Supplement to “High frequency repeated games with costly monitoring”: Appendix
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In this Appendix, we provide the proofs of the main theorem of the paper.

A.1. Proof of Lemma 4

By applying an affine transformation on the payoffs of the players, we can assume without loss of generality (w.l.o.g.) that $u(\beta) = (0, R)$ and $u(\gamma) = (R, 0)$, and then $J_\eta$ is the line segment that connects $(\eta, R - 2\eta)$ and $(R - 2\eta, \eta)$. We prove that all the points on $J_\eta$ are equilibrium payoffs.\(^1\)

We construct an equilibrium in public strategies in which the expected discounted payoff after every public history is in $J_\eta$. The mixed-action pair $\alpha^n$ that the players play along the equilibrium path is either $\beta$ or $\gamma$. Whenever the repeated game payoff $x^n$ satisfies $x^n_i < R - \eta$, i.e., whenever $x^n$ is in the upper half of the line segment $J_\eta$, the players play $\alpha^n_i = \beta$; otherwise they play $\alpha^n_i = \gamma$. Since the sum of payoffs of both players in both $\beta$ and $\gamma$ is $R$, while the sum of payoffs of both players in each point on $J_\eta$ is $R - \eta$, the players must spend at every stage an expected amount of $(1 - r^{\Delta}) \eta$ on monitoring.

The expected amount spent on monitoring by player $i$ at stage $n$ is $p^n_i c_i$. Consequently, define

$$p_i := \frac{(1 - r^{\Delta}) \eta}{c_i} \quad (7)$$

and instruct player 1 (resp. player 2) to monitor player 2 (resp. player 1) with probability $p_1$ (resp. $p_2$) in every stage in which the players play the mixed-action pair $\beta$ (resp. $\gamma$).

\(^1\)The attentive reader will note that due to the affine transformation on payoffs, we in fact prove Lemma 4 only in the case that $u_1(\gamma) - u_1(\beta) = u_2(\beta) - u_2(\gamma)$. This assumption simplifies the calculations and highlights the main ideas of the proof.
Condition A4 implies that $p_i < 1$. By Condition A3, we have $p_i > \frac{2(1-r^i)}{r^i \eta}$ for $i \in \{1, 2\}$. Due to the discussion in Section 5.2 (see (3)), a deviation of player 2 (resp. player 1) to an action outside the support of $\beta_2$ (resp. $\gamma_1$) is not profitable, provided it triggers a punishment at the minmax level.

We now turn to the formal definition of the proposed equilibrium. For every stage $n = 1, 2, \ldots$, if $x^n_1 < R - \eta$, then the following statements hold:

- We have $\alpha^n = \beta$: the players play the mixed-action pair $\beta$.
- We have $p^n_1 = p_1$ and $p^n_2 = 0$. That is, only player 1 monitors and he does it with probability $p_1$ given in (7).
- If player 1 monitors player 2, then $x^{n+1}$ is given by (see Figure 9)
  \[ x_1^{n+1} := \frac{x^n_1 + c_1}{r^\lambda}, \quad x_2^{n+1} := R - \eta - \frac{x^n_1 + c_1}{r^\lambda}. \]
- If player 1 does not monitor player 2, then $x^{n+1}$ is given by
  \[ x_1^{n+1} := \frac{x^n_1}{r^\lambda}, \quad x_2^{n+1} := R - \eta - \frac{x^n_1}{r^\lambda}. \]

If $x^n_1 \geq R - \eta$, the play is defined analogously: the players play the mixed-action pair $\gamma$; player 1 does not monitor player 2; player 2 monitors player 1 with probability $p_2$ given in (7); if player 2 monitors player 1 at stage $n$, then

\[ x_1^{n+1} := R - \eta - \frac{x^n_2 + c_2}{r^\lambda}, \quad x_2^{n+1} := \frac{x^n_2 + c_2}{r^\lambda}, \]

while if player 2 does not monitor player 1 at stage $n$, then

\[ x_1^{n+1} := R - \eta - \frac{x^n_2}{r^\lambda}, \quad x_2^{n+1} := \frac{x^n_2}{r^\lambda}. \]

Since $D^n_i = 0$ for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$, it is sufficient to verify that Conditions C2–C6 are satisfied. Since $x_i \geq \eta > 0 \geq v_i$ for every $x \in J_\eta$ and every $i = 1, 2$, Condition C2 holds. The definition of $p_i$ and Condition A1 imply that Condition C3 holds. The verification that
Conditions C4–C6 hold follows by simple algebraic manipulations. We provide here the verification of Condition C4. Assume then that \( x_1^n \leq \frac{R-\eta}{2} \), so that \( \alpha^n = \beta \) and \( p_1^n = p_1 \). Since player 1 plays a best response at \( \beta \), we have \( u_1(a_1, \alpha_2^n) = 0 \) for every \( a_1 \in \text{supp}(\alpha_1^n) \).

