

Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite-player games*

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Abstract

In the context of anonymous games (i.e., games where the payoff of a player is, apart from his/her own action, determined by the distribution of the actions made by the other players) we present a model in which, generically (in a precise sense), finite-player games have strict pure strategy Nash equilibria if the number of agents is large. A key feature of our model is that payoff functions have differentiability properties. A consequence of our existence result is that, in our model, equilibrium distributions of non-atomic games are asymptotically implementable by pure strategy Nash equilibria of large finite-player games.

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1 Introduction

It is now well-established in economics to address problems of strategic interaction among many negligible individuals by models of anonymous games. In such games,

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the impact on the payoff of a player by the actions chosen by the other players factors through the distribution of these actions.¹ A particular and convenient class of models of anonymous games is formed by games with a “continuum of players” or, more precisely, “non-atomic games” (henceforth, *continuum games* for short). In continuum games, there is no distinction anymore between the “distribution of the actions chosen by the other players” and the “distribution of the actions chosen by all players,” so that, concerning equilibrium existence, these games are rather easy to analyze. In fact, there are several results on existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium for such games, the pioneering ones provided by Schmeidler (1973) and Mas-Colell (1984). In these results, no linear structure is imposed on players’ action sets. After all, of course, continuum games are idealizations of situations with a large but finite number of players, and in this respect the following questions naturally arise:

- (1) To what extent do pure strategy Nash equilibrium existence results for continuum games carry over to pure strategy Nash equilibrium existence results for games with a large but finite number of players?
- (2) Are equilibria of continuum games artifacts of having a continuum of players or are they realizable as “limits” of pure strategy Nash equilibria of large finite-player games? That is, given a continuum game and an equilibrium of this game, are there “close” large finite-player games having “similar” pure strategy Nash equilibria?

In other words, are continuum games, and equilibria of such games, good idealizations of situations with a large but finite number of players?

The “to what extent” clause has been incorporated in the first question because it is well-known that finite-player games may fail to have pure strategy Nash equilibria

¹We follow Kalai (2004) in defining the notion of “anonymous game” this way. Actually, Kalai (2004) speaks of “semi-anonymous” games to indicate that, in the incomplete information setting he considers, a player’s identity is encoded in his type. Since we do not consider incomplete information, the prefix “semi” has been dropped. We note that in Khan and Sun (1999) the notion of “anonymous game” is reserved for games with a continuum of players specified solely by distributions of players’ characteristics.

(unless action sets are convex and quasi-concavity assumptions on payoff function are made). In fact, this may be the case for a fixed distribution of payoff functions, regardless of the number of players in such games (see the example after the statement of Theorem 1 in Section 3.5). Thus the best one can hope for in regard to the first of the above questions is to get positive results in terms of genericity analysis. As made clear by the literature on competitive equilibrium in exchange economies, a suitable and convenient setting for genericity analysis is a setting where agents' characteristics have differentiability properties. In this paper, we develop such a setting for anonymous games, so that there is a generic set of continuum games such that finite-player games forming a sequence with an increasing number of players and a "limit" in this set have pure strategy Nash equilibria if the number of players is large enough.

Of course, a differentiability assumption on payoff functions necessarily implies that the domains of these functions are subsets of a linear space (for which we take a Euclidean space). In particular, we will have a linear structure on the action sets of players. This is a restriction compared with the analysis in Mas-Colell (1984) where the action sets of players (which in Mas-Colell (1984) are the same for all players in a game) can be any compact metric space.²

Based on our existence result, we deal with the second of the above questions. We show that, in our model, any equilibrium of any continuum game is asymptotically implementable in the sense that there exists a sequence of finite-player games, with an increasing number of players, and a corresponding sequence of strict pure strategy Nash equilibria such that the given continuum game and its equilibrium arise as limit (in an appropriate sense).³ This bears some surprise: It is well-known that an

²In fact, action sets in our model will have non-empty interior in some Euclidean space. We remark in this regard that pure strategy Nash equilibria with actions belonging to the interior of action sets do not have a mixed strategy interpretation unless payoff functions are linear in the own actions of players. Models of games with action sets having non-empty interior in Euclidean spaces arise in several applications. We mention models of Cournot competition where firms can vary outputs continuously and models of auctions where bids can vary in products of intervals.

³This notion of "asymptotic implementation" is more specific than that in Khan and Sun (1996), where "asymptotic implementation" signifies, in the sense of nonstandard analysis, a "transfer" of any results for games with a hyperfinite Loeb spaces of players to games with a finite number of

equilibrium correspondence need not be lower hemi-continuous, which suggests that the set of limits of strict equilibria of *all* sequences of finite-player games “converging” to a given continuum game could still form a proper subset of the equilibrium set of the limit continuum game. As our result shows, this intuition is incorrect.⁴

The above result is important for applications that assume a continuum of players since, by considering the set of all equilibria of a game with a continuum of players, one can rest assured that none of these equilibria is a spurious implication of the (tractable but unrealistic) assumption of an infinite population. The intuition for this result is that any equilibrium of a continuum game can be made strict in a nearby continuum game and that any strict equilibrium of a continuum game is robust, i.e., it yields a strict equilibrium for all finite-player games close to it.

As mentioned above, an important aspect of our analysis is that the equilibria that we obtain for large finite-player games are strict, i.e., best reply sets in an equilibrium are singletons; thus there is no issue of specifying certain actions in the best reply sets as equilibrium actions. This makes our results immune against an objection as formulated by Mas-Colell (1977), which addresses general equilibrium theory, but applies to game theoretic contexts as well; to quote Mas-Colell (1977): “Important as those results are, the notion of equilibrium they deal with has some unattractive features. In particular, knowledge by the consumers of the equilibrium price system (plus the preference maximization hypothesis) does not determine the equilibrium; one needs, in addition, a possibly very careful specification of each consumer’s commodity bundles. This makes the equilibrium a ‘decentralized’ one only in some weak sense.”

To note some details of our model, action sets are compact subsets of some Euclidean space, with dense interior, and for any player, the externality, i.e., the channel through which his/her payoff is affected by the actions of the other players, is given, as in Araujo et al. (2000), Balder (2002), Rauh (2003), or Yu and Zhu (2005), by finitely

players (see Loeb and Wolff, 2015, p. 355).

⁴This does not imply lower hemi-continuity, which means in the above context that the set of limits of strict equilibria of *any* sequence of finite-player games “converging” to a given continuum game equals the equilibrium set of the limit continuum game.

many summary statistics (e.g., the first non-central moments) of the distribution of these actions. From the viewpoint of applications, this is not a big restriction; in fact, in many applications of anonymous games, e.g., Cournot oligopoly games, it is just the mean action of the other players which determines a player's payoff in addition to his/her own action. Payoff functions, in our model, are twice continuously differentiable. The main costs of our results, compared with standard game theory, are an assumption that implies that the best replies of a player against the distributions of the actions of the other players are always in the interior of his/her action set. This assumption is needed to be in a position in which differentiability assumptions on payoff functions can be conveniently exploited. On the set of players' characteristics (i.e., payoff functions) we define a suitable topology; because the actual definition requires some technical constructions, we refer to Section 3.4 and here say only that this topology is defined in terms of graphs of payoff functions to accommodate for the fact that action sets may differ across players. A continuum game is specified as a Borel probability measure with compact support on the space of players' characteristics. The compact support condition requires that players' characteristics in a continuum game are not too dissimilar. Equilibria of continuum games are described by equilibrium distributions, as in Mas-Colell (1984).

“Generic” in the set of continuum games is formally expressed as “open and dense” in the topology that treats two such games as close if they are close in the narrow topology and if their supports are close in the Hausdorff metric topology. “Close” for two continuum games in the former topology means that they involve similar players' characteristics with similar frequencies; the extra requirement of being “close” in the latter topology means that they are close only if they involve similar players' characteristics. In the notion of a generic set of continuum games, “open” means stability against perturbations, and “dense” that every continuum game can be approximated by continuum games belonging to the generic set.

We remark that the generic set of continuum games we identify in the proof of our main result (Theorem 1) is defined intrinsically in the sense that no reference to the particular problem of equilibrium existence in large finite-player games is made. Roughly, this set consists of those continuum games ν which have an equilibrium

distribution such that the corresponding externality (which is the same for all players in a continuum game) has a neighborhood on which (a) the correspondence that sends externalities to the externalities determined by the best replies of the players with characteristics in the support of ν can be identified with a differentiable function, and (b) at each point, the derivative of this function minus the identity matrix has maximal rank.

The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section we mention some of the related literature. In Section 3, the model is set up and the results are stated. Detailed proofs can be found in Section 5, after a Section 4 providing an outline of the proof of the main result. In an appendix, some auxiliary lemmata, which combine some more or less well-known mathematical facts, are stated and proved.⁵

2 Related literature

Results related to ours can be found in Rashid (1983), Khan and Sun (1999), Kalai (2004), Carmona and Podczeck (2009), and Carmona and Podczeck (2012b), who have established that sufficiently large finite-player games have pure strategy approximate equilibria.⁶ Relative to that literature, the contribution of the present paper consists in presenting a setting of games which allows to drop the “approximate” qualifier generically (see Theorems 1 and 3 below). This is important because approximate equilibria are not always appealing;⁷ thus, by dispensing with this qualification, this

⁵A longer version of this paper (Carmona and Podczeck, 2019) contains additional material, including a somewhat broader literature review, an application of our results to Cournot oligopoly, and some discussion of games with essentially ordinally non-equivalent payoff functions.

⁶Here “pure strategy approximate equilibrium” means a strategy profile such that for some numbers $\epsilon > 0$ and $0 \leq \eta < 1$, players which make up a fraction of at least $1 - \eta$ cannot deviate so that payoffs increase more than ϵ (in Kalai (2004) and some of the results of Carmona and Podczeck (2009) the number η is zero), and “sufficiently large” means that these numbers can be chosen arbitrarily small if one takes the number of players large enough.

⁷Consider a finite-player game where each player can choose one number in the interval $[0, 1]$, and each player’s payoff is the average choice of the entire population (including his own choice). If this game is played by n players, then the pure strategy profile where each player chooses 0 is an ϵ -equilibrium with $\epsilon = 1/n$; on the other hand, for each player, 1 is a strictly dominant strategy.

is something we do not have to worry about in our results. In fact, we obtain strict equilibria (i.e., players have unique best-replies) generically, so in an equilibrium there is no indeterminacy regarding which actions players will choose. For these reasons, our analysis provides an important supplement to the above mentioned results.

Asymptotic implementation of equilibria of continuum games, as defined in the introduction, was considered in Housman (1988) and Carmona and Podczeck (2012a). The corresponding results in those papers were stated in terms of approximate equilibria of finite-player games. As above, we can drop the “approximate” qualifier. In fact, in our model, every equilibrium of every continuum game, not just an equilibrium of a “generic” continuum game, can be asymptotically implemented in terms of strict pure strategy Nash equilibria of finite-player games (see Theorems 2 and 3).

In our companion paper Carmona and Podczeck (2020), we deal with the same questions as in the present paper, but without differentiability assumptions on payoff functions. There, for the case of finite action spaces, we obtain results that are analogous to those in the present paper. In contrast, beyond the finite actions case, our results in Carmona and Podczeck (2020) rely, directly or indirectly, on the use of “highly concentrated” mixed strategies; here, we show that mixed strategies can be completely dispensed with in our results.

In the present paper, the goal is to allow players’ actions to vary continuously and at the same time to obtain strict pure strategy Nash equilibria for large finite-player games. For this, we adopt a setting in which payoff functions have differentiability properties. The main idea of our analysis is that, with such payoff functions, there is a generic set of continuum games which have equilibria for which the following are true: (i) at the equilibrium actions, payoff functions are locally strictly concave in the own actions of players, so that best reply sets are singletons locally; (ii) this implies that best reply sets are singletons globally, (iii) this property remains true in the product of some neighborhood of a game belonging to the generic set and some neighborhood of the externality arising in the equilibrium under consideration; (iv) we can use (iii) to get existence of strict pure strategy Nash equilibrium along sequences of finite-player games with a limit in the generic set of continuum games if

the number of players is large enough.⁸

A similar idea underlies the analysis of Mas-Colell (1977, Theorem 2), who considers non-convex differentiable preferences in a general equilibrium framework of large economies. Concerning (i) above, see also Trockel (1984, p. 10). For an analysis of large economies where agents' preferences are convex, see Dierker (1975).

Apart from this similarity, the arguments in our proofs and in those of Mas-Colell (1977) differ to a large extent. For instance, in Mas-Colell (1977) existence of equilibria in large finite economies close to a generic continuum economies can be established by just applying an implicit function theorem to a (locally defined) excess demand function depending on prices and distributions of preferences (actually, Mas-Colell (1977) refers to Dierker (1975) at this point). In our setting, we cannot proceed this way, because, in finite-player games, different players may face different summary statistics of the actions of the respective other players, so that the dimension of domain of the problem increases with the number of players; as a consequence, we need a fixed point result to get pure strategy Nash equilibria. We also remark that in Mas-Colell (1977) there is no counterpart of the treatment of asymptotic implementability of any equilibrium of any continuum game.

As already pointed out in the introduction, Schmeidler (1973) and Mas-Colell (1984) established the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium for games with a continuum of players. We contribute to this literature by establishing the generic existence of pure strategy strict equilibrium for sufficiently large finite-player games.

Schmeidler (1973) is part of a literature where, different from the distributional approach adopted in the present paper to describe continuum games and their equilibria, an explicitly specified atomless measure space of players and a measurable map from this space to some space of players' characteristics are taken as given, and equilibria are described directly by strategy profiles (see also, e.g., Balder (2002) or the more recent treatment by Khan et al. (2017)). For the purpose of our paper, the distinction between the individualistic and the distributional approach is not important for the

⁸We can only be sketchy here. We just note that even though we do not assume action sets to be convex, (i) makes sense because we may assume them to have dense interior, and open sets in a Euclidean space include convex neighborhoods of each of their points.

following two reasons: First, the focus of our asymptotic generic existence result is finite-player games; continuum games matter only as a “reference point” and their equilibrium distributions provide all the information needed. Second, our asymptotic implementation result can be translated to the individualistic context using standard arguments: Given an explicit atomless measure space of players and a map from this space to a space of players’ characteristics, the joint distribution of this map and an equilibrium strategy profile is an equilibrium distribution to which we can apply our asymptotic implementation result.

It bears some repetition to emphasize that our asymptotic implementation result provides a robust version for the equilibrium existence results of Schmeidler (1973) and Mas-Colell (1984). Regarding the latter, it provides a sense under which equilibrium distributions of continuum games can be regarded as pure strategies as they are shown to be limits of pure strategy strict equilibria of large finite-player games.

3 The model and the results

3.1 General notation and terminology

If X is any metric space, we write ρ_H for the Hausdorff metric on the set of non-empty compact subsets of X .⁹ Recall that on the set of non-empty compact subsets of a metric space X , the topology defined from the Hausdorff metric depends only on the topology of X , not on the particular metric.

For a subset A of a topological space X , $\text{int } A$ denotes the interior of A , ∂A the boundary of A , $\text{cl } A$ the closure of A , and $A \setminus B$ set-theoretic subtraction. If $A \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$, then $\text{co}A$ denotes the convex hull of A .

If μ is a Borel measure on a separable metric space X , we write $\text{supp}(\mu)$ for the support of μ , i.e., the smallest closed subset of X with full measure. (Recall that every Borel measure on a separable metric space has a support.) If μ is a Borel measure on a product $X \times Y$ of metric spaces, μ_X and μ_Y denote the marginal measures on X

⁹That is, $\rho_H(A, B) = \max\{\max_{a \in A} d(a, B), \max_{b \in B} d(b, A)\}$ for any two non-empty compact sets $A, B \subseteq X$, writing d for the metric of X .

and Y respectively.

Euclidean spaces are regarded as being equipped with the Euclidean norm. For any point x in such a space, and any number $r > 0$, we write $B(x, r)$ for the open ball of center x and radius r , and $\bar{B}(x, r)$ for the closed ball of center x and radius r .

Let $X \subseteq \mathbb{R}^k$ be such that $\text{int } X$ is dense in X (which is true, in particular, if X is convex and $\text{int } X \neq \emptyset$). We say that a function $f: X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^\ell$ is continuously differentiable if there is an open $\tilde{X} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^k$ including X such that f can be extended to a function $\tilde{f}: \tilde{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^\ell$ which is continuously differentiable in the usual sense; the derivatives of f at non-interior points of X are defined to be those of \tilde{f} (note that these derivatives do not depend on the particular choice of the extension \tilde{f} if $\text{int } X$ is dense in X .) In this case, we write $Df(x)$ for the derivative of f at $x \in X$, and Df for the map $x \mapsto Df(x)$. If Df happens again to be continuously differentiable in the above sense, we say that f is twice continuously differentiable; in this case, $D^2f(x)$ stands for $DDf(x)$, and D^2f for the map $x \mapsto D^2f(x)$. If f is defined on a product $X \times Y$, where Y is any set and X is as above, then $D_x f(x, y)$ means the derivative of $f(\cdot, y)$ at $x \in X$ if $f(\cdot, y)$ is continuously differentiable; if $f(\cdot, y)$ is twice continuously differentiable, $D_x^2 f(x, y)$ stands for $D_x D_x f(x, y)$.

3.2 Actions and externality

We will consider games with a large number of players (as a particular case, with a continuum of players), where the payoff of a player is determined by his/her own action and an externality which is given by finitely many summary statistics of the distribution of the actions of the other players, as in Balder (2002) or Rauh (2003), and payoff functions have differentiability properties. We start setting up the model by fixing an ambient so as to get suitable sets for the domains of payoff functions.

There is a universe A of possible actions, which is a non-empty and compact subset of \mathbb{R}^n , with dense interior. Action sets of games will be included in A and also have dense interior.

