Uncertain Rationality, Depth of Reasoning and Robustness in Games with Incomplete Information

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Abstract

Predictions under common knowledge of payoffs may differ from those under arbitrarily, but finitely, many orders of mutual knowledge; Rubinstein’s (1989) Email game is a seminal example. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) showed that the discontinuity in the example generalizes: for all types with multiple rationalizable (ICR) actions, there exist similar types with unique rationalizable action. This paper studies how a wide class of departures from common belief in rationality impact Weinstein and Yildiz’s discontinuity. We weaken ICR to ICR$^\lambda$, where $\lambda$ is a sequence whose term $\lambda_n$ is the probability players attach to $(n-1)^{th}$-order belief in rationality. We find that Weinstein and Yildiz’ discontinuity remains when $\lambda_n$ is above an appropriate threshold for all $n$, but fails when $\lambda_n$ converges to 0. That is, if players’ confidence in mutual rationality persists at high orders, the discontinuity persists, but if confidence vanishes at high orders, the discontinuity vanishes.
Introduction

An extensive literature has taught us that small perturbations to players’ beliefs may induce large changes in our strategic predictions. In particular, Rubinstein’s email game (detailed below) is a seminal example along these lines: it showed that predictions under common knowledge of payoffs may differ from those under arbitrarily, but finitely, many orders of mutual knowledge. That is, if I know that you know that I know, etc., what the payoffs are, but this chain breaks after finitely many levels, some outcomes which would be rationalizable under full common knowledge will be non-rationalizable under this partial knowledge. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) showed that the discontinuity in the example generalizes: for any type with multiple rationalizable actions, there are types with very similar beliefs which have a unique rationalizable action. We call this the “WY-discontinuity.” The notion of “small” changes in beliefs, that is, the topology on types, is of course highly relevant here: we use here the product topology, as in Weinstein and Yildiz (2007). The significance of this choice is that arbitrary changes in very high-order beliefs are measured as small. Alternatively, recent papers such as Chen, Di Tillio, Faingold and Xiong (2010) have shown that requiring uniform convergence of belief hierarchies does imply convergence of strategic behavior.

The main result of Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) uses the solution concept of interim correlated rationalizability (ICR), which assumes common belief in rationality. In this paper we ask: what happens to the WY-discontinuity if we weaken this assumption? Specifically, we weaken ICR to the more permissive interim correlated λ-rationalizability (ICRλ) where λ = (λ_n)_{n∈N} is a sequence of probabilities with the interpretation that λ_n is the reliability that players attach to n-th-order belief in rationality; ICR itself would be the special case that λ = (1, 1, ...). The answer is twofold: when each element λ_n is above a threshold close enough to 1, we find that WY-discontinuity remains (Proposition 5), but when (λ_n)_{n∈N} → 0 as n → ∞ we find that continuity is restored (Proposition 6). That is, when common belief in rationality breaks down almost completely at high orders, the continuity of behavior with respect to perturbations of belief hierarchies is restored. As we discuss in Section 3.2, the ICRλ concept is very flexible; as λ varies it covers concepts close to ICR as
well as those much further away (such as rationality without any mutual belief in rationality.)

This restoration of continuity is important, because, as discussed in Weinstein and Yildiz (2007), the WY-discontinuity has profound implications for the large applied literature on equilibrium refinements. When the discontinuity obtains, all non-trivial refinements are non-robust to the introduction of incomplete information, or to changes in the assumptions on players’ information. Here we show that some (but not all) relaxations of common knowledge of rationality restore continuity and hence the possibility of robust refinements.

In addition to our main results in Propositions 5 and 6 we also prove some standard robustness properties of ICR$^\lambda$. We show that different types that induce the same belief hierarchy induce the same set of ICR$^\lambda$ actions (type-representation invariance, Proposition 1). We also show that, for each fixed $\lambda$, ICR$^\lambda$ is an upper-hemicontinuous correspondence, that is, small misspecifications of beliefs do not give rise to unexpected behavior (Proposition 2). Regarding robustness to the weakening of common belief in rationality, we show that, when the belief hierarchy is fixed, ICR$^\lambda$, as a correspondence of $\lambda$, is upper-hemicontinuous everywhere and is lower-hemicontinuous at $\lambda = (1,1,\ldots,1,\ldots)$, where it coincides with ICR (Proposition 3). This result establishes the full robustness of ICR to a slight weakening of common belief in rationality. Finally, we provide an epistemic foundation of ICR$^\lambda$ to show that it characterizes rationality and common $\lambda$-belief in rationality, thus confirming its suitability for the formalization of perturbations in common belief in rationality (Proposition 7). In particular, all these results, besides Propositions 5 and 6, are formulated for generic $\lambda$ and are therefore applicable to a variety of well-known solution concepts obtained by considering particular subfamilies of $\lambda$ (e.g., ICR, $p$-rationalizability or $k$-level rationalizability).

1.1 **Rubinstein’s Email game**

The incomplete information game given by the following payoff matrix is an adaptation of Rubinstein’s game:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Attack</th>
<th>No attack</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>$\theta$</td>
<td>$\theta - 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No attack</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$\theta - 1$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

for $\theta \in \{-\frac{2}{5}, \frac{2}{5}\}$.

Ex ante, players assign probability 1/2 to each of the values $-2/5$ and $2/5$. Player
1 observes the value of $\theta$ and automatically sends a message to Player 2, if $\theta = 2/5$. Each player automatically sends a message back whenever he receives one, and each message is lost, with probability $1/2$. When a message is lost, the process automatically stops and each player takes one of the actions *Attack* or *No attack*. This game can be modeled by the type space $T = \{-1, 1, 3, 5, \ldots\} \times \{0, 2, 4, 6, \ldots\}$, where the type $t_i$ is the total number of messages sent or received by player $i$ (except for type $t_1 = -1$, who knows that $\theta = -2/5$), and the common prior $\mu$ on $T \times \Theta$, where $\mu(\theta = -2/5, t_1 = -1, t_2 = 0) = 1/2$ and for each integer $m \geq 1$, $\mu(\theta = 2/5, t_1 = 2m - 1, t_2 = 2m - 2) = 1/2^{2m}$ and $\mu(\theta = 2/5, t_1 = 2m - 1, t_2 = 2m) = 1/2^{2m+1}$. Here, for $k \geq 1$, type $k$ knows that $\theta = 2/5$, knows that the other player knows $\theta = 2/5$, and so on, through $k$ orders. Now, type $t_1 = -1$ knows that $\theta = -2/5$ and, hence, his unique rationalizable action is *No attack*. Type $t_2 = 0$ does not know $\theta$ but puts probability $2/3$ on type $t_1 = -1$, thus believing that player 1 will play *No attack* with at least probability $2/3$, so that *No attack* is the only best reply and, hence, the only rationalizable action. Applying this argument inductively for each type $k$, one concludes that the new incomplete-information game is dominance-solvable and the unique rationalizable action for all types is *No attack*.

Consider Rubinstein’s commentary on his example: “It is hard to imagine that [when many messages are sent] a player will not play [according to the Pareto-dominant equilibrium]. The sharp contrast between our intuition and the game-theoretic analysis is what makes this example paradoxical. The example joins a long list of games [...] in which it seems that the source of the discrepancy is rooted in the fact that in our formal analysis we use mathematical induction while human beings do not use mathematical induction when reasoning. Systematic explanation of our intuition [...] is definitely a most intriguing question.” Indeed, the goal of this paper is to formalize this intuition. Our main results will show that some weakenings of the inductive reasoning of rationalizability will maintain the unique, counterintuitive selection in the email example which underlies the WY-discontinuity, while others will return us to the more intuitive case of multiple equilibria, from which we may select according to a criterion such as Pareto-dominance.

When reasoning is the same at every level, even if it assigns less than full confidence to opponents’ rationality, the unique selection persists. Indeed, assume that each player $i$ assigns probability $p > 2/3$ to the other player being rational, assigns probability $p$ to the other player assigning probability $p$ to $i$ being rational, and so on. Again, type $t_1 = -1$ knows that $\theta = -2/5$ and, hence, plays *No attack*, regardless of her beliefs about the other player’s choice. Type $t_2 = 0$ does not know $\theta$ but puts
probability \(2/3\) on type \(t_1 = -1\), thus believing that player 1 will play *No attack* with at least probability \(p \cdot 2/3 > 2/5\), so that *No attack* is the only best reply, and hence, the only \(p\)-rationalizable action. Similarly, type \(t_1 = 1\) puts probability \(2/3\) on type \(t_2 = 0\), and thus will play *No attack* with at least probability \(p \cdot 2/3 > 2/5\), so that, again, *No attack* is the only best reply, and, hence, the only \(p\)-rationalizable action, and so on. This is an example of Proposition 5: under appropriate conditions, there will always be a \(p < 1\) large enough that unique selection survives in this way.

The opposite result obtains when players lose almost all confidence in their reasoning at later iterations. Specifically, assume that each player \(i\) assigns probability \(\lambda_1\) to the other player being rational, assigns probability \(\lambda_2\) to the other player assigning probability \(\lambda_1\) to \(i\) being rational, and so on, where \(\lambda_k \to 0\), so that the effect of higher-order restrictions vanishes as we move up in the hierarchy. Now note that even if \(t_2 = k - 1\) is a type that always plays *No attack*, if \(\lambda_k < 2/5\), we cannot guarantee that *No attack* is the only best reply for type \(t_1 = k\). Thus, we can always find a sufficiently high number of messages for which the action *Attack* survives the iterated deletion procedure. This is an example of Proposition 6: when confidence in higher-order reasoning breaks down at high orders, all strictly rationalizable actions will be rationalizable in any perturbation.

### 1.2 Other related literature

This paper scrutinizes the discontinuity in the rationalizable set by altering the solution concept. Specifically, it studies the impact of weakening common belief in rationality on the WY-discontinuity, in the spirit of the quote above from Rubinstein (1989). Also in this line, previous papers have studied the effects of departure from the standard rationality benchmark by invoking finite depth of reasoning assumptions. Strzalecki (2014) and Heifetz and Kets (2018) extend the notion of type/belief hierarchy so that it incorporates uncertainty and higher-order beliefs about the depth of reasoning. Within this richer framework Heifetz and Kets (2018) perturb common belief in infinite depth of reasoning (an implicit feature of the standard notion of type in Weinstein and Yildiz (2007)) and find that under *almost* common belief in infinite depth of reasoning, the corresponding notion of ICR does not exhibit the WY-discontinuity.\(^1\)

A second research agenda spawned by the finding of discontinuities in rationalizability considered replacing the product topology with alternate notions of prox-\(^1\)The connection of this paper and Heifetz and Kets (2018) is examined in further detail in Section 4.2.2.
imity. Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2006) introduce the strategic topology which is implicitly defined as the coarsest topology for the space of belief hierarchies under which ICR is upper-hemicontinuous and strict ICR is lower-hemicontinuous. Previous papers by Monderer and Samet (1996) and Kajii and Morris (1997) ensure the robustness of equilibria under incomplete information by proposing topologies whose corresponding notion of perturbation, based on common p-belief, require (unlike perturbations in the product topology) approximations to take similarity of all higher-order beliefs into account. Recent work by Chen, Di Tillio, Faingold and Xiong (2010, 2016) bridges the gap between the two approaches by providing the exact metric that characterizes the strategic topology and some of its refinements.

Finally, in a third category, an important branch of the literature exploits discontinuities of behavior to construct equilibrium selection arguments (e.g., Carlsson and van Damme (1993)), explain large changes on behavior induces by small changes in economic fundamentals (e.g., Morris and Shin (1998)), and extend the domain in which the WY-discontinuity holds to dynamic games (Penta (2012) and Chen (2012)) and to more general cases of payoff uncertainty (Penta (2013), Chen, Takahashi and Xiong (2014a,b)).

2 Preliminaries

In this section we briefly review some well-known ideas central to our study. First, in Section 2.1 we describe the game-theoretical framework employed to model interaction. This will consist of games with incomplete information and Bayesian games. Remember that in such games the uncertainty each player faces is twofold: it refers to states of nature that affect preferences (payoff uncertainty) and to the actions the rest of players choose (strategic uncertainty). Payoff uncertainty is dealt with by exogenously setting either types as defined by Harsanyi (1967–1968) or belief hierarchies. The construction of the latter, together with that of universal type space, is recalled in Section 2.2. Strategic uncertainty is endogenously resolved by means of a solution concept, namely interim correlated rationalizability. This is presented in Section 2.3, where we also recall the Structure Theorem of Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) and some of its implications.

2.1 Games with incomplete information and Bayesian games

A (static) game with incomplete information consists of a list \( G = \langle I, \Theta, (A_i, u_i)_{i \in I} \rangle \), where: (i) \( I \) is a finite set of players, (ii) \( \Theta \) is a finite set of payoff states, and for
2.2 Belief hierarchies and universal type space

We follow Brandenburger and Dekel’s (1993) formulation of universal type space. For each player $i$ we set first $X_i^1 = \Theta$ and $Z_i^1 = \Delta(X_i^1)$, and call each element $\tau_{i,1} \in Z_i^1$ first-order belief. Then, set recursively $X_i^{n+1} = X_i^n \times \prod_{j \neq i} Z_j^n$ and $Z_i^{n+1} = \Delta(X_i^n)$ for any $n \in \mathbb{N}$. We refer to each $\tau_{i,n} \in Z_i^n$ as $n$th-order belief, and to the elements of $T_i^0 = \prod_{n \in \mathbb{N}} Z_i^n$, as belief hierarchies. A belief hierarchy $\tau_i$ is said to be coherent if higher-order beliefs do not contradict lower order ones, i.e., if $\text{marg}_{X_i^n} \tau_{i,n+1} = \tau_{i,n}$ for any $n \in \mathbb{N}$. Let $T_i^1$ denote the set of coherent belief hierarchies and $T_i$, the set

$$
\forall a_i' \in A_i \setminus \{a_i\}, \quad \int_{A_{-i} \times \Theta} (u_i((a_{-i}; a_i'), \theta) - u_i((a_{-i}; a'_i), \theta)) d\mu_i \geq -\varepsilon
$$

When $\varepsilon = 0$ the $\varepsilon$-best-reply correspondence boils down to the standard best-reply correspondence and in such case, we simply denote it by $BR_i$. Notice that due to the topological assumptions specified above, the $\varepsilon$-best-reply correspondence is known to be non-empty when $\varepsilon \geq 0$, and upper-hemicontinuous for all $\varepsilon \in \mathbb{R}$.

We typically represent players’ beliefs over $\Theta$ by endowing $\mathcal{G}$ with a type structure à la Harsanyi (1967–1968). A type structure is a list $\mathcal{T} = (T_i, \pi_i)_{i \in I}$ where for each player $i$ we have: (i) a compact and metrizable set of types, $T_i$, and (ii) a continuous belief map $\pi_i : T_i \to \Delta(T_{-i} \times \Theta)$ where $T_{-i} = \prod_{j \neq i} T_j$. We refer to a pair $(\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{T})$ as a Bayesian game.

The beliefs in type structures are not assumed to arise from a common prior.
of belief hierarchies that exhibit common belief in coherence.\textsuperscript{5} Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) show that there exists a homeomorphism $\varphi_i : \mathcal{T}_i \to \Delta (\mathcal{T}_{-i} \times \Theta)$, with $\mathcal{T}_{-i} = \prod_{j \neq i} \mathcal{T}_j$, such that $\text{marg}_{X^n} \varphi_i(\tau_i) = \tau_{i,n}$ for any belief hierarchy $\tau_i$ and any $n \in \mathbb{N}$. Obviously, $\mathcal{T}^* = \langle \mathcal{T}_i, \varphi_i \rangle_{i \in I}$ is a type structure for game with incomplete information $\mathcal{G}$; we refer to it as the universal type space.

