Costly Verification in Collective Decisions*

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Abstract

We study how a principal should optimally choose between implementing a new policy and maintaining the status quo when information relevant for the decision is privately held by agents. Agents are strategic in revealing their information; the principal cannot use monetary transfers to elicit this information, but can verify an agent’s claim at a cost. We characterize the mechanism that maximizes the expected utility of the principal. This mechanism can be implemented as a cardinal voting rule, in which agents can either cast a baseline vote, indicating only whether they are in favor of the new policy, or they make specific claims about their type. The principal gives more weight to specific claims and verifies a claim whenever it is decisive.

Keywords: Collective decision; Costly verification

JEL classification: D82, D71

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1 Introduction

The usual mechanism design paradigm assumes that agents have private information and the only way to learn this information is by giving agents incentives to reveal it truthfully. This is a suitable model for many situations, most importantly when agents have private information about their preferences. But there are a number of environments where agents’ private information is based on hard facts. This could enable an outside party to learn the private information of the agents, at a potentially significant cost.

For example, consider a CEO in a company who faces an investment decision. Board members have relevant information but could have misaligned incentives because the investment has different effects on different divisions. The CEO can take the information provided by a board member at face value or hire consultants to check, various claims made by a board member. Another example are large mergers in the EU, which must be approved by the European Commission. If a proposed merger has a potentially large impact and its evaluation is not clear, a detailed investigation is initiated. The Commission collects information from the merging companies, third parties and competitors. According to the Commission, this investigation “typically involves more extensive information gathering, including companies’ internal documents, extensive economic data, more detailed questionnaires to market participants, and/or site visits”. The analyses carried out by the Commission on potential efficiency gains requires that “claimed efficiencies must be verifiable” (European Union 2013). Lastly consider an example, taken from Sweden, on the decision of whether a newly approved pharmaceutical drug should be subsidized. A producer of a drug can apply for a subsidy by providing arguments for the clinical and cost-effectiveness of the drug. Other stakeholders are also given an opportunity to participate in the deliberations by contributing information relevant to the decision. Importantly, the applicant and other stakeholders should provide documentation supporting their claims (Pharmaceutical Benefits Board 2019).

In order to study such situations, we formulate a model with costly verification in which a principal decides between introducing a new policy and maintaining the status quo. The principal’s optimal choice depends on agents’ private information, summarized by each agent $i$’s type $t_i \in \mathbb{R}$. Agents can be in favor of or against the new policy, and they are strategic in revealing their information since it influences the decision made by the principal. We exclude monetary transfers, but before taking the decision the principal can verify any agent and learn his information at a cost $c_i$. We determine the mechanisms that maximizes the expected payoff of the principal; it optimally solves the trade-off between the benefits from using detailed information as input to the decision rule and the implied costs from verifying agents’ claims to make the mechanism incentive compatible.

In the optimal mechanism, agents can vote in favor or against the new policy; moreover, they have the option to report their exact type. If agent $i$ reports his type, the principal adjusts the reported type by the verification cost $c_i$ to obtain agent $i$’s net type, which is $t_i - c_i$ if $i$ votes in favor and $t_i + c_i$ if he votes against (see Figure 1 for an illustration).
If an agent does not report his type the principal assumes this agent has a default net type, namely $\omega_i^+$ if he voted in favor of the new policy and $\omega_i^-$ if he voted against. This induces bunching, since an agent who is in favor only reports his type if it is high enough and otherwise only casts a vote (and conversely if he is against). The optimal decision rule for the principal is then to implement the new policy whenever the sum of net types is positive. A report is decisive whenever it changes the decision compared to this agent not sending a report; in the optimal mechanism each decisive report is verified.

![Figure 1: Illustration of how types are transformed to net types. The principal implements the new policy whenever the sum of net types is positive.](image)

Our analysis provides at least two important insights for the design of mechanisms in applications similar to our model. We will illustrate them by connecting our analysis to the European Commission’s decision on whether to approve a merger. In a merger review, the Commission “analyses claimed efficiencies which the companies could achieve when merged together. If the positive effects of such efficiencies for consumers would outweigh the mergers’ negative effects, the merger can be cleared” (European Union 2013). Our analysis suggests, first, that the Commission should not always use claimed efficiencies (which must be verifiable), but might benefit by assuming that a merger has a predetermined estimated efficiency gain, even if they provide no verifiable documentation. Moreover, it might be beneficial to discount efficiency claims that are difficult and expensive to verify. Second, before starting the process of verifying claimed efficiencies and other reports, the Commission should first determine which reports are decisive and subsequently verify only those. While there are other verification rules that could be used, this is a particularly simple rule that is easy to implement in practice and it provides robust incentives for truth-telling.

To explain the intuition behind the optimal mechanism, we now describe in more detail our main results. We show first that the principal can, without loss of generality, use an incentive compatible direct mechanism, which can be implemented as follows. In the first
step, agents communicate their information. For each profile of reports, a mechanism then provides answers to three questions: First, which reports should be verified (verification rule)? Second, what is the decision regarding the new policy (decision rule)? Finally, what is the penalty when someone is revealed to be lying? Because we can focus on incentive compatible mechanisms, penalties will be imposed only off the equilibrium path. The principal can therefore always choose the severest possible penalty, as this weakens incentive constraints but does not affect the decision made on the equilibrium path. In general, the principal can implement any decision rule by always verifying all agents. However, the principal has to make a trade-off between using detailed information for “good” decisions and incurring the costs of verification.

Key to solving the principal’s problem is that incentive constraints are tractable. Each agent wants to send the report that maximizes the probability that his preferred decision is implemented. We show that if there is a profitable deviation for some type, any type that has a lower equilibrium probability of getting his preferred outcome also finds this deviation profitable. This suggests that incentive constraints are hardest to satisfy for the types that have the lowest equilibrium probability of getting their preferred decision; we call these types the worst-off types.\(^1\) It follows that a mechanism is incentive compatible if and only if it is incentive compatible for the worst-off types.

We can now explain how and why the optimal mechanism differs from the first best outcome. First, in the optimal mechanism the principal incurs costs of verification. Verifications are clearly necessary if information is private and, since the incentive constraints for worst-off types are exactly binding, the optimal mechanism uses costly verifications as rarely as possible. Second, the decision is distorted compared to the first-best because there is bunching at the bottom. This is optimal for the principal because, as observed above, incentive constraints are hardest to satisfy for worst-off types. Suppose instead there was no bunching at the bottom and a single type had the lowest probability of getting the preferred decision. Then any higher report has to be verified sometimes to make the worst-off type indifferent between reporting truthfully and deviating. Now if we increase the probability that the worst-off type gets his preferred outcome this will only change the decision for this type, which has essentially no effect on the principal’s expected utility from the decision. But this makes it less attractive for the worst-off type to claim to be of a different type and the principal can, therefore, verify all other types with a strictly lower probability. Thus, this change allows the principal to save on verification costs for almost all reports but it only changes the decision for one type. This implies that the cost-saving effect dominates. We conclude that the original mechanism, with a single worst-off type, could not have been optimal and that the optimal mechanism must feature bunching at the bottom. Finally, the principal’s first-best decision would be to implement the new policy whenever the sum of types is positive, but in the optimal mechanism the principal uses net types instead to determine the decision, which introduces a further

\(^1\)Since we allow for general utility functions, these are not necessarily the types with the lowest expected utility.
distortion. Whenever an agent’s report \( t_i \) is verified, the principal pays the verification cost \( c_i \). If the principal implements the new policy because agent \( i \) reported a high type, \( i \)’s effect on the principal’s payoff is only his net value \( t_i - c_i \) and not his actual type \( t_i \) because the principal has to pay the verification cost \( c_i \). It is, therefore, optimal for the principal to distort the decision rule by using net types instead of true types.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After reviewing relevant literature, we present in Section 2 our main model and describe the principal’s objective. In Section 3, we discuss the optimal mechanism. We consider various extensions in Section 4, including an analysis of the optimal mechanism with imperfect verification. All proofs not found in the main body of the paper are relegated to the Appendix.

**Related Literature**

There is a substantial literature on collective choice problems with two alternatives when monetary transfers are not possible. A particular strand of this literature, dating back to the seminal work of Rae (1969), assumes that agents have cardinal utilities and compares decision rules with respect to ex-ante expected utilities. Because money cannot be used to elicit cardinal preferences, Pareto-optimal decision rules are simple and can be implemented as voting rules, where agents indicate only whether they are in favor of or against the policy (Schmitz and Tröger 2012, Azreli and Kim 2014). Introducing a technology to learn the agents’ information allows a much richer class of decision rules to be implemented. Our main interest lies in understanding how this additional possibility allows for other implementable mechanisms and changes the optimal decision rule.

Townsend (1979) introduces costly verification in a principal-agent model with a risk-averse agent. Our model differs from his, and the literature building on it (see e.g. Gale and Hellwig 1985, Border and Sobel 1987), since monetary transfers are not feasible in our model. Allowing for monetary transfers yields different incentive constraints and economic trade-offs than in a model without money.

Recently, there has been growing interest in models with state verification that do not allow for transfers. Ben-Porath, Dekel and Lipman (2014, henceforth BDL) consider a principal that wishes to allocate an indivisible good among a group of agents, and each agent’s type can be learned at a given cost. The principal’s trade-off is between allocating the object efficiently and incurring the cost of verification. BDL characterize the mechanism that maximizes the expected utility of the principal: it is a favored-agent mechanism, where a pre-determined favored agent receives the object unless another agent claims a value above a threshold, in which case the agent with the highest (net) type gets the object. We study a similar model of costly verification and without transfers, but we are interested in optimal mechanisms in collective choice problems. In these problems more complex voting mechanisms are feasible, even in the absence of verification possibilities. More recently, Mylovanov and Zapechelnyuk (2017) study the allocation of an indivisible good when the principal always learns the private information of the agents.
but only after having made the allocation decision and having only limited penalties at his disposal. Halac and Yared (2017) introduce costly verification in a delegation setting and describe the conditions under which interval delegation with an “escape clause” is optimal.

Glazer and Rubinstein (2004) and Glazer and Rubinstein (2006) consider a situation in which an agent has private information about several characteristics and tries to persuade a principal to take a given action, and the principal can only check one of the agent’s characteristics. Recently, Ben-Porath, Dekel and Lipman (2019) study a class of mechanism design problems with evidence. They show that the optimal mechanism does not use randomization, commitment is not an issue, and robust incentive compatibility does not entail any cost. Additionally, they show that costly verification models can be embedded as evidence games as an alternative way of finding optimal mechanisms, but the results on commitment and robustness does not apply to costly verification models.

2 Model and Preliminaries

There is a principal and a set of agents \( I = \{1, 2, \ldots, I\} \). The principal decides between implementing a new policy and maintaining the status quo.\(^3\) Each agent holds private information, summarized by his type \( t_i \in \mathbb{R} \). The payoff to the principal is \( \sum_i t_i \) if the new policy is implemented, and it is normalized to zero if the status quo remains. Monetary transfers are not possible. The private information held by the agents is verifiable. The principal can check agent \( i \) at a cost of \( c_i \), in which case he learns the true type of agent \( i \). Being verified imposes no costs on the agent. Agent \( i \) with type \( t_i \) obtains a utility of \( u_i(t_i) \) if the policy is implemented and zero otherwise. For example, if \( u_i(t_i) = t_i \) for each agent, the principal maximizes utilitarian welfare; in general, the principal could have divergent preferences, for example, because he only cares about how the new policy affects himself.\(^4\) Types are drawn independently from the type space \( T_i \subset \mathbb{R} \) according to the distribution function \( F_i \) with finite moments and density \( f_i \). Let \( t = (t_i)_{i \in I} \) and \( T = \prod_i T_i \).