Summary statistics of a distribution τ_A of actions in A are given by the formulae $\int g_1(a) d\tau_A(a), \dots, \int g_m(a) d\tau_A(a)$ where $g_i, i = 1, \dots, m$, is a continuously differen-

tiable function from A to \mathbb{R} (given independently of τ_A). We write g for the vector (g_1, \dots, g_m) , and $\int g(a) d\tau_A(a)$ for the vector $(\int g_1(a) d\tau_A(a), \dots, \int g_m(a) d\tau_A(a))$. A natural example is obtained by setting

$$g(a) = (a_{(1)}, a_{(1)}^2 \dots a_{(1)}^k, a_{(2)}, a_{(2)}^2 \dots a_{(2)}^k, \dots, a_{(n)}, \dots, a_{(n)}^k)$$

for each $a \in A$, where superscripts are exponents and the subscript (h) means the h th coordinate of a , $h = 1, \dots, n$; in this case, $m = kn$ and $\int g(a) d\tau_A(a)$ is the vector of the first k non-central moments of the coordinate-distributions determined by τ_A ; see Rauh (2003). A special case of this example is given if $m = n$ and g is the restriction to A of the identity on \mathbb{R}^n , so that $\int g(a) d\tau_A(a)$ is the “mean action” corresponding to the distribution τ_A on A .

For any player and any distribution τ_A on A induced by the actions of the other players in a game, the externality is $e(\tau_A) = \int g(a) d\tau_A(a)$. Set

$$E = \left\{ \int g d\tau_A : \tau_A \text{ is a probability measure on } A \right\}.$$

Note that E is a convex and compact subset of \mathbb{R}^m , and that E is just the convex hull of the compact set $g(A)$. Every point of E can arise as externality for a player in some continuum game. Thus the set E can be seen as the universe of possible externalities.

In finite-player games, the set of externalities an individual player could actually face is of the form $\sum_{j \neq 1}^l g(A_j)/l$. To ensure that in games with sufficiently many players such sets have dense interior, i.e., are appropriate for differentiability assumptions on payoff functions, we make the following assumption on the map g : whenever O is an open set in \mathbb{R}^n with $O \subseteq A$, then $g(O)$ affinely spans \mathbb{R}^m (in other words, the smallest affine subspace in \mathbb{R}^m including $g(O)$ is \mathbb{R}^m itself); see Lemma 9 in the appendix for the desired conclusion. This assumption simply imposes some kind of homogeneity property on the map g . We remark that the assumption is satisfied if g is such that $\int g d\tau_A$ is, as in the example above, the vector of the first k non-central moments of the coordinate-distributions determined by τ_A ; see Lemma 10 in the appendix.¹⁰

¹⁰For an example where this assumption fails, put $A = [0, 1]$ and let $g: A \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ be a continuously differentiable function with a non-zero derivative at some point of A , but such that the derivative vanishes on some non-degenerate subinterval of A .

3.3 Payoff functions

A payoff function is a real-valued function u with $\text{dom } u = A_u \times E_u$ where A_u and E_u are subsets of the actions universe A and the externalities universe E respectively. The set A_u is the action set of a player with payoff function u . (We thus specify actions sets of players by components of the domains of payoff functions; this is for notational efficiency.) The set E_u is referred to as the externalities factor in $\text{dom } u$.

This formalization of payoff functions will be convenient because it gives an easy way to setup a space of payoff functions so that, in actual games, the domain of the payoff function of any player does not depend on action profiles that this player cannot observe. E.g., in a finite-player game, the set of externalities relevant for the payoff of an individual player is of the form $\sum_{j=1}^l g(A_j)/l$, where the A_j 's are the action sets of the other players, so this set is the natural choice of the externalities factor in the domain of the payoff function of this player. (See also Remark 2 below).

We write $\varphi(u, e)$ for the best reply set of a player with payoff function u if he faces $e \in E_u$ as externality. Thus

$$\varphi(u, e) = \left\{ a \in A_u : u(a, e) = \max_{a' \in A_u} u(a', e) \right\}.$$

We assume that for a payoff function u , and the associated sets A_u and E_u , the following are satisfied:

- (U1) A_u and E_u are non-empty compact subsets of A and E , respectively, such that both A_u and E_u have dense interior;
- (U2) u is twice continuously differentiable;
- (U3) if $(a, e) \in \partial A_u \times E_u$, then there is an $a' \in A_u$ such that $u(a', e) > u(a, e)$.

Note that (a) and (b) imply that $\varphi(u, e)$ is non-empty for each $e \in E_u$, and that (c) implies that $\varphi(u, e) \subseteq \text{int } A_u$ for each $e \in E_u$.

3.4 Space of payoff functions

The set of payoff functions is denoted by \mathcal{U} . In Section 5.1 we show that there is unique metrizable topology on \mathcal{U} such that a sequence $\langle u_k \rangle$ in \mathcal{U} converges to some

$u \in \mathcal{U}$ if and only if

- (a) $\rho_H(\text{dom } u, \text{dom } u_k) \rightarrow 0$ and $\rho_H(\partial A_u, \partial A_{u_k}) \rightarrow 0$; (b) if $(a, e) \in \text{dom } u$ and $(a_k, e_k) \in \text{dom } u_k$, $k \in \mathbb{N}$, are such that $(a_k, e_k) \rightarrow (a, e)$, then $u_k(a_k, e_k) \rightarrow u(a, e)$, $Du_k(a_k, e_k) \rightarrow Du(e, a)$, and $D^2u_k(a_k, e_k) \rightarrow D^2u(e, a)$.¹¹

In the rest of the paper, \mathcal{U} is regarded as being equipped with this topology, and for definiteness we fix any metric ρ inducing this topology, so that \mathcal{U} can be regarded as a metric space if necessary. None of our results depend on any specific metric inducing the topology of \mathcal{U} ; in particular, none of our them depend on the choice of the metric ρ .

Evidently on subsets of \mathcal{U} consisting of functions with a common domain, the topology of \mathcal{U} is just the topology of C^2 -uniform convergence. We also note that \mathcal{U} is a separable topological space (see Lemma 2 in Section 5.1).

Concerning the condition “ $\rho_H(\partial A_u, \partial A_{u_k}) \rightarrow 0$ ” in (a) above, this condition is needed in addition to the condition “ $\rho_H(\text{dom } u, \text{dom } u_k) \rightarrow 0$ ” to have a notion of closeness of action sets such that an interior point of an action set is also an interior point of nearby action sets. This is central for our results, but unfortunately is not implied by the condition “ $\rho_H(\text{dom } u, \text{dom } u_k) \rightarrow 0$ ” alone, unless action sets are assumed to be convex. In fact, for convex action sets, “ $\rho_H(\text{dom } u, \text{dom } u_k) \rightarrow 0$ ” implies “ $\rho_H(\partial A_u, \partial A_{u_k}) \rightarrow 0$ ” (see Wills, 2007). Of course, in scenarios where all players have the same action set (as considered in Theorem 3 below), the condition $\rho_H(\partial A_u, \partial A_{u_k}) \rightarrow 0$ can be dropped from (a).

3.5 Finite-player games

Recall that m is the dimension of the ambient Euclidean space of the externalities universe E . We consider finite-player games given by pairs (I, G) where I is a finite set of players, with $\#(I) \geq \max\{2, m + 1\}$, and G is a map from I to \mathcal{U} such that $E_i = \sum_{j \in I \setminus \{i\}} g(A_j) / ((\#I) - 1)$ for each $i \in I$, writing E_i for $E_{G(i)}$ and A_j for $A_{G(j)}$. Note that for a player i in a finite-player game (I, G) , any distribution of actions

¹¹Concerning (a), note that by what has been remarked in Section 3.1, convergence for the Hausdorff metric on the family of non-empty compact subsets of a Euclidean space X is topological, i.e., does not depend on the particular metric inducing the topology of X .

chosen by the other players is of the form $\sum_{j \in I \setminus \{i\}} \delta_{a_j} / ((\#I) - 1)$ where δ_{a_j} denotes Dirac measure at point a_j in the action set A_j of $j \in I \setminus \{i\}$. Thus the equality $E_i = \sum_{j \in I \setminus \{i\}} g(A_j) / ((\#I) - 1)$ means that the externalities factor in the domain of the payoff function of a player i is exactly the set of externalities the player could actually face in the game (I, G) . If $\#(I) > m$, then by Lemma 9, $\text{int} \sum_{j \in I \setminus \{i\}} g(A_j) / ((\#I) - 1)$ is dense in $\sum_{j \in I \setminus \{i\}} g(A_j) / ((\#I) - 1)$, so the conditions $E_i = \sum_{j \in I \setminus \{i\}} g(A_j) / ((\#I) - 1)$ are consistent with (U1) in the assumptions on payoff functions and therefore with the definition of \mathcal{U} . Because the focus of our paper is on large games, there is no problem with a condition based on the imagination that a game have sufficiently many players.

A strategy profile in a finite-player game (I, G) is a map $f: I \rightarrow A$ such that $f(i) \in A_i$ for each $i \in I$. Given any strategy profile f , we write $e_{f,i}$ for the externality faced by player i ; that is, $e_{f,i} = \sum_{j \in I \setminus \{i\}} g(f(j)) / (\#(I) - 1)$, or, in other words, $e_{f,i} = \int g(a) d\tau_{A,f,i}(a)$, where $\tau_{A,f,i}$ is the distribution of the actions chosen by the players $j \in I \setminus \{i\}$; thus, for any Borel set $B \subseteq A$,

$$\tau_{A,f,i}(B) = \#(\{j \in I \setminus \{i\} : f(j) \in B\}) / (\#(I) - 1).$$

A strategy profile $f: I \rightarrow A$ is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if $f(i) \in \varphi(G(i), e_{f,i})$ for each $i \in I$. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium is called strict if $\#(\varphi(G(i), e_{f,i})) = 1$ for each $i \in I$.

Every finite-player game (I, G) defines a distribution on \mathcal{U} , i.e., a distribution of payoff functions. We write ν_G for such a distribution; thus, for any Borel set B in \mathcal{U} , $\nu_G(B) = \#(\{i \in I : G(i) \in B\}) / \#(I)$.

3.6 Continuum games

Recall from Section 3.4 that \mathcal{U} can be regarded as a metric space. Let \mathcal{M} be the set of all Borel probability measures on \mathcal{U} with compact support. (By Lemma 2 in Section 5.1, \mathcal{U} is separable, so any Borel measure on \mathcal{U} has a support). We regard \mathcal{M} as being given the topology such that $\nu_n \rightarrow \nu$ if both $\nu_n \rightarrow \nu$ in the narrow topology¹²

¹²Recall that the narrow topology on the set of Borel measures on a metrizable topological space is the topology of pointwise convergence on the bounded continuous functions defined on this space, evaluation being given by integration.

and $\rho_H(\text{supp}(\nu_n), \text{supp}(\nu)) \rightarrow 0$, i.e., $\text{supp}(\nu_n) \rightarrow \text{supp}(\nu)$ in the Hausdorff metric topology. Note that for any finite-player game, ν_G as defined in the previous section belongs to \mathcal{M} . Given $\nu \in \mathcal{M}$, let

$$E(\nu) = \left\{ \int g \, d\tau_A : \tau \text{ is a probability measure on } \mathcal{U} \times A \text{ such that} \right. \\ \left. \tau_{\mathcal{U}} = \nu \text{ and } (u, a) \in \text{supp}(\tau) \text{ implies } a \in A_u \right\}.$$

Following Mas-Colell (1984), we define a continuum game as a distribution on the space of players' characteristics. We add the assumption that the support of the distribution of players' characteristics in a continuum game is compact, i.e., that players' characteristics in a continuum game are not too dissimilar. With a continuum of players, every player is negligible in the strict mathematical sense, so that there is no distinction between the "distribution of the actions chosen by all players" and the "distribution of the actions chosen by all but one player." Thus, because in any game the externalities factor in the domains of payoff functions must be equal to the set of externalities players could actually face, in our model a continuum game is an element $\nu \in \mathcal{M}$ such that $E_u = E(\nu)$ for each $u \in \text{supp}(\nu)$. By Lemma 5(a), requiring these equalities is consistent with the definition of \mathcal{U} . We write \mathcal{G} for the set of continuum games and give \mathcal{G} the subspace topology induced by the topology of \mathcal{M} (see the introduction for the meaning of this topology).

Pure strategy Nash equilibria of continuum games are specified in our model in terms of equilibrium distributions, as in Mas-Colell (1984). In our notation, an equilibrium distribution of a continuum game $\nu \in \mathcal{G}$ is a Borel probability measure τ on $\mathcal{U} \times A$ such that $\tau_{\mathcal{U}} = \nu$ and $\text{supp}(\tau) \subseteq \{(u, a) \in \mathcal{U} \times A : a \in \varphi(u, e(\tau_A))\}$. By Mas-Colell (1984), every continuum game $\nu \in \mathcal{G}$ has an equilibrium distribution.

Remark 1. Given $\nu \in \mathcal{G}$, there are plenty of sequences $\langle (I_n, G_n) \rangle_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ of finite-player games such that $\#(I_n) \rightarrow \infty$ and $\nu_{G_n} \rightarrow \nu$ in \mathcal{M} . Indeed, in Lemma 7 in Section 5.1 we show, based on the law of large numbers and the Shapley-Folkman theorem, that such sequences do exist. Of course, given such a sequence, there are uncountably many (ordinally non-equivalent) modifications of the countably many payoff functions involved such that the resulting sequences of finite-player games still converge to ν .

Remark 2. In our setup, whether or not a sequence of finite-player games converges to some continuum game depends only on players' payoffs at actions in their own actions sets and on the externalities they can potentially observe in an actual game. This would not be the case had we taken \mathcal{U} to be a space of functions defined on the product of the entire actions universe and the entire externalities universe.

3.7 Results

Our first result gives precision to the idea that, generically, pure strategy Nash equilibrium existence results for continuum games carry over to large finite-player games in a setting with differentiable payoff functions. In the context of this result, the compact support condition on the distributions of players' characteristics in continuum games means that, along sequences of finite-player games, players' characteristics must not become too dissimilar if the number of players increases towards infinity.

Theorem 1. *There is an open and dense subset \mathcal{G}^* of \mathcal{G} such that whenever $\nu \in \mathcal{G}^*$ and $\langle (I_n, G_n) \rangle_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ is a sequence of finite-player games such that $\#(I_n) \rightarrow \infty$ and $\nu_{G_n} \rightarrow \nu$, then there is an $N \in \mathbb{N}$ such that (I_n, G_n) has a strict pure strategy Nash equilibrium if $\#(I_n) \geq N$.*

The idea of the proof is first to identify an open and dense set $\mathcal{G}^* \subseteq \mathcal{G}$ such that if $\nu \in \mathcal{G}^*$, then ν has an equilibrium distribution τ such that, for some neighborhood V of $\text{supp}(\nu)$ and some neighborhood W of $e(\tau_A)$, best replies on $V \times W$ are given by a (continuously differentiable) function. Given such a ν , if $\langle (I_n, G_n) \rangle$ is sequence of finite-player games such that $\nu_{G_n} \rightarrow \nu$, then $\text{supp}(\nu_{G_n})$ must be in V eventually, and at this point the idea is to get strict pure strategy Nash equilibria for the games (I_n, G_n) if n is large enough by a fixed point argument, using the fact that best replies on $V \times W$ are given by a function, but taking care of the fact that in finite-player games different players may face different externalities. A more detailed overview of the proof of Theorem 1 is in Section 4.

The following example shows that, in the context of Theorem 1, we cannot do better than to obtain a result for generic distributions of players' characteristics, regardless of the number of players, i.e., of the size of I .

Example. Let $A = [-1/2, 3/2]$, and $v: A \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ a twice continuously differentiable function, with $Dv(1/2) = D^2v(1/2) = v(1/2) = 0$, assuming a global maximum, equal to 1, exactly at the points 0 and 1. Let $g: A \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ be the restriction to A of the identity on \mathbb{R} . Then $E = [-1/2, 3/2]$, and for each $f: I \rightarrow A$ and each $i \in I$, the externality $e_{f,i} \in E$ faced by i is the mean of the actions of the players different from i . Let $\#(I)$ be even, with $\#(I) \geq 4$. Partition I into sets H and J of equal size. For $i \in H$ the payoff function is $u_H: A \times E \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ defined by setting

$$u_H(a, e) = v(a)(3/2 - e) \text{ if } a < 1/2 \text{ and } u_H(a, e) = v(a) \text{ if } a \geq 1/2,$$

and for $i \in J$ the payoff function is $u_J: A \times E \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ defined by setting

$$u_J(a, e) = v(a)(e + 1/2) \text{ if } a < 1/2 \text{ and } u_J(a, e) = v(a) \text{ if } a \geq 1/2.$$

Note that for all $i \in I$ and all values of $e_{f,i}$, the best reply sets are included in $\{0, 1\}$, and that if $f: I \rightarrow A$ is a strategy profile such that $f(i) \in \{0, 1\}$ for all $i \in I$, then $e_{f,i} = \#\{j \in I \setminus \{i\} : a_j = 1\} / \#(I - 1)$ for each $i \in I$.

Now suppose $f: I \rightarrow A$ is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Consider $i, i' \in H$ and suppose $f(i) = 0$ and $f(i') = 1$. Then, by optimal choice of actions, $e_{f,i} \leq 1/2$ and $e_{f,i'} \geq 1/2$. On the other hand, calculating frequencies, we see that $f(i) = 0$ and $f(i') = 1$ together imply that $e_{f,i} > e_{f,i'}$, and from this contradiction it follows that all members of H must choose the same action, say 0. But then, because $\#(I)$ is even, $e_{f,i} < 1/2$ for all members i of J , so they all must play 1, by optimal choice of actions. This, however, means that $e_{f,i} > 1/2$ for all members of H , again because $\#(I)$ is even, so their optimal actions are also equal to 1, and this contradiction shows that no pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists.

In regard to this example, note that the set of games having pure strategy Nash equilibria is closed in the set of all games with the given number of players. Thus this example actually provides a counter-example to the idea it could be possible in our model to define, for any finite number of players, a generic set of payoff-functions such that every game with the given finite number of players and payoff functions in this set had a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

The arguments in the proof of Theorem 1 can be used to show that, in our model, every equilibrium distribution of every continuum game is the limit of some sequence of finite-player games and corresponding strict pure strategy Nash equilibria, in the sense of the following definition.

Definition. Let $\nu \in \mathcal{G}$ be a continuum game and τ an equilibrium distribution for ν . A sequence $\langle (I_n, G_n) \rangle_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ of finite-player games such that $\#(I_n) \rightarrow \infty$ and $\nu_{G_n} \rightarrow \nu$ is said to *asymptotically implement* (ν, τ) if for all n larger than some $N \in \mathbb{N}$, (I_n, G_n) has a strict pure strategy Nash equilibrium f_n such that the sequence of distributions of the maps $G_n \times f_n$ converges to τ narrowly. We say that (ν, τ) is *asymptotically implementable* if it can be asymptotically implemented by some sequence $\langle (I_n, G_n) \rangle_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ with $\#(I_n) \rightarrow \infty$ and $\nu_{G_n} \rightarrow \nu$.