Since \( D_1^n = 0 \), Condition C4 translates to \( x_1^n = r_1^{\Delta} x_1^{n+1} - c_1 \cdot 1_{\eta} \), which holds by the definition of \( x_1^{n+1} \). Regarding player 2, since he is indifferent at \( \beta \), we have \( u_2(\alpha_1^n, a_2) = R \) for every \( a_2 \in \text{supp}(\alpha_2^n) \). Since \( D_2^n = 0 \), Condition C4 translates to

\[
x_2^n = (1 - r_1^{\Delta}) R + r_1^{\Delta} \left( p_1 \left( R - \eta - \frac{x_1^n + c_1}{r_1^{\Delta}} \right) + (1 - p_1) \left( R - \eta - \frac{x_1^n}{r_1^{\Delta}} \right) \right).
\]

Since \( x_2^n = R - \eta - x_1^n \), after cancelling the term \( R - x_1^n \) from both of its sides, this equation reduces to \( p_1 c_1 = (1 - r_1^{\Delta}) \eta \), which holds by the definition of \( p_1 \).

A.2. Proof of Lemma 5

By applying an affine transformation on the payoffs of the players, we can assume that \( R_1^{(1)} = R_2^{(2)} \) and \( u_1(\beta) = u_2(\gamma) = 0 \). We prove the following result, which implies Lemma 5.

**Lemma 9.** Let \( \beta = (\beta_1, \beta_2) \) and \( \gamma = (\gamma_1, \gamma_2) \) be two mixed-action pairs and let \( R > 0 \) such that the following conditions hold:

(i) Player 1 plays a best response at \( \beta \), \( u_1(\beta) \geq 0 \), and \( u_2(\beta_1, a_2) \geq R \) for every action \( a_2 \in \text{supp}(\beta_2) \).

(ii) Player 2 plays a best response at \( \gamma \), \( u_2(\gamma) \geq 0 \), and \( u_1(a_1, \gamma_2) \geq R \) for every action \( a_1 \in \text{supp}(\gamma_1) \).

Then the pentagon \( Q_\eta \) whose extreme points are (see Figure 10) \( (v_1 + \eta, v_2 + \eta), (v_1 + \eta, R - 2\eta), (R - 2\eta, v_2 + \eta), (\eta, R - 2\eta), \) and \( (R - 2\eta, \eta) \) is a subset of \( NE(r, c_1, c_2, \Delta) \), provided that the parameters \( r, c_1, c_2, \Delta, \) and \( \eta \) satisfy Conditions A1–A4.
Proof. Let \( \xi \in Q_\eta \). We construct an equilibrium with payoff \( \xi \). The construction is similar to the construction in the proof of Lemma 4 and uses burning-money processes. Recall that \( p_i = \frac{(1-r)\eta}{\Delta} \) for \( i \in \{1, 2\} \).

Fix a Nash equilibrium \( \alpha^* \) in the base game. The play in the first stages depends on three parameters: a payoff vector \( x \in Q_\eta \) close to \( J_\eta \) and two nonnegative integers \( k_1 \) and \( k_2 \). We first describe the play in the first \( k := \max\{k_1, k_2\} \) stages, and then explain how to choose the parameters \( x, k_1, \) and \( k_2 \).

The players play as follows:

- They play the mixed action \( \alpha^* \) for \( k \) stages.
- In the first \( k_1 \) stages, player 1 monitors player 2, and in the first \( k_2 \) stages, player 2 monitors player 1. If, for example, \( k_1 < k_2 \), then in the first \( k_1 \) stages, both players monitor each other, and in the following \( k_2 - k_1 \) stages, player 2 monitors player 1 while player 1 does not monitor player 2.
- From stage \( k + 1 \) onward, the players implement an equilibrium with payoff \( x \).