The principal can design a mechanism and agents play a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the game induced by the mechanism. A mechanism could potentially be an indirect and complicated dynamic mechanism that includes multiple rounds of communication and checking. However, we show in Appendix A.1 that it is without loss of generality to focus on direct mechanisms with truth-telling as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. To allow for stochastic mechanisms we introduce a correlation device as a tool to correlate the

\(^2\)For additional papers on mechanism design with evidence, see also Green and Laffont (1986), Bull and Watson (2007), Deneckere and Severinov (2008), Ben-Porath and Lipman (2012).

\(^3\)We discuss in Section 4 how our analysis changes if the principal can decide between more than two actions.

\(^4\)Another interpretation of the objective function, suggested by a referee, is that the principal is interested in the mean of an unknown parameter.
Definition 1. A mechanism \((d, a, \ell)\) is Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) if, for all \(i \in \mathcal{I}\) and all \(t_i, t_i' \in T_i\),

\[
u_i(t_i) \cdot \mathbb{E}_{t_{-i}, s}[d(t_i, t_{-i}, s)] \geq \nu_i(t_i) \cdot \mathbb{E}_{t_{-i}, s}[d(t_i', t_{-i}, s)\{1 - a_i(t_i', t_{-i}, s)\} + a_i(t_i', t_{-i}, s)\ell_i(t_i', t, s)].
\]

With slight abuse of notation, we will drop the realization of the randomization device as an argument whenever the correlation is irrelevant. In these cases, \(\mathbb{E}_s[d(m, s)]\) is simply denoted as \(d(m)\) and \(\mathbb{E}_s[a_i(m, s)]\) is denoted as \(a_i(m)\).
The left-hand side of the equation in Definition 1 is the interim expected utility if agent $i$ truthfully reports his type $t_i$ and all others also report truthfully. The right-hand side is the interim expected utility if agent $i$ instead lies and reports to be of type $t'_i$.

The aim of the principal is to find an incentive compatible mechanism that maximizes his expected utility. The expected utility of the principal for a given mechanism $(d, a, \ell)$ is

$$E_t\left[\sum_i (d(t)t_i - a_i(t)c_i)\right],$$

where expectations are taken over the prior distribution of types.

Because the principal uses an incentive compatible mechanism, lies will occur only off the equilibrium path and will therefore not directly enter the objective function. The principal can therefore always choose the severest possible penalty for a lying agent. This will not affect the outcome on the equilibrium path, but it weakens the incentive constraints. For example, if an agent is found to have lied and his true type supports the new policy, the penalty will be to maintain the status quo. Henceforth, without loss of optimality, we assume that the principal uses this penalty scheme and, we will drop the reference to a profile of penalty functions when we describe a mechanism.

At this point, we have all the prerequisites and definitions required to formally state the aim of the principal:

$$\max_{d,a} E_t\left[\sum_i (d(t)t_i - a_i(t)c_i)\right] \quad \text{(P)}$$

subject to $(d, a)$ is Bayesian incentive compatible.

The following lemma provides a characterization of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms.

**Lemma 1.** A mechanism $(d, a)$ is Bayesian incentive compatible if and only if, for all $i \in I$ and all $t_i \in T_i$,

$$\inf_{t'_i \in T^*_i} E_{t_i,s}\left[d(t'_i, t_{-i}, s)\right] \geq E_{t_i,s}\left[d(t_i, t_{-i}, s)[1 - a_i(t_i, t_{-i}, s)]\right] \quad \text{and}$$

$$\sup_{t'_i \in T^-_i} E_{t_i,s}\left[d(t'_i, t_{-i}, s)\right] \leq E_{t_i,s}\left[d(t_i, t_{-i}, s)[1 - a_i(t_i, t_{-i}, s)] + a_i(t_i, t_{-i}, s)\right].$$

We call a type a **worst-off type** if the infimum (respectively the supremum) in Lemma 1 is attained for this type. The intuition for Lemma 1 is as follows: first, because of the binary nature of the principal’s decision an agent maximizes his utility by sending a report that maximizes the probability of getting the preferred decision. Now if type $t_i$ can increase this probability by deviating to a report $t'_i$, any other type can use the same deviation $t'_i$ to get the same probability (since types are distributed independently). By construction worst-off types have the lowest probability of getting their preferred decision when being truthful. Thus, whenever some type has a profitable deviation so does the worst-off types.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let \( i \in \mathcal{I} \). We will consider two cases, one when agent \( i \) is in favor of the policy \( (t_i' \in T_i^+) \), and the other case is when agent \( i \) is against the policy \( (t_i' \in T_i^-) \).

Since \( u_i(t_i) > 0 \) for \( t_i \in T_i^+ \) and we can without loss of generality set \( \ell_i(t', t_i, s) = 0 \) for all \( t' \) and \( t_i \in T_i^+ \), we get that agent \( i \) with type \( t_i' \in T_i^+ \) has no incentive to deviate if and only if, for all \( t_i \in T_i \),

\[
\mathbb{E}_{t_i,s}[d(t_i', t_i, s)] \geq \mathbb{E}_{t_i,s}[d(t_i', t_i, s)] + a_i(t_i', t_i, s)].
\] (1)

Since (1) is required to hold for all \( t_i' \in T_i^+ \), it must in particular hold for the infimum over \( T_i^+ \), which is equivalent to Definition 1 of BIC.

Similarly, since \( u_i(t_i) < 0 \) for \( t_i \in T_i^- \) and we can without loss of generality set \( \ell_i(t', t_i, s) = 1 \) for all \( t' \) and \( t_i \in T_i^- \), a type \( t_i' \in T_i^- \), has no incentive to deviate if and only if, for all \( t_i \in T_i \),

\[
\mathbb{E}_{t_i,s}[d(t_i', t_i, s)] \leq \mathbb{E}_{t_i,s}[d(t_i', t_i, s)] + a_i(t_i, t_i, s)].
\] (2)

Since (2) is required to hold for all \( t_i' \in T_i^- \), it must in particular hold for the supremum over \( T_i^- \), which is equivalent to Definition 1 of BIC. \( \square \)

3 Voting-with-evidence

In this section, we show that a voting-with-evidence mechanism is optimal, find optimal weights in a setting with two agents, and discuss comparative statics.

3.1 Optimal mechanism

To formally define a voting-with-evidence mechanism, we define, given a collection of weights \( \{\omega_i^+, \omega_i^-\}_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \) satisfying \( \omega_i^- \leq \omega_i^+ \), the weight function \( w_i : T_i \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \) by

\[
w_i(t_i) = \begin{cases} 
 t_i + c_i & \text{if } t_i \in T_i^+ \text{ and } t_i < \omega_i^- - c_i \\
 \omega_i^- & \text{if } t_i \in T_i^- \text{ and } t_i \geq \omega_i^- - c_i \\
 \omega_i^+ & \text{if } t_i \in T_i^+ \text{ and } t_i \leq \omega_i^+ + c_i \\
 t_i - c_i & \text{if } t_i \in T_i^- \text{ and } t_i > \omega_i^+ + c_i.
\end{cases}
\]

Given the weight functions \( w_i \), we say that a mechanism is a voting-with-evidence mechanism if

\[
d(t) = \begin{cases} 
 1 & \text{if } \sum w_i(t_i) > 0 \\
 0 & \text{if } \sum w_i(t_i) < 0
\end{cases}
\]

and an agent \( i \) is verified if and only if he is decisive. An agent \( i \) is decisive at a profile of reports \( t \) if his preferred outcome is implemented and if the decision were to change if his report was replaced by his relevant cutoff \((\omega_i^+ + c_i \text{ if he is in favor and } \omega_i^- - c_i \text{ if he prefers status quo})\).
A voting-with-evidence mechanism can be interpreted as a cardinal voting rule, where agents have the option to make specific claims to gain additional influence. To see this, consider the following indirect mechanism. Each agent casts a vote either in favor of or against the new policy. In addition, agents can make claims about their information. If agent $i$ does not make such a claim, his vote is weighted by the baseline weights $\omega_i^+\omega_i^-$ if he votes in favor of and $-\omega_i^-$ if he votes against the new policy. If agent $i$ supports the new policy and makes a claim $t_i$, his weight is increased to $t_i - c_i$. Similarly, if he opposes the new policy, his weight is increased to $-t_i + c_i$. The new policy is implemented whenever the sum of weighted votes in favor are larger than the sum of the weighted votes against the new policy. An agent’s claim will be checked whenever he is decisive. This indirect mechanism indeed implements the same outcome as a voting-with-evidence mechanism. Any agents with weak or no information supporting their desired alternative will prefer to merely cast a vote, whereas agents with sufficiently strong information will make claims to gain additional influence over the outcome of the principal’s decision. Note that the cutoffs already determine the default voting rule that is used if all agents cast votes.

A voting-with-evidence mechanism is particularly simple to describe when all agents have type-independent preferences, i.e., for each $i$, $u_i(t_i) > 0$ or $u_i(t_i) < 0$ for all $t_i$. For instance, consider the case of deciding on the provision of a public good, where the cost of provision of the public good is borne by the principal (this case is spelled out in detail in Example 1). Therefore, when agent $i$ is always in favor of implementing the project, agent $i$ is assigned a default type of $\omega_i^+ + c_i$, and the principal presumes $i$ has the default type unless $i$ reports differently. The principal reduces the reported (or presumed) type by the verification cost to obtain $i$’s net type, and implements the policy whenever the sum of net types is positive. If an agent changes the outcome because he reports a type different from the default type, he will be verified.

Remark 1 (Ex-post incentive compatibility of voting-with-evidence mechanisms). We
will now show that a voting-with-evidence mechanism is incentive compatible. We will do so by showing that for every type realization truth-telling is a best response. Let \( t \in T \) be a profile of types, consider an agent \( i \) with type \( t_i \), and assume that agent \( i \) is in favor of the new policy, i.e., \( t_i \in T_i^+ \). If \( d(t_i, t_-) = 1 \), then agent \( i \) gets his preferred alternative, and there is no beneficial deviation. Suppose instead that \( d(t_i, t_-) = 0 \); then, agent \( i \) can only change the decision by reporting some \( t'_i > t_i \) and \( t'_i > \omega_i^+ + c_i \). However, if \( d(t'_i, t_-) = 1 \), then agent \( i \) is decisive and will be verified. Agent \( i \)'s true type \( t_i \) will be revealed and the penalty is the retention of the status quo. Thus, agent \( i \) cannot gain by deviating to \( t'_i \). A symmetric argument holds if agent \( i \) is against the new policy, i.e., \( t_i \in T_i^- \). These arguments imply that truth-telling is an optimal response to truth-telling for every type realization and therefore independently of the beliefs the agents hold. We conclude that a voting-with-evidence mechanism is ex-post incentive compatible.

We are now ready to state our main result.

**Theorem 1.** A voting-with-evidence mechanism maximizes the expected utility of the principal.

Appendix A.2 contains the proof of Theorem 1. We first prove it for finite type spaces, and then extend the proof to infinite type spaces through an approximation argument. Before finding optimal weights for a voting-with-evidence mechanism in a two-agent example, we will explain intuitively why these mechanisms are optimal.

A voting-with-evidence mechanism differs in three respects from the first-best mechanism. We will argue that these inefficiencies have to be present in an optimal mechanism and that any additional inefficiencies will make the principal worse off. First, the principal verifies all decisive agents and incurs the corresponding costs, which he would not need to do if the information were public. Clearly, sometimes verifying agents is necessary to satisfy the incentive constraints for the given decision rule. Moreover, in a voting-with-evidence mechanism the verification rules are chosen such that the incentive constraints are in fact binding: if the principal were to reduce the audit probability for some report, types in the bunching region would have a strict incentive to send this report. Thus, the principal cannot implement the given decision rule with lower verification costs.