Theorem 2. *Every (ν, τ) , where $\nu \in \mathcal{G}$ is a continuum game and τ is an equilibrium distribution for ν , is asymptotically implementable by a sequence $\langle (I_n, G_n) \rangle_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ of finite-player games such that $\nu_{G_n} \in \mathcal{G}$ for each n .*

We emphasize that every continuum game can be taken in Theorem 2, not just one from a generic set. Thus Theorem 2 shows that, in our model, no equilibrium distribution of any continuum game is an artifact of having continuum many players.

The idea of the proof is to show first that any continuum game $\nu \in \mathcal{G}$, and any equilibrium distribution τ of ν , can be approximated by ν 's belonging to the generic set \mathcal{G}^* from Theorem 1, together with equilibrium distributions witnessing this. We then extend the arguments of the proof of Theorem 1 and show that, given any $\nu' \in \mathcal{G}^*$, and any equilibrium distribution τ' witnessing this, along every sequence $\langle (I_n, G_n) \rangle$ of finite-player games such that $\nu_{G_n} \rightarrow \nu'$ there are strict pure strategy Nash equilibria f_n if n is large enough such that the distributions of the maps $G_n \times f_n$ converge to τ' narrowly. Coupling these arguments with an argument (based on the law of large numbers) showing that sequences of finite player games converging to a given continuum game do exist, Theorem 2 follows by an obvious diagonal argument.

We note that the approximating sequence of finite player games is, in general, different from a finite-player truncation of the given continuum game, i.e., it is not generally the case that $\text{supp}(\nu_{G_n}) \subseteq \text{supp}(\nu)$. However, if $\langle (\hat{I}_n, \hat{G}_n) \rangle_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ is a sequence

of finite-player games such that $\#(\hat{I}_n) \rightarrow \infty$, $\nu_{\hat{G}_n} \rightarrow \nu$, and $\text{supp}(\nu_{\hat{G}_n}) \subseteq \text{supp}(\nu)$, then (\hat{I}_n, \hat{G}_n) and (I_n, G_n) are arbitrarily close when n is large.

In much of the literature on continuum games it is assumed, following Schmeidler (1973) and Mas-Colell (1984), that all players have the same action set. In our model, the set of continuum games in which all players have the same action set is not open in the set of all continuum games, so Theorems 1 and 2 do not apply to this special case. We will address this case with another theorem. To this end, it is convenient to settle some additional notation.

Let \mathcal{C} be the set of all closed subsets C of the actions universe A such that C has dense interior. For each $C \in \mathcal{C}$, let $S_C = \{u \in \mathcal{U}: A_u = C\}$. Note that S_C is closed in \mathcal{U} for each $C \in \mathcal{C}$. For each $C \in \mathcal{C}$, let $\mathcal{M}_C = \{\nu \in \mathcal{M}: \text{supp}(\nu) \subseteq S_C\}$ and $\mathcal{G}_C = \mathcal{G} \cap \mathcal{M}_C$.

Theorem 3. *Given any $C \in \mathcal{C}$, there is a relatively open dense subset \mathcal{G}_C^* of \mathcal{G}_C such that whenever $\nu \in \mathcal{G}_C^*$ and $\langle (I_n, G_n) \rangle_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ is a sequence of finite-player games such that $\#(I_n) \rightarrow \infty$ and $\nu_{G_n} \rightarrow \nu$, then there is an $N \in \mathbb{N}$ such that (I_n, G_n) has a strict pure strategy Nash equilibrium if $\#(I_n) \geq N$; moreover, every (ν, τ) , where $\nu \in \mathcal{G}_C$ is a continuum game and τ is an equilibrium distribution for ν , is asymptotically implementable by a sequence $\langle (I_n, G_n) \rangle_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ of finite-player games such that $\nu_{G_n} \in \mathcal{M}_C$ for each n .*

The ideas of the proof are the same as those of the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2, modulo that concerning asymptotic implementation of equilibrium distributions of continuum games one has to take care to choose finite-player games in which all players have the correct action set.

4 Overview of the proof of the main result

In this section we sketch the argument for our main result, Theorem 1, in the special case in which all players have the same action set $A = [0, 1]$ and the externality map g is the identity on A , i.e., $g = id_A$ (which is actually a special case of Theorem 3).

In this special case, regardless of the number of players in a game, in particular,

regardless of whether the set of players is finite or a continuum, the externality set of any player is equal to $[0, 1]$, so that $[0, 1]$ can be taken to be the universe E of externalities. Thus, the space \mathcal{U} of possible payoff functions is the space of twice continuously differentiable functions on $A \times E \equiv [0, 1] \times [0, 1]$, and the topology of \mathcal{U} is just the standard topology of C^2 -uniform convergence. Note also for the sequel that the choice of g to be id_A entails that the boundary assumption (U3) on payoff functions implies that equilibrium externalities are always in the interior of E .

We build up to the generic set \mathcal{G}^* by considering first the subset \mathcal{G}_1 of \mathcal{G} consisting of those ν such that for some equilibrium distribution τ of ν ,

- (i) $\#(\varphi(u, e(\tau_A))) = 1$ for each $u \in \text{supp}(\nu)$;
- (ii) for each $u \in \text{supp}(\nu)$, $D_a^2 u(a_u, e(\tau_A)) < 0$, where a_u is the unique element of $\varphi(u, e(\tau_A))$.

Using the implicit function theorem, and the choice of the topology on \mathcal{U} , we can show that the conditions imply that for each $\nu \in \mathcal{G}_1$, there are neighborhoods V of $\text{supp}(\nu)$ in \mathcal{U} and W of $e(\tau_A)$ in E such that, on $V \times W$, best replies of u against e can be described by a continuous map h such that $h(u, \cdot)$ is continuously differentiable. In particular, for each $e \in W$, $\int h(u, e) d\nu(u)$ is the resulting externality when players reply against e optimally. Hence, the map $\xi: W \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$, defined by setting

$$\xi(e) = \int h(u, e) d\nu(u) - e$$

for each $e \in W$, is such that its zeros are equilibrium externalities; for each equilibrium externality e , the corresponding equilibrium distributions is $\nu \circ (id_{\mathcal{U}} \times h(\cdot, e))^{-1}$. Also, by Leibniz' rule, the map ξ is continuously differentiable.

Let \mathcal{G}^* be the subset of \mathcal{G}_1 consisting of those ν such that for some equilibrium distribution τ of ν the associated map ξ has a derivative $D\xi(e(\tau_A))$ different from zero. This is needed in the fixed-point argument sketched below. The set \mathcal{G}^* is the generic set of Theorem 1. We next sketch why \mathcal{G}^* is open and dense in \mathcal{G} .

To see that \mathcal{G}^* is open, fix $\nu \in \mathcal{G}^*$, and let V , W , and h be as above. By the choice of the topology on \mathcal{G} , there is a neighborhood U of ν in \mathcal{G} such that $\text{supp}(\nu') \subseteq V$ for

all $\nu' \in U$. We can therefore define a map $\xi_U: U \times W \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$ by setting

$$\xi_U(\nu', e) = \int h(u, e) d\nu'(u) - e$$

for each $\nu' \in U$ and $e \in W$ which has the property that $\xi_U(\nu', e) = 0$ implies that e is an equilibrium externality in the continuum game ν' . The defining properties of \mathcal{G}^* imply that we can use a version of the implicit function theorem to obtain a continuous map $\nu' \mapsto e(\nu'): U \rightarrow W$ such that $\xi_U(\nu', e(\nu')) = 0$ for each $\nu' \in U$ (shrinking U , if necessary). Thus, $e(\nu')$ is an equilibrium externality of the continuum game ν' and the corresponding equilibrium distribution is, as above, $\tau' = \nu' \circ (id_U \times h(\cdot, e(\nu')))^{-1}$. Thus, any $\nu' \in U$ has an equilibrium distribution such that (i) in the definition of \mathcal{G}_1 holds; condition (ii) is easy to verify as is the condition that $D_e \xi_U(\nu', e(\nu')) \neq 0$, the latter because $D_e \xi_U(\nu', e')$ depends continuously on (ν', e') . It thus follows that \mathcal{G}^* is open.

Denseness of \mathcal{G}^* is established by perturbing the payoff functions in any given continuum game. Such a perturbation is used first to show that \mathcal{G}_1 is dense in \mathcal{G} : Fix $\nu \in \mathcal{G}$ and let τ be an equilibrium distribution of ν . For each $(u, a) \in \text{supp}(\tau)$, we make each action a be a strict best-reply for payoff function u roughly by adding a function ρ to u . Specifically, choose a twice continuously differentiable map $\rho: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ such that $\rho(0) = 0 > \rho(x)$ for all $x \in \mathbb{R} \setminus \{0\}$ and $D^2 \rho(0) < 0$. For each $k \in \mathbb{N}$, $u \in \text{supp}(\nu)$, and $a \in A$, define $u_{k,a}: A \times E \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ by setting

$$u_{k,a}(a', e) = u(a', e) + \frac{1}{k+1}(\rho(a - a'))$$

for each $(a', e) \in A \times E$; if k is large enough, then all assumptions on payoff functions are satisfied by $u_{k,a}$, and $u_{k,a}$ is close to the corresponding u . We can then construct a continuum game by changing payoff functions u to $u_{k,a}$; formally, define a map $\lambda_k: \text{supp}(\nu) \times A \rightarrow \mathcal{U}$ by setting $\lambda_k(u, a) = u_{k,a}$ for each $u \in \text{supp}(\nu)$ and $a \in A$. Then τ_k defined as $\tau_k = \tau \circ (\lambda_k \times id_A)^{-1}$ is an equilibrium distribution for $\nu_k = \tau \circ \lambda_k^{-1}$, witnessing that $\nu_k \in \mathcal{G}_1$. It follows that \mathcal{G}_1 is dense in \mathcal{G} .

For the denseness of \mathcal{G}^* , it now suffices to show that \mathcal{G}^* is dense in \mathcal{G}_1 . Fix $\nu \in \mathcal{G}_1$ and let τ be an equilibrium distribution for ν , witnessing that $\nu \in \mathcal{G}_1$. Set $\bar{e} = e(\tau_A)$. Roughly, the argument consists in constructing a family of continuum of games ν_λ ,

indexed by $\lambda \in [0, 1)$, and corresponding equilibrium distributions τ_λ , both depending continuously on λ , such that the externality $e(\tau_{\lambda,A})$ is always \bar{e} and the derivative $D\xi_\lambda(\bar{e})$ is zero for at most one value of λ , where ξ_λ is associated with τ_λ as above. This is done as follows. For each $u \in \text{supp}(\nu)$ and each $\lambda \in [0, 1)$, define $u_\lambda: A \times E \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ by setting

$$u_\lambda(a, e) = u(a, (1 - \lambda)\bar{e} + \lambda e)$$

for each $(a, e) \in A_u \times E(\nu)$. There is no difference between $u_\lambda(\cdot, \bar{e})$ and $u(\cdot, \bar{e})$, hence changing payoff function from u to u_λ yields a continuum game which belongs to \mathcal{G}_1 . Indeed, define $\kappa_\lambda: \text{supp}(\nu) \rightarrow \mathcal{U}$ by setting $\kappa_\lambda(u) = u_\lambda$. Set $\nu_\lambda = \nu \circ \kappa_\lambda^{-1}$ and $\tau_\lambda = \nu \circ (\kappa_\lambda \times h(\cdot, \bar{e}))^{-1}$. Clearly, for every $u_\lambda \in \text{supp}(\nu_\lambda)$, the optimal response against \bar{e} is the same as that of the corresponding $u \in \text{supp}(\nu)$, so ν_λ belongs to \mathcal{G}_1 , and τ_λ is an equilibrium distribution for ν_λ witnessing this. Moreover, we have

$$D\xi_\lambda(\bar{e}) = \lambda \int_{\mathcal{U}} D_e h(u, \bar{e}) d\nu(u) - 1,$$

so $D\xi_\lambda(\bar{e})$ can be zero for at most one value of λ . Hence, it is possible to choose λ as close to 1 as we please, while having $D\xi_\lambda(\bar{e}) \neq 0$. As each ν_λ belongs to \mathcal{G}_1 , it follows that \mathcal{G}^* is dense in \mathcal{G}_1 .

Finally, we outline the proof of the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria for members of the tail of a sequence $\langle (I_n, G_n) \rangle_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ of finite-player games such that $\#(I_n) \rightarrow \infty$ and $\nu_{G_n} \rightarrow \nu \in \mathcal{G}^*$. To see this, let τ be an equilibrium distribution for ν , witnessing that $\nu \in \mathcal{G}^*$. Let V, W, h , and ξ be associated with ν and τ as above. For large n , $\text{supp}(\nu_{G_n}) \subset V$, so best replies for any $u \in \text{supp}(\nu_{G_n})$ against any $e \in W$ are given by the function h . The idea now is to set up a fixed point problem as follows.

Let \widehat{W} be a compact interval such that $e(\tau_A) \in \text{int } \widehat{W}$ and $\widehat{W} \subseteq \text{int } W$. If n is large enough, then for each strategy profile $f \in A^{I_n}$ and each $i \in I_n$,

$$\int a d\tau_{A,f,i}(a) - \int a d\tau_{A,f}(a) + e \in W$$

whenever $e \in \widehat{W}$. Thus, for large n , we can define a map $\Lambda: A^{I_n} \times \widehat{W} \rightarrow A^{I_n} \times \mathbb{R}$ by setting

$$\Lambda(f, e) = \left(\left\langle h \left(G_n(i), \int a d\tau_{A,f,i}(a) - \int a d\tau_{A,f}(a) + e \right) \right\rangle_{i \in I_n}, \int a d\tau_{A,f}(a) \right)$$

for each $f \in A^{I_n}$ and $e \in \widehat{W}$. If (f, e) is a fixed point of this map, then $e = \int a \, d\tau_{A,f}(a)$ and thus for each $i \in I_n$, $\int a \, d\tau_{A,f,i}(a)$, that is the externality induced by the actions of the players other than i , equals $\int a \, d\tau_{A,f,i}(a) - \int a \, d\tau_{A,f}(a) + e$, implying that $f_i = h(G_n(i), \int a \, d\tau_{A,f,i}(a))$; thus, f is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of (I_n, G_n) . It is important to note that Λ is not a self-map. But since $\nu \in \mathcal{G}^*$ and τ witnesses this, we have $D\xi(e(\tau_A)) \neq 0$; in particular, there is neighborhood of $e(\tau_A)$ included in \widehat{W} on which $\xi(e) = 0$ if and only if $e = e(\tau_A)$. Based on these facts, we can show that a fixed-point result due to Mas-Colell (1983) can be applied to the situation (again if n is large enough).

We now mention some of the difficulties in extending these arguments to the general case considered in Theorem 1. First, the externalities set of a player in a finite-player game depends, in general, on the number of players in the game. This is so even when there is a common action set. E.g., take $A = [0, 1]$ as above, but take $a \mapsto (a, a^2)$ for the map g ; this just adds some notion of dispersion to the average of actions considered above as externality.

Second, in general the boundary assumption on payoff functions does not guarantee that equilibrium externalities are in the interior of the externality sets. This is so even with a continuum of players, and even when players have the same common action sets. As an example, again take $A = [0, 1]$ for the common action set of players, and for g take the map $a \mapsto (a, a^2): A \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^2$. To show that, for continuum games, equilibrium externalities are, generically, in the interior of the externality sets, which is needed to be in a convenient position to apply differentiability techniques, makes up for the main difficulty of this paper.

5 Proofs

This section contains the proofs of our results. Here is a short roadmap.

In Section 3.4 we have made a convention on the topology of the space \mathcal{U} of payoff functions. In Lemma 1 below we prove the existence of this topology, and in Lemma 2 that \mathcal{U} (with this topology) is separable.

We continue with some more preparing lemmata. We mention Lemma 7, which

proves the fact announced in Remark 1 that, in our model, every continuum game can be approximated by finite-player games, a fact that is a prerequisite for asymptotic implementability of equilibrium distributions of continuum games.

The set \mathcal{G}^* in the statement of Theorem 1 is defined in (c) of the proof of this theorem. The proof that this set is dense in \mathcal{G} is delegated to a separate lemma (Lemma 8 after the proof of Theorem 1). This lemma is stated in greater generality than is actually needed in the proof of Theorem 1, so that it can also be used in the proof of Theorem 2.

5.1 Preliminaries

Lemma 1. *There is unique metrizable topology on \mathcal{U} (with which \mathcal{U} is regarded as being endowed) such that a sequence $\langle u_k \rangle$ in \mathcal{U} converges to some $u \in \mathcal{U}$ if and only if*

(a) $\rho_H(\text{dom } u, \text{dom } u_k) \rightarrow 0$ and $\rho_H(\partial A_u, \partial A_{u_k}) \rightarrow 0$;

(b) if $(a, e) \in \text{dom } u$ and $(a_k, e_k) \in \text{dom } u_k$, $k \in \mathbb{N}$, are such that $(a_k, e_k) \rightarrow (a, e)$, then $u_k(a_k, e_k) \rightarrow u(a, e)$, $Du_k(a_k, e_k) \rightarrow Du(a, e)$, and $D^2u_k(a_k, e_k) \rightarrow D^2u(a, e)$.

Proof. It suffices to find one metric ρ on \mathcal{U} for which convergence of any sequence in \mathcal{U} is equivalent to the truth of (a) and (b). Define ρ by setting

$$\begin{aligned} \rho(u, u') = & \rho_H(\text{dom } u, \text{dom } u') + \rho_H(\partial A_u, \partial A_{u'}) \\ & + \rho_H(\Gamma_u, \Gamma_{u'}) + \rho_H(\Gamma_{Du}, \Gamma_{Du'}) + \rho_H(\Gamma_{D^2u}, \Gamma_{D^2u'}) \end{aligned}$$

for $u, u' \in \mathcal{U}$. Clearly ρ is a metric on \mathcal{U} . Let $u \in \mathcal{U}$ and $\langle u_k \rangle$ a sequence in \mathcal{U} .