The payoff to each player \( i \) is then \( (1 - r^{k_\Delta})u_i(\alpha^*) + r^{k_\Delta}x - (1 - r^{k_\Delta})c \): in the first \( k \) stages, the players play \( \alpha^* \); in the first \( k_1 \) stages, player \( i \) monitors player \( j \), and the continuation payoff at stage \( k \) is \( x \). We choose the parameters \( x, k_1, \) and \( k_2 \) to satisfy the following conditions.

**Condition D1.** We have \( \xi_i = (1 - r^{k_\Delta})u_i(\alpha^*) + r^{k_\Delta}x - (1 - r^{k_\Delta})c \).

**Condition D2.** We have \( x_i \geq \eta \) for \( i \in \{1, 2\} \).

**Condition D3.** We have \( R - \eta - 2c \leq x_1 + x_2 \leq R - \eta \).

Conditions D2 and D3 ensure that \( x \) is close to \( J_\eta \): there is \( y \in J_\eta \) that dominates \( x \) and satisfies \( y_i - x_i \leq 3c \). Fix then such \( y \in J_\eta \) and set

\[
x_i^1 := y, \quad D_i := y - x.
\]

For every stage \( n > k \), if \( x_i^n \leq \frac{R - \eta}{2} \), the following statements hold:

- We have \( \alpha^n = \beta \): the players play the mixed-action pair \( \beta \).
- If \( D_i^n \geq c_i \), then \( p_i^n = 1 \): a player with a high debt monitors the other player (and burns money).
- If \( D_1^n < c_1 \), then \( p_1^n = p_1 \); if \( D_2^n < c_2 \), then \( p_2^n = 0 \): Only player 1 monitors with positive probability. Recall that player 1 plays a best response at \( \beta \), so that he cannot gain by deviating from \( \beta_1 \); hence he does not have to be monitored.
- If player 1 monitors player 2 and finds out that player 2 played an action \( a_2 \notin \text{supp}(\beta_2) \), then from stage \( n + 1 \) onward he switches to a punishment strategy that reduces player 2’s payoff to \( v_2 + \eta \).

In case \( x_1^n > \frac{R - \eta}{2} \), the play is analogous: the players play the mixed-action pair \( \gamma \), a player with a debt of at least \( c_i \) monitors the other with probability 1; if player 1’s (resp.
player 2's) debt is lower than $c_1$ (resp. $c_2$), then he does not monitor player 2 (resp. monitors player 2 with probability $p_2$); and if player 2 monitors player 1 and finds out that player 1 played an action outside the support of $\gamma_1$, then he switches to a minmax strategy against player 1.

It is left to define the processes $(x^n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ and $(D^n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ so that (a) the discounted payoff is $x$ and (b) no player has an incentive to deviate. We define these two processes recursively. Suppose that $x^n \in J_\eta$ and $D^n \in \mathbb{R}_+^2$ have already been defined, and assume that $x^n_1 - D^n_1 \geq v_i + \eta$ for $i = 1, 2$. If $x^n_1 > \frac{R - \eta}{2}$, define $y^n, z^n, w^n \in J_\eta$ as (see Figure 10)

$$w^n_1 := \frac{x^n_1}{r} + \eta(1 - r^\Delta) = \frac{R - x^n_1}{r^\Delta} - \eta,$$

$$w^n_2 := \frac{x^n_1 - (1 - r^\Delta)R}{r^\Delta},$$

$$y^n_1 := \frac{x^n_1 + c}{r^\Delta},$$

$$y^n_2 := R - \eta - \frac{x^n_1 + c}{r^\Delta},$$

$$z^n_1 := \frac{x^n_1}{r^\Delta},$$

$$z^n_2 := R - \eta - \frac{x^n_1}{r^\Delta}.$$

The payoff vectors $y^n$ and $z^n$ are the continuation payoffs when player 1’s debt is lower than $c_1$. These quantities are similar to $x^{n+1}$ in the proof of Lemma 4, where $y^n$ (resp. $z^n$) was the continuation payoff when player 1 monitored (resp. did not monitor) player 2. The vector $w^n$ is the continuation payoff when player 1’s debt is higher than $c_1$. Note that these three vectors are on $J_\eta$.

When $x^n_1 > \frac{R - \eta}{2}$, the roles of the two players are exchanged: they play the mixed-action pair $\gamma$, player 2 monitors player 1 with positive probability, and the continuation payoffs $w^n, y^n, z^n$ are defined analogously.