Throughout the above constructions, as is standard, we topologize spaces of beliefs by the weak* topology and product spaces by the product topology, and in this way the space of belief hierarchies inherits a topology. A corresponding metric is also inherited at each step of the recursion: first normalize the metric on the basic space $\Theta$ so its diameter is at most 1 (this property will be inherited at each step.) Then apply the Prohorov metric to spaces of beliefs, the sup metric to finite products, and the discounted metric,

$$d(x, x') = \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} 2^{-n}d(x_n, x'_n)$$

to infinite product spaces. Thus the space of belief hierarchies also inherits a metric structure.

Finally, for each type structure $\mathcal{T}$, each type $t_i$ induces a belief hierarchy $\tau_i(t_i) = (\tau_{i,n}(t_i))_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ as follows: consider first-order belief $\tau_{i,1}(t_i) = \text{marg}_\Theta \pi_i(t_i)$ and then, for any $n \in \mathbb{N}$ define $(n + 1)^{th}$-order belief $\tau_{i,n+1}(t_i)$ by setting,

$$\tau_{i,n+1}(t_i) [E_{n+1}] = \pi_i(t_i) \{ (t_{-i}, \theta) \in T_{-i} \times \Theta \mid (\tau_{-i,n}(t_{-i}), \theta) \in E_{n+1} \},$$

for any measurable $E_{n+1} \subseteq T_{-i}^{n+1} \times \Theta$. The recursive construction being well-defined follows from the fact that, as proved by Brandenburger and Dekel (1993), every $\tau_{i,n} : T_i \to Z_i^n$ is continuous. In addition, is is easy to see that $\tau_i(T_i) \subseteq \mathcal{T}_i$; thus, $\tau_i : T_i \to \mathcal{T}_i$ is a well-defined continuous map. Furthermore, if $T_i$ has non-redundant types,\textsuperscript{6} then it is homeomorphic to $\tau_i(T_i)$.

\subsection*{2.3 Rationalizability and the WY-discontinuity}

Once a player’s uncertainty w.r.t. the set of payoff states is formalized by means of some type or belief hierarchy, it becomes pertinent to wonder which subset of actions constitutes a reasonable choice at the interim stage. By “reasonable” we

\textsuperscript{5}Formally, $\mathcal{T}_i = \bigcap_{n \geq 0} T^n_i$, where $T^{n+1}_i = \{ \tau_i \in T^n_i \mid \text{Proj}_{X^n\Gamma_i} (T^n_{-i} \times \Theta) = 1 \}$ for any $m \in \mathbb{N}$ for each $n \in \mathbb{N}$, being $T^n_{-i} = \prod_{j \neq i} T^n_j$. For any product space $X \times Y$ and any subset $S \subseteq X \times Y$, we denote projections on some component of $X$ by $\text{Proj}_X S = \{ x \in X \mid (x, y) \in S \text{ for some } y \in Y \}$.

\textsuperscript{6}That is, if every two distinct types induce different belief hierarchies: $t_i \neq t'_i$ implies that $\tau_i(t_i) \neq \tau_i(t'_i)$.
2.3 Rationalizability and the WY-discontinuity

will mean those actions consistent with rationality and common belief in opponents’ rationality, or, in other words, to those actions that survive iterated deletion of strictly dominated actions. This idea is formalized by interim correlated rationalizability (ICR), introduced by Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2007). First, let us recall the more general version of ICR embodied by $\varepsilon$-ICR due to Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2006). Given a Bayesian game $\langle G, T \rangle$ and a real number $\varepsilon$, player $i$’s set of (interim correlated) $\varepsilon$-rationalizable ($\varepsilon$-ICR) actions for type $t_i$ is defined as $\varepsilon$-ICR$_i(t_i) = \bigcap_{n \geq 0} \varepsilon$-ICR$_{i,n}(t_i)$, where:

$$\varepsilon$-ICR$_{i,0}(t_i) = A_i,$$

$$\varepsilon$-C$_{i,0}(t_i) = \{ \mu_i \in \Delta(T_{-i} \times A_{-i} \times \Theta) | \text{marg}_{T_{-i} \times \Theta}\mu_i = \pi_i(t_i) \},$$

and recursively,$^7$

$$\varepsilon$-ICR$_{i,n}(t_i) = \{ a_i \in A_i | a_i \in \varepsilon$-BR$_i(\mu_i) \text{ for some } \mu_i \in \varepsilon$-C$_{i,n-1}(t_i) \},$$

$$\varepsilon$-C$_{i,n}(t_i) = \{ \mu_i \in \varepsilon$-C$_{i,0}(t_i) | \text{supp } \mu_i \subseteq \text{Graph}(\varepsilon$-ICR$_{i,n-1} \times \Theta) \},$$

for any $n \in \mathbb{N}$. In the case of $\varepsilon = 0$ the definition collapses to Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris’s (2007) (interim correlated) rationalizability (ICR) and in such case we denote the resulting correspondence simply by ICR$_i$. Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2007) and Battigalli, Di Tillio, Grillo and Penta (2011) show that when $\varepsilon = 0$ the specific type structure employed to codify belief hierarchies is immaterial: the set of rationalizable actions corresponding to a type coincides with the set of rationalizable actions corresponding to the belief hierarchy induced by the type.$^8$ We refer to this property of ICR as type-representation invariance. In addition, it is shown by Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2006) that the correspondence $\varepsilon$-ICR$_i : T_i \Rightarrow A_i$ is upper-hemicontinuous, and by Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2007) and Battigalli, Di Tillio, Grillo and Penta (2011), that ICR characterizes the behavioral implications of rationality and common belief in rationality. Notice that we permit both positive and negative $\varepsilon$; when $\varepsilon > 0$, the concept is more permissive than standard ICR, and when $\varepsilon < 0$ it is more strict.

In their study of ICR, Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) find a striking property that generalizes the discontinuity in the Email game from an isolated phenomenon to a general feature of games with incomplete information. To better understand

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$^7$In addition, let us denote $\text{Graph}(\varepsilon$-ICR$_{i,n-1}) = \prod_{j \neq i} \{ (t_j, a_j) \in T_j \times A_j | a_j \in \varepsilon$-ICR$_{j,n-1}(t_j) \}.$

$^8$That is, for any player $i$ and any type $t_i$ it holds that ICR$_i(t_i) = \text{ICR}_i(\tau_i(t_i)).$
this phenomenon let us recall the *richness condition* first:

**Definition 1 (Richness condition).** We say that a Bayesian game satisfies the richness condition if for all actions $a_i$ of any player $i$, there is a $\theta$ such that $u(a_i, a_{-i}, \theta) > u(a'_i, a_{-i}, \theta)$ for all $(a'_i, a_{-i})$ with $a'_i \neq a_i$.

That is, in games that satisfy the richness condition, no action is commonly known not to be strictly dominant. In this context, the main result by Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) tells us that for any type $t_i$ and any action $a_i \in \text{ICR}_i(t_i)$ there exists some sequence of belief hierarchies $(\tau^n_i)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ converging to $\tau_i(t_i)$ such that $\text{ICR}_i(\tau^n_i) = \{a_i\}$ for any $n \in \mathbb{N}$.

This property, which we refer to as the *WY-discontinuity*, has important implications for games with incomplete information:

- **Non-robustness of refinements.** No non-trivial refinement of ICR is robust in the sense of upper-hemicontinuity on $\mathcal{T}_i$. To see why, suppose that $S_i : \mathcal{T}_i \Rightarrow A_i$ is a non-trivial refinement of ICR$_i$. Then, there exists some belief hierarchy $\tau_i$ such that ICR$_i(\tau_i) \setminus S_i(\tau_i)$ contains some action $a_i$. By Weinstein and Yildiz’s (2007) result, we know that there exists some sequence $(\tau^n_i)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ such that $\emptyset \neq S_i(\tau^n_i) \subseteq \text{ICR}_i(\tau^n_i) = \{a_i\}$ for any $n \in \mathbb{N}$; hence $S_i$ cannot be upper-hemicontinuous. In particular, the fact that equilibrium outcomes refine ICR outcomes implies that equilibrium predictions are not robust: small misspecifications of players’ uncertainty by the analyst lead to outcomes overlooked in the original model.

- **Generic uniqueness of rationalizability.** There exists an open and dense subset of $\mathcal{T}_i$ such that the set of ICR$_i$ actions corresponding to each belief hierarchy in the set is unique. Thus, rationalizability generically (in a particular topological sense) yields a unique prediction.

## 3 Interim correlated $\lambda$-rationalizability

### 3.1 Definition

We now introduce interim correlated $\lambda$-rationalizability (ICR$^\lambda$), the solution concept that formalizes our relaxation of common belief in rationality. This concept captures the ideas that (A) rationality may not be common belief and (B) players’ confidence

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9Recently, Penta (2013) found that the rather demanding richness condition can be abandoned and the discontinuity result extended to relatively mild relaxations of common knowledge assumptions.
3.2 Special cases of ICR\(^λ\)

in the rationality of others may be different at different orders. The sequence \(\lambda \in [0, 1]^N\) signifies that when performing stage \(n\) of the elimination process, players have confidence \(\lambda_n\) that others have followed the elimination process at previous stages, as captured in the following definition:

**Definition 2 (Interim correlated \(\lambda\)-rationalizability).** Let \(\langle G, \mathcal{T} \rangle\) be a Bayesian game and \(\lambda\), a sequence of probabilities. Then, player \(i\)’s set of (interim correlated) \(\lambda\)-rationalizable actions for type \(t_i\) is defined as

\[
\operatorname{ICR}^\lambda_{i,0} (t_i) = A_i,
\]

\[
\operatorname{C}^\lambda_{i,0} (t_i) = \{ \mu_i \in \Delta(T_{-i} \times A_{-i} \times \Theta) \mid \text{marg}_{T_{-i} \times \Theta} \mu_i = \pi_i(t_i) \},
\]

and recursively, for any \(n \in \mathbb{N}\),

\[
\operatorname{ICR}^\lambda_{i,n} (t_i) = \{ a_i \in \operatorname{ICR}^\lambda_{i,n-1} (t_i) \mid a_i \in \operatorname{BR}_i (\mu_i) \text{ for some } \mu_i \in \operatorname{C}^\lambda_{i,n-1} (t_i) \},
\]

\[
\operatorname{C}^\lambda_{i,n} (t_i) = \{ \mu_i \in \operatorname{C}^\lambda_{i,n-1} (t_i) \mid \mu_i \left[ \text{Graph} \left( \operatorname{ICR}^\lambda_{-i,n} \right) \times \Theta \right] \geq \lambda_n \}.
\]

For \(p \in [0, 1]\), we will use \(\lambda = \bar{p}\) to signify the constant sequence \(\lambda_n \equiv p\). Then \(\operatorname{ICR}^\bar{p}\) will reflect reasoning that is depth-independent, capturing departures from common belief in rationality in the sense of (A), but not (B) above. Also, we use the usual termwise partial ordering on sequences, so in particular \(\lambda \geq \bar{p}\) will mean that \(\lambda_n \geq p\) for all \(n\). Our examples all focus on the natural case of decreasing \(\lambda\), though we do not require this in the definition. This case is natural because it represents depth-dependent reasoning which is less confident at higher orders, hence capturing both (A) and (B) above. We will especially consider the case \(\lambda \rightarrow 0\), which represents a near-complete breakdown in confidence of others’ reasoning at high orders.

### 3.2 Special cases of ICR\(^λ\)

Let \(\Lambda = [0, 1]^N\) represent the set of probability sequences. Certain subsets of \(\Lambda\) give rise to different well-known solutions concepts as special cases of ICR\(^λ\):

1. \(p\)-Rationalizability. \(\lambda = \bar{p}\), for any \(p \in [0, 1]\). These sequences follow the idea by Monderer and Samet (1987) of perturbing common belief by employing \(p\)-beliefs; this approach was also followed by Hu (2007) in his analysis of robustness to perturbation in common belief in rationality in the context of games.

\[\text{Graph} (\operatorname{ICR}^\lambda_{-i,n})\]

\[\text{appearing in the last equation of this definition is indeed always measurable.}\]
with complete information. We sometimes refer to ICR^p actions as *interim correlated p-rationalizable*.

(ii) *Rationalizability*. The special case $\lambda = 1$. The standard case of common belief in rationality, that is, infinite depth of reasoning in which player adhere probability 1 to rationality at every iteration. The case ICR^\dagger reduces to the standard notion of ICR, as defined by Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2007) and discussed above.

(iii) *Models with k orders of belief in rationality*. For each $k \geq 0$ define sequence $\lambda^k = (\lambda^k_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ by

$$
\lambda^k_n = 1 \text{ if } n \leq k \text{ and } \lambda^k_n = 0 \text{ otherwise.}
$$

An action $a_i \in \text{ICR}_i^\lambda(\tau_i)$ corresponds to the choice of a player who assumes that others are rational for $k - 1$ orders and makes no further assumptions.\(^{11}\)

(iv) *Models with distinct “cognitive bound” and “rationality bound”*. Friedenberg, Kets and Kneeland (2016) define the following (on p. 3):

- **Rationality**: Say Ann is *rational* if she maximizes her expected utility given subjective belief about how Bob plays the game.

- **Cognition**: Say Ann is *cognitive* if she has a subjective belief about how Bob plays the game.

From this they further define:

- **Reasoning About Rationality**: Say that Ann has a *rationality bound* of level $n$ if she is rational, thinks that Bob is rational, thinks that Bob thinks she is rational, and so on up to the statement that includes the word “rational” $n$ times, but no further.

- **Reasoning About Cognition**: Say that Ann has a *cognitive bound* of level $m$ if she is thinking about Bob’s strategy choice, if she is thinking about what Bob is thinking about her strategy choice, and so on up to the statement that includes the word “thinking” $m$ times, but no further.

\(^{11}\)This has a similar flavor to “level-k reasoning,” with the distinction that level-k models begin with a level 0 type who takes a specific baseline action (possibly randomized), leading to specific actions for types at each level. We, rather, allow the full range of possible actions at stage 0 and continue with a set-valued concept at each stage. See Stahl and Wilson (1994) or Nagel (1995), among others, for “level-k reasoning”.

Since rationality is stronger than cognition, we must have \( n \leq m \). In our model, a rationality bound of \( n \) and cognitive bound of \( m \) are captured by a \( \lambda \) with \( \lambda_k = 1 \) for \( k \leq n \), \( \lambda_k \in (0,1) \) for \( n < k \leq m \), and \( \lambda_k = 0 \) for \( k > m \).

A related distinction between rationality and cognitive ability was analyzed in Alaoui and Penta (2016). In that paper players choose whether to make the effort of reasoning as much as their cognitive bound allows. This idea is also similar to the framework in Camerer, Loewenstein and Rabin (2004), which unlike standard level-\( k \) reasoning, allows for uncertainty on the level of rationality attached to opponents. Kets (2014) and Heifetz and Kets (2018) generalize the \( \sigma \)-algebras attached to types so that they are able to capture a similar idea, and apply their construction to the study of the WY-discontinuity.

\[(v)\] *Unlimited depth of reasoning, with uncertainty on opponents’ depth.* Pick sequence \( \lambda \) satisfying,

\[
\forall n \in \mathbb{N}, \lambda_n \geq \lambda_{n+1}.
\]

Here, we allow \( \lambda \) to be positive at all orders, which would signify that the player has unlimited depth of reasoning and attaches positive probability to all levels of opponents’ reasoning. Again, \( \lambda_n \) is the probability he attaches to opponents’ reasoning to at least depth \( n \). He attaches probability \( \lim_{k \to \infty} \lambda_k \) to his opponents’ having unlimited depth of reasoning.