The second inefficiency is introduced by replacing types with net types. Specifically, any report \( t_i \in T_i^+ \) and above \( \omega_i^+ + c_i \) is replaced by the net type \( t_i - c_i \). Similarly, types \( t_i \in T_i^- \) and below \( \omega_i^- - c_i \) are replaced by the net type \( t_i + c_i \). Suppose we replace types of agent \( i \) by net types. Then, for a given profile of types, by replacing agent \( i \)'s type with his net type, the decision will either remain the same or it will change. First, if the decision remains the same it does not matter whether the type or net type is used. On the other hand, if the decision changes then agent \( i \) must be decisive with type \( t_i \), but not with the net type. Therefore, the principal has to verify the agent if he uses the type \( t_i \) to decide on the policy in order to induce truthful reporting and incurs the cost of verification. Hence, the actual contribution of agent \( i \) to the principal’s utility is his net
type, \( t_i - c_i \), and not \( t_i \). Thus, the principal is made better off by using \( i \)'s net type \( t_i - c_i \) when determining his decision on the policy, anticipating that he will have to verify the agent whenever he is decisive.

The third inefficiency arises from the fact that all types below the cutoff \( \omega^+ + c_i \) of an agent in favor of the policy are bunched together and receive the same weight, the baseline weight \( \omega^+ \). Similarly, all types above the cutoff \( \omega^- + c_i \) and against the policy are bunched together into the baseline weight \( \omega^- \). Suppose instead that in the optimal mechanism there was a type \( t'_i \in T_i^+ \) that uniquely had the lowest probability of getting his preferred decision, \( \mathbb{E}[d(t'_i, t^-_i)] < \mathbb{E}[d(t_i, t^-_i)] \) for all \( t_i \). Increasing the probability with which this type gets his most preferred alternative does not affect the principal’s expected utility directly (because this type is realized with probability 0). However, our characterization of incentive compatibility implies that changing this probability affects the audit probability for all other types \( t_i \in T_i^- \):

\[
\mathbb{E}_t\mathbb{E}_{\omega_i}[a(t_i, t^-_i)] \geq \mathbb{E}_t\mathbb{E}_{\omega_i}[d(t_i, t^-_i)] - \mathbb{E}_t\mathbb{E}_{\omega_i}[d(t'_i, t^-_i)].
\]

Therefore, changing the allocation on a Null set will allow the principal to save verification costs with strictly positive probability. This contradicts that the original mechanism could be optimal and implies that any optimal mechanism will have bunching “at the bottom”.\(^6\)

**Remark 2.** We comment briefly on the role of the assumption \( t_i^- < t_i^+ \) for all \( t_i^- \in T_i^- \) and \( t_i^+ \in T_i^+ \). Without this assumption we get a similar result to Theorem 1 except for the conclusion \( \omega_i^+ > \omega_i^- \). We then have to check whether agents have an incentive to misreport their ordinal preference in this mechanism. As long as \( \omega_i^+ > \omega_i^- \) all incentive constraints are satisfied even if the assumption \( t_i^- < t_i^+ \) is violated. Only if preferences are strongly misaligned, so that an agent being in favor makes the principal less eager to implement the new policy, we have to augment the mechanism by either (i) verifying agents even if they report in the bunching region or (ii) adjusting the weights so that \( \omega_i^+ > \omega_i^- \) holds.

**Remark 3.** As noted before, any voting-with-evidence mechanism satisfies the strong notion of ex-post incentive compatibility (see Remark 1). This implies that truthful reporting is an equilibrium irrespective of the prior beliefs or the information structure. This robustness of the voting-with-evidence mechanism is a desirable property which seems particularly useful regarding practical implementations.

\(^6\)More specifically, assume there is an agent \( i \) who is always in favor of the new policy, his type space is \( T_i = [0, 1] \) and suppose \( \mathbb{E}_t\mathbb{E}_{\omega_i}[d(0, t^-_i)] < \mathbb{E}_t\mathbb{E}_{\omega_i}[d(t_i, t^-_i)] \), so 0 is the only worst-off type. In particular, every report except 0 will sometimes be verified. Consider changing the decision rule so that, for any type \( t_i \in [0, \varepsilon] \) and any \( t^-_i \), the probability of implementing the new policy is \( d(t_i, t^-_i) - \mathbb{E}[d(z, t^-_i)]z \leq \varepsilon \), and the expected decision is unchanged for all other types of \( i \) and all other agents. It then follows from Lemma 1 that for any type above \( \varepsilon \) the verification probability can be reduced by \( \delta - \mathbb{E}_t\mathbb{E}_{\omega_i}[d(0, t^-_i) - d(0, t^-_i)] > 0 \) and no type of agent \( i \) below \( \varepsilon \) will ever be verified. For \( \varepsilon \) sufficiently small, the saving in verification costs is in the order of \( \delta (1 - \varepsilon) \) and therefore outweighs the inefficiency induced to the decision rule, which is in the order of \( \delta \varepsilon \). Hence, it could not have been optimal to have a unique worst-off type.
Because the optimal mechanism is ex-post incentive compatible and we allowed for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism, we conclude that the principal cannot save verification costs by implementing the mechanism only in Bayesian equilibrium. In the working paper version (Erlanson and Kleiner (2019)), we explain this observation by showing that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism in our model there exists an equivalent ex-post incentive compatible mechanism with the same expected verification costs. We will see in Section 4.2 that this conclusion depends partly on the details of our model and explore extensions in which this equivalence breaks down.

3.2 Optimal weights and comparative statics for two agents

We will begin with characterizing the optimal weights in an utilitarian setting with two agents and then discuss comparative statics.

Proposition 1. Suppose \( I = 2 \), \( T_i^+ = \{ t_i \in T_i | t_i \geq 0 \} \), and \( T_i^- = \{ t_i \in T_i | t_i < 0 \} \). Let \( \omega_i^+ \) and \( \omega_i^- \) be implicitly defined by

\[
E[t_i | t_i \geq 0] = E[\max\{\omega_i^+, t_i - c_i\} | t_i \geq 0] \quad \text{and} \quad E[t_i | t_i < 0] = E[\min\{\omega_i^-, t_i + c_i\} | t_i < 0].
\]

Then voting-with-evidence using weights \( \omega_i^+ \) and \( \omega_i^- \) is optimal.

To gain some intuition for the result in Proposition 1, suppose \( \omega_1^+ < \omega_2^- \) and consider slightly changing \( \omega_1^+ \). This only has an effect if \( t_2 + c_2 = -\omega_1^+ \), so we condition throughout on this event. If \( \omega_1^+ \) is slightly increased, then for any \( t_1 > 0 \) the project will be implemented and no one will be verified. On the other hand, if \( \omega_1^+ \) is slightly decreased there are two cases: if \( t_1 - c_1 + t_2 + c_2 \geq 0 \) the project is implemented and agent 1 is verified, otherwise the project is not implemented and agent 2 is verified. We obtain that \( \omega_1^+ \) satisfies the first-order condition if

\[
\int_0^\infty t_1 + t_2 dF(t_1) = \int_0^\infty (t_1 + t_2 - c_1)1_{t_1-c_1+t_2+c_2\geq 0}(t_1) - c_21_{t_1-c_1+t_2+c_2<0}(t_2)dF_1(t_1).
\]

Using \( t_2 + c_2 = -\omega_1^- \), this can be rewritten as

\[
\int_0^\infty t_1 dF_1(t_1) = \int_0^\infty (t_1 - c_1)1_{t_1-c_1\geq \omega_1^+}(t_1) + \omega_1^+1_{t_1-c_1<\omega_1^+}(t_2)dF_1(t_1),
\]

which yields the first condition in Proposition 1. An analogous argument heuristically explains the second condition.

Given the characterization of the optimal weights in Proposition 1, we can study how a change in the cost parameter \( c_i \) affects the optimal weights. Suppose that the

---

7With more than two agents, the weight of agent \( i \) not only affects the likelihood that \( i \) is decisive, but also has non-trivial effects on the probability that other agents are decisive. It is therefore more difficult to find closed-form solutions for the optimal weights \( \omega_i^+, \omega_i^- \).
cost of verifying agent \( i \) increases. Then the optimal weight \( \omega_{i}^+ \) will increase in order for
\[
E[r_{i} | t_{i} \geq 0] \text{ to equal } E[\max\{\omega_{i}^+, t_{i} - c_{i}\} | t_{i} \geq 0].
\]
Analogously, the increase in \( c_{i} \) implies that \( \omega_{i}^- \) decreases. We conclude that, as the cost of verifying an agent increases, the bunching region increases and the agent will be verified less often. Another possible comparative static result concerns a second-order stochastic dominance change. Suppose the expected value of agent \( i \)'s type \( t_{i} \), conditional on him being in favor, increases. Then Proposition 1 implies that his optimal weight \( \omega_{i}^+ \) increases as well.

4 Imperfect Verification and Robustness

In this section we discuss the robustness of our results from various angles. In the first part, we relax the assumption of perfect verification. In the second part, we discuss briefly type-dependent costs of verification, interdependent preferences, a continuous decision on the level of the public good, and limited commitment.

4.1 Imperfect verification

Thus far, we have assumed that the verification technology works perfectly, that is, whenever the principal audits an agent, he will learn the true type with probability one. We now explore the extent to which the above results are robust to imperfect verification. We will study a reduced form model and assume that in the event of an audit of agent \( i \), the verification technology reveals the true type of agent \( i \) only with probability \( p \), and with probability \( 1 - p \), the technology fails, in which case the output of the technology equals the report by the agent. Consequently, if the verification output differs from the reported type the principal knows that the agent lied. However, if the output of the verification technology coincides with the reported type the principal only knows that the agent was truthful or that the verification technology failed, but not which of these two cases applies. Moreover, we assume that multiple verifications of the same agent reveal no additional information.

To find the optimal mechanism we first characterize Bayesian incentive compatibility in this new setting with imperfect verification. Similar to the case of perfect verification the key incentive constraints are those for the worst-off types. The additional uncertainty of whether the verification technology managed to detect a lie implies that the worst-off type must get a higher expected probability of getting the preferred alternative.

Lemma 2. A mechanism \((d, a)\) is Bayesian incentive compatible if and only if, for all \( i \in I \) and all \( t_{i} \in T_{i} \),
\[
\inf_{t'_{i} \in T_{i}^+} E_{t_{i}, s}[d(t'_{i}, t_{-i}, s)] \geq E_{t_{i}, s}[d(t_{i}, t_{-i}, s)] [1 - p \cdot a_{i}(t_{i}, t_{-i}, s)]
\]
\[
\sup_{t'_{i} \in T_{i}^-} E_{t_{i}, s}[d(t'_{i}, t_{-i}, s)] \leq E_{t_{i}, s}[d(t_{i}, t_{-i}, s)] [1 - p \cdot a_{i}(t_{i}, t_{-i}, s)] + p \cdot a_{i}(t_{i}, t_{-i}, s).
\]
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 1.

The imperfectness of the verification technology implies that it is harder to satisfy the incentive constraints. Moreover, there is an upper bound on how much influence an agent can have in expectation. Since, by feasibility $a_i(t, s) \leq 1$ and using Lemma 2 we get that any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism satisfies

$$\forall t_i \in T_i^+: \mathbb{E}_{d_{-i}, s}[d(t_i, t_{-i}, s)] \leq \frac{1}{1 - p} \inf_{t'_i \in T_i^+} \mathbb{E}_{d_{-i}, s}[d(t'_i, t_{-i}, s)]$$

(3)

$$\forall t_i \in T_i^-: \mathbb{E}_{d_{-i}, s}[d(t_i, t_{-i}, s)] \geq \frac{1}{1 - p} \left[ \sup_{t'_i \in T_i^-} \mathbb{E}_{d_{-i}, s}[d(t'_i, t_{-i}, s)] - p \right].$$

(4)

This adds an additional constraint to the relaxed problem that essentially restricts the maximal influence an agent could have on the decision rule in any incentive compatible mechanism. The higher the probability of failure $1 - p$ of the verification technology the tighter the bound is and the less influence an agent can have.