Assume $\rho(u, u_k) \rightarrow 0$. Directly from the definition of ρ we see that (a) must be true. As for (b), let (a, e) and (a_k, e_k) , $k \in \mathbb{N}$, be as hypothesized. Note that $\rho_H(\Gamma_u, \Gamma_{u_k}) \rightarrow 0$ because $\rho(u, u_k) \rightarrow 0$. Thus, by the definition of ρ_H , the sequence $\langle (a_k, e_k, u_k(a_k, e_k)) \rangle$ must be bounded and any of its cluster points must belong to Γ_u and therefore (by the definition of graph) must be of the form $(a, e, u(a, e))$ since $(a_k, e_k) \rightarrow (a, e)$. Thus the assertion of (b) follows (because, in a Euclidean space, a bounded sequence has a cluster point, x say, and is convergent to x if x is the only cluster point). Similarly, the other assertions of (b) follow.

Assume that (a) and (b) are true. Combining the first of the facts in (b) with the fact that $\rho_H(\text{dom } u, \text{dom } u_k) \rightarrow 0$, we see that $\Gamma_u \subseteq \text{Li } \Gamma_{u_k}$.¹³ Suppose $(a, e, r) \in \text{Ls } \Gamma_{u_k}$. Then for some sequence $\langle n_i \rangle_{i \in \mathbb{N}}$ in \mathbb{N} there are points $(a_{k_i}, e_{k_i}) \in \text{dom } u_{k_i}$, $i \in \mathbb{N}$, such that $(a_{k_i}, e_{k_i}, u_{k_i}(a_{k_i}, e_{k_i})) \rightarrow (a, e, r)$. From the fact that $\rho_H(\text{dom } u, \text{dom } u_k) \rightarrow 0$ we see that $(a, e) \in \text{dom } u$. Again by this fact, there is a sequence $\langle (a_k, e_k) \rangle_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ such that $(a_k, e_k) \rightarrow (a, e)$ and $(a_k, e_k) \in \text{dom } u_k$ for each k . Define a sequence $\langle (a'_k, e'_k) \rangle_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ by setting $(a'_k, e'_k) = (a_{k_i}, e_{k_i})$ if $k = k_i$ for some i , and $(a'_k, e'_k) = (a_k, e_k)$ otherwise. Then $(a'_k, e'_k) \in \text{dom } u_k$ for each k and $(a'_k, e'_k) \rightarrow (a, e)$. Consequently (b) implies that $u_k(a'_k, e'_k) \rightarrow u(a, e)$. In particular, we have $u_{k_i}(a_{k_i}, e_{k_i}) \rightarrow u(a, e)$ and therefore $r = u(a, e)$. Thus $\text{Ls } \Gamma_{u_k} \subseteq \Gamma_u$ and it follows that $\Gamma_u = \text{Ls } \Gamma_{u_k} = \text{Li } \Gamma_{u_k}$. Now because $\text{dom } u$ and $\text{dom } u_k$, $k \in \mathbb{N}$, are all included in the compact set $A \times E$, and because the maps u and u_k are continuous, (a) and (b) imply, in particular, that the sets Γ_u and Γ_{u_k} , $k \in \mathbb{N}$, are commonly included in a compact subset of the ambient Euclidean space, so the fact that $\Gamma_u = \text{Ls } \Gamma_{u_k} = \text{Li } \Gamma_{u_k}$ implies that $\rho_H(\Gamma_u, \Gamma_{u_k}) \rightarrow 0$.

Similarly, we see that both $\rho_H(\Gamma_{D u}, \Gamma_{D u_k})$ and $\rho_H(\Gamma_{D^2 u}, \Gamma_{D^2 u_k})$ converge to 0 as $k \rightarrow \infty$. By the definition of ρ , we conclude that $\rho(u, u_k) \rightarrow 0$. \square

Lemma 2. \mathcal{U} is separable.

Proof. Let \mathcal{F}_0 be the set of all non-empty compact subsets of \mathbb{R}^{n+m} , \mathcal{F}_1 the set of all non-empty compact subsets of $\mathbb{R}^{n+m} \times \mathbb{R}$, \mathcal{F}_2 the set of all non-empty compact subsets of $\mathbb{R}^{n+m} \times \mathbb{R}^{n+m}$, and \mathcal{F}_3 the set of all non-empty compact subsets of $\mathbb{R}^{n+m} \times \mathbb{R}^{(n+m)^2}$. For each $i = 0, 1, 2, 3$, give \mathcal{F}_i the Hausdorff metric topology, so that each \mathcal{F}_i becomes a separable metric space. Write $\mathcal{F} = \mathcal{F}_0 \times \mathcal{F}_0 \times \mathcal{F}_1 \times \mathcal{F}_2 \times \mathcal{F}_3$ and give \mathcal{F} the product topology. Then \mathcal{F} is a separable metrizable topological space. Consider the map $\phi: \mathcal{U} \rightarrow \mathcal{F}$ defined by setting

$$\phi(u) = (\text{dom } u, \partial A_u, \Gamma_u, \Gamma_{D u}, \Gamma_{D^2 u})$$

for each $u \in \mathcal{U}$. By definition of the topology of \mathcal{U} , ϕ is a homeomorphism from \mathcal{U} onto $\phi(\mathcal{U})$. As \mathcal{F} is separable and metrizable, any subset of \mathcal{F} is separable (in the subspace topology). In particular $\phi(\mathcal{U})$ is separable, and it follows that \mathcal{U} is separable. \square

¹³Here and below, $\text{Li } \Gamma_{u_k}$ is the set of limits of sequences $\langle (a_k, e_k, r_k) \rangle$ such that $(a_k, e_k, r_k) \in \Gamma_{u_k}$ for all k , and $\text{Ls } \Gamma_{u_k}$ the set of cluster points of such sequences.

Lemma 3. *Let C and C_k , $k \in \mathbb{N}$, be compact subsets of \mathbb{R}^ℓ , all with non-empty interior, such that both $\rho_H(C, C_k) \rightarrow 0$ and $\rho_H(\partial C, \partial C_k) \rightarrow 0$ as $k \rightarrow \infty$. Let $x \in \text{int } C$, and suppose $\langle x_k \rangle$ is a sequence in \mathbb{R}^ℓ such that $x_k \rightarrow x$. Then $x_k \in \text{int } C_k$ for all sufficiently large k .*

Proof. Otherwise, passing to a subsequence, if necessary, we can assume $x_k \notin \text{int } C_k$ for each k . As $\rho_H(C, C_k) \rightarrow 0$, we can find a $y_k \in C_k$ for each k so that $y_k \rightarrow x$. Now using the fact that the C_k 's are closed, we can select a $\lambda_k \in [0, 1]$ for each k so that $z_k = (1 - \lambda_k)y_k + \lambda_k x_k \in \partial C_k$. As $x_k \rightarrow x$ as well as $y_k \rightarrow x$, we also have $z_k \rightarrow x$. As $\rho_H(\partial C, \partial C_k) \rightarrow 0$, it follows that $x \in \partial C$, contradicting the hypothesis about x . \square

Lemma 4. *Let C and C_k , $k \in \mathbb{N}$, be compact subsets of \mathbb{R}^ℓ , all with non-empty interior, such that both $\rho_H(C, C_k) \rightarrow 0$ and $\rho_H(\partial C, \partial C_k) \rightarrow 0$ as $k \rightarrow \infty$. Let K be a compact subset of $\text{int } C$. Then $K \subseteq \text{int } C_k$ for all sufficiently large k .*

Proof. Otherwise, passing to a subsequence, if necessary, for each k we can find an $x_k \in K$ such that $x_k \notin \text{int } C_k$. As K is compact, we can assume that $x_k \rightarrow x$, again passing to a subsequence, if necessary. Now $x \in K \subseteq \text{int } C$, so by Lemma 3 we must have $x_k \in \text{int } C_k$ for large k , thus getting a contradiction. \square

Lemma 5. (a) *For every $\nu \in \mathcal{M}$, $E(\nu)$ is a compact convex subset of E with non-empty interior in \mathbb{R}^m . (b) *If $\nu_n \rightarrow \nu$ in \mathcal{M} , then $\rho_H(E(\nu_n), E(\nu)) \rightarrow 0$.**

Proof. Clearly $E(\nu)$ is convex for each $\nu \in \mathcal{M}$. As for compactness, fix $\nu \in \mathcal{M}$ and set $Y = \text{supp}(\nu)$. By the definition of \mathcal{M} , Y is compact, and by hypothesis, so is the actions universe A . Thus the set Z of all Borel probability measures on $Y \times A$ is narrowly compact. Evidently the set of those Borel probability measures which matter in the definition of $E(\nu)$ can be regarded as a narrowly closed subset of Z , and thus $E(\nu)$ must be compact, because g is continuous.

For the other claims, consider the correspondence $\theta: \mathcal{U} \rightarrow 2^{\mathbb{R}^m}$ defined by setting

$$\theta(u) = \text{cog}(A_u)$$

for each $u \in \mathcal{U}$. Then θ has non-empty compact convex values, all with non-empty interior by Lemma 9(b). The fact that θ has convex values implies that $\int \theta \, d\nu$ is convex

for all $\nu \in \mathcal{M}$, and the fact that θ has compact values, all included in the compact set $\text{cog}(A)$, implies that $\int \theta \, d\nu$ is compact for all $\nu \in \mathcal{M}$ (see Hildenbrand, 1974, D.II.4, Proposition 7). Note that the correspondence $u \mapsto A_u: \mathcal{U} \rightarrow 2^A$ is continuous (see Hildenbrand, 1974, B.III, Problem 4). Because the map g is continuous, this implies that the correspondence $u \mapsto g(A_u): \mathcal{U} \rightarrow 2^{\mathbb{R}^m}$ is continuous. By Hildenbrand (1974, B.III, Propositions 6 and 10), it follows that θ is continuous.

We claim that $E(\nu) = \int \theta(u) \, d\nu(u)$ for each $\nu \in \mathcal{M}$. To see this, fix any $\nu \in \mathcal{M}$ and any $p \in \mathbb{R}^m$. Note that the map $p \circ g$ from A to \mathbb{R} is continuous. Consequently, since the correspondence $u \mapsto A_u$ is continuous, with non-empty compact values, it has a measurable selection h such that $(p \circ g)h(u) = \max(p \circ g)A_u$ for each $u \in \mathcal{U}$ (use the maximum theorem together with Hildenbrand, 1974, B.III, Proposition 1 and D.II.2, Lemma 1). We must therefore have $\max pE(\nu) = \int_{\mathcal{U}} \max pg(A_u) \, d\nu(u)$, by the definition of $E(\nu)$, and also

$$\int_{\mathcal{U}} \max pg(A_u) \, d\nu(u) = \int_{\mathcal{U}} \max p \, \text{cog}(A_u) \, d\nu(u) = \max p \int_{\mathcal{U}} \theta(u) \, d\nu(u).$$

As p is an arbitrary element of \mathbb{R}^m , and both $E(\nu)$ and $\int_{\mathcal{U}} \theta(u) \, d\nu(u)$ are compact and convex, it follows that $E(\nu) = \int_{\mathcal{U}} \theta(u) \, d\nu(u)$, as claimed.

Now from this equality we can see that $\text{int } E(\nu) \neq \emptyset$ for each $\nu \in \mathcal{M}$. Indeed, pick any $\nu \in \mathcal{M}$ and any $u' \in \text{supp}(\nu)$. By what has been noted above, $\text{int } \theta(u') \neq \emptyset$, so there is a compact set $K \subseteq \text{int } \theta(u')$ such that $\text{int } K \neq \emptyset$. By Lemma 4, there is an open neighborhood V of u' such that $K \subseteq \theta(u'')$ for each $u'' \in V$. As $u' \in \text{supp}(\nu)$, $\nu(V) > 0$, so the set $\nu(V)K$ has non-empty interior. Now

$$\nu(V)K + \int_{\mathcal{U} \setminus V} \theta(u) \, d\nu(u) \subseteq \int_V \theta(u) \, d\nu(u) + \int_{\mathcal{U} \setminus V} \theta(u) \, d\nu(u) = \int_{\mathcal{U}} \theta(u) \, d\nu(u),$$

showing that $\text{int } \int_{\mathcal{U}} \theta(u) \, d\nu(u) \neq \emptyset$. Finally, to see that (b) of the lemma is true, note that since θ is continuous, with non-empty compact values, for each $p \in \mathbb{R}^m$ the map $u \mapsto \max p\theta(u): \mathcal{U} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is continuous, by the maximum theorem. Moreover, this map is bounded because the values of θ are included in the compact set $E \subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$. Hence, for each $p \in \mathbb{R}^m$, the map $\nu \mapsto \int_{\mathcal{U}} \max p\theta(u) \, d\nu(u): \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is continuous. By the facts used above, we see that θ has a measurable selection h such that $h(u) = \max p\theta(u)$ for each $u \in \mathcal{U}$, implying that $\int_{\mathcal{U}} \max p\theta(u) \, d\nu(u) = \max p \int_{\mathcal{U}} \theta(u) \, d\nu(u)$, and it follows

that for each $p \in \mathbb{R}^m$ the map $\nu \mapsto \max p \int_{\mathcal{U}} \theta(u) d\nu(u) : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is continuous. Because $\int_{\mathcal{U}} \theta(u) d\nu(u)$ is non-empty convex and compact for each $\nu \in \mathcal{M}$, it follows from this that the map $\nu \mapsto \int_{\mathcal{U}} \theta(u) d\nu(u)$ is continuous for the Hausdorff metric on the set of all non-empty compact subsets of \mathbb{R}^m (see Castaing and Valadier, 1977, II-23). Thus we get (b), again by the equality $E(\nu) = \int_{\mathcal{U}} \theta(u) d\nu(u)$ established above. \square

Lemma 6. *Let $\nu \in \mathcal{G}$ and let $\langle (I_n, G_n) \rangle_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ be a sequence of finite-player games such that $\#(I_n) \rightarrow \infty$ and $\nu_{G_n} \rightarrow \nu$ in \mathcal{M} . Let W be a compact subset of $\text{int } E(\nu)$. Then there is an $N \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $W \subseteq E_{G_n(i)}$ for each $i \in I_n$ whenever $n \geq N$.*

Proof. In this proof, we write $E_{n,i}$ for $E_{G_n(i)}$, and l_n for $\#(I_n) - 1$.

(a) There are numbers $N_1 \in \mathbb{N}$ and $\epsilon > 0$ such that whenever $n \geq N_1$ and $i \in I_n$, then $W \subseteq \text{co}E_{n,i}$ but $\text{dist}(e, \partial \text{co}E_{n,i}) \geq \epsilon$ for each $e \in W$. To see this, for each n and each $i \in I_n$ define $\nu_{n,i} \in \mathcal{M}$ by setting $\nu_{n,i} = (1/l_n) \sum_{j \in I_n \setminus \{i\}} \delta_{G_n(j)}$. Note that $E(\nu_{n,i}) = \text{co}E_{n,i}$ for each n and each $i \in I_n$. Consider any sequence $\langle i_n \rangle$ with $i_n \in I_n$ for each n . The hypothesis that $\nu_{G_n} \rightarrow \nu$ in \mathcal{M} implies that $\nu_{n,i_n} \rightarrow \nu$ in \mathcal{M} . By Lemma 5(b), it follows that $\text{co}E_{n,i_n} \rightarrow E(\nu)$, and therefore, by Lemma 5(a) and Lemma 4, that $W \subseteq \text{int } \text{co}E_{n,i}$ if n is sufficiently large. Thus, would the claim be wrong, there would be a subsequence $\langle I_{n_k} \rangle$ of the sequence $\langle I_n \rangle$ such that $\text{dist}(e_k, \partial \text{co}E_{n_k, i_k}) \rightarrow 0$ for some points $i_k \in I_{n_k}$ and $e_k \in W$, $k \in \mathbb{N}$. Now because all the sets $E(\nu)$ and $\text{co}E_{n_k, i_k}$, $k \in \mathbb{N}$, are compact, convex, and have non-empty interior, it follows from the material in Wills (2007) that $\rho_H(\partial E(\nu), \partial \text{co}E_{n_k, i_k}) \rightarrow 0$, and therefore that $\text{dist}(e_k, \partial E(\nu)) \rightarrow 0$. Because W is compact we can assume that $e_k \rightarrow e$ for some $e \in W$. But then, because $\partial E(\nu)$ is closed, we must have $e \in W \cap \partial E(\nu)$, contradicting the hypothesis that $W \subseteq \text{int } E(\nu)$.

(b) There are numbers $\eta > 0$ and N_2 , with $N_2 \geq m$ (m being the dimension of the ambient Euclidean space of the externalities universe), such that if $l_n \geq N_2$, then for each $i \in I_n$ and each $J \subseteq I_n \setminus \{i\}$ with $\#(J) = m$ the set $\sum_{j \in J} g(A_{G_n(j)})$ includes a ball of radius η . To see this, consider the correspondence $\theta: \text{supp}(\nu) \rightarrow 2^A$, given by setting $\theta(u) = A_u$ for each $u \in \text{supp}(\nu)$. Then θ is continuous (see Hildenbrand, 1974, B.III, Problem 4), with non-empty compact values, all with non-empty interior. Moreover, $\rho_H(\partial A_u, \partial A_{u_k}) \rightarrow 0$ whenever $u_k \rightarrow u$ in $\text{supp}(\nu)$. Using Lemma 4 and the

fact that $\text{supp}(\nu)$ is compact, we see from these properties that there is a non-empty finite set \mathcal{C} of compact balls in A (all with radius > 0), such that for each $u \in \text{supp}(\nu)$, $\text{int } A_u$ includes some member of \mathcal{C} . As $\rho_H(\text{supp } \nu, \text{supp}(\nu_{G_n})) \rightarrow 0$, another invocation of Lemma 4 and the fact that $\text{supp}(\nu)$ is compact now shows that there is an $N'_2 \in \mathbb{N}$ such that whenever $n \geq N'_2$, then for each $i \in I_n$, $A_{G_n(i)}$ includes some member of \mathcal{C} . Let \mathcal{F} be the set of all families $F = (B_{F,1}, \dots, B_{F,m})$ where $B_{F,i} = C$ for some $C \in \mathcal{C}$, $i = 1, \dots, m$. Then \mathcal{F} is finite, and by Lemma 9 in the appendix, for each $F \in \mathcal{F}$, $\sum_{i=1}^m g(B_{F,i})$ includes a ball of radius $\eta_F > 0$. Set $\eta = \min\{\eta_F : F \in \mathcal{F}\}$. As \mathcal{F} is finite, $\eta > 0$. Thus, setting $N_2 = \max\{N'_2, m\}$, the claim follows.