Most of the results of this paper (Propositions 1, 2 and 3, and Proposition 7) apply to every sequence \( \lambda \), so in particular, also for the families of solution concepts considered above (in particular, Proposition 7 provides an epistemic foundation for all of them within a standard epistemic framework). In Proposition 6 we will focus on a particular class of perturbations:

\[(vi)\] *Fading higher-order belief in rationality.*

\[
\Lambda^0 = \left\{ \lambda \in \Lambda \left| \begin{array}{l}
(i) \lim_{n \to \infty} \lambda_n = 0, \\
(ii) \lambda_n \geq \lambda_{n+1} \text{ for any } n \in \mathbb{N}
\end{array} \right. \right\}.
\]

The interpretation here is that each player is capable of reasoning to arbitrary levels, but is sufficiently uncertain of his opponents’ depth that he loses almost all confidence at higher orders.
3.3 Elementary properties

Before continuing to our main results in Section 4, we present some elementary properties of $\text{ICR}^\lambda$. First, we check that $\text{ICR}^\lambda$ is type-representation invariant; that is, the specific type structure employed to model a certain belief hierarchy does not affect interim correlated $\lambda$-rationalizable predictions:

**Proposition 1 (Type-representation invariance).** Let $\langle \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{T} \rangle$ be a Bayesian game. Then, for any player $i$, any type $t_i$ and any sequence of probabilities $\lambda$, $\text{ICR}^\lambda_i(t_i) = \text{ICR}^\lambda_i(\tau_i(t_i))$.

Proposition 1 can be regarded as a robustness result of $\text{ICR}^\lambda$: different type representations of the same belief hierarchy lead to the same predictions. An additional robustness property of $\text{ICR}^\lambda$ is presented in the following proposition, which shows that $\text{ICR}^\lambda : \mathcal{T}_i \Rightarrow A_i$ is an upper-hemicontinuous correspondence. This means that behavior which is excluded by $\text{ICR}^\lambda$ at a certain type will still be excluded at nearby belief hierarchies. This is similar to results shown for ordinary ICR and $\epsilon$-ICR in Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2007)

**Proposition 2 (Robustness to higher-order uncertainty about payoffs).** Let $\langle \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{T} \rangle$ be a Bayesian game. Then, for any $n \geq 0$, any player $i$, and any sequence of probabilities $\lambda$, correspondence $\text{ICR}^\lambda_{i,n} : \mathcal{T}_i \Rightarrow A_i$ is upper-hemicontinuous. It follows that $\text{ICR}^\lambda_i : \mathcal{T}_i \Rightarrow A_i$ is upper-hemicontinuous too.

**Remark 1.** Notice that, for any $n \in \mathbb{N}$, any player $i$, and any sequence of probabilities $\lambda$, the correspondence $\text{ICR}^\lambda_{i,n} : \mathcal{T}_i \Rightarrow A_i$ has closed domain and is closed-valued; thus, Proposition 2 and the Closed Graph Theorem imply that $\text{Graph}(\text{ICR}^\lambda_{i,n})$ is closed and therefore, measurable, justifying Definition 2.

Proposition 1 turns out to be helpful not only in simplifying the definition of $\text{ICR}^\lambda$, but also in the proof of the next result in this section, Proposition 3, which shows that:

(i) $\text{ICR}$ and $\text{ICR}^\lambda$ coincide as perturbations in common belief in rationality vanish (i.e., when $\lambda = \bar{1}$) and, based on the latter, that (ii) $\text{ICR}$ is robust to higher-order uncertainty about rationality:

A related result by Germano and Zuazo-Garin (2017) shows that their notion of $p$-rational outcomes (which coincide with the correlated equilibria when $p = 1$ and otherwise generalize these by assuming common knowledge of mutual $p$-belief in rationality rather than common knowledge of rationality) are continuous in $p$, for any $p \leq 1$, which, in particular, implies robustness of correlated equilibria to bounded rationality.
continuous (that is, also lower-hemicontinuous) when common belief in rationality is perturbed. Furthermore, Proposition 3, when combined with Propositions 1 and 2 above shows that both type-representation invariance and upper-hemicontinuity, as robustness properties of ICR, happen to be themselves robust to perturbations in common belief in rationality.

**Proposition 3 (Robustness to higher-order uncertainty about rationality).** Let \( \langle G, \mathcal{F} \rangle \) be a Bayesian game. Then, for any player \( i \) and any type \( t_i \), we have that:

(i) \( \text{ICR}_i(t_i) = \text{ICR}_i^1(t_i) \).

(ii) The correspondence given by \( \lambda \mapsto \text{ICR}_i^\lambda(t_i) \) is upper-hemicontinuous everywhere and continuous at \( \lambda = \bar{\lambda} \)

The last result in this section illustrates the connection between \( \lambda \)-rationalizability and \( \varepsilon \)-rationalizability: for any \( \varepsilon > 0 \), there exists some strictly positive amount of suspicion of lack of common belief in rationality, represented by \( \lambda = \bar{\rho} \) with \( p < 1 \), such that for every player and every belief hierarchy, every \( \lambda \)-rationalizable action is also \( \varepsilon \)-rationalizable.

**Proposition 4 (\( \lambda \)-rationalizability and \( \varepsilon \)-rationalizability).** Let \( \langle G, \mathcal{F} \rangle \) be a Bayesian game. Then, for any \( \varepsilon > 0 \), any \( n \geq 0 \), any player \( i \) and any type \( t_i \), we have that, for every \( p \geq 1/(1 + \varepsilon/(2M)) \), \( \text{ICR}_i^{p,n}(t_i) \subseteq \varepsilon\text{-ICR}_i^{n}(t_i) \).

### 4 Main results

We present now the main results of the paper, which study whether perturbations in higher-order belief in rationality eliminate the failures in continuity of rationalizability discovered by Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) in their Structure Theorem. To this end, we study the behavior of interim correlated \( \lambda \)-rationalizability for different \( \lambda \). Our findings are twofold. Proposition 5 proves the robustness of the WY-discontinuity for sequences \( \lambda \) with components \( \lambda_n \) sufficiently close to 1; even under perturbation in common belief in rationality, if higher-order belief in rationality remains above some threshold \( p \), unique selection arguments à la Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) still work. However, Proposition 6 shows that the discontinuity goes away when \( \lambda \) converges to 0: if higher-order in rationality becomes eventually low enough, unique selection becomes impossible to accomplish. Similar results are found by Heifetz and Kets (2018), who instead of explicitly relaxing higher-order belief in rationality, introduce a more sophisticated framework that allows for higher-order uncertainty about players’ cognitive bounds. The relation between Heifetz and Kets’s
Main results

(2018) work and this paper is examined in Section 4.2, where we also discuss the relevance of our results to global games.

4.1 The WY-discontinuity and common belief in rationality

First, we show that the WY-discontinuity persists under perturbations in common belief in rationality that keep higher-order belief in rationality above some high enough threshold. To formalize this insight, we need to recall first the following refinement of ICR due to Chen, Takahashi and Xiong (2014b):

**Definition 3** (Robust selection, cf. Definition 4 by Chen, Takahashi and Xiong, 2014b). Let \((\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{T})\) be a Bayesian game. Then, for any player \(i\) and any type \(t_i\) we say that action \(a_i\) can be robustly selected for type \(t_i\) if there exists some \(\epsilon > 0\) and some sequence \((\tau^n_{i})_{n \in \mathbb{N}}\) approaching \(\tau_{i}(t_i)\) such that \(\epsilon\)-ICR\(_i(\tau^n_{i}) = \{a_i\}\) for any \(n \in \mathbb{N}\). Let RS\(_i(t_i)\) denote the set of actions that can be robustly selected for type \(t_i\).

Obviously, it is possible that a type does not admit a robust selection; however, it follows from Weinstein and Yildiz’s (2007) Structure Theorem and Proposition 5 by Chen, Takahashi and Xiong (2014b) that if the richness assumption is satisfied then the set of belief hierarchies that admit a robust selection is generic. We can now state our first main result:

**Proposition 5** (WY-discontinuity for persistently high \(\lambda\)). Let \((\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{T})\) be a Bayesian game with finite type space. Then, there exists some \(p < 1\) such that for any player \(i\), any type \(t_i\), any \(\lambda\) with \(\lambda \geq \bar{p}\), and any \(a_i \in RS_i(t_i)\), there exists some convergent sequence \((\tau^n_{i})_{n \in \mathbb{N}}\) approaching \(\tau_{i}(t_i)\) such that ICR\(_i(\tau^n_{i}) = \{a_i\}\) for all \(n \in \mathbb{N}\).

Thus, at any type admitting the WY-discontinuity (i.e. with multiple robustly selected actions), the discontinuity persists when the ICR concept is replaced by ICR\(_p\), or by ICR\(_\lambda\) with \(\lambda \geq \bar{p}\). That is, even under this more permissive solution concept, representing bounded rationality, unique selection procedures work and any refinement sharper than robust selection will fail to be robust. Since, as shown by Chen, Takahashi and Xiong (2014b), under the richness condition every action which is \(\epsilon\)-ICR for some \(\epsilon < 0\) can be robustly selected, the theorem applies to such actions. Thus, for large enough \(\lambda\) as in the proposition, any refinement which makes a selection among strict equilibria will fail to be robust under ICR\(_\lambda\). Indeed, we have:

**Corollary 1** (Robust selection of strictly rationalizable actions for persistently high \(\lambda\)). Let \((\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{T})\) be a Bayesian game, with finite type space, which satisfies the
richness condition. Then, for any type $t_i$ and any $a_i \in \varepsilon$-$ICR(t_i)$ for some $\varepsilon < 0$, there exists some $p < 1$ such that for any $\lambda$ with $\lambda \geq \bar{p}$, there exists some convergent sequence $(\tau_i^n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ approaching $\tau_i(t_i)$ such that $ICR_i^\lambda(\tau_i^n) = \{a_i\}$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$.

We note here that the converse of Proposition 5 fails. The following simple example, where no action can be robustly selected but the conclusion of Proposition 5 holds, is inspired by Section 4 in Chen, Takahashi and Xiong (2014b). Consider a case where a player is insensitive to others’ actions and has two actions which are tied for best reply. Proposition 3 of Chen, Takahashi and Xiong (2014b) shows that no robust selection is possible in such a case. The conclusion of our Proposition 5, though, is satisfied for both actions. Since $\lambda$ now has no impact, the choice of $p$ is irrelevant, and one can simply use any sequence where payoffs are perturbed in a consistent direction to select one of the actions.\(^{13}\)

Results such as Proposition 5 fail if we allow a different weakening of common belief in rationality, where belief in rationality becomes very low at high orders:

**Proposition 6 (No WY-discontinuity for vanishing $\lambda$).** Let $(\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{T})$ be a Bayesian game with finite type space. Then, for any $\varepsilon < 0$, any player $i$, any type $t_i$ and any $\lambda$ with $\lambda_n \to 0$, there exists a neighborhood $U$ of $\tau_i(t_i)$ such that $\varepsilon$-$ICR_i(t_i) \subseteq ICR_i^\lambda(\tau_i)$, for any $\tau_i \in U$.

If, for instance, each ICR action of type $t_i$ is actually a strict best reply for some belief, then the ICR and $\varepsilon$-ICR sets are identical at a type $t_i$ for some $\varepsilon < 0$. Proposition 6 then implies that $ICR_i^\lambda$ is continuous at $t_i$ for any $\lambda$ with $\lambda_n \to 0$. Notice that Propositions 5 and 6 provide contrasting cases of the impact of higher-order belief in rationality on the WY-discontinuity. On the one hand, Proposition 5 states that the WY-discontinuity remains under perturbations of that maintain higher-order belief in rationality above a high-enough threshold. On the other hand, Proposition 6 tells us that the WY-discontinuity vanishes under perturbations of a different kind: when the weight attached to higher-order belief in rationality becomes arbitrarily smaller as higher-order beliefs are considered, the unique selection of actions that can be made in the case of common belief in rationality turns out to be impossible. That is, as long as the assumption that higher-order beliefs become eventually negligible for players is introduced, no matter how slowly this diminishing impact of higher-order beliefs takes place, continuity of behavior with respect to perturbations of belief hierarchies is re-established (even when such perturbations

\(^{13}\)We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this example.
are considered in the sense of the product topology).\footnote{Notice that in one natural sense this is a small departure from common belief in rationality: if we put the product topology on the set of possible sequences $\lambda$, $\bar{1}$ is a limit point of the set of $\lambda$ with $\lambda_n \to 0$ referenced in Proposition 6.} A special case was mentioned in Section 3.2: when $\lambda_n = 0$ for all $n > k$, a version of level-$k$ reasoning. A rough justification for this result, in the level-$k$ case, is that (1) $\varepsilon$-ICR actions (for $\varepsilon < 0$) remain in $\text{ICR}_{i,k}$ when the first $k$ levels of the hierarchy are close enough to the original type, and (2) the tail of the hierarchy becomes irrelevant when we reason only to level $k$.

A corollary to Proposition 6 states that the generic uniqueness result of Weinstein and Yildiz (closely related to WY-discontinuity) also fails whenever $\lambda_n \to 0$ and there is any type with multiple $\varepsilon$-rationalizable actions for some $\varepsilon < 0$. Under these conditions, there is an open set of types in which every element admits multiple $\lambda$-rationalizable actions.

**Corollary 2 (Non-robustness of generic uniqueness).** Let $\langle G, \mathcal{T} \rangle$ be a Bayesian game. Then, for any player $i$ for which there exist some $\varepsilon < 0$ and some type $t_i$ such that $|\varepsilon\text{-ICR}_i(t_i)| > 1$, and for any $\lambda$ with $\lambda_n \to 0$, the following set is not dense:

$$U^\lambda_i = \{ \tau_i \in \mathcal{T}_i | |\text{ICR}^\lambda_i(\tau_i)| = 1 \}.$$

Proposition 6 is related to previous work showing that for finite $n$, $\text{ICR}_n$ satisfies a form of lower-hemicontinuity. See, for instance, Proposition 2 of Chen, Di Tillio, Faingold and Xiong (2010). In the case, mentioned earlier, that $\lambda$ consists of finitely many 1’s followed by 0’s, $\text{ICR}^\lambda$ is equivalent to $\text{ICR}_n$ for finite $n$.

### 4.2 Discussion

#### 4.2.1 Implications for global games

Carlsson and van Damme (1993) introduced an argument for selection of “risk-dominant” equilibria, based on a discontinuity of the equilibrium correspondence. Given a complete-information game with multiple equilibria, they construct a family of incomplete-information games based on noisy observations of payoffs in the original game (a “global game”), where the risk-dominant equilibrium is unique even as the noise goes to zero. As discussed in Weinstein and Yildiz (2007), the WY-discontinuity weakens this argument in the sense that, for a larger family of perturbations of the original game, any action may be uniquely rationalizable. Our main results shed
some light on these issues in the context of weakened common knowledge of rationality, as represented by ICR$^\lambda$. Under the conditions in Proposition 5, the selection of risk-dominant equilibria in global games will persist for large enough $p$, but so will the critique that the WY-discontinuity can lead to any selection. Under the conditions in Proposition 6, unique selection will be impossible for games close enough to the original game, because all actions played in a strict equilibrium, e.g. all actions in a $2 \times 2$ coordination game, remain rationalizable in small enough perturbations.