The continuation payoff $x^{n+1}$ and the debt $D^{n+1}$ are given by the table in Figure 11. For the sake of convenience we provide the quantity $r^\Delta D^{n+1}_i$ for $i = 1, 2$. When player 1 monitors player 2, the action $a_2$ that player 2 plays at stage $n$ is common knowledge, and $D^{n+1}$ can depend on it. Recall that the event that player $i$ monitors player $j$ at stage $n$ is denoted by $I^n_i$.

We explain below the intuition behind the definition of the burning-money process for player 1.

- Whenever a player monitors the other to burn money (i.e., $D^n_i \geq c_i$, which implies $p^n_i = 1$), his debt decreases by $c_i$. For instance, in lines 1 and 2, the first part of $r^\Delta D^{n+1}_i$ is $D^n_i - c_i$. 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If $x^n_1 \leq \frac{R - \eta}{2}$ and ...</th>
<th>$x^{n+1}$</th>
<th>$r^\Delta D^{n+1}_1$</th>
<th>$r^\Delta D^{n+1}_2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 $D^n_1 \geq c_1, D^n_2 \geq c_2$</td>
<td>$w^n_1$</td>
<td>$D^n_1 - c_1 + (1 - r^\Delta)u_1(\beta) + (1 - r^\Delta)\eta$</td>
<td>$D^n_2 - c_2 + (1 - r^\Delta)(u_2(\beta_1, a_2) - R)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 $D^n_1 \geq c_1, D^n_2 &lt; c_2$</td>
<td>$w^n_2$</td>
<td>$D^n_2 - c_2 + (1 - r^\Delta)(u_2(\beta_1, a_2) - R)$</td>
<td>$D^n_2 + (1 - r^\Delta)(u_2(\beta_1, a_2) - R)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 $D^n_1 &lt; c_1, D^n_2 \geq c_2$</td>
<td>$y^n_1$</td>
<td>$D^n_1 + (1 - r^\Delta)u_1(\beta)$</td>
<td>$D^n_2 - c_2 + \frac{c_2}{\eta}(u_2(\beta_1, a_2) - R)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 $D^n_1 &lt; c_1, D^n_2 &lt; c_2$</td>
<td>$y^n_2$</td>
<td>$D^n_2 + (1 - r^\Delta)(u_2(\beta_1, a_2) - R)$</td>
<td>$D^n_2 + (1 - r^\Delta)(u_2(\beta_1, a_2) - R)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 $D^n_1 &lt; c_1, -I^n_1, D^n_2 \geq c_2$</td>
<td>$z^n_1$</td>
<td>$D^n_1 + (1 - r^\Delta)u_1(\beta)$</td>
<td>$D^n_2 - c_2 + (1 - r^\Delta)(u_2(\beta_1, a_2) - R)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 $D^n_1 &lt; c_1, -I^n_1, D^n_2 &lt; c_2$</td>
<td>$z^n_2$</td>
<td>$D^n_2 + (1 - r^\Delta)(u_2(\beta_1, a_2) - R)$</td>
<td>$D^n_2 + (1 - r^\Delta)(u_2(\beta_1, a_2) - R)$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 11.** The continuation payoff and the debt.
When $D^n_i \geq c_i$, as in lines 1 and 2, the last part of $r^A D^{n+1}_i$ is $(1 - r^A) \eta$. The reason for adding this term is that the construction assumes that the stage payoff is $(0, R)$ or $(R, 0)$, so that the sum of stage payoffs of the two players is $R$. However, the sum of payoffs in all points in $J_\eta$ is $R - \eta$. Since both the continuation payoff and the current payoff should be on $J_\eta$, we need to add $(1 - r^A) \eta$ to the debt of the players.