(c) Because the actions universe is compact and g is continuous, there is number $\delta' > 0$ such that $\text{diam}(g(A_{G_n(i)})) \leq \delta'$ for all $i \in I_n$ and n . Set $\delta_0 = m\delta'$, so that we have $\text{diam}(g(A_{G_n(i)})) \leq \delta_0$ for all $i \in I_n$ and n as well as $\text{diam}(\sum_{j \in J} g(A_{G_n(j)})) \leq \delta_0$ if J is as above. Choose a number $h \in \mathbb{N}$ with $h\eta \geq m\delta_0$. Note that for all n and $i \in I_n$,

$$l_n E_{n,i} = \sum_{j \in I_n \setminus \{i\}} g(A_{G_n(j)}),$$

and that if $l_n \geq hm$, the latter sum can be written in the form

$$\sum_{j \in J_1} g(A_{G_n(j)}) + \dots + \sum_{j \in J_h} g(A_{G_n(j)}) + \sum_{j \notin \bigcup_{k=1}^h J_k} g(A_{G_n(j)}),$$

where the J_k 's, $k = 1, \dots, h$, are pairwise disjoint and $\#(J_k) = m$ for all $k = 1, \dots, h$. By Howe (1979, Proposition 2), it follows that if $n \geq N_2$ is such that $l_n \geq hm$, and $z \in \text{co}(l_n E_{n,i})$ is such that $\text{dist}(z, \partial \text{co}(l_n E_{n,i})) \geq h\delta_0$, then $z \in l_n E_{n,i}$.¹⁴

Note that (a) implies that whenever $n \geq N_1$ and $i \in I_n$, then $l_n W \subseteq \text{co}(l_n E_{n,i})$ and for each $e \in l_n W$ we have $\text{dist}(e, \partial \text{co}(l_n E_{n,i})) \geq l_n \epsilon$. By the previous paragraph, it follows that if $n \geq \max\{N_1, N_2\}$ is such that both $l_n \geq hm$ and $l_n \epsilon \geq h\delta_0$, then $l_n W \subseteq l_n E_{n,i}$ for each $i \in I_n$, and thus $W \subseteq E_{n,i}$ for each $i \in I_n$. As $n \rightarrow \infty$ implies $l_n \rightarrow \infty$, this establishes the lemma. \square

Lemma 7. *Given $\nu \in \mathcal{G}$, there is a sequence $\langle (I_n, G_n) \rangle_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ of finite-player games such that $\#(I_n) \rightarrow \infty$ and $\nu_{G_n} \rightarrow \nu$ in \mathcal{M} .*

¹⁴Note that the h here corresponds to the m in Howe (1979, Proposition 2), while $\dim V$ and ν there are what is called m and η here respectively.

Proof. **(a)** Let $\nu \in \mathcal{G}$ be given. Write $X = \text{supp}(\nu)$. By the law of large numbers (Glivenko-Cantelli version) there is a sequence $\langle u_n \rangle$ in X such that the sequence $\langle \nu_n \rangle$, defined by setting $\nu_n = 1/(n+1) \sum_{i=0}^n \delta_{u_i}$ for each $n \in \mathbb{N}$, converges to ν narrowly. Since $\text{supp}(\nu_n) \subseteq X = \text{supp}(\nu)$, narrow convergence of $\langle \nu_n \rangle$ to ν implies that we also have $\rho_H(\text{supp}(\nu_n), \text{supp}(\nu)) \rightarrow 0$. Thus we have $\nu_n \rightarrow \nu$ in the topology of \mathcal{M} . For each $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{0\}$ and each $0 \leq i \leq n$ define $\nu_{n,i} \in \mathcal{M}$ by setting $\nu_{n,i} = 1/n \sum_{j \in J_{n,i}} \delta_{u_j}$ where $J_{n,i} = \{0, \dots, n\} \setminus \{i\}$; set $\nu_{0,0} = \nu_0$. Note that for each $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{0\}$ and each $0 \leq i \leq n$ we have $\|\nu_n - \nu_{n,i}\|_V \leq 2/n$, writing $\|\cdot\|_V$ for the variation norm on \mathcal{M} . Consequently, because $\nu_n \rightarrow \nu$, we have $\nu_{n,i_n} \rightarrow \nu$ as $n \rightarrow \infty$ whenever $\langle i_n \rangle$ is a sequence in \mathbb{N} with $0 \leq i_n \leq n$ for each n . By Lemma 5, it follows that $\rho_H(E(\nu), E(\nu_{n,i_n})) \rightarrow 0$ whenever $\langle i_n \rangle$ is as in the previous sentence.

Fix $b \in \text{int } E(\nu)$. By Lemma 3 it follows from the conclusion of the previous paragraph that $b \in \text{int } E(\nu_{n,i})$ for each $0 \leq i \leq n$ if n is large enough; we can assume that this is true for all n . Now, for each n , we can define $r_n > 0$ to be the largest real number $r \leq 1$ such that $r(E(\nu_{n,i}) - \{b\}) + \{b\} \subseteq E(\nu)$ for each $0 \leq i \leq n$. We must have $r_n \rightarrow 1$. To see this, fix $0 < r < 1$. Since $E(\nu)$ is convex and $b \in \text{int } E(\nu)$, we have $r(E(\nu) - \{b\}) + \{b\} \subseteq \text{int } E(\nu)$. Using the fact that $\rho_H(E(\nu), E(\nu_{n,i_n})) \rightarrow 0$ whenever $\langle i_n \rangle$ is a sequence in \mathbb{N} with $0 \leq i_n \leq n$ for each n , it follows that if n is large, then $r(E(\nu_{n,i}) - \{b\}) + \{b\} \subseteq \text{int } E(\nu)$ for all $0 \leq i \leq n$. Thus $r_n \geq r$ for such n . As $0 < r < 1$ is arbitrary, we conclude that $r_n \rightarrow 1$.

(b) For each n and each $i = 0, \dots, n$, define a map $\tilde{u}_{n,i}: A_{u_i} \times E(\nu_{n,i_n}) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ by setting $\tilde{u}_{n,i}(a, e) = u_i(a, r_n(e - b) + b)$ for $(a, e) \in A_{u_i} \times E(\nu_{n,i})$ and note that $\tilde{u}_{n,i} \in \mathcal{U}$. We claim that for any $\epsilon > 0$ there is an n_ϵ such that whenever $n > n_\epsilon$, then $\rho(\tilde{u}_{n,i}, u_i) < \epsilon$ for all $i = 0, \dots, n$ (where ρ is the metric on \mathcal{U} chosen in Section 3.4). Indeed, otherwise there are points \tilde{u}_{n_k, i_k} and u_{i_k} , $k \in \mathbb{N}$, such that $n_k \rightarrow \infty$ as $k \rightarrow \infty$ and $\rho(\tilde{u}_{n_k, i_k}, u_{i_k}) \geq \epsilon > 0$ for each k . Because $u_{i_k} \in \text{supp}(\nu)$ and $\text{supp}(\nu)$ is compact, we can assume that $u_{i_k} \rightarrow \bar{u}$ for some $\bar{u} \in \text{supp}(\nu)$. But then, using Lemma 1, together with the facts that $\rho_H(E(\nu), E(\nu_{n_k, i_{n_k}})) \rightarrow 0$ and $r_{n_k} \rightarrow 1$, it follows that also $\tilde{u}_{n_k, i_k} \rightarrow \bar{u}$, and we get a contradiction.

(c) For each $n \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{0\}$ and each $0 \leq i \leq n$, set $E_{n,i} = 1/n \sum_{j \in J_{n,i}} g(A_j)$. Note that $E(\nu_{n,i}) = 1/n \sum_{j \in J_{n,i}} \text{cog}(A_j)$ (cf. the proof of Lemma 5); thus $E_{n,i} \subseteq E(\nu_{n,i})$.

Let $u_{n,i}: A_{u_{n,i}} \times E_{n,i} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ be the restriction of $\tilde{u}_{n,i}$ to $A_{u_{n,i}} \times E_{n,i}$. By Lemma 9(a) and the hypothesis on g made in Section 3.2, there is an $\bar{n} \in \mathbb{N}$ such that if $n \geq \bar{n}$ then for all $0 \leq i \leq n$, $\text{int } E_{n,i}$ is dense in $E_{n,i}$ and thus $u_{n,i} \in \mathcal{U}$. Because all the sets $E_{n,i}$ are included in the compact convex externalities universe E , it follows from the Shapley-Folkman theorem that for each $\epsilon > 0$ there is a $n'_\epsilon \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $\rho_H(E_{n,i}, E(\nu_{n,i})) < \epsilon$ for all $0 \leq i \leq n$ if $n \geq n'_\epsilon$. Using Lemma 1, it follows from this and (b) that for each $\epsilon > 0$ there is an $n''_\epsilon \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $\rho(u_{n,i}, u_i) < \epsilon$ for all $0 \leq i \leq n$ whenever $n \geq \max\{\bar{n}, n''_\epsilon\}$, because $u_{n,i}$ is just the restriction of $\tilde{u}_{n,i}$ to $A_{u_{n,i}} \times E_{n,i}$.

Now, for each $n \in \mathbb{N}$ with $n \geq \bar{n}$, set $I_n = \{0, 1, \dots, n\}$ and define $G_n: I_n \rightarrow \mathcal{U}$ by setting $G(i) = u_{n,i}$ for each $i \in I_n$. For $n < \bar{n}$, let (I_n, G_n) be an arbitrary finite-player game. By (a), $\nu_n = 1/(n+1) \sum_{i=0}^n \delta_{u_i} \rightarrow \nu$ narrowly and $\rho_H(\text{supp}(\nu_n), \text{supp}(\nu)) \rightarrow 0$, so from the end of the previous paragraph we see that $\rho_H(\text{supp}(\nu_{G_n}), \text{supp}(\nu)) \rightarrow 0$ and that $\int h d\nu_{G_n} \rightarrow \int h d\nu$ whenever $h: \mathcal{U} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is a bounded uniformly continuous function. By Billingsley (1968, Theorem 2.1), the latter fact implies that $\nu_{G_n} \rightarrow \nu$ narrowly. We conclude that $\nu_{G_n} \rightarrow \nu$ in the topology of \mathcal{M} . \square

Remark 3. Inspecting the proof of Lemma 7 shows that, given any $\nu \in \mathcal{G}$, the sequence $\langle (I_n, G_n) \rangle_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ as guaranteed by Lemma 7 can be chosen so that for each n , $u \in \text{supp}(\nu_{G_n})$ implies $A_u = A_{u'}$ for some $u' \in \text{supp}(\nu)$. This observation is useful in regard to the proof of Theorem 3.

5.2 Proofs of the theorems

Proof of Theorem 1. (a) As noted in Section 3.6, every continuum game $\nu \in \mathcal{G}$ has an equilibrium distribution, i.e., there is a Borel probability measure τ on $\mathcal{U} \times A$ such that $\tau_{\mathcal{U}} = \nu$ and $\text{supp}(\tau) \subseteq \{(u, a) \in \mathcal{U} \times A: a \in \varphi(u, e(\tau_A))\}$. By (U3) in the assumptions on payoff functions, we have $\varphi(u, e) \subseteq \text{int } A_u$ for each $u \in \mathcal{U}$ and each $e \in E(\nu)$. Thus if τ is an equilibrium distribution of $\nu \in \mathcal{G}$, then $a \in \text{int } A_u$ for each $(u, a) \in \text{supp}(\tau)$.

(b) Write \mathcal{G}_1 for the subset of \mathcal{G} consisting of those ν such that for some equilibrium distribution τ of ν ,

- (i) $\#(\varphi(u, e(\tau_A))) = 1$ for each $u \in \text{supp}(\nu)$;

- (ii) for each $u \in \text{supp}(\nu)$, $D_a^2 u(a_u, e(\tau_A))$ is negative definite, where a_u is the unique element of $\varphi(u, e(\tau_A))$ (note that $a_u \in \text{int } A_u$, so $D_a^2 u(a_u, e(\tau_A))$ is defined);
- (iii) $e(\tau_A) \in \text{int } E(\nu)$.

Write $\mathcal{U}_c = \{u \in \mathcal{U} : E_u \text{ is convex}\}$. We claim that given any $\nu \in \mathcal{G}_1$ and any equilibrium distribution τ of ν such that (i)–(iii) are true, there are open neighborhoods \tilde{V} of $\text{supp}(\nu)$ in \mathcal{U} and W of $e(\tau_A)$ in \mathbb{R}^m , with $\text{cl } W \subseteq \text{int } E(\nu)$, such that, setting $\hat{V} = \{u \in \tilde{V} : W \subseteq E_u\}$ and $V = \tilde{V} \cap \mathcal{U}_c$, the following hold: $V \subseteq \hat{V}$, and on $\hat{V} \times W$, the best replies of u against e are given by a continuous map $h : \hat{V} \times W \rightarrow A$ such that (1) $h(u, \cdot)$ is differentiable for each $u \in \hat{V}$, (2) the derivative of $h(u, \cdot)$ depends continuously on (u, e) , and (3) $D_a^2 u(h(u, e), e)$ is negative definite for each $(u, e) \in \hat{V} \times W$.

To see that this claim is true, choose a compact neighborhood W_1 of $e(\tau_A)$ such that $W_1 \subseteq \text{int } E(\nu)$, which is possible by (iii). Then by compactness of $\text{supp}(\nu)$, Lemma 1, and Lemma 4, there is a (relatively) open neighborhood V_1 of $\text{supp}(\nu)$ in \mathcal{U}_c such that $W_1 \subseteq \text{int } E_u$ for all $u \in V_1$. Now pick any $u \in \text{supp}(\nu)$. As above, let $a_u \in \text{int } A_u$ be the unique element of $\varphi(u, e(\tau_A))$. Then there is a compact and convex neighborhood U_{a_u} of a_u in $\text{int } A_u$ such that $D_a^2 u(a, e(\tau_A))$ is negative definite for every $a \in U_{a_u}$. Now we can find numbers r_1, r_2 such that $u(a_u, e(\tau_A)) > r_1 > r_2 > u(a, e(\tau_A))$ for each $a \in A_u \setminus U_{a_u}$. In particular, we must have $r_1 > u(a, e(\tau_A))$ for all $a \in \text{cl}(A_u \setminus U_{a_u})$. Using Lemma 1 and Lemma 4 we see that there is a neighborhood \tilde{V}'_u of u in \mathcal{U} such that $U_{a_u} \subseteq \text{int } A_{u'}$ for each $u' \in \tilde{V}'_u$. Because the actions universe A is compact, Lemma 1 now shows that there are open neighborhoods \tilde{V}_u of u in \mathcal{U} and W_u of $e(\tau_A)$ in \mathbb{R}^m , with $\tilde{V}_u \cap \mathcal{U}_c \subseteq \tilde{V}'_u \cap V_1$ and $W_u \subseteq W_1$, such that, setting $\hat{V}_u = \{u' \in \tilde{V}_u : W_u \subseteq E_{u'}\}$, $u'(a_u, e) > r_1 > u'(a, e)$ for each $u' \in \hat{V}_u$, $e \in W_u$, and $a \in A_{u'} \setminus U_{a_u}$, and such that $D_a^2 u'(a, e)$ is negative definite for each $u' \in \hat{V}_u$, $e \in W_u$, and $a \in U_{a_u}$. In particular, for each $u' \in \hat{V}_u$ and $e \in W_u$, $u'(\cdot, e)$ is strictly concave on U_{a_u} . Consequently for each $u' \in \hat{V}_u$ and $e \in W_u$, the best reply of u' against e is unique. Apply this argument to each $u \in \text{supp}(\nu)$. Then by compactness of $\text{supp}(\nu)$ there are $u_1, \dots, u_k \in \text{supp}(\nu)$ such that $\text{supp}(\nu) \subseteq \tilde{V} = \bigcup_{i=1}^k \tilde{V}_{u_i}$. Set $W = \bigcap_{i=1}^k W_{u_i}$ and $K = \bigcup_{i=1}^k U_{a_i}$. Then for V and \hat{V} (defined relative to the sets \tilde{V} and W according to the previous paragraph), we have $V \subseteq \hat{V}$, and for each $(u, e) \in \hat{V} \times W$, the best reply of u against e is unique

and belongs to K . Thus, on $\hat{V} \times W$, the best reply correspondence φ can be identified with a function h taking values in K . Using the fact that K is compact we see that h is continuous. Note that by construction, $D_a^2 u(h(u, e), e)$ is negative definite for each $(u, e) \in \hat{V} \times W$, i.e., we have (3). In view of this, the implicit function theorem applied to the maps $(a, e) \mapsto D_a u(a, e)$, $u \in \hat{V}$, shows that (1) is true. Using Lemma 1 we see that the evaluation maps $(u, a, e) \mapsto D_a^2 u(a, e)$ and $(u, a, e) \mapsto D_e D_a u(a, e)$, which are defined on the set $\{(u, a, e) \in \mathcal{U} \times A \times E : a \in \text{int } A_u, e \in E_u\}$, are continuous. From this we see that (2) is true.

Let $\nu \in \mathcal{G}_1$ and τ an equilibrium distribution for ν such that (i)–(iii) are satisfied. Let W correspond to τ as above. We can then define a map $\xi_\tau : W \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$ by setting

$$\xi_\tau(e) = \int g(h(u, e)) d\nu(u) - e$$

for each $e \in W$; then by the generalized version of Leibniz' rule in Schwartz (1967, Chap IV.11, Theorem 115), ξ_τ is continuously differentiable on W , and we have $D\xi_\tau(e) = \int D_e(g \circ h)(u, e) d\nu(u) - I$ where I is the $(m \times m)$ -identity matrix.

(c) Let \mathcal{G}^* be the subset of \mathcal{G} consisting of those $\nu \in \mathcal{G}$ such that for some equilibrium distribution τ of ν , (i)–(iii) of (b) are satisfied and $D\xi_\tau(e(\tau_A))$ has full rank, where ξ_τ is associated with τ as above. (Note that while the choice of the neighborhood W of $e(\tau_A)$, i.e., the domain of ξ_τ , involves some arbitrariness, $D\xi_\tau(e(\tau_A))$ is uniquely determined.) By Lemma 8 below, \mathcal{G}^* is dense in \mathcal{G} , and we are now going to show that \mathcal{G}^* is open in \mathcal{G} .