4.2.2 Almost common belief in rationality and almost common belief in infinite depth of reasoning

Proposition 6 shows that, under certain arbitrarily small perturbations in common belief in rationality, the WY-discontinuity vanishes; that is, continuity of behavior is restored, even under almost common belief in rationality. Going back to the terminology of Alaoui and Penta (2016) and Friedenberg, Kets and Kneeland (2016), the theorem departs from the standard model in Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) by introducing perturbations in common belief assumptions regarding players’ rationality bounds. Strzalecki (2014) and Heifetz and Kets (2018) study the impact on the WY-discontinuity of perturbations in common belief assumptions regarding players’ cognitive bound. Specifically, Heifetz and Kets (2018) provides a framework that allows for modeling players’ uncertainty about each others’ depth of reasoning (i.e., cognitive bound), and show that under almost common belief in infinite depth of reasoning, the WY-discontinuity fails. That is, almost common belief in infinite depth is consistent with robust multiplicity (i.e., absence of generic uniqueness).

Our Proposition 6 sheds light on both rationality bounds and cognitive bounds. As discussed in Section 3.2, for given $\lambda$ the cognitive bound is $\sup \{ n \in \mathbb{N} | \lambda_n > 0 \}$ and the rationality bound is $\sup \{ n \in \mathbb{N} | \lambda_n = 1 \}$. When $\lambda$ satisfies $\lambda_n > 0$ for every $n$, ICR$^\lambda$ represents common belief in infinite depth of reasoning (synonymously, a cognitive bound of $\infty$, also called unbounded cognition.) Thus, the failure of the WY-discontinuity in Proposition 6, and, in particular, robust multiplicity, are consistent with common belief in unbounded cognition, since the proposition requires only that $\lambda$ be a sequence converging to 0. Of course, if $\lambda$ converges to 0, there must exist some $m$ such that $\lambda_n < 1$ for every $n \geq m$, meaning that every players’ rationality bound is finite. Within the framework of ICR$^\lambda$, we see a clear distinction between unbounded cognition, which in many cases allows robust multiplicity, and the much stronger unbounded rationality which eliminates robust multiplicity and restores the WY-discontinuity.
4.2.3 Alternate definition of ICR$^\lambda$

An anonymous referee proposed an interesting alternate definition of ICR$^\lambda$, with the same general motivating ideas. We will call it ICR2$^\lambda$ and discuss its merits here. To determine ICR2$^\lambda_k$, one applies elimination steps using the first $k$ values of $\lambda$, but reversed from our order. That is, one first runs a round with confidence $\lambda_k$ in remaining actions being played, then with confidence $\lambda_{k-1}$, etc. down to $\lambda_1$, for $k$ total rounds of elimination. To determine ICR2$^\lambda_{k+1}$, then, requires an entirely different $(k+1)$-step process, starting with $\lambda_{k+1}$. As before, the infinite intersection of the ICR2$^\lambda_k$ determines ICR2$^\lambda$. This may sound like a surprising way to apply the sequence $\lambda_k$, but it has a nice motivation. The final step, using $\lambda_1$, ensures that all players best-respond to a belief assigning at least $\lambda_1$ to rational actions of the other players. The penultimate step, using $\lambda_2$, means that other players’s actions are based on assigning probability at least $\lambda_2$ to opposing actions, and so on. As pointed out by the referee, this process reflects actions which are consistent with a natural infinite sequence of statements. For Player 1, the first statement would be that Player 1 is rational and believes with probability at least $\lambda_1$ that Player 2 is rational. The second is that Player 1 is rational, and believes with probability at least $\lambda_1$ that: Player 2 is rational and believes Player 1 is rational with probability at least $\lambda_2$.

Our definition involves a much simpler and more intuitive modification to the elimination process. Players analyze the game by first reducing the available actions for each player to actions which are sometimes a best reply. Then they reduce to best replies to the remaining actions, but assuming only $\lambda_1$ confidence that the previous step has been applied, and so on. Our concept is motivated by the idea of players who apply the deductive process of successive elimination rules with only partial confidence. Both concepts also have an epistemic foundation, in terms of players’ higher-order beliefs about rationality, as distinct from the elimination process. The foundation for ICR2$^\lambda$ reduces to a single infinite statement, while ours requires an infinite series of independent statements, so this gives ICR2 a rival claim to simplicity.

In two significant special cases we have mentioned, the case of constant $\lambda$ and of $\lambda$ consisting of finitely many 1’s followed by zeroes (cases (i)-(iii) in Section 3.2), the two concepts coincide. Indeed, the two concepts are close enough that replacing ICR$^\lambda$ with ICR2$^\lambda$ has no effect on the two main results, Propositions 5 and 6. The constant case suffices to imply that Proposition 5 is unaffected. Proposition 6 is unaffected because the proof hinges on the fact that $\lambda_n \to 0$ makes the elimination process effectively finite, and this idea applies for either concept.
Finally, we formally analyze the epistemic foundation of $\lambda$-rationalizability. The exercise corresponds to the incomplete information version of the case already studied by Hu (2007), with the addition that beliefs of different order can be given different consideration in the decision making process. Specifically, in Section 5.1 we introduce the epistemic framework needed for our study, which consists of a particular instance of the environment defined by Battigalli, Di Tillio, Grillo and Penta (2011). Next, in Section 5.2 we introduce the notion of common $\lambda$-belief, with $\lambda$ a sequence of probabilities. This concept generalizes the standard notion of common $p$-belief due to Monderer and Samet (1987), allowing heterogeneous weights on higher-order beliefs. Common $\lambda$-belief serves as the base of our epistemic characterization result in Proposition 7, which generalizes several well-known characterization results in the Epistemic Game Theory literature.

5.1 Epistemic framework

By applying Brandenburger and Dekel’s (1993) construction to family of basic uncertainty spaces $(A_{-i} \times \Theta)_{i \in I}$, an alternative universal type space, $(\mathcal{E}_i, \psi_i)_{i \in I}$, is obtained. We refer to each belief hierarchy $e_i \in \mathcal{E}_i$ as epistemic hierarchy. This way, following Battigalli, Di Tillio, Grillo and Penta (2011), the epistemic analysis is based on epistemic hierarchies and performed in state space $\Omega = \mathcal{E} \times A \times \Theta$, where $\mathcal{E} = \prod_{i \in I} \mathcal{E}_i$. For each player $i$ we denote $\Omega_i = \mathcal{E}_i \times A_i$, and for each state $\omega$, we will consider the following projections: $\omega_i = \text{Proj}_{\mathcal{E}_i}(\omega)$, $e_i(\omega) = \text{Proj}_{\mathcal{E}_i}(\omega)$, $a_i(\omega) = \text{Proj}_{A_i}(\omega)$ and $\theta(\omega) = \text{Proj}_{\Theta}(\omega)$. Thus, each state is a description of players’ epistemic hierarchies and actions, and payoff states. The epistemic language is completed as follows.

5.1.1 Rationality and common ($p$-)belief

We say that player $i$ is rational at state $\omega$ whenever her choice at $\omega$ is optimal given her first-order beliefs at $\omega$. This event is formally represented by set $R_i = \{\omega \in \Omega | a_i(\omega) \in BR_i(e_{i,1}(\omega))\}$. As usual let $R = \bigcap_{i \in I} R_i$ and $R_{-i} = \bigcap_{i \in I} R_i$. Note that all these sets are closed and therefore measurable due to $BR_i$ being closed-valued and $\text{Proj}_{A_i}$, continuous. Assumptions on players’ beliefs can be represented by means of $p$-belief operators, as originally introduced by Monderer and Samet (1987). For positive probability $p$, player $i$’s $p$-belief operator is defined as map $E \mapsto B_i^p(E)$,
where for any event \( E \),

\[
B^p_i (E) = \left\{ \omega \in \Omega \mid \psi_i (e_i (\omega)) \left[ \left( \omega_{-i}, \theta \right) \in \mathcal{E}_{-i} \times A_{-i} \times \Theta \right] \left( \omega_{-i}, \omega_i, \theta \right) \in E \right\} \geq p
\]

That is, event \( B^p_i (E) \) is the collection of states in which player \( i \) assigns at least probability \( p \) to event \( E \); we refer to it as the event that player \( i \) \( p \)-believes \( E \).

The mutual \( p \)-belief operator is given by \( E \mapsto B^p_i (E) = \bigcap_{i \in I} B^p_i (E) \) for any event \( E \). When \( p \) equals 1 we drop superscripts and refer to 1-belief as simply, belief.

Note that it follows from the fact that every \( \psi_i \) is a homeomorphism that \( p \)-belief operators are closed-valued and therefore yield measurable sets. Finally, higher-order belief restrictions can be imposed using the common \( p \)-belief operator, which is recursively defined as follows: for each player \( i \) let \( C B^p_i (E) = \bigcap_{n \geq 0} B^{p,n}_i (E) \), where \( B^{0,p}_i (E) = E \), and recursively, \( B^{n+1,p}_i (E) = B^p_i (B^{n,p}_i (E)) \) for any \( n \geq 0 \). We write simply \( C B_i (E) = C B^1_i (E) \) to represent common belief.

### 5.1.2 Epistemic hierarchies and belief hierarchies

Unsurprisingly, epistemic hierarchies and belief hierarchies are closely related. As shown by Battigalli, Di Tillio, Grillo and Penta (2011), it is possible to construct, by recursive marginalization, quotient maps \( q_i : \mathcal{E}_i \rightarrow \mathcal{T}_i \) and \( \bar{q}_i : \Delta (\mathcal{E}_{-i} \times A_{-i} \times \Theta) \rightarrow \Delta (\mathcal{T}_{-i} \times \Theta) \) that make the following diagram commutative:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\mathcal{E}_i & \xrightarrow{q_i} & \mathcal{T}_i \\
\psi_i & \downarrow & \quad \downarrow \varphi_i \\
\Delta (\mathcal{E}_{-i} \times A_{-i} \times \Theta) & \xrightarrow{\bar{q}_i} & \Delta (\mathcal{T}_{-i} \times \Theta)
\end{array}
\]

so that consistency between events that are expressible in each domain, the ones corresponding to uncertainty about \( \Theta \) and uncertainty about \( A_{-i} \times \Theta \), is guaranteed. Then, for any player \( i \) and belief hierarchy \( \tau_i \), let \( [q_i = \tau_i] = \{ \omega \in \Omega \mid q_i (e_i (\omega)) = \tau_i \} \) be the event that player \( i \)'s belief hierarchy is exactly \( \tau_i \). Note that \( [q_i = \tau_i] \) is closed due to \( q_i \) being continuous.

### 5.2 Characterization result

We introduce now the epistemic operator that allows for our characterization result.

**Definition 4 (Common \( \lambda \)-belief).** Let \( E \subseteq \Omega \) be an event, and \( \lambda \), a sequence of probabilities. Let \( B^{\lambda,0}_i (E) = E \), and set recursively \( B^{\lambda,n+1}_i (E) = \bigcap_{i \in I} B^{\lambda,n+1}_i (B^{\lambda,n}_i (E)) \).
for each \( n \geq 0 \). Then, for each player \( i \), \( CB^\lambda_i(E) = \bigcap_{n \geq 0} B^{\lambda_{n+1}}_i(B^{\lambda_n}(E)) \) is the event that player \( i \) exhibits common \( \lambda \)-belief in \( E \).

Thus, common \( \lambda \)-belief generalizes the notion of common \( p \)-belief, so that at each iteration, the weight assigned to the corresponding epistemic restriction is not necessarily constant. The epistemic characterization of interim correlated \( \lambda \)-rationalizability exhibits then the expected pattern:

**Proposition 7 (Epistemic foundation of ICR\( ^\lambda \)).** Let \( \langle \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{T} \rangle \) be a Bayesian game and \( \lambda \), a sequence of probabilities. Then, \( \lambda \)-rationalizability characterizes rationality and common \( \lambda \)-belief in rationality; i.e., for any player \( i \) and any type \( t_i \) it holds that,

\[
ICR^\lambda_i(t_i) = \text{Proj}_{A_i} \left( R_i \cap CB^\lambda_i(R) \cap [q_i = \tau_i(t_i)] \right).
\]

The theoretical relevance of Proposition 7 lies in two features. First, as depicted in Figure 1, it shows that rationalizability is robust to a wide range of perturbations of common belief in rationality: not only perturbations à la \( p \)-belief, but also to the more general ones captured by non-constant \( \lambda \) parameters. This follows from the facts that: (i) interim correlated \( \lambda \)-rationalizability represents rational choice under departures from the standard rational benchmark by relaxing higher-order belief in rationality not necessarily weighting different order belief in an homogeneous way (Proposition 7) and (ii) interim correlated \( \lambda \)-rationalizability is upper-hemicontinuous on \( \lambda \) and indeed, continuous when \( \lambda = \bar{\Pi} \) (Proposition 3). Second, since the result holds for arbitrary sequence \( \lambda \), the epistemic foundation result covers the cases of particular \( \lambda \) sequences characterizing the different solution concepts reviewed in Section 2.3. This is already known in the case of standard solution concepts such as ICR (see Theorem 1 by Battigalli, Di Tillio, Grillo and Penta (2011), which corresponds to the \( \lambda = \bar{\Pi} \) case) or \( p \)-rationalizability (see Proposition 1 by Hu (2007), which corresponds to the case of \( \lambda = \bar{p} \) and \( \tau_i \) exhibiting common belief in some game). The fact that solution concepts based on complex formal departures such as finite depth of reasoning models can be formalized and given epistemic formulation by means of already well-known tools reinforces the strength of the standard and classic game-theoretical approach.
For convenience, we begin with the proof of Proposition 2.

**Proposition 2 (Robustness to higher-order uncertainty about payoffs).** Let \( \langle \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{T} \rangle \) be a Bayesian game. Then, for any \( n \geq 0 \), any player \( i \), and any sequence of probabilities \( \lambda \), correspondence \( \text{ICR}_{i,n}^\lambda : T_i \rightharpoondown A_i \) is upper-hemicontinuous. It follows that \( \text{ICR}_{i}^\lambda : T_i \rightharpoondown A_i \) is upper-hemicontinuous too.