Whenever $D^n_i \geq c_i$, the continuation payoff $w^{n+1}_i$ is defined to satisfy Condition C6 for player 1. Indeed, using the definition of $w^n$ and $D^n$,

\[
(1 - r^A)u_1(\beta) - c_1 + r^A w_1 - r^A D^{n+1}_1 = (1 - r^A)u_1(\beta) - c_1 + r^A \left( \frac{x^n_i}{r^A} + \eta(1 - r^A) \right) - (D^n_1 - c_1 + (1 - r^A)u_1(\beta) + (1 - r^A) \eta) = x^n_i - D^n_1.
\]

Whenever player 1 decides randomly whether to monitor player 2 (lines 3–6 in the table in Figure 11), the continuation payoff $x^{n+1}$ is given as in the proof of Lemma 4. In case player 1 monitors player 2, the continuation payoff is $y^n$; otherwise it is $z^n$. The continuation payoffs were chosen to ensure that Condition C4 holds. We verify this for line 3:

\[
(1 - r^A)u_1(\beta) + r^A y_1 - r^A D^{n+1}_1 = (1 - r^A)u_1(\beta) - c_1 + r^A y_1 - [D^n_1 + (1 - r^A)u_1(\beta)] = (1 - r^A)u_1(\beta) - c_1 + r^A \left[ \frac{x^n_i + c_i}{r^A} \right] - [D^n_1 + (1 - r^A)u_1(\beta)] = x^n_i - D^n_1.
\]

We now verify that this definition satisfies the conditions listed in Section 5.3. In the first $k$ stages, no player can profit by deviating, and so we need to verify these conditions only from stage $k$ onward. We first check that Condition C2 holds. One can verify that if $D^n_i \geq c_i$, then $x^{n+1}_i - D^{n+1}_i \geq x^n_i - D^n_i$, and the result follows by induction; otherwise, $D^{n+1}_i \leq \frac{c_i}{r^A}$. When $x^n_i \leq \frac{R}{2}$, we have $y^n_i$, $z^n_i \geq x^n_i \geq \eta$, and therefore $x^{n+1}_i - D^{n+1}_i \geq 0$. Since $x^n_i \leq \frac{R}{2}$, it follows that $x^{n+1}_i - D^{n+1}_i \geq 0$. The definition of $p_i$ together with Condition A3 implies that Condition C3 is satisfied. The verification that Conditions C4–C6 hold amounts to substituting the quantities defined above in the relevant equations, as illustrated above.

\[\square\]

A.3. Proof of Lemma 6

We denote $u(a) = (A, B)$, and distinguish between four cases that are handled separately (see Figure 12).

Case 1. We have $u_1(a) \geq t^2_1$ and $u_2(a) \geq t^2_2$. 

Case 2. We have $u_1(a) < t_1^1$ and $u_2(a) > t_2^1$.

Case 3. We have $u_2(a) < t_2^2$ and $u_1(a) > t_1^2$, which is analogous to Case 2.

Case 4. Cases 1–3 do not hold.

The construction in this section does not employ burning-money processes. Rather, we use a recursive construction: we identify a set $J_1$ of payoff vectors, which can be arbitrarily close to $J'$, and for every payoff vector $g \in J_1$, we define a one-shot auxiliary game in which (a) the payoffs are the stage payoff in the base game plus a continuation payoff, (b) the continuation payoff, which depends on the players’ choices, are in $J \cup J_1$, and (c) there is an equilibrium whose payoff is $g$ and in which each player monitors the other with probability $p$ that satisfies (3).

A.4. Case 1: $u_1(a) \geq t_1^2$ AND $u_2(a) \geq t_2^1$

Roughly, we prove that all the points in the triangle whose extreme points are $t_1^1$, $t_2^1$, and $(t_1^2, t_2^1)$ are in $E(r, c, \Delta)$, provided that $c_1$, $c_2$, and $\Delta$ are sufficiently small. Fix $\eta < \min\{\frac{\beta^* - u_1(\beta^*)}{\gamma}, \frac{\gamma^* - u_2(\gamma^*)}{\gamma}\}$. Denote by $-\alpha$ the slope of the line segment $[t_1^1, t_2^1]$. Set (see Figure 13)

$$w^1 := (t_1^1 + \eta, t_2^1 - 2\alpha\eta), \quad w^2 := (t_1^2 - 2\eta, t_2^2 + \alpha\eta)$$

$$s^1 := (t_1^1 + 2\eta, t_2^1 - 3\alpha\eta), \quad s^2 := (t_1^2 - 3\eta, t_2^2 + 2\alpha\eta)$$

$$z := (t_1^2 - 4\eta, t_2^1 - 4\alpha\eta).$$

Since $J$ is an asymptotic set of Nash equilibrium payoffs, Lemma 5 implies that all the points in the pentagon $J_0$ whose extreme points are $(v_1, v_2), (v_1, w_2^1), (w_1^1, v_2), w^1$, and $w^2$.
are in \( E(r, c_1, c_2, \Delta) \), provided that \( c_1, c_2, \) and \( \Delta \) are sufficiently small. Denote the slope of the line segment \( [s_1, \hat{z}] \) by \( -d := \frac{-\eta^2}{t_1 - u(\beta^*) - 6\eta} \), and denote the slope of the line segment \( [\hat{z}, s^2] \) by \( -e := -\frac{t_2 - u(\gamma^*) - 6\eta}{\eta} \) (see Figure 13).