Figure 3: Example illustrating weights for imperfect verification with utility $u_i(t_i) = t_i$.

Theorem 2. With imperfect verification as described above, an optimal mechanism sets $d(t) = 1$ if and only if $\sum_i w_i(t_i) > 0$, where

$$w_i(t_i) = \begin{cases} 
\nu_i^- & \text{if } t_i \in T_i^- \text{ and } t_i \leq \nu_i^- - \frac{\omega_i}{p} \\
\nu_i^- + \frac{\omega_i}{p} & \text{if } t_i \in T_i^- \text{ and } \nu_i^- < t_i < \nu_i^- + \frac{\omega_i}{p} \\
\omega_i^- & \text{if } t_i \in T_i^- \text{ and } t_i \geq \nu_i^- - \frac{\omega_i}{p} \\
\omega_i^+ & \text{if } t_i \in T_i^+ \text{ and } t_i \leq \nu_i^+ + \frac{\omega_i}{p} \\
t_i - \frac{\omega_i}{p} & \text{if } t_i \in T_i^+ \text{ and } \nu_i^+ < t_i < \nu_i^+ + \frac{\omega_i}{p} \\
\nu_i^+ & \text{if } t_i \in T_i^+ \text{ and } t_i \geq \nu_i^+ + \frac{\omega_i}{p} 
\end{cases}$$

for some constants $\{\omega_i^+, \omega_i^-, \nu_i^+, \nu_i^-\}$ satisfying $\omega_i^- \leq \omega_i^+$.
Compared to the optimal mechanism in the benchmark model with perfect verification, the optimal mechanism with imperfect verification can feature additional bunching regions at the extremes (see Figure 3). The reason is that any incentive compatible mechanism must restrict the maximal weight of an agent compared to the worst-off types. If a worst-off type could misreport his type and thereby increase the probability of getting his preferred outcome by too much, this misreport would be a profitable deviation even if this agent was always verified, simply because the verification technology sometimes fails to detect the lie. Therefore, any incentive compatible mechanism must cap the maximal weight an agent could get, inducing bunching for the extreme types.\footnote{This is reminiscent of the optimal mechanism in Mylovanov and Zapechelnuk (2017), who study the optimal allocation of a prize when the winner is subject to a limited penalty if he makes a false claim. In their model, the limit on the penalty similarly requires that agents with the highest possible type are merely short-listed and will not win the prize with certainty.}

In contrast to the optimal mechanism with perfect verification it is not enough to only verify decisive agents. Clearly, one should only verify an agent that gets his preferred outcome, but to induce truth-telling as a Bayes-Nash equilibrium one sometimes needs to verify agents who are not decisive. Suppose only decisive agents were verified. Clearly, agents with worst-off types would have an incentive to overstate their types because this could never hurt them (they are only verified if they are decisive, in which case the penalty is the outcome they would have obtained under truth-telling), and benefits them whenever the verification technology fails to detect their lie. Thus, agents sometimes need to be verified even so they are not decisive; by doing this sufficiently often we can ensure that the mechanism is BIC. There are several ex-post auditing rules that can make the optimal mechanism BIC, and we have not specified exactly which agents are going to be verified for a given realization of reports. We establish the existence of a feasible auditing rule in Lemma 8. This reasoning also implies that the optimal mechanism is not ex-post incentive compatible if the verification technology is imperfect.

\textbf{Remark 4.} The additional bunching regions are the main qualitative difference of the optimal decision rule compared to the model with perfect verification. However, in many settings this difference will not even arise: if an optimal decision rule $d$ (as described in Theorem 2) satisfies, for each $i$,

\begin{align*}
(1 - p) \sup_{t \in T_i^+} \mathbb{E}_{d, i}(t, t_\bot) &< \inf_{t \in T_i^+} \mathbb{E}_{d, i}(t, t_\bot) \quad \text{and} \\
(1 - p) \inf_{t \in T_i^-} \mathbb{E}_{d, i}(t, t_\bot) &> \sup_{t \in T_i^-} \mathbb{E}_{d, i}(t, t_\bot),
\end{align*}

then $\nu_i^+ = \infty$ and $\nu_i^- = -\infty$ (see the proof of Lemma 7). Therefore, the weight function looks qualitatively as in the case of perfect verification. For example, if $p > \frac{1}{2}$ then the above conditions are always satisfied for a symmetric mechanism ($d$ is symmetric around 0) in a symmetric environment ($f_i(t_i) = f_i(-t_i)$ and $T_i^+ = -T_i^-$), because $\inf_{t \in T_i^+} \mathbb{E}_{d, i}(t, t_\bot) \geq \frac{1}{2}$ and $\sup_{t \in T_i^-} \mathbb{E}_{d, i}(t, t_\bot) \leq \frac{1}{2}$. 

\[8\]
4.2 Robustness

In the remainder we are going to keep the assumption of perfect verification and change some of our other assumptions to inquire which features of our analysis are robust.

**Type-dependent cost function** In our benchmark model we assume that the cost of verifying an agent only depends on the agent’s identity and not on his true type. Alternatively, one could argue that it’s more expensive to audit an agent that claims to have a large type and provides extensive documentation substantiating his claim. Similarly, one could argue that it is easier, and therefore cheaper, to verify an agent with a low type. Here, we explain how our conclusions are altered if we allow for the audit cost to depend on the true type. Let $c_i(t_i)$ denote the audit cost for verifying agent $i$ if his true type is $t_i$.

We observe first that the revelation principle still applies, and we can restrict attention to Bayesian incentive compatible direct mechanisms. Also, this change only affects the principal’s utility and we can therefore use the characterization of Bayesian incentive compatibility as before. On the equilibrium path, the principal will only verify agents that are truthful, so the cost of verification is $c_i(t_i)$. To simplify the discussion, we assume that the net type $t_i - c_i(t_i)$ is increasing in $t_i$. Using the same arguments as in our benchmark model we can conclude that the optimal mechanism uses a weighting rule as in a voting-with-evidence mechanism, except that the weight of a report outside of the bunching region is now $t_i - c_i(t_i)$ instead of $t_i - c_i$ (respectively, $t_i + c_i(t_i)$). The part of the weighting function outside the bunching region is therefore no longer a straight line with a slope of one but a potentially nonlinear increasing function instead. Other than that the optimal mechanism is like a voting-with-evidence mechanism: the project is implemented if the sum of the weighted reports is positive and an agent is verified if and only if he is decisive.

**Choosing the level of the public good** In our benchmark model we assume the principal takes a binary action by deciding whether or not to implement a public project. We relax this assumption here and analyze a principal who decides on the quantity $d \in [0, 1]$ of a public good and assume that the principal pays a cost of $C(d)$ for providing the public good at level $d$. Assume that the cost function $C : [0, 1] \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is continuously differentiable, increasing, convex, and satisfies $C'(0) = 0$ and $\lim_{d \rightarrow 1} C(d) = +\infty$. All agents have preferences of the form $u(t_i, d) = t_i \cdot d$ and $t_i \in [0, 1]$, i.e., agents always prefers more of the public good to less. The objective function of the principal is

$$E_r[\sum_i [d(t_i) - a_i(t)c_i] - C(d(t_i))]$$

since he incurs the additional costs $C(d)$ of providing the public good.

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9If the net type $t_i - c_i(t_i)$ is not increasing similar arguments can be applied after the types have been reordered.
We begin the discussion with the simplest setting of having only one agent. It follows again from Lemma 1 that any incentive compatible mechanism satisfies \( \inf_t d(t') \geq C(d(t)) \) and, since audits are costly, it is optimal to choose the verification rule such that this holds as an equality. Plugging this into the objective function, we get that the principal maximizes \( E_t\left[ d(t)t - \frac{\inf_t d(t')}{d(t)}c - C(d(t)) \right] \).  

The optimal decision rule \( d \) must therefore satisfy, for almost every \( t \) such that \( d(t) > \inf_t d(t') \), the following first-order condition:

\[
t - c\frac{\inf_t d(t')}{d^2(t)} - C'(d(t)) = 0. 
\]  

Therefore, as before there is a bunching region, and outside the bunching region we have downward-distortions, i.e., too little public good is provided and this distortion is increasing in the verification cost. Note that in contrast to the previous analysis, where the quantity was either 0 or 1, optimal audits are now stochastic (as they satisfy \( a(t) = 1 - \frac{\inf_t d(t')}{d(t)} \)). Intuition suggests that these conclusions for one agent carry over to the case with multiple agents if we impose ex-post incentive compatibility instead of Bayesian incentive compatibility.

Let us now look briefly at the case with several agents and Bayesian incentive constraints. The characterization of Bayesian incentive compatibility in Lemma 1 continues to hold in this setting. Although incentive constraints remain tractable, solving the principal’s problem turns out to be less tractable. The principal’s optimization problem is to maximize (5) subject to

\[
E_{t_i}[d(t_i, t_{-i})] \geq \inf_{t'_i} E_{t_i}[d(t'_i, t_{-i})] \geq E_{t_i}[d(t_i, t_{-i})(1 - a_i(t_i, t_{-i}))].
\]  

Consider first how to construct the optimal audit rule for a given decision rule \( d \). Again, the optimal audit rule will satisfy the second inequality in (7) as an equality. To achieve this in the most cost efficient way, we set, for each \( i \) and \( t_i \), \( a_i(t_i, t_{-i}) = 1 \) for those \( t_i \) such that \( d(t_i, t_{-i}) \) is largest until the second inequality in (7) binds. Thus, the optimal verification rule is deterministic. This is in contrast to the analysis above for the case of one agent. It also implies that there is no simple way to compute the verification costs necessary to implement a given decision rule and we cannot formulate the problem in a simple way with the decision rule being the only choice variable. Because of this,

\(^{10}\)Observe that, for an optimal decision rule, \( \inf_t d(t') > 0 \). Suppose instead \( \inf_t d(t') = 0 \). Given \( \varepsilon > 0 \), let \( \delta(\varepsilon) = \text{Prob}(\{ t | d(t) \leq \varepsilon \}) \). If there is \( \varepsilon > 0 \) such that \( \delta(\varepsilon) < 1 \), we can change the decision rule such that \( \inf_t d(t') = \varepsilon \) by only changing the decision for types in \( \{ t | d(t) < \varepsilon \} \). This change will increase the cost of public good provision by at most \( \delta(\varepsilon)c'\varepsilon \), but will decrease the cost of verifications by at least \( (1 - \delta(\varepsilon))c \). Therefore, for \( \varepsilon \) small enough this increases the principal’s expected payoff. On the other hand, if \( \delta(\varepsilon) = 1 \) for all \( \varepsilon > 0 \) then \( d(t) = 0 \) for almost every \( t \). Changing the decision rule to \( d(t) = \varepsilon \) increases the cost of public good provision by at most \( \varepsilon c' \varepsilon \) and increases the expected welfare of the principal by \( \varepsilon E[t] \). Since \( C \) is continuously differentiable and \( C'(0) = 0 \) we can therefore choose \( \varepsilon \) small enough such that this change increases the principal’s expected welfare. We conclude that in any optimal mechanism \( \inf_t d(t') > 0 \).
a complete analysis of the optimal decision rule in this case is beyond the scope of our paper.