**Proof.** We proceed by induction. The initial step \( (n = 0) \) is immediate: \( \tau_i \mapsto \text{ICR}_{i,0}^\lambda(\tau_i) = A_i \) is trivially upper-hemicontinuous for any \( i \in I \) and \( \lambda \in \Lambda \). For the inductive step, suppose the claim holds for \( n \geq 0 \). Then, to check the \( (n+1) \) case, fix \( i \in I \) and \( \lambda \in \Lambda \) and pick a convergent sequence \( (\tau_{i,k})_{k \in \mathbb{N}} \) with limit \( \tau_i \) and \( a_i \in A_i \) such that \( a_i \in \text{ICR}_{i,n+1}^\lambda(\tau_{i,k}) \) for any \( k \in \mathbb{N} \). Then, we know that for any \( k \in \mathbb{N} \) there is some \( \eta_i^k \in C_{i,n}^{\lambda}(\tau_{i,k}) \) such that \( a_i \in BR_i(\eta_i^k) \). Let \( (\eta_i^{k,m})_{m \in \mathbb{N}} \) be a convergent subsequence of \( (\eta_i^k)_{k \in \mathbb{N}} \) and let \( \eta_i \) denote its limit. Since \( \text{marg}_{\mathcal{T}_- \times \Theta} \) is continuous, \( \eta_i \in C_{i,0}^{\lambda}(\tau_i) \). Now, notice that we know by the induction hypothesis that \( \text{ICR}_{i,\ell}^\lambda : T_{-i} \rightharpoondown A_{-i} \) is upper-hemicontinuous for any \( \ell = 1, \ldots, n \). Then, it follows from the Closed Graph Theorem that for any \( \ell = 1, \ldots, n \), \( M_\ell = \text{Graph}(\text{ICR}_{i,\ell}^\lambda) \) is closed and therefore, measurable. Obviously, this implies that \( \eta_i^{k,m}[M_\ell] \geq \lambda_\ell \) for any \( \ell = 1, \ldots, n \) and any \( m \in \mathbb{N} \). Then, since \( (\eta_i^{k,m})_{m \in \mathbb{N}} \) converges to \( \eta_i \) and \( (M_\ell)_{\ell=1}^n \) is a family of closed sets,

\[
\eta_i[M_\ell] \geq \limsup_{m \to \infty} \eta_i^{k,m}[M_\ell] \geq \lambda_\ell
\]

for any \( \ell = 1, \ldots, n \), and therefore, \( \eta_i \in C_{i,n}^{\lambda}(\tau_i) \). Finally, the fact that \( BR_i \) is upper-hemicontinuous and \( a_i \in BR_i(\eta_i^{k,m}) \) for any \( m \in \mathbb{N} \) implies that \( a_i \in \text{ICR}_{i,n+1}^\lambda(\tau_i) \). \( \blacksquare \)
A.1 Elementary properties

An immediate corollary of this result is Remark 1, simply because closed sets are measurable. Remark 1 greatly simplifies the proof of the following lemma, providing an alternate characterization of ICR\(^\lambda\), which is used in the proofs of Propositions 1 and 3.

**Lemma 1.** Let \( \mathcal{G} \) be a game with incomplete information and \( \lambda \), sequence of probabilities, and let \( \lambda_0 = 1 \). Then, for \( n \in \mathbb{N} \), any player \( i \) and any belief hierarchy \( \tau_i \) it holds that:

\[
\text{ICR}_{i,n}^\lambda (\tau_i) = \left\{ a_i \in A_i \mid \begin{aligned}
\text{There exists a measurable } \sigma_{-i} : \mathcal{T}_{-i} \times \Theta \to \Delta(A_{-i}) \text{ such that:} \\
(i) & \int_{\mathcal{T}_{-i} \times \Theta} \sigma_{-i}(\tau_{-i}, \theta) \left[ \text{ICR}_{i,k}^\lambda (\tau_{-i}) \right] d\varphi_i(\tau_i) \geq \lambda_k \text{ for each } k = 1, \ldots, n - 1 \\
(ii) & a_i \in \arg \max_{a'_i \in A_i} \int_{\mathcal{T}_{-i} \times \Theta} \left( \sum_{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} \sigma_{-i}(\tau_{-i}, \theta)[a_{-i}] \cdot u_i((a_{-i}, a'_i), \theta) \right) d\varphi_i(\tau_i)
\end{aligned} \right\}.
\]

**Proof.** We proceed by induction on \( n \):

**Initial step (\( n = 1 \)).** For the right-hand inclusion, pick \( a_i \in \text{ICR}_{i,1}^\lambda (\tau_i) \) and \( \eta_i \in C_{i,0} (\tau_i) \) such that \( a_i \in BR_i(\eta_i) \). Since \( \text{Proj}_{\mathcal{T}_{-i} \times \Theta} : \mathcal{T}_{-i} \times A_{-i} \times \Theta \to \mathcal{T}_{-i} \times \Theta \) is continuous and \( \varphi_i(\tau_i)[E] = \eta_i[\text{Proj}_{\mathcal{T}_{-i} \times \Theta}(E)] \) for any measurable \( E \subseteq \mathcal{T}_{-i} \times \Theta \), it follows immediately from the Disintegration Theorem that there exists a map \( \sigma_{-i} : \mathcal{T}_{-i} \times \Theta \to \Delta(A_{-i}) \) such that,

(a) For each \( E \subseteq A_{-i} \), map \( \sigma_{-i}^E : \mathcal{T}_{-i} \times \Theta \to [0, 1] \) given \( (\tau_{-i}, \theta) \mapsto \sigma_i(\tau_{-i}, \theta)[E] \) is measurable. Hence, \( \sigma_{-i} \) is measurable too.

(b) For any measurable \( E \subseteq \mathcal{T}_{-i} \times A_{-i} \times \Theta \),

\[
\mu_i[E] = \int_{\mathcal{T}_{-i} \times \Theta} \sigma_{-i}(\tau_{-i}, \theta)[\text{Proj}_{A_{-i}} (E \cap \{(\tau_{-i}, \theta) \} \times A_{-i})] d\varphi_i(\tau_i).
\]

\(^{15}\)See Theorem 5.3.1 in Ambrosio, Gigli and Savaré (2006), p. 121. We are working with compact and metrizable spaces; thus, in particular, all of them are Polish and hence, Radon.

\(^{16}\)Remember that we know from Lemma 4.5 by Heifetz and Samet (1998) that the Borel \( \sigma \)-algebra in corresponding to \( A_{-i} \) is generated by family \( \{\{\mu_i \in \Delta(A_{-i}) | \mu_i[E] \geq p\} \} \subseteq A_{-i} \) and \( p \in [0, 1] \). Hence, it follows from the measurability of each \( \sigma_{-i}^E \), that \( \{(\tau_{-i}, \theta) \in \mathcal{T}_{-i} \times \Theta | \sigma_i(\tau_{-i}, \theta)[E] \geq p\} \) is measurable for every \( E \subseteq A_{-i} \) and every \( p \in [0, 1] \). In consequence, \( \sigma_{-i} \) is measurable.
\[ \int_{A_{-i} \times \Theta} u_i((a_{-i}; a_i), \theta)d(\text{marg}_{A_{-i} \times \Theta} \eta_i) = \int_{T_{-i} \times \Theta} \left( \sum_{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} \sigma_{-i}(\tau_{-i}, \theta)[a_{-i}] \cdot u_i((a_{-i}, a_i), \theta) \right) d\varphi_i(\tau_i). \]

Then, since ICR_{-i,0}(\tau_{-i}) = A_{-i} for and \( \tau_{-i} \in T_{-i} \), \( \sigma_{-i} \) obviously satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) in the statement of the Lemma. For the left-hand inclusion, pick \( a_i \in A_i \) and measurable \( \sigma_{-i} : T_{-i} \times \Theta \rightarrow \Delta(A_{-i}) \) satisfying conditions (i) and (ii) above. Then, define measure \( \eta_i \in \Delta(T_{-i} \times A_{-i} \times \Theta) \) as follows:

\[ \eta_i[E] = \int_{T_{-i} \times \Theta} \left( \sum_{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} \sigma_{-i}(\tau_{-i}, \theta) [\text{Proj}_{A_{-i}}(E \cap \{(\tau_{-i}, a_{-i}, \theta)\})] \right) d\varphi_i(\tau_i), \]

for any measurable \( E \subseteq T_{-i} \times A_{-i} \times \Theta \).

We now make the following two claims:

- \( \eta_i \in C_{i,0}^\lambda(\tau_i) \). To see this, pick measurable \( E \subseteq T_{-i} \times \Theta \) and develop:

\[ \eta_i[E \times A_{-i}] = \int_{T_{-i} \times \Theta} \left( \sum_{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} \sigma_{-i}(\tau_{-i}, \theta) [\text{Proj}_{A_{-i}}(E \times A_{-i} \cap \{(\tau_{-i}, a_{-i}, \theta)\})] \right) d\varphi_i(\tau_i) \]

\[ = \int_{E} \sigma_i(\tau_{-i}, \theta)[A_{-i}] d\varphi_i(\tau_i) = \varphi_i(\tau_i)[E]. \]

- \( a_i \in BR_i(\eta_i) \). To see this, first, define, for each \( a_{-i} \in A_{-i} \), measure \( \nu_i(a_{-i}) \in \Delta(T_{-i} \times \Theta) \) as \( E \mapsto \eta_i[E \times \{a_{-i}\}] \). Then, for any \( a'_i \in A_i \),

\[ \int_{A_{-i} \times \Theta} u_i((a_{-i}; a'_i), \theta)d(\text{marg}_{A_{-i} \times \Theta} \eta_i) = \]

\[ = \sum_{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} \int_{T_{-i} \times \Theta} u_i((a_{-i}; a'_i), \theta)d\nu_i(a_{-i}) \]

\[ = \int_{T_{-i} \times \Theta} \left( \sum_{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} \sigma_{-i}(\tau_{-i}, \theta)[a_{-i}] \cdot u_i((a_{-i}, a'_i), \theta) \right) d\varphi_i(\tau_i). \]

A similar argument to the one in the previous footnote proves that if \( \sigma_{-i} \) is measurable, then so is \( \sigma_{-i}^E \) for measurable set \( E \). Since every set \( \text{Proj}_{A_{-i}}(E \cap \{(\tau_{-i}, a_{-i}, \theta)\}) \) is measurable, we conclude that \( \eta_i \) is a well-defined measure.
Then, the fact that $\sigma_{-i}$ satisfies property (ii) above proves the claim.

In consequence, $a_i \in ICR^\lambda_{i,1}(\tau_i)$.

**Inductive step.** Suppose that $n \geq 1$ is such that the claim holds. Let’s check the $(n+1)$ case. For the right-hand inclusion, pick $a_i \in ICR^\lambda_{i,n+1}(\tau_i)$ and $\eta_i \in C^\lambda_{i,n}(\tau_i)$ such that $a_i \in BR_i(\eta_i)$, and family $(M^n_k)_{k=1}^{n}$ of measurable sets such that $M_k \subseteq \text{Graph}(ICR^\lambda_{-i,k})$ and $\eta_i[M_k] \geq \lambda_k$ for any $k = 1, \ldots , n$. Then, since map $\text{Proj}_{\mathcal{T}_i \times \Theta} : \mathcal{T}_i \times A_{-i} \times \Theta \rightarrow \mathcal{T}_i \times \Theta$ is continuous and $\varphi_i(\tau_i)\{E\} = \eta_i[\text{Proj}^{-1}_{\mathcal{T}_i \times \Theta}(E)]$ for any measurable $E \subseteq \mathcal{T}_i \times \Theta$, we know again from the Disintegration Theorem that there exists a map $\sigma_{-i} : \mathcal{T}_i \times \Theta \rightarrow \Delta(A_{-i})$ that satisfies properties (a), (b) and (c) in the paragraph above (in particular, we saw that such $\sigma_{-i}$ is measurable). Condition (ii) in the statement of the lemma is trivially satisfied. To see (i), simply note that for any $k = 1, \ldots , n$,

$$
\int_{\mathcal{T}_i \times \Theta} \sigma_{-i}(\tau_{-i}, \theta)[ICR^\lambda_{-i,k}(\tau_{-i})]d\varphi_i(\tau_i) = \\
= \int_{\mathcal{T}_i \times \Theta} \sigma_{-i}(\tau_{-i}, \theta)[\text{Proj}_{A_{-i}}(\mathcal{T}_i \times ICR^\lambda_{-i,k}(\tau_{-i}) \times \Theta) \cap \{(\tau_{-i}, \theta) \times A_{-i}\}]d\varphi_i(\tau_i) \\
\geq \int_{\mathcal{T}_i \times \Theta} \sigma_{-i}(\tau_{-i}, \theta)[\text{Proj}_{A_{-i}}(M_k \cap \{(\tau_{-i}, \theta) \times A_{-i}\})]d\varphi_i(\tau_i) \\
= \mu_i[M_k] \geq \lambda_k.
$$

For the left-hand inclusion, pick $a_i \in A_i$ and measurable map $\sigma_{-i} : \mathcal{T}_i \times \Theta \rightarrow \Delta(A_{-i})$ satisfying conditions (i) and (ii) for the $(n+1)$th version of the statement of the lemma. Then, define measure $\eta_i \in \Delta(\mathcal{T}_i \times A_{-i} \times \Theta)$ as follows:

$$
\eta_i[E] = \int_{\mathcal{T}_i \times \Theta} \left( \sum_{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} \sigma_{-i}(\tau_{-i}, \theta) \left[ \text{Proj}_{A_{-i}}(E \cap \{(\tau_{-i}, a_{-i}, \theta)\}) \right] \right) d\varphi_i(\tau_i),
$$

for any measurable $E \subseteq \mathcal{T}_i \times A_{-i} \times \Theta$. We claim now that the following three hold:

- $\eta_i \in C^\lambda_{i,0}(\tau_i)$. To see this, pick measurable $E \subseteq T_{-i} \times \Theta$ and develop:

$$
\eta_i[E \times A_{-i}] = \int_{T_{-i} \times \Theta} \left( \sum_{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} \sigma_{-i}(\tau_{-i}, \theta) \left[ \text{Proj}_{A_{-i}}(E \times A_{-i} \cap \{(\tau_{-i}, a_{-i}, \theta)\}) \right] \right) d\varphi_i(\tau_i) \\
= \int_E \sigma_{i}(\tau_{-i}, \theta)[A_{-i}]d\varphi_i(\tau_i) = \varphi_i[E].
$$
• \( \eta_i \in C_{i,t}^{\lambda} (\tau_i) \). Note that we know from Proposition 2 that \( M_k = \text{Graph}(ICR_{\lambda, i,k}^\lambda) \) is measurable for any \( k = 1, \ldots, n \). Thus:

\[
\eta_i[M_k] = \int_{T_i \times \Theta} \sigma_i(\tau_i, \theta) [\text{Proj}_{A-i}(M_k \cap \{(\tau_i, \theta)\} \times A-i)] d\varphi_i(\tau_i)
\]

\[
= \int_{T_i \times \Theta} \sigma_i(\tau_i, \theta) [ICR_{\lambda, i,k}^\lambda(\tau_i)] d\varphi_i(\tau_i) \geq \lambda_k
\]

for any \( k = 1, \ldots, n \).

• \( a_i \in BR_i(\eta_i) \). To see this, first, define, for each \( a_i \in A_i \), measure \( \nu_i(a_i) \in \Delta(T_i \times A_i) \) given by \( E \mapsto \eta_i[E \times \{(a_i - i)\}] \). Then, for any \( a_i' \in A_i \),

\[
\int_{T_i \times \Theta} u_i((a_i - i); a_i') d(marg_{(T_i \times A_i)} \eta_i) = \sum_{a_i \in A_i} \int_{T_i \times \Theta} u_i((a_i - i); a_i') d\nu_i(a_i)
\]

\[
= \int_{T_i \times \Theta} \left( \sum_{a_i \in A_i} \sigma_i(\tau_i, \theta) [a_i] \cdot u_i((a_i - i); a_i') \right) d\varphi_i(\tau_i).
\]

The fact that \( \sigma_i \) satisfies property (ii) above proves the claim.

This way, we conclude that \( a_i \in ICR_{\lambda, i,n+1}^\lambda (\tau_i) \).

We now apply Lemma 1 to the proofs of the two remaining propositions of Section 3.3:

PROPOSITION 1 (Type-representation invariance). Let \( \langle G, \mathcal{F} \rangle \) be a Bayesian game. Then, for any player \( i \), any type \( t_i \) and any sequence of probabilities \( \lambda \), \( ICR_i^\lambda (t_i) = ICR_i^\lambda (\tau_i (t_i)) \).