By the choice of \( \eta \), we can state the following condition.

**Condition E0.** We have \( s_1 < \hat{z}_1 \) and \( s_2 < \hat{z}_2 \).

Hence, \( e > d > 0 \).

Assume that \( c_1, c_2, \) and \( \Delta \) are sufficiently small to satisfy Conditions A1–A4, as well as the following conditions for \( i \in \{1, 2\} \).

**Condition E1.** We have \( 1-r^\Delta < c_i < \frac{\eta}{6} \).

**Condition E2.** We have \( \frac{1}{\eta}c_i < \frac{1}{4}Be, \frac{1}{4}Ad < \frac{\eta}{2(1-r^\Delta)} \).

**Condition E3.** We have \( \frac{2c_i}{d^3}, \frac{2c_i}{r^3} < \eta \).

**Condition E4.** We have \( r^\Delta > \frac{1}{2} \) and \( 4(1-r^\Delta) < \eta \).

We show that all points in the triangle \( J_1 \), whose extreme points are \( s_1, s_2, \) and \( \hat{z} \), are in \( E(r, c_1, c_2, \Delta) \).
Fix a point $g$ in the triangle $J_1$, and for the calculations below add a constant to the payoff so that $g = (0, 0)$. We now describe a $2 \times 2$ one-shot auxiliary game $G(\xi_1, \xi_2, x, y)$ whose payoffs depend on four positive real numbers $\xi_1, \xi_2, x,$ and $y$, and an equilibrium in that game that yields the payoff $(0, 0)$.

- Each player has two actions, “monitor” and “don’t monitor.”

- The payoff function is given by the table in Figure 14, in which at each entry, player 1’s payoff appears at the top and player 2’s payoff appears at the bottom.

The payoff is calculated as if, in the original repeated game with costly observation, the players play the pure action pair $a$, each player chooses whether to monitor the other player, and the continuation payoffs, which depend on the identity of the players who chose to monitor, are given by the matrix in Figure 15.

Because the slopes of the line segments that define $J_1$ are $-d$ and $-e$, the vectors $(\frac{\xi_1}{\eta}, -\xi_2)$ and $(\xi_1, 0)$ are in $J_0 \cup J_1$, provided that $\xi_1$ and $\xi_2$ are sufficiently small. Recall that $g = (0, 0)$ is in $J_1$. We have to ensure that $x, y \in [0, \eta]$ so that $(-x, -y)$ is in $J_0 \cup J_1$.

Set

$$p := \frac{2(1 - r^3)}{r^3 \eta}.$$  

We find positive numbers $\xi_1, \xi_2, x,$ and $y$ such that the pair of strategies in which each player monitors the other with probability $p$ is an equilibrium of $G(\xi_1, \xi_2, x, y)$ with payoff $(0, 0)$. By (3), this implies that in the repeated game, no player can profit by a deviation to an action that he is supposed to play with probability 0, provided such a deviation leads to a punishment at the maxmin level. By solving the indifference conditions of the
players, we obtain that if
\[ \xi_2 = \frac{e(c_1 - (1 - r^A)A)}{r^A(1 - p)}, \]  
(10)
\[ \xi_1 = \frac{c_2 - (1 - r^A)B}{dr^A(1 - p)}, \]  
(11)
\[ x = \frac{(1 - r^A)Ad(1 - p) - p(c_2 - (1 - r^A)B)}{d(1 - p)^2}, \]  
(12)
\[ y = \frac{(1 - r^A)B(1 - p) - pe(c_1 - (1 - r^A)A)}{(1 - p)^2}, \]  
(13)
then having both players monitor each other with probability \( p \) is an equilibrium of \( G(\xi_1, \xi_2, x, y) \).

Condition E1 implies that \( \xi_1 \) and \( \xi_2 \) are positive; Conditions E2 and E4 imply that \( x \) and \( y \) are positive; Conditions E3 and E4 imply that \( \xi_1 \) and \( \xi_2 \) are smaller than \( \eta \); and Condition E2 implies that \( x \) and \( y \) are smaller than \( \eta \). This concludes the proof for Case 1.