**Interdependent preferences** Independent private values allow for a simple characterization of incentive compatibility: a mechanism is Bayesian incentive compatible if and only if it is Bayesian incentive compatible for the worst-off types. This observation does not carry over to models with interdependent preferences. While a complete analysis of this case is beyond the scope of this paper, we discuss below the incentives to misreport in a voting-with-evidence mechanism and possible improvements of this mechanism when preferences are interdependent. To fix ideas, for each \( i \in \mathcal{I} \), suppose \( T_i = [-1,1] \) and agent \( i \)'s utility is given by \( u_i(t) = t_i + \alpha \sum_{j \neq i} t_j \) if the policy is implemented and the type profile is \( t \), where \( \alpha \) satisfies \( 0 < \alpha < 1 \). For our discussion below consider a fixed voting-with-evidence mechanism.

If the level of interdependence, \( \alpha \), is high enough then incentive constraints in the voting-with-evidence mechanism are not binding. Recall that in our benchmark model reports are verified exactly to make worst-off types indifferent between lying and being truthful. If preferences are sufficiently interdependent, an agent with a small positive type might not want to deviate and send a large report even without verifications: his utility is mainly determined by other agents’ types, and claiming a high type might lead to implementation of the new policy although all others have negative types. This implies that one can reduce the verification probability of large reports without creating any incentives to misreport. However, one cannot lower the verification probability all the way to zero, as otherwise intermediate types will have an incentive to send high reports. Which incentive constraints will be binding in the optimal mechanism therefore depends on the details of preferences and type distributions. This implies that it is difficult to find the optimal mechanism. But the arguments so far suggest that one way to improve upon a voting-with-evidence mechanism might be to reduce the verification probabilities for high reports, at least if \( \alpha \), the degree of preference interdependence, is sufficiently large.

For moderate degrees of interdependence, \( \alpha \), all types above a threshold will prefer the new policy no matter what the types of all others are since they are only moderately affected by others’ types. For these types, incentives are as in our benchmark model since these types will send a report to maximize the probability that the new policy is implemented. Furthermore, for small enough \( \alpha \) this is even true for some types in the bunching region of the voting-with-evidence mechanism. Since the worst-off types were used to determine the verification probabilities, we cannot reduce the verification probabilities of voting-with-evidence at all for small degrees of interdependence.

This suggests that there are only limited ways to improve upon voting-with-evidence if \( \alpha \) is small. One particularly simple way to improve upon a voting-with-evidence mechanism is to allow agents to abstain in this mechanism. Consider a setting where \( F_i \) is symmetric around 0 for each \( i \) and adjust the given voting-with-evidence mechanism by allowing for abstention and giving abstentions a weight of 0. Now, an agent with a pos-
itive type close enough to $0$ strictly prefers to abstain instead of casting a vote in favor, which would give weight $\omega^+_i$. This allows for more information being transmitted to the principal without adding verification costs and this mechanism can therefore increase the principal’s expected utility compared to a voting-with-evidence mechanism.

**Limited commitment**  Following the standard approach in mechanism design, we assume the principal commits to a mechanism. There are several ways in which our optimal mechanism uses commitment of the principal and our results would change if the principal could not commit. Most importantly, the principal commits to costly verifications although in equilibrium he will never find an agent lying. Secondly, as explained above, the decision rule is not the first-best for the principal since he distorts the decision by bunching agents and by using net types. This is similar to the use of commitment in standard mechanism design, where principal’s often commit to ex-post inefficient outcomes. Thirdly, in our model the principal commits to penalize an agent that is found lying. Note however that it is not necessary to use this third component to commit to unreasonable penalties. Suppose in a voting-with-evidence mechanism agent $i$ deviates and reports $t'_i$ although his true type is $t_i$. This will only be relevant if agent $i$’s report changes the outcome to the more preferred one for him, which implies that agent $i$’s report is decisive. In this case, his report is audited and the penalty for agent $i$ will be to do the opposite of what agent $i$ prefers. This coincides with the decision if agent $i$ would have been truthful and reported $t_i$ in the first place because agent $i$ is decisive. In this sense it is not necessary to use commitment to carry out unreasonable penalties.

The fact that commitment matters is typical for models of costly verification, and contrasts with some models of evidence which show that commitment is not necessary (see, e.g., Ben-Porath et al. (2019)). One reason for the difference is that, with costly verification, the principal will anticipate the verification costs induced by a given decision rule and deviate from the first-best rule in order to reduce these costs. This effect is not present in models with evidence that have no verification costs.
A Appendix

A.1 Revelation principle

In this section of the Appendix we show that it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to the class of direct mechanisms as we define them in Section 2. Similar versions of the revelation principle have been obtained in Townsend (1988) and Ben-Porath et al. (2014). We will proceed in two steps. The first step is a revelation principle argument where we establish that any indirect mechanism can be implemented via a direct mechanism. In the second step we show that direct mechanisms can be expressed as a tuple $(d,a,\ell)$, where $d$ specifies the decision, $a_i$ specifies if agent $i$ is verified, and $\ell_i$ specifies what happens if agent $i$ is revealed to be lying.

**Step 1:** It is without loss of generality to restrict attention to direct mechanisms in which truth-telling is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.

Let $(M_1, ..., M_I, \bar{x}, \bar{y})$ be an indirect mechanism, and $M = \times_{i \in I} M_i$, where each $M_i$ denotes the message space for agent $i$, $\bar{x} : M \times T \times [0,1] \to \{0,1\}$ is the decision function specifying whether the policy is implemented, and $\bar{y} : M \times T \times \mathcal{I} \times [0,1] \to \{0,1\}$ is the verification function specifying whether an agent is verified.\(^{11}\) Fix a Bayes-Nash equilibrium $\sigma$ of the game induced by the indirect mechanism.\(^{12}\) In the corresponding direct mechanism, let $T_i$ be the message space for agent $i$. Define $x : T \times T \times [0,1] \to \{0,1\}$ as $x(t', t, s) = \bar{x}(\sigma(t'), t, s)$ and $y : T \times T \times \mathcal{I} \times [0,1] \to \{0,1\}$ as $y(t', t, i, s) = \bar{y}(\sigma(t'), t, i, s)$. Since $\sigma$ is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the original game, truth-telling is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the game induced by the direct mechanism. This implies that in both equilibria the same decision is taken and the same agents are verified.

Note that in any feasible direct mechanism the decision whether or not to verify an agent cannot depend on his true type, hence $y(t'_i, t_{-i}, t'_i, t_{-i}, i, s) = y(t'_i, t_{-i}, t, i, s)$. Also, if agent $i$ was not verified, the implementation decision cannot depend on his true type, $x(t, t, s) = x(t, t', t_{-i}, s)$.

**Step 2:** Any direct mechanism can be written as a tuple $(d,a,\ell)$, where $d : T \times [0,1] \to \{0,1\}$, $a_i : T \times [0,1] \to \{0,1\}$, and $\ell_i : T \times T_i \times [0,1] \to \{0,1\}$.

---

\(^{11}\)To describe possibly stochastic mechanisms we introduce a random variable $s$ that is uniformly distributed on $[0,1]$ and only observed by the principal. This random variable is one way to correlate the verification and the decision on the policy.

\(^{12}\)In the game induced by the indirect mechanism, whenever the principal verifies agent $i$ nature draws a type $\tilde{t}_i \in T_i$ as the outcome of the verification. Perfect verification implies that $\tilde{t}_i$ equals the true type of agent $i$ with probability 1. The strategies $m_i \in M_i$ specify an action for each information set where agent $i$ takes an action, even if this information set is never reached with strictly positive probability. In particular, they specify actions for information sets in which the outcome of the verification does not agree with the true type.
Let
\[ d(t, s) = x(t, t, s) \]
\[ a_i(t, s) = y(t, t, i, s) \]
and
\[ \ell_i(t_i', t_{-i}, t_i, t_{-i}, s) = x(t_i', t_{-i}, t_i, t_{-i}, s). \]

On the equilibrium path \((d, a, \ell)\) implements the same outcome as \((x, y)\) by definition. Suppose instead agent \(i\) of type \(t_i\) reports \(t'_i\) and all other agents report \(t_i\) truthfully. Denoting \(t'_1\), the decision taken in the mechanism \((d, a, \ell)\) if the type profile is \(t\) and the report profile is \(t'_1\) is
\[
\begin{align*}
[1 - a_i(t', s)]d(t', s) + a_i(t', s) \ell_i(t'_i, t_i, t_{-i}, s) \\
[1 - y(t', t', i, s)]x(t', t', s) + y(t', t', i, s) x(t', t, s)
\end{align*}
\]
\[
\begin{cases}
  x(t', t, s) & \text{if } y(t', t', i, s) = 1 \\
  x(t', t', s) & \text{if } y(t', t', i, s) = 0,
\end{cases}
\]

If \(y(t', t', i, s) = 1\), the decision is \(x(t', t, s)\) under both formulations. Instead, if \(y(t', t', i, s) = 0\) then \(y(t', t, i, s) = 0\) (since the decision to verify agent \(i\) cannot depend on his true type), and hence the decision on the policy must coincide with the case when agent \(i\) is verified and reports \(t'_i\), \(x(t', t', s) = x(t', t, s)\) We conclude that the decision is the same in both formulations of the mechanism if one agent deviates. Since truth-telling is an equilibrium in the mechanism \((x, y)\), it is therefore an equilibrium in the mechanism \((d, a, \ell)\), which consequently implements the same decision and verification rules.

### A.2 Proof of Theorem 1

In this section of the Appendix we show that a voting-with-evidence mechanism maximizes the expected utility of the principal. The first step in the proof of Theorem 1 is to construct a relaxed problem for the principal where the optimization is only over decision rules, compared to maximizing jointly of decision and verification rules in the original problem. The solution to the relaxed problem always yields weakly higher value than the solution to the original optimization problem (Lemma 3). In the second step we show that the solution to the relaxed problem is a voting-with evidence mechanism: first we establish this for finite type spaces (Lemma 4) and then extend the result to infinite type spaces (Lemma 5). To finish the proof we construct verification rules such that the solution to the relaxed problem is feasible for the original problem and achieves the same objective value. This proves Theorem 1.

We will show that the problem below is a relaxed version of the principal’s maximization problem as defined in (P):

\[
\max_{0 \leq d \leq 1} \mathbb{E}_d \left[ \sum_i d(t_i) [t_i - \bar{c}(t_i)] + c_i \left( \mathbb{I}_{T_i^+}(t_i) \inf_{t'_i \in T_i^+} \mathbb{E}_{t_{-i}}[d(t'_i, t_{-i})] - \mathbb{I}_{T_i^-}(t_i) \sup_{t'_i \in T_i^-} \mathbb{E}_{t_{-i}}[d(t'_i, t_{-i})] \right) \right] \tag{R}
\]
where $\mathbb{1}_{T_i^+}(t_i)$ denotes the indicator function for $T_i^+$, $\mathbb{1}_{T_i^-}(t_i)$ the indicator function for $T_i^-$, and $\tilde{c}_i(t_i) = c_i$ if $t_i \in T_i^+$ and $\tilde{c}_i(t_i) = -c_i$ if $t_i \in T_i^-$. For each mechanism $(d, a)$ let $V_P(d, a)$ denote value of the objective in problem (P), and for each decision rule $d$ let $V_R(d)$ denote the objective value in problem (R).