Proof. We will prove the slightly more general claim: for any player \( i \), any type \( t_i \), any sequence of probabilities \( \lambda \) and any non-negative integer \( n \), it holds that \( ICR_{i,n}^{\lambda, \mathcal{F}} (t_i) = ICR_{i,n}^{\lambda} (\tau_i (t_i)) \). Let’s proceed by induction on \( n \). The initial case \((n = 0)\) holds trivially. For the inductive step, suppose that \( n \geq 0 \) is such that the claim holds for any \( k = 0, \ldots, n \), and fix \( i \in I, t_i \in T_i \) and \( \lambda \in \Lambda \). For the right inclusion, pick \( a_i \in ICR_{i,n+1}^{\lambda, \mathcal{F}} (t_i) \) and \( \mu_i \in C_{i,n+1}^{\lambda, \mathcal{F}} (t_i) \) such that \( a_i \in BR_i(\mu_i) \), and, for each \( k = 1, \ldots, n \), \( \mu_i[\text{Graph}(ICR_{i,k}^{\lambda, \mathcal{F}}) \times \Theta] \geq \lambda_k \). Define now \( \eta_i(\mu_i) \in \Delta(T_i \times A_i \times \Theta) \).
as follows:

\[ E \mapsto \eta_i(\mu_i)[E] = \mu_i[\{(t_{-i}, a_{-i}, \theta) \in T_{-i} \times A_{-i} \times \Theta | ((\tau_{-i}(t_{-i})), a_{-i}, \theta) \in E\}], \]

for any measurable \( E \subseteq T_{-i} \times A_{-i} \times \Theta \). Since \( \tau_{-i} \) is continuous, \( \eta_i(\mu_i) \) is well-defined.\(^\text{18}\)

Notice that we have \((i)\) that \( \text{marg}_{A_{-i} \times \Theta} \eta_i(\mu_i) = \text{marg}_{A_{-i} \times \Theta} \mu_i \) and \((ii)\) that,\(^\text{19}\)

\[
\text{marg}_{T_{-i} \times \Theta} \eta_i(\mu_i)[E] = \eta_i(\mu_i)[A_{-i} \times E]
= \mu_i[\{(t_{-i}, a_{-i}, \theta) \in T_{-i} \times A_{-i} \times \Theta | ((\tau_{-i}(t_{-i})), a_{-i}, \theta) \in A_{-i} \times E\}],
= \text{marg}_{T_{-i} \times \Theta} \mu_i[\{(t_{-i}, \theta) \in T_{-i} \times \Theta | (\tau_{-i}(t_{-i}), \theta) \in E\}],
= \pi_i(t_i)[\{(t_{-i}, \theta) \in T_{-i} \times \Theta | (\tau_{-i}(t_{-i}), \theta) \in E\}],
= \varphi_i(\tau_i(t_i))[E].
\]

Thus, it follows from \((i)\) that \( a_i \in BR_i(\eta_i(\mu_i)) \), and from \((ii)\), that \( \eta_i(\mu_i) \in C^\lambda_{i,0}(\tau_i(t_i)) \).

Now, fix \( k = 0, \ldots, n \) and note that we know, due to the induction hypothesis that,\(^\text{20}\)

\[
\eta_i(\mu_i)[\text{Graph}(\text{ICR}^\lambda_{-i,k}) \times \Theta] \geq \mu_i[\{(t_{-i}, a_{-i}) \in T_{-i} \times A_{-i} | a_{-i} \in \text{ICR}^\lambda_{-i,k} (\tau_{-i}(t_{-i})) \} \times \Theta],
= \mu_i[\text{Graph}(\text{ICR}^\lambda_{-i,k}) \times \Theta],
\geq \lambda_k.
\]

Thus, we conclude that \( \eta_i(\mu_i) \in C^\lambda_{i,n}(\tau_i(t_i)) \). For the left inclusion we make use of Lemma 1. Pick \( a_i \in \text{ICR}^\lambda_{i,n+1}(\tau_i(t_i)) \) and measurable \( \sigma_{-i} : T_{-i} \times \Theta \to \Delta(A_{-i}) \) satisfying conditions \((i)\) and \((ii)\) in the statement of the lemma. Since map \( f_{-i} : T_{-i} \times \Theta \to T_{-i} \times \Theta \) given by \((t_{-i}, \theta) \mapsto (\tau_{-i}(t_{-i}), \theta)\) is continuous, \( \hat{\sigma}_{-i} = \sigma_{-i} \circ f_{-i} \) is measurable. We can then define \( \mu_i \in \Delta(T_{-i} \times A_{-i} \times \Theta) \) as follows:

\[
E \mapsto \mu_i[E] = \sum_{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} \int_{T_{-i} \times \Theta} \hat{\sigma}_{-i}(t_{-i}, \theta) [E \cap \{(t_{-i}, a_{-i}, \theta)\}] \, d\pi_i(t_i),
\]

for any measurable \( E \subseteq T_{-i} \times A_{-i} \times \Theta \). Then, we have that:

\(^\text{18}\)Due to every \( \{(t_{-i}, a_{-i}, \theta) \in T_{-i} \times A_{-i} \times \Theta | ((\tau_{-i}(t_{-i})), a_{-i}, \theta) \in E\} \) being measurable.
\(^\text{19}\)The fifth equality is a special case of formula (4) in Battigalli, Di Tillio, Grillo and Penta (2011), p. 10.
\(^\text{20}\)Each Graph(\text{ICR}^\lambda_{-i,k}) is clearly measurable, see Footnote 18.
• \( \mu_i \in C_{i,0}^{\lambda_i,\gamma}(t_i) \). To see this, pick measurable \( E \subseteq T_{-i} \times \Theta \) and develop:

\[
\mu_i[E \times A_{-i}] = \int_{T_{-i} \times \Theta} \left( \sum_{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} \hat{\sigma}_{-i}(t_{-i}, \theta) \left[ \text{Proj}_{A_{-i}}(E \times A_{-i} \cap \{(t_{-i}, a_{-i}, \theta)\}) \right] \right) \, d\pi_i(t_i) = \int_{E} \hat{\sigma}_{-i}(t_{-i}, \theta)[A_{-i}] \, d\pi_i(t_i) = \pi_i(t_i)[E].
\]

• \( \mu_i \in C_{i,n}^{\lambda_i,\gamma}(t_i) \). Consider continuous map \( F_i : T_{-i} \times A_{-i} \times \Theta \rightarrow T_{-i} \times A_{-i} \times \Theta \) given by \( (t_{-i}, a_{-i}, \theta) \mapsto (f_i(t_{-i}, \theta), a_{-i}) \). Then, we have that:

\[
\mu_i[\text{Graph(ICR}^{\lambda_i,\gamma}_{-i,k})] = \int_{T_{-i} \times \Theta} \sigma_{-i}(t_{-i}, \theta)[\text{Proj}_{A_{-i}}(\text{Graph(ICR}^{\lambda_i,\gamma}_{-i,k}) \cap \{(t_{-i}, \theta)\} \times A_{-i})] \, d\pi_i(t_i) = \int_{T_{-i} \times \Theta} \sigma_{-i}(t_{-i}, \theta)[\text{ICR}^{\lambda_i,\gamma}_{-i,k}(t_{-i})] \, d\pi_i(t_i) \geq \lambda_k
\]

for any \( k = 1, \ldots, n \).

• \( a_i \in BR_i(\mu_i) \). Note first that:

\[
\int_{T_{-i} \times \Theta} \left( \sum_{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} \hat{\sigma}_{-i}(t_{-i}, \theta)[a_{-i}] \cdot u_i((a_{-i}, a'_i), \theta) \right) \, d\pi_i(t_i) = \\
= \int_{T_{-i} \times \Theta} \left( \int_{\tau_{-i}(t_{-i}) \times \Theta} \left( \sum_{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} \hat{\sigma}_{-i}(t_{-i}, \theta)[a_{-i}] \cdot u_i((a_{-i}, a'_i), \theta) \right) \, d\pi_i(t_i) \right) \, d\phi_i(\tau_i) = \\
= \int_{T_{-i} \times \Theta} \left( \int_{\tau_{-i}(t_{-i}) \times \Theta} \left( \sum_{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} \sigma_{-i}(f_i(t_{-i}), \theta)[a_{-i}] \cdot u_i((a_{-i}, a'_i), \theta) \right) \, d\pi_i(t_i) \right) \, d\phi_i(\tau_i) = \\
= \int_{T_{-i} \times \Theta} \left( \int_{\tau_{-i}(t_{-i}) \times \Theta} \left( \sum_{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} \sigma_{-i}(\tau_{-i}, \theta)[a_{-i}] \cdot u_i((a_{-i}, a'_i), \theta) \right) \, d\pi_i(t_i) \right) \, d\phi_i(\tau_i) = \\
= \int_{T_{-i} \times \Theta} \left( \sum_{a_{-i} \in A_{-i}} \sigma_{-i}(\tau_{-i}, \theta)[a_{-i}] \cdot u_i((a_{-i}, a'_i), \theta) \right) \, d\phi_i(\tau_i).
\]

Now, define for each \( a_{-i} \in A_{-i} \) measure \( \nu_i(a_{-i}) \in \Delta(T_{-i} \times \Theta) \) as \( E \mapsto \mu_i[E \times \{a_{-i}\}] \). Then, for any \( a'_i \in A_i \),

\[
\int_{A_{-i} \times \Theta} u_i((a_{-i}; a'_i), \theta) \, d(\text{marg}_{A_{-i} \times \Theta} \mu_i) =
\]
Thus, we conclude that $a_i \in \text{ICR}_{i,n+1}^\lambda(t_i)$. \hfill \blacksquare

**Proposition 3** (Robustness to higher-order uncertainty about rationality). Let $(\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{F})$ be a Bayesian game. Then, for any player $i$ and any type $t_i$, we have that:

(i) $\text{ICR}_i(t_i) = \text{ICR}_i^\lambda(t_i)$.

(ii) The correspondence given by $\lambda \mapsto \text{ICR}^\lambda_i(t_i)$ is upper-hemicontinuous everywhere and continuous at $\lambda = \bar{1}$

**Proof.** Since it follows immediately from Lemma 1 that for any $n \in \mathbb{N}$, any $i \in I$ and any $\tau_i \in \mathcal{T}_i$, $\text{ICR}^\lambda_{i,n}(\tau_i) = \text{ICR}^\lambda_{i,n}(\tau_i)$, we focus on the claims concerning continuity. We prove them separately:

**Upper-Hemicontinuity.** We prove first the following claim: for any $i \in I$, any $\tau_i \in \mathcal{T}_i$ and any $n \geq 0$, correspondence $\lambda \mapsto \text{ICR}^\lambda_{i,n}(\tau_i)$ is upper-hemicontinuous. We proceed by induction on $n$. The initial step ($n = 0$) holds trivially. For the inductive step, suppose that $n \geq 0$ is such that the claim holds for any $k = 0, \ldots, n$. In particular, note that each $\text{ICR}^\lambda_{i,k}(\tau_{-i})$ is compact-valued, and hence, upper-hemicontinuity implies that $\bigcap_{\lambda \in \Lambda} \text{ICR}^\lambda_{i,k}(\tau_{-i}) \subseteq \text{ICR}^\lambda_{i,k}(\tau_{-i})$ for any $(\lambda^n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \rightarrow \lambda$.\(^{21}\) Now, fix $i \in I$ and $\tau_i \in \mathcal{T}_i$, pick convergent sequence $(\lambda^n, a_i^n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \subseteq \Lambda \times A_i$ such that $a_i^n \in \text{ICR}^\lambda_{i,n+1}(\tau_i)$ for any $m \in \mathbb{N}$, and denote by $(\lambda, a_i)$ the limit of the sequence. We need to check that $a_i \in \text{ICR}^\lambda_{i,n+1}(\tau_i)$. First, pick $(\eta_i^m)_{m \in \mathbb{N}} \in \prod_{m \in \mathbb{N}} C^\lambda_{i,n}(\tau_i)$ such that $a_i^m \in \text{BR}_i(\eta_i^m)$ for any $m \in \mathbb{N}$, and notice that, since $\Delta(\mathcal{T}_{-i} \times A_{-i} \times \Theta)$ is compact, there exists a convergent subsequence $(\eta_i^{m_j})_{j \in \mathbb{N}} \subseteq (\eta_i^m)_{m \in \mathbb{N}}$ with limit $\eta_i$. Obviously, $(a_i^{m_j})_{j \in \mathbb{N}}$ converges to $a_i$, and thus, we know from the upper-hemicontinuity of $\text{BR}_i$ that $a_i \in \text{BR}_i(\eta_i)$. Since $\text{marg}_{\mathcal{T}_{-i} \times \Theta}$ is continuous we also know that $\text{marg}_{\mathcal{T}_{-i} \times \Theta}\eta_i = \varphi(\tau_i)$.

\(^{21}\)Just write: $\Gamma(\lambda) = \text{ICR}^\lambda_{i,k}(\tau_{-i})$. Since $\Gamma$ is compact-valued and upper-hemicontinuous, then $a_{-i} \in \Gamma(\lambda)$ for any $(\lambda^n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ converging to $\lambda$ such that $a_{-i} \in \Gamma(\lambda^n)$ for any $n \in \mathbb{N}$. Thus, $\bigcap_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \Gamma(\lambda^n) \subseteq \Gamma(\lambda)$. 
It only remains to be checked that $\eta_i[\text{Graph}(\text{ICR}^\lambda_{-i,k}) \times \Theta] \geq \lambda_k$ for any $k = 0, \ldots, n$. Fix $k = 0, \ldots, n$ and notice that $\eta_i^m[\text{Graph}(\text{ICR}^\lambda_{-i,k}) \times \Theta] \geq \lambda_k^m$ for any $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$. Then, set $(\lambda_k^m) = (\inf_{\ell \geq \ell} \lambda_k^m)_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ and $A_{k,m} = \bigcup_{\ell \geq \ell} \text{Graph}(\text{ICR}^\lambda_{-i,k})$ for any $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$. Since $(\lambda_k^m)$ is a weakly increasing sequence (i.e., for any $t \geq \ell$, $\lambda_k^m \geq \lambda_k^m$) and, clearly, $\lambda_k^m \geq \hat{\lambda}_k^m$, the following hold for any $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$,

(i) $\text{Graph}(\text{ICR}^\lambda_{-i,k}) \subseteq \text{Graph}(\text{ICR}^\lambda_{-i,k})$ for any $t \geq \ell$.

(ii) $\text{Graph}(\text{ICR}^\lambda_{-i,k}) \subseteq \text{Graph}(\text{ICR}^\lambda_{-i,k})$.