(d) Fix $\nu \in \mathcal{G}^*$. We need to show that ν has a neighborhood U in \mathcal{G} such that U is included in \mathcal{G}^* . Let τ be an equilibrium distribution for ν , witnessing that $\nu \in \mathcal{G}^*$. Let W, V, h , and ξ_τ be associated with τ as in (b).

(i) Pick a compact neighborhood W_1 of $e(\tau_A)$ with $W_1 \subseteq W$. Then there is a $k \in \mathbb{N}$ and a neighborhood V_1 of $\text{supp}(\nu)$ in \mathcal{U}_c , with $V_1 \subseteq V$, such that $\|D_e(g \circ h)(u, e)\| \leq k$ for each $(u, e) \in V_1 \times W_1$. Indeed, otherwise, for each $k \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{0\}$, we can find points $e_k \in W_1$ and $u_k \in V$ such that $\|D_e(g \circ h)(u_k, e_k)\| > k$ but $\text{dist}(u_k, \text{supp}(\nu)) < 1/k$. Since W_1 and $\text{supp}(\nu)$ are compact we may assume that $(u_k, e_k) \rightarrow (u, e)$ for some $(u, e) \in \text{supp}(\nu) \times W_1$. Now $D_e(g \circ h)(u_k, e_k) = Dg(h(u_k, e_k))D_e h(u_k, e_k)$, and because Dg, h , and $D_e h$ are continuous, it follows that $D_e(g \circ h)(u_k, e_k) \rightarrow D_e(g \circ h)(u, e)$,

and we get a contradiction.

(ii) Write W_2 for the interior of W_1 in \mathbb{R}^m . Choose an open neighborhood U_1 of ν in \mathcal{G} such that $\text{supp}(\nu') \subseteq V_1$ for each $\nu' \in U_1$. Note that $W_2 \subseteq E(\nu')$ for each $\nu' \in U_1$. We can therefore define a map $\xi_U: U_1 \times W_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$ by setting

$$\xi_U(\nu', e) = \int g(h(u, e)) d\nu'(u) - e$$

for each $\nu' \in U_1$ and $e \in W_2$. As above we see that for each fixed $\nu' \in U_1$, $\xi_U(\nu', \cdot)$ is continuously differentiable on W_2 , with $D_e \xi_U(\nu', e) = \int D_e(g \circ h)(u, e) d\nu'(u) - I$ where I is the $(m \times m)$ -unit matrix. Now ξ_U is continuous and $D_e \xi_U(\nu', e)$ depends continuously on (ν', e) . Indeed, suppose that $e_k \rightarrow e$ in W_2 and $u_k \rightarrow u$ in V_1 . Then $(g \circ h)(u_k, e_k) \rightarrow (g \circ h)(u, e)$, because h and g are continuous, and as in (i) we see that $D_e(g \circ h)(u_k, e_k) \rightarrow D_e(g \circ h)(u, e)$. Thus, uniformly on compact subsets of V_1 , we have both $(g \circ h)(\cdot, e_k) \rightarrow (g \circ h)(\cdot, e)$ and $D_e(g \circ h)(\cdot, e_k) \rightarrow D_e(g \circ h)(\cdot, e)$. Using Billingsley (1968, Theorem 5.5) it follows that if $\nu_k \rightarrow \nu'$ in U_1 , then the corresponding sequences of distributions of the maps $(g \circ h)(\cdot, e_k)$ and $D_e(g \circ h)(\cdot, e_k)$ converge narrowly to the distributions of $(g \circ h)(\cdot, e)$ and $D_e(g \circ h)(\cdot, e)$ respectively. As $g \circ h$ takes values in the compact set E , we can now use change of variables to see that $\xi_U(\nu_k, e_k) \rightarrow \xi_U(\nu', e)$. Similarly, by (1), we see that $D_e \xi_U(\nu_k, e_k) \rightarrow D_e \xi_U(\nu', e)$. Thus, on $U_1 \times W_2$, ξ_U is continuous and $D_e \xi_U(\nu', e)$ depends continuously on (ν', e) , as claimed.

Now as τ is an equilibrium distribution for ν , we have $\xi_U(\nu, e(\tau_A)) = 0$, and since $\nu \in \mathcal{G}^*$, $D_e \xi_U(\nu, e(\tau_A)) \equiv D \xi_\tau(e(\tau_A))$ has full rank. Hence, by a version of the implicit function theorem (see Schwartz, 1967, Chap. III.8, Theorem 25, or Mas-Colell, 1985, Chap. 1, C.3.3), there is an open neighborhood U of ν in \mathcal{G} , with $U \subseteq U_1$, and a continuous map $\nu' \mapsto e(\nu'): U \rightarrow W_2$ such that for each $\nu' \in U$, $\xi_U(\nu', e(\nu')) = 0$. Also, since $D_e \xi_U(\nu', e)$ depends continuously on (ν', e) , $D_e \xi_U(\nu', e(\nu'))$ has full rank for each $\nu' \in U$, shrinking U if need be.

Fix any $\nu' \in U$ and set $\tau' = \nu' \circ (id \times h(\cdot, e(\nu')))^{-1}$. Then

$$\text{supp}(\tau') \subseteq \{(u, a) \in \mathcal{U} \times A: a \in \varphi(u, e(\nu'))\},$$

by the choice of h , and

$$e(\tau'_A) = \int g(h(u, e(\nu'))) d\nu'(u) = \xi_U(\nu', e(\nu')) + e(\nu') = e(\nu').$$

Thus τ' is an equilibrium distribution for ν' . By the choices of V and W , and since $e(\nu'') \in W_2 \subseteq W$ for each $\nu'' \in U$, (i)–(iii) of (b) are true for τ' . Let V' , W' , h' , and $\xi_{\tau'}$ be associated with τ' as in (b). Then $V' \cap V_1$ is a neighborhood of $\text{supp}(\nu')$ in \mathcal{U}_c , and $W' \cap W_2$ a neighborhood of $e(\tau'_A) = e(\nu')$. Moreover, h and h' agree on $(V' \cap V_1) \times (W' \cap W_2)$, and hence so do $\xi_{\tau'}$ and $\xi_U(\nu', \cdot)$. Thus $D\xi_{\tau'}(e(\tau'_A))$ has maximal rank. It follows that every $\nu' \in U$ belongs to \mathcal{G}^* . As $\nu \in \mathcal{G}^*$ is arbitrary, \mathcal{G}^* is open.

(e) Let $\nu \in \mathcal{G}^*$ and let $\langle (I_n, G_n) \rangle_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ be a sequence of finite-player games such that $\#(I_n) \rightarrow \infty$ and $\nu_{G_n} \rightarrow \nu$ in \mathcal{M} . For each n we can write $I_n = \{1, \dots, k_n\}$, where $k_n = \#(I_n)$. Let \hat{A} be the convex hull of the actions universe A , and identify g with a continuous extension to \hat{A} . For any map $f: I_n \rightarrow \hat{A}$, and any $i \in I_n$, we write $\tau_{\hat{A}, f}$ for the probability measure on \hat{A} given by setting $\tau_{\hat{A}, f}(B) = \#\{j \in I_n: f(j) \in B\} / \#(I_n)$ for each Borel set $B \subseteq \hat{A}$, and $\tau_{\hat{A}, f, i}$ for the probability measure on \hat{A} which is given by setting $\tau_{\hat{A}, f, i}(B) = \#\{j \in I_n \setminus \{i\}: f(j) \in B\} / (\#(I_n) - 1)$ for each Borel set $B \subseteq \hat{A}$.

Write $\|\cdot\|_V$ for the variation norm on the space $M(\hat{A})$ of all signed Borel measures on \hat{A} . Note that for any $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and any $f: I_n \rightarrow \hat{A}$, $\|\tau_{\hat{A}, f, i} - \tau_{\hat{A}, f}\|_V \leq 2/\#(I_n)$ for each $i \in I_n$. Because g is bounded on \hat{A} , it follows that for any $\delta > 0$ there is an $N_\delta \in \mathbb{N}$ such that if $n \geq N_\delta$ then $\|\int g(a) d\tau_{\hat{A}, f, i}(a) - \int g(a) d\tau_{\hat{A}, f}(a)\| < \delta$ for each $f: I_n \rightarrow \hat{A}$ and each $i \in I_n$.

Let τ be an equilibrium distribution for ν , witnessing that $\nu \in \mathcal{G}^*$. Let \tilde{V} , \hat{V} , W , and h be as in the paragraph after the statement of (i)–(iii) in (b).

As $\nu \in \mathcal{G}^*$, the derivative of ξ_τ at $e(\tau_A)$ has full rank, which implies that on some convex compact neighborhood W_1 of $e(\tau_A)$ in \mathbb{R}^m , with $W_1 \subseteq W$, $\xi_\tau(e) = 0$ if and only if $e = e(\tau_A)$. Let W_2 be a convex compact neighborhood of $e(\tau_A)$ in \mathbb{R}^m such that $W_2 \subseteq \text{int } W_1$.

Now because $\nu_{G_n} \rightarrow \nu$, and therefore $\rho_H(\text{supp}(\nu_{G_n}), \text{supp}(\nu)) \rightarrow 0$, Lemma 6 implies that there is an $N \in \mathbb{N}$ such that whenever $n \geq N$, then $\text{supp}(\nu_{G_n}) \subseteq \hat{V}$ (i.e., $\text{supp}(\nu_{G_n}) \subseteq \tilde{V}$ and $W \subseteq E_{G_n(i)}$ for each $i \in I_n$). By what was noted in the second paragraph of this part of the proof, we can assume that N is so large that if $n \geq N$,

then for each $f \in \hat{A}^{I_n}$ and $i = 1 \dots, k_n$,

$$\int g(a) d\tau_{\hat{A},f,i}(a) - \int g(a) d\tau_{\hat{A},f}(a) + e \in W_1$$

whenever $e \in W_2$. For $n \geq N$, consider the function $\Lambda: \hat{A}^{I_n} \times W_2 \rightarrow \hat{A}^{I_n} \times \mathbb{R}^m$ defined by setting

$$\begin{aligned} \Lambda(f, e) &= \left(h_1 \left(\int g(a) d\tau_{\hat{A},f,1}(a) - \int g(a) d\tau_{\hat{A},f}(a) + e \right), \dots, \right. \\ &\quad \left. h_{k_n} \left(\int g(a) d\tau_{\hat{A},f,k_n}(a) - \int g(a) d\tau_{\hat{A},f}(a) + e \right), \int g(a) d\tau_{\hat{A},f}(a) \right), \end{aligned}$$

writing $h_i(\cdot)$ in place of $h(G(i), \cdot)$ for each $i \in \{1, \dots, k_n\}$. Then a fixed point of Λ is a strict pure strategy Nash equilibrium of (I_n, G_n) .

We claim that there is an $N_1 \geq N$ such that for $n \geq N_1$ the fixed point theorem stated in the appendix as Theorem 4 applies to Λ . Clearly Λ is continuous, and for $X = \hat{A}^{I_n}$ and $Y = W_2$ the requirements of Theorem 4 on X and Y are satisfied. With the map ξ_τ it is also clear that we have (a) of Theorem 4. Let $\gamma > 0$ be such that $\|\xi_\tau(e)\| \geq \gamma$ for each $e \in \partial W_2$. We need to show that for some $N_1 \geq N$ also (b) of that theorem is satisfied for Λ and ξ_τ if $n \geq N_1$.

To this end, fix $n \geq N$ and suppose that $f \in \hat{A}^{I_n}$ and $e \in \partial W_2$ are such that

$$\begin{aligned} f &= \left(h_1 \left(\int g(a) d\tau_{\hat{A},f,1}(a) - \int g(a) d\tau_{\hat{A},f}(a) + e \right), \right. \\ &\quad \left. \dots, h_{k_n} \left(\int g(a) d\tau_{\hat{A},f,k_n}(a) - \int g(a) d\tau_{\hat{A},f}(a) + e \right) \right). \end{aligned}$$

Note that

$$\begin{aligned} \left\| \frac{1}{k_n} \sum_{i=1}^{k_n} g(f(i)) - e - \xi_\tau(e) \right\| &= \left\| \frac{1}{k_n} \sum_{i=1}^{k_n} g(f(i)) - e - \left(\int g(h(u, e)) d\nu(u) - e \right) \right\| \\ &= \left\| \frac{1}{n_k} \sum_{i=1}^{n_k} g(f(i)) - \int g(h(u, e)) d\nu(u) \right\| \\ &\leq \left\| \frac{1}{k_n} \sum_{i=1}^{k_n} g(f(i)) - \frac{1}{k_n} \sum_{i=1}^{k_n} g(h_i(e)) \right\| + \left\| \frac{1}{k_n} \sum_{i=1}^{k_n} g(h_i(e)) - \int g(h(u, e)) d\nu(u) \right\| \\ &= \left\| \frac{1}{k_n} \sum_{i=1}^{k_n} g(f(i)) - \frac{1}{k_n} \sum_{i=1}^{k_n} g(h_i(e)) \right\| + \left\| \int g(h(u, e)) d\nu_{G_n}(u) - \int g(h(u, e)) d\nu(u) \right\|. \end{aligned}$$

Since $\text{supp}(\nu)$ is compact, there are a neighborhood \tilde{V}_1 of $\text{supp}(\nu)$ in \mathcal{U} , with $\tilde{V}_1 \subseteq \tilde{V}$, and a $\delta > 0$ such that for $z \in \mathbb{R}^m$ with $e + z \in W$, $\|g(h(u, e + z)) - g(h(u, e))\| < \gamma/3$ whenever $u \in V_1 \cap \hat{V}$, $e \in W_1$, and $\|z\| < \delta$, and by what was noted earlier, if n is large then $\|\int g(a) d\tau_{\hat{A},f,i}(a) - \int g(a) d\tau_{\hat{A},f}(a)\| < \delta$ for each $f \in \hat{A}^{I_n}$ and each $i \in I_n$. Hence, as $\rho_H(\text{supp}(\nu_{G_n}), \text{supp}(\nu)) \rightarrow 0$, we have

$$\left\| \frac{1}{k_n} \sum_{i=1}^{k_n} g(f(i)) - \frac{1}{k_n} \sum_{i=1}^{k_n} g(h_i(e)) \right\| < \gamma/3$$

for large n whenever $f \in \hat{A}^{I_n}$ and $e \in \partial W_2$ are as above. On the other hand, combining the first part of the penultimate sentence with the fact that $\nu_{G_n} \rightarrow \nu$ narrowly, we see that each $e \in \partial W_2$ has a neighborhood U in ∂W_2 such that for large n we have $\|\int g(h(u, e')) d\nu_{G_n}(u) - \int g(h(u, e')) d\nu(u)\| < (2\gamma)/3$ for each $e' \in U$. Thus, since ∂W_2 is compact, if n is large then $\|\int g(h(u, e)) d\nu_{G_n}(u) - \int g(h(u, e)) d\nu(u)\| < (2\gamma)/3$ for every $e \in \partial W_2$. It follows that for some $N_1 \geq N$,

$$\left\| \frac{1}{k_n} \sum_{i=1}^{k_n} g(f(i)) - e - \xi_\tau(e) \right\| < \gamma$$

for $n \geq N_1$ whenever $f \in \hat{A}^{I_n}$ and $e \in \partial W_2$ are as above. Consequently, because

$$\frac{1}{k_n} \sum_{i=1}^{k_n} g(f(i)) = \int g(a) d\tau_{A,f}(a),$$

(b) of Theorem 4 is satisfied if $n \geq N_1$.

We can conclude that for $n \geq N_1$, Λ has a fixed point and thus (I_n, G_n) has a strict pure strategy Nash equilibrium. \square

Lemma 8. *Let \mathcal{G}^* be defined as in the proof of Theorem 1. Let $\nu \in \mathcal{G}$ and τ an equilibrium distribution for ν . Then there is a sequence $\langle \nu_k \rangle$ of elements of \mathcal{G}^* and a sequence $\langle \tau_k \rangle$ of corresponding equilibrium distributions such that $\nu_k \rightarrow \nu$ in the topology of \mathcal{G} , $\tau_k \rightarrow \tau$ narrowly, and for each k , τ_k witnesses that $\nu_k \in \mathcal{G}^*$.*

Proof. In the sequel, for elements ν and ν_k , $k \in \mathbb{N}$, in \mathcal{G} , we write $\nu_k \rightarrow \nu$ to mean convergence of the sequence $\langle \nu_k \rangle$ to ν in the topology of \mathcal{G} ; for equilibrium distributions τ and τ_k , $k \in \mathbb{N}$, we write $\tau_k \rightarrow \tau$ to mean convergence of the sequence $\langle \tau_k \rangle$ to τ in the narrow topology. Given $\nu \in \mathcal{G}$, we often write Y for $\text{supp}(\nu)$. The set $\mathcal{G}_1 \subseteq \mathcal{G}$ is

defined as in the proof of Theorem 1. We write \mathcal{G}_2 for the set of elements of \mathcal{G} which have an equilibrium distribution satisfying (i) and (ii) in the definition of \mathcal{G}_1 , and \mathcal{G}_3 for the subset of \mathcal{G}_2 consisting of the elements ν of \mathcal{G}_2 such that for some $\bar{u} \in \text{supp}(\nu)$ there is a decreasing sequence $\langle W_l \rangle$ of compact subsets of Y , with $A_u = A_{\bar{u}}$ for each $u \in W_0$, such that $\bigcap_{l=0}^{\infty} W_l = \{\bar{u}\}$, and $\nu(W_l) > 0$ for each l . The proof of the lemma is organized in the following steps.

(a) If $\nu \in \mathcal{G}$ and τ is an equilibrium distribution for ν , there is a sequence $\langle \nu_k \rangle$ in \mathcal{G}_2 and a sequence $\langle \tau_k \rangle$ of equilibrium distributions for the ν_k 's such that $\nu_k \rightarrow \nu$, $\tau_k \rightarrow \tau$, and for each k , τ_k witnesses that $\nu_k \in \mathcal{G}_2$.

(b) If $\nu \in \mathcal{G}_2$ and τ is an equilibrium distribution for ν , witnessing that $\nu \in \mathcal{G}_2$, then there is a sequence $\langle \nu_k \rangle$ in \mathcal{G}_3 and a sequence $\langle \tau_k \rangle$ of equilibrium distributions for the ν_k 's such that $\nu_k \rightarrow \nu$, $\tau_k \rightarrow \tau$, and for each k , τ_k witnesses that $\nu_k \in \mathcal{G}_2$.