**Lemma 3.** For any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism $(d, a)$, $V_P(d, a) \leq V_R(d)$.

**Proof.**

\[
V_P(d, a) = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \sum_i d(t_i) [t_i - \tilde{c}_i(t_i)] + c_i \mathbb{1}_{T_i^+}(t_i) [d(t_i) - a_i(t)] - c_i \mathbb{1}_{T_i^-}(t_i) [d(t_i) + a_i(t)] \right]
\]

\[
\leq \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \sum_i d(t_i) [t_i - \tilde{c}_i(t_i)] + c_i \mathbb{1}_{T_i^+}(t_i) [d(t_i) (1 - a_i(t)) - a_i(t)] - c_i \mathbb{1}_{T_i^-}(t_i) [d(t_i) (1 - a_i(t)) + a_i(t)] \right]
\]

\[
\leq \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \sum_i d(t_i) [t_i - \tilde{c}_i(t_i)] + c_i \mathbb{1}_{T_i^+}(t_i) \inf_{t'_i \in T_i^+} \mathbb{E}_{t_i}[d(t'_i, t_{-i})] - c_i \mathbb{1}_{T_i^-}(t_i) \sup_{t'_i \in T_i^-} \mathbb{E}_{t_i}[d(t'_i, t_{-i})] \right]
\]

\[= V_R(d).
\]

The first inequality holds because $-a_i(t) \leq -d(t) a_i(t)$ and $d(t) a_i(t) \geq 0$. The second inequality follows from the fact that $(d, a)$ is BIC. \qed

The significance of the relaxed problem lies in the fact that for any optimal solution $d$ to problem (R), we can construct verification rules $a$ such that $(d, a)$ is feasible and $V_P(d, a) = V_R(d)$. This implies that $d$ is part of an optimal solution to problem (P).

We now describe an optimal solution to the relaxed problem for finite type spaces.

**Lemma 4.** Suppose that the type space $T$ is finite. Problem (R) is solved by a voting-with-evidence mechanism.

**Proof.** Let $d^*$ denote an optimal solution to (R), let $\varphi_i^+ = \inf_{t'_i \in T_i^+} \mathbb{E}_{t_{-i}}[d^*(t'_i, t_{-i})]$ and $\varphi_i^- = \sup_{t'_i \in T_i^-} \mathbb{E}_{t_{-i}}[d^*(t'_i, t_{-i})]$, and observe that $\varphi_i^- \leq \varphi_i^+$.

Consider the following auxiliary maximization problem:

\[
\max_{0 \leq d \leq 1} \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \sum_i d(t_i) [t_i - \tilde{c}_i(t_i)] \right] \tag{Aux}
\]

s.t. for all $i \in I$:

\[
\mathbb{E}_{t_{-i}}[d(t_i)] \geq \varphi_i^+ \text{ for all } t_i \in T_i^+; \text{ and}
\]

\[
\mathbb{E}_{t_{-i}}[d(t_i)] \leq \varphi_i^- \text{ for all } t_i \in T_i^-.
\]

Clearly, $d^*$ also solves the auxiliary problem. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker theorem (Arrow, Hurwicz and Uzawa 1961, Luenberger 1969) implies that there exist Lagrange multipliers $\lambda_i^+(t_i)$, such that $\lambda_i^+(t_i) \geq 0$ for $t_i \in T_i^+$ and $\lambda_i^+(t_i) \leq 0$ for $t_i \in T_i^-$ and such that $d^*$ maximizes
\[ L(d, \lambda^*) = E_t \left[ \sum_i d(t_i) (t_i - \bar{c}_i(t_i)) \right] + \sum_i \sum_{t_i \in T_i} \left( \lambda^*_i(t_i) (E_{t_i} [d(t_i, \tau_{t_i})] - \varphi_i(t_i)) \right) \]

\[ = \sum_{w \in T} d(t) \sum_i \left( t_i - \bar{c}_i(t_i) + \frac{\lambda^*_i(t_i)}{f_i(t_i)} \right) f(t) + \text{constant}, \]

where

\[ \varphi_i(t_i) := \begin{cases} \varphi_i^+ & \text{if } t_i \in T_i^+ \\ \varphi_i^- & \text{if } t_i \in T_i^- \end{cases}. \]

Setting \( h^*_i(t_i) := t_i - c_i(t_i) + \frac{\lambda^*_i(t_i)}{f_i(t_i)} \) and ignoring the constant in the Lagrangian, we observe that \( d^* \) maximizes the function

\[ g(d, h^*) = \sum_{w \in T} \sum_i d(t) f(t) h_i^*(t_i). \tag{10} \]

Let

\[ \alpha_i^+ = \inf_{t_i \in T_i^+} \{ t_i | E_{t_i} [d^*(t_i, \tau_{t_i})] > \varphi_i^+ \} - c_i \tag{11} \]

\[ \alpha_i^- = \sup_{t_i \in T_i^-} \{ t_i | E_{t_i} [d^*(t_i, \tau_{t_i})] < \varphi_i^- \} + c_i \tag{12} \]

and define

\[ \overline{h}_i(t_i) := \begin{cases} \frac{1}{\mu_i(A_i^+)} \sum_{t_i \in A_i^+} f_i(t_i) h_i^*(t_i) & \text{if } t_i \in T_i^+ \text{ and } t_i \leq \alpha_i^+ + c_i \\ \frac{1}{\mu_i(A_i^-)} \sum_{t_i \in A_i^-} f_i(t_i) h_i^*(t_i) & \text{if } t_i \in T_i^- \text{ and } t_i \geq \alpha_i^- - c_i \\ t_i - \bar{c}_i(t_i) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \]

where \( A_i^+ = \{ t_i \in T_i^+ | t_i < \alpha_i^+ + c_i \} \), \( A_i^- = \{ t_i \in T_i^- | t_i > \alpha_i^- - c_i \} \), and \( \mu_i(A) \) denotes the measure induced by \( F_i \). Let \( A_i^c = T_i \setminus (A_i^+ \cup A_i^-) \) and \( A_i = A_i^+ \cup A_i^- \).

**Claim 1.** \( d^* \) also maximizes \( g(d, \overline{h}) = \sum_{w \in T} \sum_i d(t) f(t) \overline{h}_i(t_i) \).

**Step 1:** \( \lambda^*(t_i) = 0 \) for \( t_i \in A_i^c \).

Complementary slackness implies \( \lambda_i^*(\alpha_i^+ + c_i) = 0 \). Moreover, for every \( t_i \in T_i^+ \) such that \( t_i > \alpha_i^+ + c_i \), we get \( t_i - c_i + \frac{\lambda_i^*(t_i)}{f_i(t_i)} \geq \alpha_i^+ \) and hence for every optimal solution to the Lagrangian \( d \) that \( E_{t_i} [d(t_i, \tau_{t_i})] \geq E_{t_i} [d(\alpha_i^+ + c_i, \tau_{t_i})] > \varphi_i^+ \). This implies that for \( t_i \in T_i^+ \cap A_i^c \), \( \lambda_i^*(t_i) = 0 \) by complementary slackness. Analogous arguments for \( t_i \in T_i^- \cap A_i^c \) apply. Thus, \( \lambda_i^*(t_i) = 0 \) for \( t_i \in A_i^c \).

**Step 2:** \( g(d^*, h^*) = g(d^*, \overline{h}) \).

First, observe that \( h_i^*(t_i) = \overline{h}_i(t_i) \) for \( t_i \in A_i^c \). \( \varphi_i^+ = E_{t_i} [d^*(t_i, \tau_{t_i})] \) for \( t_i \in A_i^+ \), and \( \varphi_i^- = E_{t_i} [d^*(t_i, \tau_{t_i})] \) for \( t_i \in A_i^- \). This implies
\[
g(d^*, h^*) = \sum_i \left[ \sum_{t_i \in A_i^+} h_i^+(t_i) f_i(t_i) E_{I_i} \left[ d^*(t) \right] + \sum_{t_i \in A_i^-} h_i^-(t_i) f_i(t_i) E_{I_i} \left[ d^*(t) \right] \right]
\]

\[
= \sum_i \left[ \sum_{t_i \in A_i^+} h_i(t_i) f_i(t_i) \varphi_i^+ + \sum_{t_i \in A_i^-} h_i(t_i) f_i(t_i) \varphi_i^- + \sum_{t_i \in A_i} \tilde{h}_i(t_i) f_i(t_i) E_{I_i} \left[ d^*(t) \right] \right]
\]

\[
= \sum_i \left[ \sum_{t_i \in A_i^+} \tilde{h}_i(t_i) f_i(t_i) \varphi_i^+ + \sum_{t_i \in A_i^-} \tilde{h}_i(t_i) f_i(t_i) \varphi_i^- + \sum_{t_i \in A_i} \tilde{h}_i(t_i) f_i(t_i) E_{I_i} \left[ d^*(t) \right] \right]
\]

\[
= \sum_i \left[ \sum_{t_i \in A_i^+} \tilde{h}_i(t_i) f_i(t_i) E_{I_i} \left[ d^*(t) \right] + \sum_{t_i \in A_i} \tilde{h}_i(t_i) f_i(t_i) E_{I_i} \left[ d^*(t) \right] \right] = g(d^*, \tilde{h}).
\]

**Step 3:** \( g(d^*, \tilde{h}) = g(d^*, h^*) = \max_{0 \leq d \leq 1} g(d, h^*) \geq \max_{0 \leq d \leq 1} g(d, \tilde{h}). \)

The first equality follows from Step 2 and the second holds because \( d^* \) maximizes \( g(d, h^*) \) by construction.

Let \( h_i : T_i \to \mathbb{R} \) be any real-valued function, and for each such function \( h_i \) define \( H_i(t_i) := h_i(t_i) f_i(t_i) \) and denote by \( H_i = (H_i(t_i))_{t_i \in T_i} \). Fix an agent \( i \in I \), and define a function \( \Psi : \mathbb{R}^{|I|} \to \mathbb{R} \), as \( \Psi(H_i) := \max_{0 \leq d \leq 1} \sum_{t_i \in T_i} d(t) \left[ f_{-i}(t_{-i}) H_i(t_i) + \sum_{j \in \mathbb{R}_{-i}} f(t) h_j(t_j) \right] \).

The function \( \Psi \) is convex, since it is a maximum over linear functions. It is also symmetric, since permuting the vector \( H_i \) does not change the value of \( \Psi \). Thus, \( \Psi \) is Schur-convex. By construction, \( H_i^+ \) (defined as \( H_i^+(t_i) = h_i^+(t_i) f_i(t_i) \)) majorizes \( \tilde{H}_i \) (defined as \( \tilde{H}_i(t_i) = \tilde{h}_i(t_i) f_i(t_i) \)). Therefore we obtain that,

\[
\Psi(H_i^+) \geq \Psi(\tilde{H}_i)
\]

We have now shown that if we replace \( h_i^* \) for agent \( i \) with its average \( \tilde{h}_i \) we have that \( d^* \) remains the maximizer of \( \max_{0 \leq d \leq 1} g(d, h_i^*) \). By repeating this argument by agent we can conclude that,

\[
\max_{0 \leq d \leq 1} g(d, h^*) = \max_{0 \leq d \leq 1} \sum_{t_i \in T_i} \sum_{i \in I} d(t) f_{-i}(t_{-i}) H_i^+(t_i) \geq \max_{0 \leq d \leq 1} \sum_{t_i \in T_i} \sum_{i \in I} d(t) f_{-i}(t_{-i}) \tilde{H}_i(t_i) = \max_{0 \leq d \leq 1} g(d, \tilde{h}).
\]

This proves the Claim 1.

Hence, every solution to the Lagrangian can be described as follows:

\[
d(t) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } \sum w_i(t_i) > 0 \\
0 & \text{if } \sum w_i(t_i) < 0,
\end{cases}
\]

where

\[
w_i(t_i) = \begin{cases} 
\omega_i^+ & \text{if } t_i \in T_i^+ \text{ and } t_i \leq \alpha_i^+ + c_i \\
\omega_i^- & \text{if } t_i \in T_i^- \text{ and } t_i \geq \alpha_i^- - c_i \\
t_i - c_i(t_i) & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\] (13)

for constants \( \{\omega_i^+, \omega_i^-\}_{i \in I} \). Since \( d^* \) maximizes the Lagrangian by assumption, we conclude that it takes this form.
Note that $\omega_i^+ \geq \sup_{t \in A_i^+}\{t_i - c_i\}$ since $\lambda^*_{\#}(t_i) \geq 0$ for $t_i \in A_i^+$. Also, $\omega_i^- \leq \alpha_i^+$, since otherwise we would get, for $t_i \in A_i^+$, $E_{\mathcal{L}_i}[d^n(t_i, t_{-i})] \geq E_{\mathcal{L}_i}[d^n(\alpha_i^+ - c_i, t_{-i})] > \varphi_i^+$, contradicting the definition of $A_i^+$. Analogous arguments imply $\inf_{t \in A_i^-}\{t_i + c_i\} \leq \omega^- \leq \alpha_i^+$. This implies that we can replace $\alpha_i^+$ (or $\alpha_i^-$) with $\omega_i^+$ (or $\omega_i^-$) in the definition of the weight function $w_i$ in (13) above without changing the outcome of the mechanism in any way.