A.5. Case 2: \( u_1(a) < t_1^2 \) AND \( u_2(a) > t_2^2 \)

The proof in this case is similar to the proof in Case 1, with a different definition of \( \hat{z} \), and the calculations are slightly more cumbersome. Recall that \( u(a) = (A, B) \), so that in this case \( A < t_1^2 \) and \( B > t_2^2 \) (see Figure 16). The slope of the line segment \([u(a), t^2]\) is \( \frac{t_2^2 - B}{t_1^2 - A} < 0 \). Fix \( \eta > 0 \) sufficiently small to satisfy \( \eta < \frac{t_2^2 - B}{t_1^2 - A} \), and define the points \( w^1, w^2, s^1, \) and \( s^2 \) as in Case 1 (see (8) and (9)). Set
\[ e := -\frac{t_2^2 - B}{t_1^2 - A} - \eta > 0. \]

Consider the line with slope \( -e \) that passes through \( s^2 \), and let \( \hat{z} \) be the point on this line that satisfies \( \hat{z}_2 = t_1^2 - 4\eta \). Let \( d \) be the slope of the line segment \([s^1, \hat{z}]\). Then \( 0 < d < e < \infty \). Suppose that Conditions E2–E4 hold for the \( d \) and \( e \) defined here, as well as the following two conditions.

Condition E5. We have \( ec_1 < \frac{1}{8}, e(1 - r^A)(-A) < \frac{1}{8}, \) and \( c_2 < 4d\eta \).

Condition E6. We have \( d(-A)\eta^2 > 8e(c_2 + dc_1) \).

Denote by \( J_1 \) the triangle whose extreme points are \( s^1, s^2, \) and \( \hat{z} \). We prove that all the points in the triangle \( J_1 \) are in \( E(r, c_1, c_2, \Delta) \), provided that \( c_1, c_2, \) and \( \Delta \) are sufficiently small.

Fix a point \( g \in J_1 \) and for the calculation below add a constant to the payoffs so that \( g = (0, 0) \). Because \( g = (0, 0) \) is below the line segment \([u(a), t^2] \),
\[ \frac{B}{-A} > e + \eta. \]
Consider the $2 \times 2$ one-shot auxiliary game $G(\xi_1, \xi_2, x, y)$ that is defined in Figure 15. Having each player monitor the other with probability $p = \frac{3(1-rA)}{r^2\eta}$ is an equilibrium in the game $G(\xi_1, \xi_2, x, y)$ that yields payoff $(0, 0)$, where $\xi_1$, $\xi_2$, $x$, and $y$ are given by (10)–(13). Because $A$ is negative, $x$ is negative as well.
Condition E1 implies that $\zeta_1$ is positive and together with Condition E3 it implies that it is less than $\eta$. Plainly $\zeta_2$ is positive, and Conditions E1 and E5 imply that it is less than $\eta$. Condition E2 implies that $y$ is positive and Conditions E1 and E4 imply that it is less than $\eta$. As mentioned above, $x$ is negative, and Conditions E1 and E5 imply that it is larger than $-\eta$.

To complete the proof we need to show that $(-x, y)$ lies in $J_0 \cup J_1$. To this end we show that $\frac{-x}{y} > -e$. By (12) and (13), this inequality reduces to

$$(1 - r)dB(1 - p) - ped(c_1 - (1 - r)A) > pe(c_2 - (1 - r)B) - (1 - r)Ade(1 - p).$$

Since $p = \frac{3(1 - r^A)}{r^A \eta}$, we can divide all terms by $(1 - r^A)$, so that this inequality is equivalent to

$$d(1 - p)(B + Ae) + ped(A + B) > \frac{2e(c_2 + dc_1)}{r^A \eta},$$

which holds by Condition E6.

A.6. Case 4

To solve Case 4, we use Case 1 and jointly controlled lotteries. Specifically, by Case 1, the grey area in Figure 17 is in $NE(r, c_1, c_2, \Delta)$, provided that $c_1, c_2$, and $\Delta$ are sufficiently small.