(c) If $\nu \in \mathcal{G}_3$ and τ is an equilibrium distribution for ν , witnessing that $\nu \in \mathcal{G}_2$, then there is a sequence $\langle \nu_k \rangle$ in \mathcal{G}_1 and a sequence $\langle \tau_k \rangle$ of equilibrium distributions for the ν_k 's such that $\nu_k \rightarrow \nu$, $\tau_k \rightarrow \tau$, and for each k , τ_k witnesses that $\nu_k \in \mathcal{G}_1$.

(d) If $\nu \in \mathcal{G}_1$ and τ is an equilibrium distribution for ν , witnessing that $\nu \in \mathcal{G}_1$, then there is a sequence $\langle \nu_k \rangle$ in \mathcal{G}^* and a sequence $\langle \tau_k \rangle$ of equilibrium distributions for the ν_k 's such that $\nu_k \rightarrow \nu$, $\tau_k \rightarrow \tau$, and for each k , τ_k witnesses that $\nu_k \in \mathcal{G}^*$.

Putting (a)–(d) together, proves the lemma.

(a) Let $\nu \in \mathcal{G}$ and τ any equilibrium distribution for ν . Choose a twice continuously differentiable map $\rho: \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ such that $\rho(0) = 0 > \rho(x)$ for all $x \in \mathbb{R}^n \setminus \{0\}$ and $D^2\rho(0)$ is negative definite. For each $k \in \mathbb{N}$, $a \in A$, and $u \in Y$ define a function $u_{k,a}: A_u \times E(\nu) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ by setting

$$u_{k,a}(a', e) = u(a', e) + \frac{1}{k+1}(\rho(a - a'))$$

for each $(a', e) \in A_u \times E(\nu)$. Evidently (U1) and (U2) in the definition of payoff functions are satisfied for each $u_{k,a}$. Using Lemmata 1 and 3, we see from compactness of Y , A , and $E(\nu)$ that there is a $k_0 \in \mathbb{N}$ such that also (U3) in the definition of payoff functions is satisfied whenever $k \geq k_0$. We can assume that $k_0 = 0$.

Now, for each k , define a map $\lambda_k: Y \times A \rightarrow \mathcal{U}$ by setting $\lambda_k(u, a) = u_{k,a}$ for each $u \in Y$ and $a \in A$. Write proj_Y for the projection of $Y \times A$ onto Y . Using Lemma 1, we

see that λ_k is continuous for each k , and that the sequence $\langle \lambda_k \rangle$ converges uniformly to proj_Y as $k \rightarrow \infty$. Because A and Y are compact and λ_k is continuous for each k , we can define an element ν_k in \mathcal{M} for each k by setting $\nu_k = \tau \circ \lambda_k^{-1}$. Evidently $E(\nu_k) = E(\nu)$ for each k , so each ν_k actually belongs to \mathcal{G} . The fact that $\langle \lambda_k \rangle$ converges uniformly to proj_Y implies that $\nu_k \rightarrow \nu$, because $\tau_{\mathcal{U}} = \nu$ by the fact that τ is an equilibrium distribution for ν .

Write proj_A for the projection of $\mathcal{U} \times A$ onto A . For each k , define a continuous map $\kappa_k: Y \times A \rightarrow \mathcal{U} \times A$ by setting $\kappa_k = \lambda_k \times \text{proj}_A$ and set $\tau_k = \tau \circ \kappa_k^{-1}$. Then $\tau_{k,\mathcal{U}} = \nu_k$ and $\tau_{k,A} = \tau_A$ for each k . As $\langle \lambda_k \rangle$ converges uniformly to proj_Y , $\langle \kappa_k \rangle$ converges uniformly to the identity on $Y \times A$, and thus we have $\tau_k \rightarrow \tau$. Fix any k . Note that because $Y \times A$ is compact and κ_k is continuous, $\text{supp}(\tau_k) = \{(\kappa_k(u, a) : (u, a) \in Y \times A)\}$; that is, $\text{supp}(\tau_k) = \{(u_{k,a}, a) : (u, a) \in Y \times A\}$. Thus if $(u', a') \in \text{supp}(\tau_k)$, then for some $(u, a) \in \text{supp}(\tau)$, $u' = u_{k,a}$ and $a' = a$. But if $(u, a) \in \text{supp}(\tau)$, then $a \in \varphi(u, e(\tau_A))$ since τ is an equilibrium distribution; in particular, $D_a^2 u(a, e(\tau_A))$ is negative semi-definite. Consequently, by the choice of the functions $u_{k,a}$, if $(u', a') \in \text{supp}(\tau_k)$, then $\varphi(u', e(\tau_A)) = \{a'\}$ and $D_a^2 u'(a', e(\tau_A))$ is negative definite. As $\tau_{k,\mathcal{U}} = \nu_k$ and $\tau_A = \tau_{k,A}$, it follows that τ_k is an equilibrium distribution for ν_k and that $\nu_k \in \mathcal{G}_2$.

(b) Let $\nu \in \mathcal{G}_2$ and τ an equilibrium distribution for ν , witnessing that $\nu \in \mathcal{G}_2$. If there is a $u \in Y$ with $\nu(\{u\}) > 0$, we can simply set $\nu_k = \nu$ and $\tau_k = \tau$ for each κ . Suppose that $\nu(\{u\}) = 0$ for each $u \in Y$. Pick an arbitrary point \bar{u} in Y . By Lemma 11 in the appendix, there is an increasing sequence $\langle A_{\bar{u}_k} \rangle$ of non-empty compact subsets of $A_{\bar{u}}$, all with dense interior, such that $A_{\bar{u}_k} \subseteq \text{int } A_{\bar{u}}$ for each k and both $\rho_H(A_{\bar{u}}, A_{\bar{u}_k}) \rightarrow 0$ and $\rho_H(\partial A_{\bar{u}}, \partial A_{\bar{u}_k}) \rightarrow 0$. Now by Lemma 4, for each k there is a closed neighborhood V'_k of \bar{u} in \mathcal{U} such that $A_{\bar{u}_k} \subseteq \text{int } A_u$ for each $u \in V'_k$. For each k , set $V_k = V'_k \cap Y$. Then $\nu(V_k) > 0$ for each k , because $\bar{u} \in Y (\equiv \text{supp}(\nu))$. We can assume that the sequence $\langle V_k \rangle$ is decreasing and that $\bigcap_{k=0}^{\infty} V_k = \{\bar{u}\}$.

For each k and each $u \in Y$ define a map u'_k by setting $u'_k = u \upharpoonright (A_{\bar{u}_k} \times E(\nu))$ if $u \in V_k$ and $u'_k = u$ otherwise. Then all these maps are twice continuously differentiable on their domains. As $\rho_H(A_{\bar{u}}, A_{\bar{u}_k}) \rightarrow 0$ and $\rho_H(\partial A_{\bar{u}}, \partial A_{\bar{u}_k}) \rightarrow 0$, we can see, as in (a), that if k is sufficiently large, then (U3) in the assumptions on payoff functions is satisfied by all the maps u'_k . We can assume that this is true for each k , so that we

can define a map $\lambda'_k: Y \rightarrow \mathcal{U}$ for each k by setting $\lambda'_k(u) = u'_k$ for each $u \in Y$. Note that the restrictions of λ'_k to V_k and $Y \setminus V_k$ are both continuous. Thus for each k , λ'_k is measurable, so $\nu'_k = \nu \circ \lambda'_k$ is defined. Evidently, for each k , $\text{supp}(\nu'_k)$ is compact, so $\nu'_k \in \mathcal{M}$. Using Lemma 1 and the choice of the sequence $\langle A_{\bar{u}_k} \rangle$ it follows that the sequence $\langle \lambda'_k \rangle$ converges uniformly to the identity on Y , which implies that $\nu'_k \rightarrow \nu$ in the topology of \mathcal{M} .

Now by Lemma 5, $\rho_H(E(\nu), E(\nu'_k)) \rightarrow 0$. Moreover, $E(\nu'_k) \subseteq E(\nu)$ for each k . Indeed, fix any k . Then

$$\int_{V_k} \text{co } g(A_{\bar{u}_k}) \, d\nu = \nu(V_k) \text{co } g(A_{\bar{u}_k}) = \nu'_k(\{\bar{u}'_k\}) \text{co } g(A_{\bar{u}_k}),$$

so, by the proof of Lemma 5 and the choice of ν'_k ,

$$\begin{aligned} E(\nu) &= \int_Y \text{co } g(A_u) \, d\nu(u) \supseteq \int_{Y \setminus V_k} \text{co } g(A_u) \, d\nu(u) + \int_{V_k} \text{co } g(A_{\bar{u}_k}) \, d\nu \\ &= \int_{Y \setminus V_k} \text{co } g(A_u) \, d\nu'_k(u) + \nu'_k(\{\bar{u}'_k\}) \text{co } g(A_{\bar{u}_k}) = E(\nu'_k). \end{aligned}$$

For each $u \in Y$, we can therefore define a map $u_k: A_u \times E(\nu'_k) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ by setting $u_k(a, e) = u(a, e)$ for $(a, e) \in A_u \times E(\nu'_k)$, and for each $u \in V_k$, we can define a map $\tilde{u}_k: A_{\bar{u}_k} \times E(\nu'_k) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ by setting $\tilde{u}_k(a, e) = u(a, e)$ for $(a, e) \in A_{\bar{u}_k} \times E(\nu'_k)$. For each k , define $\lambda_k: Y \rightarrow \mathcal{U}$ by setting $\lambda_k(u) = u_k$ for $u \in Y \setminus V_k$, and $\lambda_k(u) = \tilde{u}_k$ for $u \in V_k$. As with λ'_k , we see that λ_k is measurable for each k , so $\nu_k = \nu \circ \lambda_k^{-1}$ is defined. Clearly $\text{supp}(\nu_k)$ is compact and $E(\nu_k) = E(\nu'_k)$ for each k , so ν_k belongs to \mathcal{G} . Since $\rho_H(E(\nu), E(\nu'_k)) \rightarrow 0$, we see that $\langle \lambda_k \rangle$ converges uniformly to the identity on Y , using Lemma 1 and the choice of the sequence $\langle A_{\bar{u}_k} \rangle$. Thus $\nu_k \rightarrow \nu$.

Since $\nu \in \mathcal{G}_2$ and τ witnesses this, we see as in (i) in the proof of Theorem 1 that there is continuous map $f: Y \rightarrow A$ such that $\varphi(u, e(\tau_A)) = \{f(u)\}$ for all $u \in Y$; in particular, $\tau = \nu \circ (\text{id}_Y \times f)^{-1}$. By (U3) in the assumptions on payoff functions, we have $f(\bar{u}) \in \text{int } A_{\bar{u}}$. Consequently, by Lemma 3 and the choice of the sequence $\langle A_{\bar{u}_k} \rangle$, we must have $f(\bar{u}) \in \text{int } A_{\bar{u}_k}$ for large k , and therefore, by the choice of the sequence $\langle V_k \rangle$, continuity of f implies that $f(u) \in A_{\bar{u}_k}$ for each $u \in V_k$ if k is large enough. We can assume that this is true for all k . Now for each k , set $\tau_k = \nu \circ (\lambda_k \times f)^{-1}$. Then $\tau_{k, \mathcal{U}} = \nu_k$ for each k . Because Y and $V_k \subseteq Y$ are compact, and the maps $f, u \mapsto u_k: Y \rightarrow A$, and

$u \mapsto \tilde{u}_k: V_k \rightarrow A$ are continuous, the set $\{(u_k, f(u)): u \in Y\} \cup \{(\tilde{u}_k, f(u)): u \in V_k\}$ is closed and therefore includes $\text{supp}(\tau_k)$. Note that $e(\tau_{k,A}) = \int g(f(u)) d\nu(u) = e(\tau_A)$. By the hypothesis that τ is an equilibrium distribution for ν satisfying (i) and (ii) in the definition of \mathcal{G}_1 , together with the choice of the u_k 's and \tilde{u}_k 's, it follows that τ_k is an equilibrium distribution for ν_k , also satisfying (i) and (ii) in the definition of \mathcal{G}_1 . Clearly the sequence $\langle \lambda_k, f \rangle$ converges uniformly to $id_Y \times f$, so $\tau_k \rightarrow \tau$, because $\tau = \nu \circ (id_Y \times f)^{-1}$.

Finally to see that each ν_k actually belongs to \mathcal{G}_3 , fix any k . Note first that $\lambda_k(\bar{u}) \in \text{supp}(\nu_k)$. Indeed, note that λ_k is continuous on V_k and that \bar{u} belongs to the relative interior of V_k in Y . Hence whenever O is an open neighborhood of $\lambda_k(\bar{u})$, there is a relatively open neighborhood U of \bar{u} in Y , with $U \subseteq V_k$, such that $\lambda_k(U) \subseteq O$. Consequently, for any such O and U ,

$$\nu_k(O) = \nu(\{u \in Y: \lambda_k(u) \in O\}) \geq \nu(U) > 0,$$

since $\bar{u} \in Y$ ($\equiv \text{supp}(\nu)$).

Now set $W_l = \lambda_k(V_{k+l}) \cap \text{supp}(\nu_k)$ for each $l \in \mathbb{N}$, so that each W_l is a closed subset of $\text{supp}(\nu_k)$, because V_{k+l} is compact and λ_k is continuous on V_{k+l} . By the choice of the sequence $\langle V_k \rangle$, we have $\bigcap_{l=0}^{\infty} V_{k+l} = \{\bar{u}\}$, therefore $\bigcap_{l=0}^{\infty} \lambda_k(V_{k+l}) = \{\lambda_k(\bar{u})\}$ since λ_k is continuous on V_k , and hence $\bigcap_{l=0}^{\infty} W_l = \{\lambda_k(\bar{u})\}$. Also, for each l , the relative interior of V_{k+l} in Y is non-empty, therefore $\nu(V_{k+l}) > 0$ since $V_{k+l} \subseteq \text{supp}(\nu)$, and hence $\nu_k(\lambda_k(V_{k+l})) > 0$. Thus $\nu_k(W_l) > 0$ for each l . By construction, $A_u = A_{\lambda_k(\bar{u})}$ for each $u \in W_0$, and it follows that ν_k satisfies the requirements to be a member of \mathcal{G}_3 .

(c) Let $\nu \in \mathcal{G}_3$ and τ an equilibrium distribution for ν , witnessing that $\nu \in \mathcal{G}_2$. As in (b), there is continuous map $f: Y \rightarrow A$ such that $\varphi(u, e(\tau_A)) = \{f(u)\}$ for all $u \in Y$, and we have $e(\tau_A) = \int g(f(u)) d\nu(u)$ and $\tau = \nu \circ (id_Y \times f)^{-1}$.

(i) Suppose first that there is a $\bar{u} \in Y$ with $\nu(\{\bar{u}\}) > 0$. Write α for $\nu(\{\bar{u}\})$. Note that $f(\bar{u}) \in \text{int } A_{\bar{u}}$. Let $\langle W_k \rangle$ be a non-increasing sequence of compact convex neighborhoods of $f(\bar{u})$ in $A_{\bar{u}}$ such that $\bigcap_{k=1}^{\infty} W_k = \{f(\bar{u})\}$. By Lemma 9(b), $\text{int cog}(W_k)$ is non-empty for each k . For each k fix a point $e_{\bar{u},k} \in \text{int cog}(W_k)$. Using Caratheodory's theorem, for each k we can find points $a_{k,h}$, $h = 1, \dots, m+1$, in W_k such that $e_{\bar{u},k} = \sum_{h=1}^{m+1} \beta_{k,h} g(a_{k,h})$ for some numbers $\beta_{k,h}$ with $\beta_{k,h} \geq 0$ and

$\sum_{h=1}^{m+1} \beta_{k,h} = 1$. Note that $E(\nu) = \alpha \operatorname{co}(g(A_{\bar{u}})) + \int_{Y \setminus \{\bar{u}\}} \operatorname{co}(A_u) d\nu(u)$. Thus, setting $e_k = \alpha_1 e_{\bar{u},k} + \int_{Y \setminus \{\bar{u}\}} g(f(u)) d\nu(u)$ we have $e_k \in \operatorname{int} E(\nu)$ for each k . Also, $e_k \rightarrow e(\tau_A)$, by continuity of g , since $a_{k,h} \rightarrow f(\bar{u})$ for each h if $k \rightarrow \infty$ by choice of the points $a_{k,h}$.

As $f(\bar{u}) \in \operatorname{int} A_{\bar{u}}$, we can find numbers $0 < r_1 < r_2$ such that $\bar{B}(f(\bar{u}), r_1) \subseteq \bar{B}(f(\bar{u}), r_2) \subseteq \operatorname{int} A_{\bar{u}}$. Let $\rho: \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ be a twice continuously differentiable map such that $\rho(a) = 1$ if $a \in B(f(\bar{u}), r_1)$, $0 \leq \rho(a) \leq 1$ for all $a \in \mathbb{R}^n$, and $\rho(a) = 0$ if $a \notin B(f(\bar{u}), r_2)$. As $a_{k,h} \rightarrow f(\bar{u})$ for each $h = 1, \dots, m+1$ if $k \rightarrow \infty$, we can assume for each k and each h that $a_{k,h} \in B(f(\bar{u}), r_1)$ and that $a + \rho(a)(f(\bar{u}) - a_{k,h}) \in \operatorname{int} A_{\bar{u}}$ whenever $a \in B(f(\bar{u}), r_2)$. Define a map $\bar{u}_{k,h}: A_{\bar{u}} \times E(\nu) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ for each $h = 1, \dots, m+1$ and each k by setting

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{u}_{k,h}(a, e) &= \bar{u}(a + \rho(a)(f(\bar{u}) - a_{k,h}), e) \\ &\quad - \bar{u}(a + \rho(a)(f(\bar{u}) - a_{k,h}), e_k) + \bar{u}(a + \rho(a)(f(\bar{u}) - a_{k,h}), e(\tau_A)) \end{aligned}$$

for each $(a, e) \in A_{\bar{u}} \times E(\nu)$; for each $u \in Y$ and each k , define a map $u_k: A_u \times E(\nu) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ by setting

$$u_k(a, e) = u(a, e) - u(a, e_k) + u(a, e(\tau_A))$$

for each $(a, e) \in A_u \times E(\nu)$. Then, for each k , all the maps u_k and $\bar{u}_{k,h}$, $h = 1, \dots, m+1$, are twice continuously differentiable on their domains. Using the facts that $e_k \rightarrow e(\tau_A)$ and that $a_{k,h} \rightarrow f(\bar{u})$ for each $h = 1, \dots, m+1$, we can assume, as in (a), that they all satisfy (U3) in the assumptions on payoff functions.