As the next step in the proof we show that voting-with-evidence mechanisms are also optimal for infinite type space.

**Lemma 5.** Suppose that $T$ is an infinite type space. Problem (R) is solved by a voting-with-evidence mechanism.

**Proof.** Let $F_{i}^+$ and $F_i^-$ denote the conditional distributions induced by $F_i$ on $T_i^+$ and $T_i^-$, respectively. We first construct a discrete approximation of the type space: For $i \in \mathcal{I}$, $n \geq 1$, $l_i = 1, \ldots, 2^n+1$, let

$$S_i(n, l_i) := \begin{cases} \{t_i \in T_i^+ \mid \frac{l_i - 1}{2^n} \leq F_i^+(t_i) < \frac{l_i}{2^n}\} & \text{for } l_i \leq 2^n \\ \{t_i \in T_i^+ \mid \frac{l_i - 2^n - 1}{2^n} \leq F_i^-(t_i) < \frac{l_i - 2^n}{2^n}\} & \text{for } l_i > 2^n, \end{cases}$$

which form partitions of $T_i^+$ and $T_i^-$, and denote by $\mathcal{F}_i^n$ the set consisting of all possible unions of the $S_i(n, l_i)$. Let $l = (l_1, \ldots, l_n)$ and $S(n, l) = \prod_{i \in \mathcal{I}} S_i(n, l_i)$, which defines a partition of $T$, and denote by $\mathcal{F}^n$ the induced $\sigma$-algebra.

Let $(R^n)$ denote the relaxed problem with the additional restriction that $d$ is measurable with respect to $\mathcal{F}^n$. Then the constraint set has non-empty interior and an optimal solution to $(R^n)$ exists. Define $\tilde{\mu}_i(t_i) := \frac{1}{\mu_i(S_i(n, l_i))} \int_{S_i(n, l_i)} s dF_i$ for $t_i \in S_i(n, l_i)$, where $\mu_i$ denotes the measure induced by $F_i$. The arguments for finite type spaces imply that the following rule is an optimal solution to $(R^n)$ for some $\omega_i^{+, n}, \omega_i^-, n$:

$$r_i^n(t_i) = \begin{cases} \omega_i^{+, n} - c_i & \text{if } t_i \in T_i^+ \text{ and } \tilde{\mu}_i(t_i) \leq \omega_i^{+, n} \\ \omega_i^-, n + c_i & \text{if } t_i \in T_i^- \text{ and } \tilde{\mu}_i(t_i) \geq \omega_i^-, n \\ \tilde{\mu}_i(t_i) - c_i(t_i) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$d^n(t) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \sum r_i^n(t_i) > 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } \sum r_i^n(t_i) < 0. \end{cases}$$

Let $\omega_i^+ := \lim_{n \to \infty} \omega_i^{+, n}$ and $\omega_i^- := \lim_{n \to \infty} \omega_i^-, n$ (by potentially choosing a convergent subsequence). Define

$$r_i(t_i) = \begin{cases} \omega_i^+ - c_i & \text{if } t_i \in T_i^+ \text{ and } \tilde{\mu}_i(t_i) \leq \omega_i^{+, n} \\ \omega_i^- + c_i & \text{if } t_i \in T_i^- \text{ and } \tilde{\mu}_i(t_i) \geq \omega_i^-, n \\ t_i - \tilde{\mu}_i(t_i) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

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\[d(t) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } \sum r_i(t_i) > 0 \\
0 & \text{if } \sum r_i(t_i) < 0.
\end{cases}\]

Then, for all \(i\) and \(t_i\), \(\mathbb{E}_{d_{t_i}}[d^n(t_i, t_{-i})] = \text{Prob}[\sum_{j \neq i} r_j^n(t_i) \geq r_i^n(t_i)]\) converges point-wise almost everywhere to \(\mathbb{E}_{d_{t_i}}[d(t_i, t_{-i})]\). This implies that the marginals converge in \(L^1\)-norm and hence the objective value of \(d^n\) converges to the objective value of \(d\). This implies that \(d\) is an optimal solution to (R), since if there was a solution achieving a strictly higher objective value, there would exist \(\mathcal{F}^n\)-measurable solutions achieving a strictly higher objective value for all \(n\) large enough. Therefore, a voting-with-evidence mechanism solves problem (R).

Now we have all the parts required to establish our main result Theorem 1 that voting-with-evidence mechanisms are optimal.

**Proof of Theorem 1.** Denote by \(d^*\) the solution to problem (R). We first construct a verification rule \(a^*\) such that \((d^*, a^*)\) is Bayesian incentive compatible and then argue that \(V_P(d^*, a^*) = V_R(d^*)\). Given that \(V_P(d, a) \leq V_R(d)\) holds for any incentive compatible mechanism, this implies that \((d^*, a^*)\) solves (P).

Let \(a^*\) be such that agent \(i\) is verified whenever he is decisive. Then \(a^*_i(t) = a^*_i(t)d^*(t)\) for all \(t_i \in T_i^+\) (if \(d^*(t) = 0\) then type \(t_i \in T_i^+\) is not decisive), and \(d^*(t) = d^*(t)[1 - a^*_i(t)]\) for all \(t_i \in T_i^-\) (if \(a^*_i(t) = 1\) then \(d^*(t) = 0\)). Hence, inequality (8) holds as an equality for \((d^*, a^*)\).

Note that in mechanism \((d^*, a^*)\), all incentive constraints are binding and therefore inequality (9) holds as an equality as well. We therefore conclude \(V_P(d^*, a^*) = V_R(d^*)\).

**Proof of Proposition 1.** Without loss of generality, suppose \(\omega_1^+ \leq -\omega_2^-\) and consider changing \(\omega_2^-\) (the other cases are analogous). This matters only if agent 2 has a negative type and 1 has a positive type. We consider two cases: (a) a change to \(\omega_2'^-\) such that \(\omega_1^+ \leq -\omega_2'^-\); (b) a change such that \(\omega_1^+ > -\omega_2'^-\).

Case (a):

Using weight \(\omega_2'^-\) such that \(-\omega_1^+ \geq \omega_2'^- > \omega_2^-\) instead of \(\omega_2^-\) matters only if agent 1’s type satisfies \(\omega_2^- \leq -t_1 + c_1 \leq \omega_2'^-\). Conditional on such a type, the expected utility of the principal from using weight \(\omega_2^-\) is 0. On the other hand, using weight \(\omega_2'^-\) gives conditional expected utility of

\[
\int_{-\infty}^{0} (t_1 + t_2 - c_1)1_{t_1-e_1+t_2+c_2 \geq 0} - c_21_{t_1-e_1+t_2+c_2 < 0} dF_2.
\]
The definition of $\omega_t^-$ implies
\[
\int_{-\infty}^{0} t_2 dF_2 = \int_{-\infty}^{0} \min\{\omega_t^-, t_2 + c_2\} dF_2 \\
\leq \int_{-\infty}^{0} \min\{-t_1 + c_1, t_2 + c_2\} dF_2 \\
= \int_{-\infty}^{0} (-t_1 + c_1) 1_{t_1-c_1+t_2+c_2 \geq 0} + (t_2 + c_2) 1_{t_1-c_1+t_2+c_2 < 0} dF_2.
\]
Subtracting $\int_{-\infty}^{0} t_2 dF_2$ from both sides and multiplying by $-1$, this implies
\[
0 \geq \int_{-\infty}^{0} (t_1 + t_2 - c_1) 1_{t_1-c_1+t_2+c_2 \geq 0} - c_2 1_{t_1-c_1+t_2+c_2 < 0} dF_2,
\]
and hence the principal is better off using weight $\omega_t^-$. Similar arguments also show that the principal is worse off using a cutoff $\omega_t^+ < \omega_t^-$.

Case (b): We can think of this case in two steps. First, a change such that $\hat{\omega}_t^- = -\omega_t^+$. As shown in Case (a), this reduces the principal’s welfare. Second, a further change to $\omega_t^+$, which only changes the decision if both agents cast a vote. The effect of this second change non-positive if and only if
\[
0 \geq \int_{\omega_\tau^+ -c_2}^{\omega_\tau^+ +c_1} t_1 + t_2 dF_2 dF_1 \\
+ c_1 [1 - F_1(\omega_\tau^+ + c_1)][F_2(0) - F_2(-\omega_\tau^- - c_2)] - c_2 [F_1(\omega_\tau^+ + c_1) - F_1(0)] F_2(-\omega_\tau^- - c_2).
\]
This is equivalent to
\[
0 \geq \mathbb{E}[t_1 | 0 \leq t_1 \leq \omega_\tau^+ + c_1] + \mathbb{E}[t_2 | 0 \geq t_2 \geq -\omega_\tau^- - c_2] [F_1(\omega_\tau^+ + c_1) - F_1(0)] [F_2(0) - F_2(-\omega_\tau^- - c_2)] \\
+ c_1 [1 - F_1(\omega_\tau^+ + c_1)][F_2(0) - F_2(-\omega_\tau^- - c_2)] - c_2 [F_1(\omega_\tau^+ + c_1) - F_1(0)] F_2(-\omega_\tau^- - c_2),
\]
or to
\[
0 \geq \mathbb{E}[t_1 | 0 \leq t_1 \leq \omega_\tau^+ + c_1] + \mathbb{E}[t_2 | 0 \geq t_2 \geq -\omega_\tau^- - c_2] \frac{1 - F_1(0)}{F_1(\omega_\tau^+ + c_1) - F_1(0)} - c_1 - c_2 \frac{F_2(0)}{F_2(0) - F_2(-\omega_\tau^- - c_2)} + c_2 \quad (14)
\]
However, the definition of $\omega_\tau^+$ implies
\[
\int_{0}^{\infty} t_1 dF_1 = \int_{\omega_\tau^+ + c_1}^{\infty} t_1 - c_1 dF_1 + [F(\omega_\tau^+ + c_1) - F(0)] \omega_\tau^+ \\
\Longleftrightarrow \omega_\tau^+ = \mathbb{E}[t_1 | 0 \leq t_1 \leq \omega_\tau^+ + c_1] - c_1 + c_1 \frac{1 - F_1(0)}{F_1(\omega_\tau^+ + c_1) - F_1(0)} \quad (15)
\]
Similarly, the definition of $\omega_t^-$ and the fact that $\omega_t^- \leq -\omega_t^+$ imply
\[
\mathbb{E}[t_2 | t_2 < 0] = \mathbb{E}[\min\{\omega_t^-, c_2, t_2\} + c_2 | t_2 < 0] \\
\leq \mathbb{E}[\min\{-\omega_t^+, c_2, t_2\} + c_2 | t_2 < 0].
\]
Rearranging this inequality yields

$$\mathbb{E}[t_2] - \omega_1^+ - c_2 \leq t_2 < 0 - c_2 \frac{F_2(0)}{F_2(0) - F_2(\omega_1^+ - c_2)} \leq -\omega_1^+ - c_2.$$  (16)

Plugging (15) and (16) in (14), we see that (14) holds. We conclude that the principal is better off using weight $\omega_2^-$. \hfill \Box

### A.3 Proof of Theorem 2

Consider the relaxed problem

$$\max_{0 \leq d \leq 1} \mathbb{E}_d \left[ \sum_i d(t_i) [t_i - \frac{\hat{e}_i(t_i)}{p}] + \frac{e_i}{p} \left( \mathbb{1}_{T_i^+}(t_i) \inf_{t_i \in T_i^+} \mathbb{E}_{\mu_i,s}[d(t_i', t_i-s)] - \mathbb{1}_{T_i^-}(t_i) \sup_{t_i \in T_i^-} \mathbb{E}_{\mu_i,s}[d(t_i', t_i-s)] \right) \right]$$

s.t. (3) and (4) ($\tilde{R}$)

For any mechanism $(d, a)$, let $V_p(d,a)$ denote the expected utility of the principal given mechanism $(d,a)$ and let $V_{\tilde{R}}(d)$ denote the value achieved by the decision rule $d$ in the relaxed problem.