It follows from (i) and (ii) that $A_{k,m} \subseteq \text{Graph}(\text{ICR}^\lambda_{-i,k})$ for any $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$,\(^{22}\) Now, notice that for any $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$, $\eta_i^m[\text{Graph}(\text{ICR}^\lambda_{-i,k}) \times \Theta] \geq \lambda_k^m$, and that $(\eta_i^m)_{r \geq 0}$ converges to $\eta_i$. Thus, we know from Theorem 15.3 by Aliprantis and Border (1999) that $\eta_i[A_{k,m} \times \Theta] \geq \lambda_k$, and therefore, that $\eta_i[\text{Graph}(\text{ICR}^\lambda_{-i,k}) \times \Theta] \geq \lambda_k$ for any $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$. The latter, together with (i) above and the fact that $(\lambda_k^m)_{t \in \mathbb{N}}$ converges to $\lambda_k$ implies that,

$$
\eta_i[\bigcap_{\ell \in \mathbb{N}} \text{Graph}(\text{ICR}^\lambda_{-i,k}) \times \Theta] = \eta_i[\lim_{\ell \to \infty} (\text{Graph}(\text{ICR}^\lambda_{-i,k}) \times \Theta)] = \lim_{\ell \to \infty} \eta_i[\text{Graph}(\text{ICR}^\lambda_{-i,k}) \times \Theta] \geq \lim_{\ell \to \infty} \lambda_k^m = \lambda_k.
$$

Notice that we know from the induction hypothesis (see Footnote 17), again together with the fact that $(\lambda_k^m)_{t \in \mathbb{N}}$ converges to $\lambda_k$, that,

$$
\eta_i[\text{Graph}(\text{ICR}^\lambda_{-i,k}) \times \Theta] \geq \eta_i[\bigcap_{\ell \in \mathbb{N}} \text{Graph}(\text{ICR}^\lambda_{-i,k}) \times \Theta].
$$

Thus, we conclude from the last two that $\eta_i[\text{Graph}(\text{ICR}^\lambda_{-i,k}) \times \Theta] \geq \lambda_k$ and hence, that $\eta_i \in C^\lambda_{-i,k}(\tau_i)$, and $a_i \in \text{ICR}^\lambda_{-i,n+1}(\tau_i)$.

It follows from the above that for any $i \in I$, any $\tau_i \in T_i$ and any $n \geq 0$, $\text{Graph}(\text{ICR}^{(i)}_{i,n}(\tau_i))$ is closed, and thus, that so is $\text{ICR}^\lambda_{i,n}(\tau_i) = \text{Proj}_{A_i}((\lambda) \times A_i) \cap \text{Graph}(\text{ICR}^{(i)}_{i,n}(\tau_i)))$ for any $\lambda \in \Lambda$. Thus, $\text{ICR}^{(i)}_{i,n}(\tau_i)$ is a compact-valued correspondence, and hence, by Theorem 17.25 in Aliprantis and Border (1999), we conclude that $\text{ICR}^{(i)}_{i}(\tau_i) = \bigcap_{n \geq 0} \text{ICR}^{(i)}_{i,n}(\tau_i)$ is upper-hemicontinuous.

**Continuity at $\lambda = 1$.** Fix $i \in I$, and $\tau_i \in T_i$. It suffices to check lower-hemicontinuity at $\lambda = 1$; that is, we need to show (see Aliprantis and Border 1999,\(^{22}\)By $A_{k,m}$ we denote the closure of $A_{k,m}$; note that we know from Proposition 2 that $\text{ICR}^\lambda_{-i,k}$ has closed graph.)
Def. 17.2) that for any open subset $U \subseteq A_i$ such that $\text{ICR}_i^\lambda(\tau_i) \cap U \neq \emptyset$, there exists a neighborhood $V \subseteq \Lambda$ of $\lambda = 1$ such that if $\lambda' \in V$, then $\text{ICR}_i^{\lambda'}(\tau_i) \cap U \neq \emptyset$. This follows immediately from the fact that, since $\lambda'_n \geq \lambda_n$ for any $n \in \mathbb{N}$, then $\text{ICR}_i^\lambda(\tau_i) \subseteq \text{ICR}_i^{\lambda'}(\tau_i)$. 

**Proposition 4 (λ-rationalizability and ε-rationalizability).** Let $\langle \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{T} \rangle$ be a Bayesian game. Then, for any $\varepsilon > 0$, any $n \geq 0$, any player $i$ and any type $t_i$, we have that, for every $p \geq 1/(1 + \varepsilon/(2M))$, $\text{ICR}_i^\lambda_{i,n}(t_i) \subseteq \varepsilon\text{-ICR}_i_{i,n}(t_i)$.

**Proof.** Fix $\varepsilon > 0$, $i \in I$, $\tau_i \in \mathcal{T}_i$ and $p \geq 1/(1 + \varepsilon/(2M))$. We proceed by induction on $n$. The initial case ($n = 0$) holds trivially. Suppose that the claim is true for $n = k$; let’s verify that then, it also holds for $n = k + 1$. Fix $a_i \in \text{ICR}_i^\lambda_{i,k+1}(\tau_i)$ and conjecture $\mu_i \in C_i^\varepsilon(\tau_i)$ for which $a_i$ is a best-reply. Now:

(i) If $\mu_i$ puts probability 1 on $\text{Graph}(\text{ICR}_{i,k}) \times \Theta$ then set:

$$\bar{\mu}_i = \mu_i.$$

(ii) If $\mu_i$ puts probability $q \in [p, 1)$ on $\text{Graph}(\text{ICR}_{i,k}) \times \Theta$ then set:

$$\bar{\mu}_i = \mu_i[\cdot | \text{Graph}(\text{ICR}_{i,k}) \times \Theta] \text{ and,}$$

$$\hat{\mu}_i = \mu_i[\cdot | (\text{Graph}(\text{ICR}_{i,k}) \times \Theta)^c].$$

It follows from the induction hypothesis that in any case $\bar{\mu}_i \in \varepsilon\text{-C}_{i,k}(\tau_i)$. Since $a_i \in \text{BR}_i(\mu_i)$ it follows that if (i) then, in particular, $a_i \in \varepsilon\text{-BR}_i(\mu_i)$, and thus, that $a_i \in \varepsilon\text{-ICR}_{i,k+1}(\tau_i)$. If (ii) it follows from $a_i \in \text{BR}_i(\mu_i)$ that for any $a'_i \in A_i \setminus \{a_i\}$,

$$q \cdot (U_i(\bar{\mu}_i, a_i) - U_i(\bar{\mu}_i, a'_i)) + (1 - q) \cdot (U_i(\hat{\mu}_i, a_i) - U_i(\hat{\mu}_i, a'_i)) \geq 0,$$

and thus, that:

$$U_i(\bar{\mu}_i, a_i) - U_i(\bar{\mu}_i, a'_i) \geq -\left(\frac{1 - q}{q}\right) \cdot (U_i(\hat{\mu}_i, a_i) - U_i(\hat{\mu}_i, a'_i))$$

$$\geq -\left(\frac{1 - q}{q}\right) \cdot 2M$$

$$\geq -\left(\frac{1 - p}{p}\right) \cdot 2M \geq -\varepsilon.$$
Then, since \( a_i \in \varepsilon\cdot BR_i(\bar{\mu}_i) \) and \( \bar{\mu}_i \in \varepsilon\cdot C_{i,k}(\tau_i) \), we conclude that \( a_i \in \varepsilon\cdot ICR_{i,k+1}(\tau_i) \) in this case too.

### A.2 Epistemic characterization

**Proposition 7** (Epistemic foundation of \( ICR^\lambda \)). Let \( \langle \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{T} \rangle \) be a Bayesian game and \( \lambda \), a sequence of probabilities. Then, \( \lambda \)-rationalizability characterizes rationality and common \( \lambda \)-belief in rationality; i.e., for any player \( i \) and any type \( t_i \) it holds that,

\[
ICR^\lambda_i(t_i) = \text{Proj}_{A_i} \left( R_i \cap CB_i^\lambda(R) \cap [q_i = \tau_i(t_i)] \right).
\]

**Proof.** Fix sequence of probabilities \( \lambda \). Now, first, for any \( i \in I \) and any \( n \geq 1 \) define auxiliary correspondence \( \Phi_{i,n} : \text{Graph}(ICR^\lambda_{i,n}) \Rightarrow \Omega_i \) as follows:

\[
(\tau_i, a_i) \mapsto \{ e_i \in q_i^{-1}(\tau_i) \mid (e_i, a_i) \in \text{Proj}_{E_i \times A_i}(R_i \cap B_i^{\lambda,n}(R)) \} \times \{ a_i \}.
\]

Note that for any \( i \in I \) and \( n \in \mathbb{N} \), correspondence \( \Phi_{i,n-1} \) has closed graph: pick convergent sequence \( (\tau_i^m, a_i^m, e_i^m, a_i^m)_{m \in \mathbb{N}} \subseteq \text{Graph}(\Phi_{i,n-1}) \) with limit \((\tau_i, a_i, e_i, a_i)\). Since \( q_i(e_i^m) = \tau_i^m \) for any \( m \in \mathbb{N} \) and \( q_i \) is continuous, we know that \( e_i \in q_i^{-1}(\tau_i) \). Thus, it suffices to check that \( (e_i, a_i) \in \text{Proj}_{E_i \times A_i}(R_i \cap B_i^{\lambda,n-1}(R)) \). But the latter is obvious: it follows immediately from the facts that \( R_i \cap B_i^{\lambda,n-1}(R) \) is closed and \( (e_i^m, a_i^m)_{m \in \mathbb{N}} \subseteq \text{Proj}_{E_i \times A_i}(R_i \cap B_i^{\lambda,n-1}(R)) \). This way, we conclude that \((\tau_i, a_i, e_i, a_i) \in \text{Graph}(\Phi_{i,n-1}) \).

Now, for any \( i \in I \) denote \( B_i^{\lambda,0}(R) = \Omega \). Let’s prove that for any \( n \geq 0 \) we have that,

\[
\text{Graph}(ICR^\lambda_{i,n+1}) = \{(q_i(e_i), a_i) \in \mathcal{T}_i \times A_i \mid (e_i, a_i) \in \text{Proj}_{E_i \times A_i}(R_i \cap B_i^{\lambda,n}(R))\}.
\]

We proceed by induction:

**Initial step.** Fix \( i \in I \). For the left inclusion, pick \( \omega \in R_i \) and set \((\tau_i, a_i) = (q_i(e_i(\omega)), a_i(\omega))\). Define now \( \eta_i \in \Delta(\mathcal{T}_i \times A_{-i} \times \Theta) \) as follows:

\[
E \mapsto \eta_i[E] = \psi_i(e_i(\omega))\{(e_{-i}, a_{-i}, \theta) \in \mathcal{E}_{-i} \times A_{-i} \times \Theta \mid (q_i(e_{-i}), a_{-i}, \theta) \in E\}.
\]

Since \( q_i \) is a homeomorphism, \( \eta_i \) is well-defined, and obviously, it satisfies the following two conditions: (i) \( \text{ marg}_{\mathcal{T}_i \times \Theta} \eta_i = q_i(\tau_i) \) and (ii) \( \text{ marg}_{A_{-i} \times \Theta} \eta_i = e_i(\omega) \). Thus, we have, first, that \( \eta_i \in C_{i,0}^\lambda(\tau_i) \), and, second, since \( \omega \in R_i \), that \( a_i \in BR_i(\eta_i) \). In consequence, \((\tau_i, a_i) \in \text{Graph}(ICR^\lambda_{i,1}) \). For the right inclusion, define first corre-
spondence \( \Phi_{i,0} : T_i \times A_i \rightarrow \Omega_i \) as follows: \((\tau_i, a_i) \mapsto q_i^{-1}(\tau_i) \times \{a_i\}\). Obviously, \( \Phi_{i,0} \) is non-empty and has closed graph. Thus, it is also weakly measurable and then, we know from the Kuratowski-Ryll Nardzewski Selection Theorem that it admits a measurable selector \( \phi_{i,0} \). Let \( \phi_{-i,0} = (\phi_{j,0})_{j \neq i} \). Next, pick \((\tau_i, a_i) \in T_i \times A_i\) such that \(a_i \in ICR_{i,1}(\tau_i)\), and \(\eta_i \in C_{i,0}^\lambda(\tau_i)\) such that \(a_i \in BR_i(\eta_i)\), and define belief \(\psi_i(\eta_i) \in \Delta(E_{-i} \times A_{-i} \times \Theta)\) as follows:

\[
E \mapsto \psi_i(\eta_i)[E] = \eta_i[\{(\tau_{-i}, a_{-i}, \theta) \in T_{-i} \times A_{-i} \times \Theta | (\phi_{-i,0}(\tau_{-i}, a_{-i}), \theta) \in E\}].
\]

Since \( \phi_{-i,0} \) is measurable and its domain is \( T_{-i} \times A_{-i} \), \( \psi_i(\eta_i) \) is well-defined. Set \( e_i = \psi_i^{-1}(\psi_i(\eta_i)) \). Then, we have that: (i) \( \text{marg}_{T_{-i} \times \Theta} \psi_i(e_i) = \text{marg}_{T_{-i} \times \Theta} \eta_i \) and (ii) \( e_i,1 = \text{marg}_{A_{-i} \times \Theta} \eta_i \). Thus, it follows that \( q_i(e_i) = \tau_i \) and \( a_i \in BR_i(e_i,1) \), and therefore, that \((e_i, a_i) \in \text{Proj}_{E_{-i} \times A_i}(R_i)\). Notice that, in particular, the proof of the right inclusion implies that \( \Phi_{i,1} \) is non-empty.

**Inductive Step.** Suppose that \( n \geq 0 \) is such that for any \( k = 0, \ldots, n \) the claim holds and \( \Phi_{i,k+1} \) is non-empty for any \( i \in I \). Fix \( i \in I \). For the left inclusion, pick \( \omega \in R_i \cap B_i^{\lambda,n+1}(R) \) and let \((\tau_i, a_i) = (q_i(e_i(\omega)), a_i(\omega))\). Define belief \( \eta_i \in \Delta(T_{-i} \times A_{-i} \times \Theta)\) as follows:

\[
E \mapsto \eta_i[E] = \psi_i(e_i(\omega))[\{(e_{-i}, a_{-i}, \theta) \in E_{-i} \times A_{-i} \times \Theta | (q_{-i}(e_{-i}), a_{-i}, \theta) \in E\}].
\]

Since \( q_{-i} \) is a homeomorphism, \( \eta_i \) is well-defined, and clearly, it satisfies the following two conditions: (i) \( \text{marg}_{E_{-i} \times \Theta} \eta_i = q_i(\tau_i) \) and (ii) \( \text{marg}_{A_{-i} \times \Theta} \eta_i = e_i,1(\omega) \). Thus, obviously, we have, first, that \( \eta_i \in C_{i,0}^\lambda(\tau_i) \), and second, since \( \omega \in R_i \), that \( a_i \in BR_i(\eta_i) \). Finally, notice that, since \( \omega \in B_i^{\lambda,n+1}(R) \), for any \( k = 1, \ldots, n + 1 \) it holds that,

\[
\eta_i[\text{Graph}(ICR_{i,k}^\lambda) \times \Theta] = \\
= \eta_i[\{q_{-i}(e_{-i}), a_{-i} \in T_{-i} \times A_{-i} | (e_{-i}, a_{-i}) \in \text{Proj}_{E_{-i} \times A_{-i}}(R_{-i} \cap B_{-i}^{\lambda,k-1}(R)) \} \times \Theta] \\
= \psi_i(e_i(\omega))[\{(e_{-i}, a_{-i}) \in E_{-i} \times A_{-i} | (e_{-i}, a_{-i}) \in ICR_{i,k}^\lambda(q_{-i}(e_{-i})) \} \times \Theta] \\
= \psi_i(e_i(\omega)) \left[ (e_{-i}, a_{-i}) \in \Omega_{-i} \right| \text{There exists some } e_i' \in q_{-i}^{-1}(e_{-i}) \text{ such that } (e_i', a_{-i}) \in \text{Proj}_{E_{-i} \times A_{-i}}(R_{-i} \cap B_{-i}^{\lambda,k-1}(R)) \right] \times \Theta \\
\geq \psi_i(e_i(\omega))[\{(e_{-i}, a_{-i}, \theta) \in \Omega_{-i} \times \Theta | (e_{-i}, a_{-i}) \in \text{Proj}_{E_{-i} \times A_{-i}}(R_{-i} \cap B_{-i}^{\lambda,k-1}(R)) \}] \\
= \psi_i(e_i(\omega))[\{ (\omega_i', \theta) \in \Omega_i \times \Theta | (\omega_i, \omega_i', \theta) \in R_i \cap B_{i}^{\lambda,k-1}(R) \} \geq \lambda_{k}. \\
\]