To complete Case 4, we show that the set $NE(r, c_1, c_2, \Delta)$ is almost convex. Indeed, suppose that at the first stage, the players jointly choose between, say, implementing as an equilibrium payoff a vector close to $\tilde{z}$ or a vector close to $t^2$. This is done as follows.
Supplementary Material

High frequency repeated games

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- Let \( a_1, a'_1 \in A_1 \) and \( a_2, a'_2 \in A_2 \) be two distinct actions of the two players. At the first stage, player 1 (resp. player 2) chooses either \( a_1 \) or \( a'_1 \) (resp. \( a_2 \) or \( a'_2 \)) with equal probabilities, and both players monitor each other.

- If, at the first stage, one of the players fails to monitor the other or fails to play one of the designated actions, both players switch to punishment strategies.

- Otherwise, according to the realized action pair at the first stage, the players implement from the second stage onward one of the following payoff vectors as an equilibrium payoff, where \( w = t^2 + (−\eta, \eta) \).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action pair</th>
<th>Player 1’s payoff</th>
<th>Player 2’s payoff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>((a_1, a_2))</td>
<td>(\tilde{z}_1 - (1 - r^\Delta)u_1(a_1, a_2))</td>
<td>(\tilde{z}_2 - (1 - r^\Delta)u_2(a_1, a_2))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((a_1, a'_2))</td>
<td>(w_1 - (1 - r^\Delta)u_1(a_1, a'_2))</td>
<td>(w_2 - (1 - r^\Delta)u_2(a_1, a'_2))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((a'_1, a_2))</td>
<td>(w_1 - (1 - r^\Delta)u_1(a'_1, a_2))</td>
<td>(w_2 - (1 - r^\Delta)u_2(a'_1, a_2))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((a'_1, a'_2))</td>
<td>(\tilde{z}_1 - (1 - r^\Delta)u_1(a'_1, a'_2))</td>
<td>(\tilde{z}_2 - (1 - r^\Delta)u_2(a'_1, a'_2))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A.7. Public perfect equilibria

In the construction of Nash equilibria, we used threats of punishment. In this section, we modify the proof of Lemma 5 so that the implementation of the vector \( \xi := (v_1 + \eta, v_2 + \eta) \) does not involve noncredible threats. As is common in the literature, the implementation of a credible punishment is accomplished by having the players lower their payoffs for a fixed number of stages and return to the equilibrium play afterward.

The implementation of \( \xi \) in the proof of Lemma 5 includes a first phase that lasts \( k \) stages, in which the players follow an equilibrium \( \alpha^* \) of the base game and partially monitor each other. We change only the implementation of this phase.

Suppose w.l.o.g. that \( k_1 \leq k_2 \), so that \( k = k_2 \). Thus, player 1 monitors player 2 in the first \( k_1 \) stages, and player 2 monitors player 1 in the first \( k_2 \) stages.

- In the first \( k \) stages, player 1 plays a minmax mixed action \( \beta_1 \).

- In the first \( k_1 \) stages, player 2 plays a minmax mixed action \( \beta_2 \).

- In the following \( k_2 - k_1 \) stages, player 2 plays a best response \( \gamma_2 \) against \( \beta_1 \).

If no deviation occurs, the expected payoff to player 1 in the first \( k \) stages, given the public history, is

\[
\delta_1 := \sum_{n=1}^{k_1}(1 - r^\Delta)r^{(n-1)\Delta}u_1(a^n_1, a^n_2) + \sum_{n=k_1+1}^{k_2}(1 - r^\Delta)r^{(n-1)\Delta}u_1(a^n_1, \gamma_2) - (1 - r^{k_1\Delta})c,
\]

and the expected payoff to player 2 in the first \( k \) stages, given the public history, is

\[
\delta_2 := \sum_{n=1}^{k_1}(1 - r^\Delta)r^{(n-1)\Delta}u_2(a^n_1, a^n_2) + \sum_{n=k_1+1}^{k_2}(1 - r^\Delta)r^{(n-1)\Delta}u_2(a^n_1, \gamma_2) - (1 - r^{k_2\Delta})c.
\]
The continuation payoff $x$ is a random variable that satisfies

$$
\xi = \delta + r^{k_1} x,
$$

where $\delta = (\delta_1, \delta_2)$. Provided $\Delta$ is small, $x$ is in $Q_\eta$ and satisfies $d(x, J_\eta) \leq 2\eta$.

Whenever a deviation is observed, the players restart implementing $\xi$ with the above construction. It is left to the reader to verify that the construction is indeed a public perfect equilibrium.

**Reference**


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