**Lemma 6.** For any mechanism $(d,a)$ that is Bayesian incentive compatible in the imperfect verification setting, $V_p(d,a) \leq V_{\tilde{R}}(d)$.

**Proof.** Note that Lemma 2 implies that

$$\forall t_i \in T_i^+: \mathbb{E}_{\mu_i,s}[a_i(t_i, t_i-s)d(t_i, t_i-s)] \geq \frac{1}{p} \left[ \mathbb{E}_{\mu_i,s}[d(t_i, t_i-s)] - \inf_{t_i \in T_i^+} \mathbb{E}_{\mu_i,s}[d(t_i', t_i-s)] \right]$$

and

$$\forall t_i \in T_i^-: \mathbb{E}_{\mu_i,s}[a_i(t_i, t_i-s)[1 - d(t_i, t_i-s)]] \geq \frac{1}{p} \left[ \sup_{t_i \in T_i^+} \mathbb{E}_{\mu_i,s}[d(t_i', t_i-s)] - \mathbb{E}_{\mu_i,s}[d(t_i, t_i-s)] \right]$$

Hence,

$$V_p(d,a) = \mathbb{E}_d \left[ \sum_i d(t_i) t_i - a_i(t_i) c_i \right]$$

$$\leq \mathbb{E}_d \left[ \sum_i d(t_i) t_i - \mathbb{1}_{T_i^+}(t_i) d(t_i) a_i(t_i) c_i - \mathbb{1}_{T_i^-}(t_i) [1 - d(t_i)] a_i(t_i) c_i \right]$$

$$\leq \mathbb{E}_d \left[ \sum_i \mathbb{E}_{\mu_i,s}[d(t_i)] t_i - \mathbb{1}_{T_i^+}(t_i) \frac{1}{p} \left[ \mathbb{E}_{\mu_i,s}[d(t_i, t_i-s)] - \inf_{t_i \in T_i^+} \mathbb{E}_{\mu_i,s}[d(t_i', t_i-s)] \right] c_i \right.$$  (19)

$$\left. - \mathbb{1}_{T_i^-}(t_i) \frac{1}{p} \left[ \sup_{t_i \in T_i^+} \mathbb{E}_{\mu_i,s}[d(t_i', t_i-s)] - \mathbb{E}_{\mu_i,s}[d(t_i, t_i-s)] \right] c_i \right]$$

$$= V_{\tilde{R}}(d)$$

\hfill \Box

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Lemma 7. Suppose $T$ is finite. The decision rule stated in Theorem 2 solves problem \((\bar{R})\).

Proof. Let $d^*$ denote an optimal solution to the relaxed problem \((\bar{R})\) above, and define
\[
\varphi_i^+ = \inf_{t' \in T^+_i} \mathbb{E}_{t_-}[d^*(t'_i, t_-)] \quad \text{and} \quad \varphi_i^- = \sup_{t' \in T^-_i} \mathbb{E}_{t_-}[d^*(t'_i, t_-)].
\]
Then $d^*$ also solves the following problem:
\[
\max_{0 \leq d \leq 1} \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \sum_i d(t) \left( t_i - \frac{\tilde{c}_i(t_i)}{p} \right) \right] \quad \text{(Aux)}
\]
\[
\text{s.t. for all } i \in I:
\]
\[
\varphi_i^+ = \mathbb{E}_{t_-}[d(t)] \leq \frac{\varphi_i^+}{1 - p} \quad \text{for all } t_i \in T_i^+,
\]
\[
\varphi_i^- - \frac{p}{1 - p} \leq \mathbb{E}_{t_-}[d(t)] \leq \varphi_i^- \quad \text{for all } t_i \in T_i^-.
\]
The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker theorem implies that there exist Lagrange multipliers $\lambda_i(t_i)$ and $\mu_i(t_i)$ such that $d^*$ maximizes the Lagrangian:
\[
\mathcal{L}(d, \lambda, \mu) = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \sum_i d(t) (t_i - \frac{\tilde{c}_i(t_i)}{p}) \right] + \sum_i \sum_{t_i \in T_i^+} \left( \lambda_i(t_i) (\mathbb{E}_{t_-}[d(t_i, t_-)] - \varphi_i^+) + \mu_i(t_i) \left( \frac{\varphi_i^+}{1 - p} - \mathbb{E}_{t_-}[d(t_i, t_-)] \right) \right)
\]
\[
+ \sum_i \sum_{t_i \in T_i^-} \left( \lambda_i(t_i) (\mathbb{E}_{t_-}[d(t_i, t_-)] - \varphi_i^-) + \mu_i(t_i) \left( \frac{\varphi_i^- - p}{1 - p} - \mathbb{E}_{t_-}[d(t_i, t_-)] \right) \right)
\]
Define $h_i(t_i) := t_i - \frac{\tilde{c}_i(t_i)}{p} + \frac{\lambda_i(t_i) + \mu_i(t_i)}{f_i(t_i)}$ and let
\[
\alpha_i^+ = \inf_{t_i \in T_i^+} \left\{ t_i : \mathbb{E}_{t_-}[d^*(t_i, t_-)] > \varphi_i^+ \right\}, \quad \alpha_i^- = \sup_{t_i \in T_i^-} \left\{ t_i : \mathbb{E}_{t_-}[d^*(t_i, t_-)] < \varphi_i^- \right\},
\]
\[
\beta_i^+ = \sup_{t_i \in T_i^+} \left\{ t_i : \mathbb{E}_{t_-}[d^*(t_i, t_-)] < \varphi_i^+ \right\}, \quad \beta_i^- = \inf_{t_i \in T_i^-} \left\{ t_i : \mathbb{E}_{t_-}[d^*(t_i, t_-)] > \varphi_i^- \right\}.
\]
Define $A_i^+ = \{ t_i \in T_i^+ | t_i < \alpha_i^+ \}$, $A_i^- = \{ t_i \in T_i^- | t_i > \alpha_i^- \}$, $B_i^+ = \{ t_i \in T_i^+ | t_i > \beta_i^+ \}$, $B_i^- = \{ t_i \in T_i^- | t_i < \beta_i^- \}$, and
\[
\bar{h}_i(t_i) := \begin{cases}
\frac{1}{\mu_i(A_i^+)} \sum_{t_i \in A_i^+} f_i(t_i) h_i(t_i) & \text{if } t_i \in A_i^+ \\
\frac{1}{\mu_i(B_i^+)} \sum_{t_i \in B_i^+} f_i(t_i) h_i(t_i) & \text{if } t_i \in B_i^+ \\
\frac{1}{\mu_i(A_i^-)} \sum_{t_i \in A_i^-} f_i(t_i) h_i(t_i) & \text{if } t_i \in A_i^- \\
\frac{1}{\mu_i(B_i^-)} \sum_{t_i \in B_i^-} f_i(t_i) h_i(t_i) & \text{if } t_i \in B_i^- \\
t_i - \tilde{c}_i(t_i) & \text{otherwise}.
\end{cases}
\]
The same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 4 imply that $d^*$ maximizes $\sum_i \sum_t f(t) d(t) \bar{h}_i(t_i)$. \qed
Lemma 8. Suppose $T$ is infinite. The decision rule stated in Theorem 2 solves problem ($\bar{R}$).

Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 5 and hence omitted. \hfill \square

Proof of Theorem 2. Denote by $d^*$ the solution to problem $\bar{R}$. For each $i$, define $q_i : T_i \rightarrow [0,1]$ as the solution to

\[
\mathbb{E}_{t_{-i}} [d^*(t_i, t_{-i}) [1 - p \cdot q_i(t_i)] ] = \inf_{t'_i \in T_i^+} \mathbb{E}_{t_{-i}} [d^*(t'_i, t_{-i}) ]
\]

for $t_i \in T_i^+$ and

\[
\mathbb{E}_{t_{-i}} [d^*(t_i, t_{-i})[1 - p \cdot q_i(t_i)] ] = \sup_{t'_i \in T_i^-} \mathbb{E}_{t_{-i}} [d^*(t'_i, t_{-i}) ] - p \cdot q_i(t_i)]
\]

for $t_i \in T_i^-$. We will now show that a solution $q_i$ exists. For $t_i \in T_i^+$, setting $q_i(t_i) = 0$ yields

\[
\mathbb{E}_{t_{-i}} [d^*(t_i, t_{-i})[1 - p q_i(t_i)] ] = \inf_{t'_i \in T_i^+} \mathbb{E}_{t_{-i}} [d^*(t_i, t_{-i}) ] \geq \inf_{t'_i \in T_i^+} \mathbb{E}_{t_{-i}} [d^*(t'_i, t_{-i}) ]
\]

and setting $q_i(t_i) = 1$ yields

\[
\mathbb{E}_{t_{-i}} [d^*(t_i, t_{-i})[1 - p q_i(t_i)] ] = \inf_{t'_i \in T_i^+} \mathbb{E}_{t_{-i}} [d^*(t'_i, t_{-i}) ] = \mathbb{E}_{t_{-i}} [d^*(t_i, t_{-i})[1 - p]] \leq \inf_{t'_i \in T_i^+} \mathbb{E}_{t_{-i}} [d^*(t'_i, t_{-i}) ]
\]

where the inequality follows from (3). The intermediate-value theorem hence implies the existence of a solution $q_i$. Similar arguments apply for $t_i \in T_i^-$. Define

\[
a^*_i(t) := \begin{cases} 
q_i(t_i) & \text{if } t_i \in T_i^+ \text{ and } d^*(t) = 1 \\
q_i(t_i) & \text{if } t_i \in T_i^- \text{ and } d^*(t) = 0 \\
0 & \text{else.} 
\end{cases}
\]

For each $i$ and for all $t_i \in T_i^+$,

\[
\inf_{t'_i \in T_i^+} \mathbb{E}_{t_{-i},s} [d^*(t'_i, t_{-i}, s)] = \mathbb{E}_{t_{-i},s} [d^*(t_i, t_{-i}, s)[1 - p \cdot a^*_i(t_i, t_{-i}, s)]],
\]

and for all $t_i \in T_i^-$,

\[
\sup_{t'_i \in T_i^-} \mathbb{E}_{t_{-i},s} [d^*(t'_i, t_{-i}, s)] = \mathbb{E}_{t_{-i},s} [d^*(t_i, t_{-i}, s)[1 - p \cdot a^*_i(t_i, t_{-i}, s)] + p \cdot a^*_i(t_i, t_{-i}, s)].
\]

Hence, $(d^*, a^*)$ is Bayesian incentive compatible by Lemma 2 and inequality (20) holds as an equality. By construction, $t_i \in T_i^+$ implies $d(t) a^*_i(t) = a^*_i(t)$ and $t_i \in T_i^-$ implies $[1-d(t)] a^*_i(t) = a^*_i(t)$. Therefore, inequality (19) also holds as an equality and we conclude $V_P(d^*, a^*) = V_{\bar{R}}(d^*)$. Hence, $(d^*, a^*)$ is optimal. \hfill \square
References