Thus, \( \eta_i \in C_{i,k}^\lambda(\tau_i) \) for any \( k = 0, \ldots, n + 1 \) and, in consequence, \((\tau_i, a_i) \in \text{Graph}(ICR_{i,n+2}^\lambda)\).
For the right inclusion, pick \((\tau_i, a_i) \in \mathcal{T}_i \times A_i\) such that \(a_i \in ICR_{i,n+2}^\lambda(\tau_i)\), and \(\eta_i \in C_{i,n+1}^\lambda(\tau_i)\) such that \(a_i \in BR_i(\eta_i)\). We know from the induction hypothesis that \(\Phi_{j,n+1}\) is non-empty for any \(j \neq i\). Thus, since every \(\Phi_{j,n+1}\) has closed graph, and hence, is weakly measurable, there exists a measurable map \(\phi_{-i,n+1} = (\phi_{j,n+1})_{j \neq i}\) where for each \(j \neq i\) map \(\phi_{j,n+1}\) is a measurable selector of \(\Phi_{j,n+1}\). Next, let’s introduce the following notational convention: let \(Z_{-i,\mathcal{K}} = \text{Graph}(ICR_{-i,k}^\lambda)\) and \(W_{-i,k} = \text{Proj}_{\Omega_i}(R_{-i} \cap B_{-i}^\lambda k(R))\) for any \(k = 0, \ldots, n+1\). Then, define \(\psi_i(\eta_i) \in \Delta(E_{-i} \times A_{-i} \times \Theta)\) as follows:

\[
E \mapsto \psi_i(\eta_i)[E] = \sum_{k=0}^{n+1} \psi_i^k(\eta_i)[E],
\]

where,

\[
\psi_i^{n+1}(\eta_i)[E] = \eta_i[(\tau_{-i}, a_{-i}, \emptyset) \in Z_{-i,n+1} \times \Theta | (\phi_{-i,n+1}(\tau_{-i}, a_{-i}), \emptyset) \in E], \quad \text{and,}
\]

\[
\psi_i^k(\eta_i)[E] = \eta_i[(\tau_{-i}, a_{-i}, \emptyset) \in (Z_{-i,k} \setminus Z_{-i,k+1}) \times \Theta | (\phi_{-i,k}(\tau_{-i}, a_{-i}), \emptyset) \in E],
\]

for any \(k = 0, \ldots, n\). Since every \(\phi_{-i,k+1}\) is measurable, \(\psi_i(\eta_i)\) is well-defined. Set \(e_i = \psi_i^{-1}(\psi_i(\eta_i))\) and \(\omega_i = (e_i, a_i)\). Then, we have that: (i) \(\text{marg}_{\tau_{-i} \times \Theta} \psi_i(e_i) = \text{marg}_{\tau_{-i} \times \Theta} \eta_i\) and (ii) \(e_i, a_i = \text{marg}_{A_{-i} \times \Theta} \eta_i\). Thus, it follows that \(q_i(e_i) = \tau_i\) and \(a_i \in BR_i(e_i, a_i)\). Now, notice that for any \(k = 0, \ldots, n\) we have that,

\[
\psi_i(e_i(\omega))[\{(\omega_{-i}', \emptyset) \in \Omega_{-i} \times \Theta | (\omega_{-i}', \omega_i, \emptyset) \in R_{-i} \cap B_{-i}^\lambda k(R)\}] =
\]

\[
= \psi_i(e_i(\omega))[\text{Proj}_{\Omega_{-i}} W_{-i,k} \times \Theta]
\]

\[
= \sum_{\ell=0}^{n+1} \psi_i^\ell(e_i(\omega))[\text{Proj}_{\Omega_{-i}} W_{-i,k} \times \Theta]
\]

\[
\geq \sum_{\ell=k+1}^{n} \eta_i[(\tau_{-i}, a_{-i}) \in (Z_{-i,\ell} \setminus Z_{-i,\ell+1}) \times \Theta | (\phi_{-i,\ell}(\tau_{-i}, a_{-i}), \emptyset) \in \text{Proj}_{\Omega_{-i}} W_{-i,k} \times \Theta]
\]

\[
\quad + \eta_i[(\tau_{-i}, a_{-i}) \in Z_{-i,n+1} \times \Theta | (\phi_{-i,n+1}(\tau_{-i}, a_{-i}), \emptyset) \in \text{Proj}_{\Omega_{-i}} W_{-i,k} \times \Theta]
\]

\[
= \eta_i[Z_{-i,k+1} \times \Theta] \geq \lambda_{k+1}.
\]

Thus, we conclude that \(\omega \in R_{i} \cap B_{i}^{\lambda_{n+1}}(R) \cap [q_i = \tau_i]\), and therefore, that there exists some \((e_i, a_i) \in \text{Proj}_{E_i \times A_i}(R_{i} \cap B_{i}^{\lambda_{n+1}}(R))\) such that \(q_i(e_i) = \tau_i\). Finally, notice that, in particular, the proof of the right inclusion implies that for any \(i \in I\) correspondence \(\Phi_{i,n+2}\) is non-empty.
Now, in order to finish the proof, fix $i \in I$ and $\tau_i \in \mathcal{T}_i$, and notice that for any $n \geq 0$,

$$ICR^\lambda_{i,n+1}(\tau_i) = \text{Proj}_{A_i}((\{\tau_i\} \times A_i) \cap \text{Graph}(ICR^\lambda_{i,n+1}))$$

$$= \text{Proj}_{A_i}((\{\tau_i\} \times A_i) \cap \{(q_i(e_i), a_i) \in T_i \times A_i | (e_i, a_i) \in \text{Proj}_{E_i \times A_i}(R_i \cap B_i^{\lambda,n}(R))\})$$

$$= \text{Proj}_{A_i}((\{\tau_i\} \times \{a_i \in A_i | (e_i, a_i) \in \text{Proj}_{E_i \times A_i}(R_i \cap B_i^{\lambda,n}(R) \cap [q_i = \tau_i])\})$$

$$= \text{Proj}_{A_i}(R_i \cap B_i^{\lambda,n}(R) \cap [q_i = \tau_i]).$$

Finally, the fact that,

$$ICR^\lambda_i(\tau_i) = \bigcap_{n \geq 0} \text{Proj}_{A_i}(R_i \cap B_i^{\lambda,n}(R) \cap [q_i = \tau_i])$$

$$= \text{Proj}_{A_i}(R_i \cap \bigcap_{n \geq 0} B_i^{\lambda,n}(R) \cap [q_i = \tau_i])$$

$$= \text{Proj}_{A_i}(R_i \cap CB_i^{\lambda}(R) \cap [q_i = \tau_i]),$$

completes the proof.  

\section{B Proofs: Main results}

\subsection{B.1 Robustness of the WY-discontinuity}

\textbf{Proposition 5 (WY-discontinuity for persistently high $\lambda$).} Let $\langle \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{T} \rangle$ be a Bayesian game with finite type space. Then, there exists some $p < 1$ such that for any player $i$, any type $t_i$, any $\lambda$ with $\lambda \geq \bar{p}$, and any $a_i \in RS_i(t_i)$, there exists some convergent sequence $(\tau_i^n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ approaching $\tau_i(t_i)$ such that $ICR^\lambda_i(\tau_i^n) = \{a_i\}$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$.

\textit{Proof.} Fix any $t_i$ and use $\tau_i$ as an abbreviation for $\tau_i(t_i)$. Since $a_i$ is robustly selected for $t_i$, we know that there exists some $\varepsilon > 0$ and some sequence $(\tau_i^n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ converging to $\tau_i$ such that $a_i$ is uniquely $\varepsilon$-rationalizable for $\tau_i^n$ for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$. Then, it follows from Proposition 4 and non-emptiness of $\bar{p}$-rationalizability that for any $p \geq 1/(1 + \varepsilon/(2M))$, $a_i$ is uniquely $\bar{p}$-rationalizable for $\tau_i^n$ for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$. Then the result follows from the fact that $ICR^\lambda_i$ is clearly monotone decreasing, i.e. for $\lambda \geq \bar{p}$ and every $a_i$, $ICR^\lambda_i(a_i) \subseteq ICR^\bar{p}_i(a_i)$.  

\qed

\section{B.2 Persistently high $\lambda$}

\textbf{Proposition 6 (Persistently high $\lambda$ for robustness.)} Let $\langle \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{T} \rangle$ be a Bayesian game with finite type space. Then, there exists some $p < 1$ such that for any player $i$, any type $t_i$, any $\lambda$ with $\lambda \geq \bar{p}$, and any $a_i \in RS_i(t_i)$, there exists some convergent sequence $(\tau_i^n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ approaching $\tau_i(t_i)$ such that $ICR^\lambda_i(\tau_i^n) = \{a_i\}$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$.

\textit{Proof.} Fix any $t_i$ and use $\tau_i$ as an abbreviation for $\tau_i(t_i)$. Since $a_i$ is robustly selected for $t_i$, we know that there exists some $\varepsilon > 0$ and some sequence $(\tau_i^n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ converging to $\tau_i$ such that $a_i$ is uniquely $\varepsilon$-rationalizable for $\tau_i^n$ for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$. Then, it follows from Proposition 4 and non-emptiness of $\bar{p}$-rationalizability that for any $p \geq 1/(1 + \varepsilon/(2M))$, $a_i$ is uniquely $\bar{p}$-rationalizable for $\tau_i^n$ for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$. Then the result follows from the fact that $ICR^\lambda_i$ is clearly monotone decreasing, i.e. for $\lambda \geq \bar{p}$ and every $a_i$, $ICR^\lambda_i(a_i) \subseteq ICR^\bar{p}_i(a_i)$.  

\qed
B.2 Non-robustness of the WY-discontinuity

Proposition 6 (No WY-discontinuity for vanishing $\lambda$). Let $\langle G, T \rangle$ be a Bayesian game with finite type space. Then, for any $\varepsilon < 0$, any player $i$, any type $t_i$ and any $\lambda$ with $\lambda_n \to 0$, there exists a neighborhood $U$ of $\tau_i(t_i)$ such that $\varepsilon$-ICR$_i(t_i) \subseteq$ ICR$^\lambda_i(\tau_i)$, for any $\tau_i \in U$.

Proof. Fix $i \in I$, let $t_i \in T_i$ and abbreviate $\tau_i(t_i)$ by simply $\tau_i$. Let $a_i \in \varepsilon$-ICR$_i(\tau_i)$ for some $\varepsilon < 0$. We know from Proposition 2 in Chen, Di Tillio, Faingold and Xiong (2010) that for any $n \in \mathbb{N}$ there exists some $\delta_n > 0$ such that:

$$2\varepsilon$-ICR$_{i,n}(\tau_i) \subseteq \varepsilon$-ICR$_{i,n}(\hat{\tau}_i),$$

for any $\hat{\tau}_i \in U_i^n = B_{\delta_n}(\tau_i)$. Clearly, it follows that:

$$a_i \in \varepsilon$-ICR$_{i,n}(\hat{\tau}_i) \subseteq$ ICR$_{i,n}(\hat{\tau}_i)$$

for any $\hat{\tau}_i \in U_i^n$.

Now, since $\lambda$ converges to 0 we know that there exists some $n_0 \in \mathbb{N}$ such that:

$$\lambda_n \leq x := \frac{-\varepsilon}{2M - \varepsilon}$$

for any $n \geq n_0$. Then, for any $\hat{\tau}_i \in U_i$ take arbitrary $\hat{\eta}_i^1 \in \varepsilon$-C$_{i,n_0}(\hat{\tau}_i)$ and arbitrary $\hat{\eta}_i^2 \in \bigcap_{n > n_0} C_{i,n}(\hat{\tau}_i)$ and define:

$$\hat{\eta}_i = (1 - x) \cdot \hat{\eta}_i^1 + x \cdot \hat{\eta}_i^2.$$

Then:

- $a_i \in BR_i(\hat{\eta}_i)$. To see this, simply notice that for any $a'_i \in A_i \setminus \{a_i\}$ we have:

$$U_i(\hat{\eta}_i, a_i) - U_i(\hat{\eta}_i, a'_i) = (1 - x) \cdot (U_i(\hat{\eta}_i^1, a_i) - U_i(\hat{\eta}_i^1, \hat{a}_i^i)) + x \cdot (U_i(\hat{\eta}_i^2, a_i) - U_i(\hat{\eta}_i^2, a'_i)) \geq (1 - x) \cdot (-\varepsilon) + x \cdot 2M = 0.$$

- $\hat{\eta}_i \in \bigcap_{n \geq 0} C_{i,n}^\lambda(\hat{\tau}_i)$. Obviously, $\hat{\eta}_i \in C_{i,0}^\lambda(\hat{\tau}_i)$. Now, for any natural $n \leq n_0$ we

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$^{23}$Proposition 2 by Chen, Di Tillio, Faingold and Xiong (2010) is stated for $\varepsilon > 0$. It is routine to verify that the authors’ proof generalizes to arbitrary $\varepsilon$. For better comparison between that result and this claim, suppose that $\gamma = 2\varepsilon$ and $\varepsilon = \gamma + 4M\delta_n$ and then take $\delta_n = -\varepsilon/4M$. 

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have:

\[ \hat{\eta}_i [\text{Graph} (\text{ICR}^\lambda_{i,n}) \times \Theta] \geq \hat{\eta}_i [\text{Graph} (\varepsilon\text{-ICR}_{i,n}) \times \Theta] = (1 - x) + x \geq \lambda_n. \]

Whereas for \( n > n_0 \) we have:

\[ \hat{\eta}_i [\text{Graph} (\text{ICR}^\lambda_{i,n}) \times \Theta] \geq x \cdot \hat{\eta}_i^2 [\text{Graph} (\text{ICR}_{i,n}) \times \Theta] = x \geq \lambda_n. \]

Thus, we conclude that \( a_i \in \text{ICR}^\lambda(\hat{\tau}_i) \) for every \( \hat{\tau}_i \in U^I_i \). The fact that the action sets are finite ensures that \( U_i \), the intersection of all the \( U^I_i \) corresponding to each rationalizable action, is open too and thus, the proof is complete.

Corollary 2 (Non-robustness of generic uniqueness). Let \( \langle \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{T} \rangle \) be a Bayesian game. Then, for any player \( i \) for which there exist some \( \varepsilon < 0 \) and some type \( t_i \) such that \( |\varepsilon\text{-ICR}_i(t_i)| > 1 \), and for any \( \lambda \) with \( \lambda_n \to 0 \), the following set is not dense:

\[ U^\lambda_i = \{ \tau_i \in \mathcal{T}_i | |\text{ICR}^\lambda_i(\tau_i)| = 1 \}. \]

Proof. This follows directly from Proposition 6: fix sequence \( \lambda \) with limit 0 and pick \( i \in I \) and \( t_i \in T_i \) such that \( |\varepsilon\text{-ICR}_i(t_i)| > 1 \) for some \( \epsilon < 0 \). Then, we know that there exists some open neighborhood \( U \) of \( t_i \) such that \( \varepsilon\text{-ICR}_i(t_i) \notin \text{ICR}^\lambda_i(\hat{t}_i) \) for any \( \hat{t}_i \in U \). Thus, the set \( U_i \) does not intersect open set \( U \), and is not dense.

**References**


