_2} - p_{o_1}] = 9 - 3 = 6.
\]

The VCG transfer of \( a_1 \) is his externality on \( a_2 \). When \( a_1 \) is present, \( a_2 \) is allocated \( o_2 \) while when \( a_1 \) is removed, \( a_2 \) is allocated \( o_1 \); therefore, \( a_1 \)'s VCG transfer is
\[
i_{VCG}^{a_1} = W^*_{-a_1, o_2} - W^*_{-a_1, o_1} = 4 - 4 = 0 > -1 = \overline{q}_{a_1}.
\]
Analogously, \( a_1 \) is allocated \( o_2 \) when \( a_2 \) is present and \( o_1 \) when \( a_2 \) is absent; hence, \( a_2 \)'s VCG transfer is
\[
i_{VCG}^{a_2} = W^*_{-a_2, o_1} - W^*_{-a_2, o_2} = 9 - 3 = 6 = \overline{q}_{a_2}.
\]

**Example 4**  A price vector \((p_{o_1}, p_{o_2})\) is a Walrasian price vector if it satisfies the following six conditions:

\[
3 - p_{o_2} \geq 0 \quad (a_1 \text{ weakly prefers } \{o_2\} \text{ to } \emptyset)
\]

---

\[31\] We consider here the efficient allocation in which \( a_1 \) is allocated \( o_2 \) and \( a_2 \) is allocated \( o_1 \). The calculations are analogous for the other efficient allocation in which \( a_1 \) is allocated \( o_1 \) and \( a_2 \) is allocated \( o_2 \), and as predicted by Claim 2, yield the same set of Walrasian price vectors.
For any agent \( a \), the set of Walrasian price vectors contains all price vectors such that 
\[
3 - p_{o_2} \geq 3 - p_{o_1} \quad (a_1 \text{ weakly prefers } \{o_2\} \text{ to } \{o_1\})
\]
\[
3 - p_{o_2} \geq 4 - p_{o_1} - p_{o_2} \quad (a_1 \text{ weakly prefers } \{o_2\} \text{ to } \{o_1, o_2\})
\]
\[
4 - p_{o_1} \geq 0 \quad (a_2 \text{ weakly prefers } \{o_1\} \text{ to } \emptyset)
\]
\[
4 - p_{o_1} \geq 4 - p_{o_2} \quad (a_2 \text{ weakly prefers } \{o_1\} \text{ to } \{o_2\})
\]
\[
4 - p_{o_1} \geq 6 + \epsilon - p_{o_1} - p_{o_2} \quad (a_2 \text{ weakly prefers } \{o_1\} \text{ to } \{o_1, o_2\})
\]

The second and fifth conditions imply that \( p_{o_1} = p_{o_2} \), the third and fourth conditions imply that \( p_{o_1} \in [1, 4] \), and the first and last conditions imply that \( p_{o_2} \in [2 + \epsilon, 3] \). Therefore, the set of Walrasian price vectors contains all price vectors such that \( p_{o_1} = p_{o_2} \in [2 + \epsilon, 3] \). As \( a_2 \) buys an object from \( a_1 \), the largest net Walrasian prices are
\[
\bar{q}_{a_1} = \max_{(p_{o_1}, p_{o_2}) \in \mathcal{P}W} p_{o_1} = 3 \quad \text{and} \quad \bar{q}_{a_2} = \max_{(p_{o_1}, p_{o_2}) \in \mathcal{P}W} -p_{o_1} = -2 - \epsilon.
\]

The VCG transfer of \( a_1 \) is his externality on \( a_2 \). When \( a_1 \) is present, \( a_2 \) is allocated one object while when \( a_1 \) is removed, \( a_2 \) is not allocated anything; therefore, \( a_1 \)’s VCG transfer is
\[
\tau_{a_1}^{\text{VCG}} = W_{-a_1, -o_2} - W_{-a_1, \{o_1, o_2\}} = 4 - 0 = 4 > 3 = \bar{q}_{a_1}.
\]

When \( a_2 \) is present, \( a_1 \) is allocated one object while when \( a_2 \) is removed, \( a_1 \) is allocated both objects; therefore, \( a_2 \)’s VCG transfer is
\[
\tau_{a_2}^{\text{VCG}} = W_{-a_2, -o_1} - W_{-a_2, \{o_1, o_2\}} = 3 - 4 = -1 > -2 - \epsilon = \bar{q}_{a_2}.
\]

The largest net Walrasian prices of both agents are strictly smaller than their VCG transfers, and as a result, the sum of the largest net Walrasian prices \((3 - 2 - \epsilon = 1 - \epsilon)\) is strictly smaller than the VCG deficit \((4 - 1 = 3)\).

### B.2 Gross substitutes valuations

For any agent \( a \) and any price vector \( \mathbf{p} = (p_{o})_{o \in \mathcal{O}} \), let
\[
D_a(\mathbf{p}) = \left\{ Y \subseteq \mathcal{O} : v_a(Y) - \sum_{o \in Y} p_o \geq v_a(Z) - \sum_{o \in Z} p_o \text{ for all } Z \subseteq \mathcal{O} \right\}
\]
be the set of bundles that are optimal for \( a \) to pick when he faces the price vector \( \mathbf{p} \).

**Definition B.1 (Kelso and Crawford, 1982).** The valuation \( v_a \) of agent \( a \in \mathcal{A} \) satisfies the \textbf{gross substitutes} condition if for any two price vectors \( \mathbf{p} = (p_{o})_{o \in \mathcal{O}} \) and \( \mathbf{p}' = (p'_{o})_{o \in \mathcal{O}} \) with \( p' \geq \mathbf{p} \), and any bundle \( Y \in D_a(\mathbf{p}) \), there exists a bundle \( Z \in D_a(\mathbf{p}') \) such that \( \{o \in Y : p_o = p'_{o}\} \subseteq Z \).

**Definition B.2.** In a homogeneous good market, agent \( a \in \mathcal{A} \) has \textbf{decreasing marginal values} if, for any bundles \( Y_1, Y_2, Y_3 \subseteq \mathcal{O} \) with \( |Y_1| + 2 = |Y_2| + 1 = |Y_3| \), we have that
\[
v_a(Y_2) - v_a(Y_1) \geq v_a(Y_3) - v_a(Y_2).
\]
**Proposition B.1.** In a homogeneous good market, an agent has decreasing marginal values if and only if his valuation satisfies the gross substitutes condition.

**Proof.** \((Only \ if):\) Delacrétaz et al. (2019) show that in a homogeneous good market all valuations with decreasing marginal values are assignment valuations. Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) show that all assignment valuations satisfy the gross substitutes condition.

\((If):\) In a homogeneous good market, agent \(a \in \mathcal{A}\) having decreasing marginal values is equivalent to \(a\) having decreasing marginal returns: for any two bundles \(Y, Z \subseteq \mathcal{O}\) with \(Y \subseteq Z\) and any object \(o \in Y\), \(v_a(Y) - v_a(Y \setminus \{o\}) \geq v_a(Z) - v_a(Z \setminus \{o\})\). When valuations are monotone, Gul and Stacchetti (1999, Lemmas 1 and 6) show that the gross substitutes condition implies the decreasing marginal returns condition. 

**References**


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