Now for each k define $\lambda_k: Y \rightarrow \mathcal{U}$ by setting $\lambda_k(u) = u_k$ for each $u \in Y$ and note that λ_k is continuous. For each k , set $\nu' = \nu - \alpha \delta_{\bar{u}}$ and $\nu_k = \alpha \sum_{h=1}^{m+1} \beta_{k,h} \delta_{\bar{u}_{k,h}} + \nu' \circ \lambda_k^{-1}$. Because Y is compact and λ_k is continuous, $\operatorname{supp}(\nu' \circ \lambda_k^{-1})$ is compact for each k , and hence so is $\operatorname{supp}(\nu_k)$ for each k . Thus $\nu_k \in \mathcal{M}$ for each k . Because the distribution of action sets induced by ν is the same as that induced by ν_k , we have $E(\nu_k) = E(\nu)$, and thus ν_k actually belongs to \mathcal{G} for each k . Using Lemma 1 we see that λ_k converges uniformly to the identity on Y , and from this that $\nu' \circ \lambda_k^{-1} \rightarrow \nu'$ narrowly and that $\rho_H(\operatorname{supp}(\nu'), \operatorname{supp}(\nu' \circ \lambda_k^{-1})) \rightarrow 0$. Also $\alpha \sum_{h=1}^{m+1} \beta_{k,h} \delta_{\bar{u}_{k,h}} \rightarrow \alpha \delta_{\bar{u}}$ narrowly and $\rho_H(\operatorname{supp}(\alpha \delta_{\bar{u}}), \operatorname{supp}(\alpha \sum_{h=1}^{m+1} \beta_{k,h} \delta_{\bar{u}_{k,h}})) \rightarrow 0$, by the facts that $a_{k,h} \rightarrow f(\bar{u})$ for each $h = 1, \dots, m+1$ and that $e_k \rightarrow e(\tau_A)$. Consequently we have $\nu_k \rightarrow \nu$.

Set $\tau_k = \alpha \sum_{h=1}^{m+1} \beta_{k,h} \delta_{\bar{u}_{k,h}, a_{k,h}} + \nu' \circ (\lambda_k \times f)^{-1}$ for each k . We claim that if k is

large enough, then τ_k is an equilibrium distribution for ν_k such that (i)–(iii) in the definition of \mathcal{G}_1 are true. Indeed, it is clear that $\tau_{k,\mathcal{U}} = \nu_k$. Note next that by the facts that f and λ_k are continuous and Y is compact, the set

$$\{(\bar{u}_{k,h}, a_{k,h}): h = 1, \dots, m+1\} \cup \{(\lambda_k(u), f(u)): u \in Y\}$$

is closed and must therefore include $\text{supp}(\tau_k)$. Note also that

$$e(\tau_{k,A}) = \alpha \sum_{h=1}^{m+1} \beta_{k,h} g(a_{k,h}) + \int g(f(u)) d\nu'(u) = e_k.$$

Now for any $u \in Y$, we have $\lambda_k(u)(a, e_k) = u(a, e(\tau_A))$ for each $a \in A_u$, by the choice of $\lambda_k(u)$; hence $\varphi(\lambda_k(u), e_k) = \{f(u)\}$ and $D^2\lambda_k(u)(f(u), e_k)$ is negative definite, because τ is an equilibrium distribution for ν satisfying (i) and (ii) in the definition of \mathcal{G}_1 . From the second property of τ we also see that there is a compact neighborhood \bar{U} of $f(\bar{u})$ in $\text{int } A_{\bar{u}}$ such that $D_a^2\bar{u}_{k,h}(a, e_k)$ is negative definite for each $a \in \bar{U}$ and each $h = 1, \dots, m+1$ if k is large enough, because $\bar{u}_{k,h} \rightarrow \bar{u}$ for each $h = 1, \dots, m+1$. Since $a_{k,h} \rightarrow f(\bar{u})$ and $D_a\bar{u}_{k,h}(a_{k,h}, e_k) = D_a\bar{u}(f(\bar{u}), e(\tau_A)) = 0$ for each $h = 1, \dots, m+1$, it now follows from first of the properties noted for the equilibrium distribution τ that $\varphi(\bar{u}_{k,h}, e_k) = \{a_{k,h}\}$ for each $h = 1, \dots, m+1$ if k is large enough. By construction, $e(\tau_{k,A}) = e_k \in \text{int } E(\nu) = \text{int } E(\nu_k)$ for each k , and thus the above claim is true.

Clearly, the sequence $\langle \alpha \sum_{h=1}^{m+1} \beta_{k,h} \delta_{\bar{u}_{k,h}, a_{k,h}} \rangle$ of measures on \mathcal{U} converges narrowly to $\alpha \delta_{\bar{u}, f(\bar{u})}$, and since $\langle \lambda_k \times f \rangle$ converges uniformly to $id_Y \times f$, the sequence $\langle \nu' \circ (\lambda_k \times f)^{-1} \rangle$ of measures on \mathcal{U} converges narrowly to $\nu' \circ (id_Y \times f)^{-1}$. Since $\alpha \delta_{\bar{u}, f(\bar{u})} = \alpha \delta_{\bar{u}} \circ (id_Y \times f)^{-1}$ and $\nu' \circ (id_Y \times f)^{-1} = (\nu - \alpha \delta_{\bar{u}}) \circ (id_Y \times f)^{-1}$, it follows that $\tau_k \rightarrow \nu \circ (id_Y \times f)^{-1}$ narrowly; that is $\tau_k \rightarrow \tau$, because $\tau = \nu \circ (id_Y \times f)^{-1}$. Thus the assertion of (c) is true in case there is a $\bar{u} \in Y$ with $\nu(\bar{u}) > 0$.

(ii) Now suppose $\nu(\{u\}) = 0$ for each $u \in Y$. As $\nu \in \mathcal{G}_3$, we can choose a $\bar{u} \in Y$ and a decreasing sequence $\langle W_l \rangle$ of compact subsets of Y such that $\bigcap_{l=0}^{\infty} W_l = \{\bar{u}\}$, $\nu(W_l) > 0$ for each l , and $A_u = A_{\bar{u}}$ for each $u \in W_0$.

For each l , define a map $f_l: Y \rightarrow A$ by setting $f_l = 1_{Y \setminus W_l} f + 1_{W_l} f(\bar{u})$ and set $e_l = \int_{Y \setminus W_l} g(f(u)) d\nu(u) + \nu(W_l) g(f(\bar{u}))$. Note that $e_l \rightarrow e(\tau_A)$ as $l \rightarrow \infty$ and that $e_l \in E(\nu)$ for each l . Now for each l and each $u \in Y$, define a map $u_l: A_u \times E(\nu) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$

by setting

$$u_l(a, e) = u(a, e) - u(a, e_l) + u(a, e(\tau_A))$$

for $(a, e) \in A_u \times E(\nu)$, and for each $u \in W_l$ and each l , define $\bar{u}_l: A_{\bar{u}_l} \times E(\nu) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ by setting

$$\bar{u}_l(a, e) = \bar{u}(a, e) - \bar{u}(a, e_l) + \bar{u}(a, e(\tau_A))$$

for $(a, e) \in A_{\bar{u}_l} \times E(\nu)$. As in (i), all these maps are twice continuously differentiable on their domains and we may assume that they all satisfy (U3) in the assumptions on payoff functions. For each l , define $\lambda_l: Y \rightarrow \mathcal{U}$ by setting $\lambda_l(u) = u_l$ for $u \in Y \setminus W_l$, and $\lambda_l(u) = \bar{u}_l$ for $u \in W_l$. As in (b), λ_l is measurable for each l , so $\nu_l = \nu \circ \lambda_l^{-1}$ is defined. As in (i) it follows that $\nu_l \in \mathcal{G}$ for each l . Using Lemma 1 and the fact that $e_l \rightarrow e(\tau_A)$, we see that $\langle \lambda_l \rangle$ converges uniformly to the identity on Y . This implies that $\nu_l \rightarrow \nu$. Moreover, we have $\nu_l(\{\bar{u}\}) \geq \nu(W_l) > 0$ for each l .

For each l , set $\tau_l = \nu \circ (\lambda_l \times f_l)^{-1}$. Then $\tau_{l,\mathcal{M}} = \nu_l$ for each l . For reasons as in (b), we have $\text{supp}(\tau_l) \subseteq \{(u_l, f(u)) : u \in Y\} \cup \{(\bar{u}_l, f(\bar{u}))\}$. Noting that $e(\tau_{l,A}) = \int g \circ f_l d\nu = e_l$, it follows from the hypothesis that τ is an equilibrium distribution for ν satisfying (i) and (ii) in the definition of \mathcal{G}_1 , together with the choice of the u_l 's and \bar{u}_l 's, that τ_l is an equilibrium distribution for ν_l , also satisfying (i) and (ii) in the definition of \mathcal{G}_1 . Finally, note that $\tau = \nu \circ (id_Y \times f)^{-1}$ and that the sequence $\langle \lambda_l \times f_l \rangle$ converges uniformly to $id_Y \times f$. Consequently $\tau_l \rightarrow \tau$.

(iii) Combining (i) and (ii), proves the assertion of (c).

(d) Let $\nu \in \mathcal{G}_1$ and τ an equilibrium distribution for ν , witnessing that $\nu \in \mathcal{G}_1$. Let V, W, h , and ξ_τ be associated with τ as in (b) of the proof of Theorem 1. Write $\bar{e} = e(\tau_A)$. If $\det D\xi_\tau(\bar{e}) \neq 0$, then $\nu \in \mathcal{G}^*$. Otherwise, pick any $0 < \lambda < 1$. For each $u \in Y$ define $u_\lambda \in \mathcal{U}$ by setting $u_\lambda(a, e) = u(a, (1-\lambda)\bar{e} + \lambda e)$ for each $(a, e) \in A_u \times E(\nu)$, so that, in particular, $\text{dom } u_\lambda = \text{dom } u$. Note that for each $u \in Y$ and $a \in A_u$, we have $u_\lambda(a, \bar{e}) = u(a, \bar{e})$. Define a map $\kappa_\lambda: Y \rightarrow \mathcal{U}$ by setting $\kappa_\lambda(u) = u_\lambda$. By Lemma 1, κ_λ is continuous. Thus $\nu_\lambda = \nu \circ \kappa_\lambda^{-1}$ has compact support (since ν has) and therefore ν_λ belongs to \mathcal{M} . Because the distribution of action sets induced by ν_λ is the same as that induced by ν , we have $E(\nu_\lambda) = E(\nu)$, and thus ν_λ actually belongs to \mathcal{G} . Set

$\tau_\lambda = \nu \circ (\kappa_\lambda \times h(\cdot, \bar{e}))^{-1}$. Clearly $\tau_{\lambda, \mathcal{M}} = \nu_\lambda$. Moreover,

$$e(\tau_{\lambda, A}) = \int_{\mathcal{U}} g(h(u, \bar{e})) d\nu(u) = \bar{e}.$$

Further, if $(u', a') \in \text{supp}(\tau_\lambda)$, then for some $u \in Y$, $u' = \kappa_\lambda(u) = u_\lambda$ and $a' = h(u, \bar{e})$. Since $u_\lambda(a, \bar{e}) = u(a, \bar{e})$ for each $u \in Y$ and $a \in A_u$, it follows that τ_λ is an equilibrium distribution for ν_λ satisfying (i) and (ii) in the definition of \mathcal{G}_1 . Because $\bar{e} \in \text{int } E(\nu)$ (by hypothesis), and since $E(\nu_\lambda) = E(\nu)$ and $e(\tau_{\lambda, A}) = \bar{e}$, also (iii) in the definition of \mathcal{G}_1 is true for τ_λ . Thus τ_λ is an equilibrium distribution for ν_λ , witnessing that $\nu_\lambda \in \mathcal{G}_1$.

Using Lemma 1 and the fact that Y is compact we see that whenever $\langle \lambda_k \rangle$ is a sequence in $(0, 1)$ such that $\lambda_k \rightarrow 1$, then the sequence $\langle \kappa_{\lambda_k} \rangle$ converges uniformly to id_Y and thus $\rho_H(\text{supp}(\nu), \text{supp}(\nu_{\lambda_k})) \rightarrow 0$. Hence, for large $\lambda \in (0, 1)$, $\text{supp}(\nu_\lambda) \subseteq V$ and therefore $h(u_\lambda, \cdot): W \rightarrow A$ is defined for each $u \in Y$; in particular, $D_e u_\lambda(h(u_\lambda, \bar{e}), \bar{e})$ must be defined. Clearly, for such λ , we have $h(u_\lambda, \bar{e}) = h(u, \bar{e})$ for each $u \in Y$, and in addition we must have $D_a^2 u_\lambda(h(u_\lambda, \bar{e}), \bar{e}) = D_a^2 u(h(u, \bar{e}), \bar{e})$ and $D_e u_\lambda(h(u_\lambda, \bar{e}), \bar{e}) = \lambda D_e u(h(u, \bar{e}), \bar{e})$, therefore

$$D_e(g \circ h)(u_\lambda, \bar{e}) = \lambda D_e(g \circ h)(u, \bar{e}).$$

Consequently

$$D\xi_{\tau_\lambda}(\bar{e}) = \int_{\mathcal{U}} D_e(g \circ h)(u_\lambda, \bar{e}) d\nu(u) - I = \lambda \int_{\mathcal{U}} D_e(g \circ h)(u, \bar{e}) d\nu(u) - I.$$

Because the characteristic polynomial of the matrix $\int_{\mathcal{U}} D_e(g \circ h)(u, \bar{e}) d\nu(u)$ can have only finitely many zeros, we have

$$\det\left(\int_{\mathcal{U}} D_e(g \circ h)(u, \bar{e}) d\nu(u) - \frac{1}{\lambda} I\right) \neq 0$$

for all sufficiently large $0 < \lambda < 1$, and hence $\det(\lambda \int_{\mathcal{U}} D_e(g \circ h)(u, \bar{e}) d\nu(u) - I) \neq 0$ for such numbers λ .

As earlier, write id_Y for the identity on Y . Let $\langle \lambda_k \rangle$ be a sequence in $(0, 1)$ such that $\lambda_k \rightarrow 1$. Then, as noted above, the sequence $\langle \kappa_{\lambda_k} \rangle$ converges uniformly to id_Y , so $\nu_{\lambda_k} \rightarrow \nu$. The fact that $\langle \kappa_{\lambda_k} \rangle$ converges uniformly to id_Y implies also that the sequence $\langle \kappa_{\lambda_k} \times h(\cdot, \bar{e}) \rangle$ converges uniformly to $id_Y \times h(\cdot, \bar{e})$, and thus we have $\tau_{\lambda_k} \rightarrow \tau$. By what was also noted above, each τ_{λ_k} belongs to \mathcal{G}_1 . Combining these facts with the

conclusion of the previous paragraph, we see that there is a sequence $\langle \nu_k \rangle$ in \mathcal{G}^* and a sequence $\langle \tau_k \rangle$ of equilibrium distributions for the ν_k 's such that $\nu_k \rightarrow \nu$, $\tau_k \rightarrow \tau$, and for each k , τ_k witnesses that $\nu_k \in \mathcal{G}^*$. \square

Proof of Theorem 2. (a) Let \mathcal{G}^* be defined as in the proof of Theorem 1. Fix any $\nu \in \mathcal{G}^*$ and let τ be an equilibrium distribution for ν such that the requirements in (c) of the proof of Theorem 1 are satisfied. Suppose $\langle (I_n, G_n) \rangle_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ is a sequence of finite-player games such that $\#(I_n) \rightarrow \infty$, $\nu_{G_n} \in \mathcal{M}$ for each n , and $\nu_{G_n} \rightarrow \nu$. Let \hat{V} , W , W_1 , and $h: \hat{V} \times W \rightarrow A$ be as in (f) of the proof of Theorem 1. Observe that $\tau = \nu \circ (id_{\hat{V}} \times h(\cdot, e(\tau_A)))^{-1}$. Let $\langle W_{2,k} \rangle$ be a non-increasing sequence of compact convex neighborhoods of $e(\tau_A)$, with $W_{2,k} \subseteq \text{int } W_1$ for each k , such that $\bigcap_{k=0}^{\infty} W_{2,k} = \{e(\tau_A)\}$. Instead with a fixed W_2 , the argument in (f) of the proof of Theorem 1 can be applied with each member of the sequence $\langle W_{2,k} \rangle$ to yield an increasing sequence $\langle n_k \rangle$ in \mathbb{N} , and for each $k \in \mathbb{N}$ an equilibrium f_k of the game (I_{n_k}, G_{n_k}) such that f_k can be written in the form $f_k(i) = h(G_{n_k}(i), e_k + z_k(i))$, $i \in I_{n_k}$, where $e_k \in W_{2,k}$ and $\|z_k(i)\| \leq \epsilon_k$ for each $i \in I_{n_k}$, and $\epsilon_k \rightarrow 0$ as $k \rightarrow \infty$.

For each k , let $f'_k: I_{n_k} \rightarrow A$ be the map defined by setting $f'_k(i) = h(G_{n_k}(i), e_k)$ for each $i \in I_{n_k}$. Let τ_k be the distribution of $G_{n_k} \times f_k$, and τ'_k that of $G_{n_k} \times f'_k$. As $e_k \in W_{2,k}$ for all k and $\bigcap_{k=0}^{\infty} W_{2,k} = \{e(\tau_A)\}$, we have $e_k \rightarrow e(\tau_A)$. From this we see that $id_V \times h(\cdot, e_k) \rightarrow id_V \times h(\cdot, e(\tau_A))$, uniformly on compact subsets of V , because h is continuous. Consequently

$$\tau'_k = \nu_{G_{n_k}} \circ (id_V \times h(\cdot, e_k))^{-1} \rightarrow \nu \circ (id_V \times h(\cdot, e(\tau_A)))^{-1} = \tau,$$

i.e., the sequence $\langle \tau'_k \rangle$ of distributions of the maps $G_{n_k} \times f'_k$ converges to τ narrowly. Now note that if $\langle u'_k \rangle$ is any sequence in $\text{supp}(\nu)$, and $\langle z_k \rangle$ a sequence in \mathbb{R}^m such that $h(u'_k, e_k + z_k)$ is defined and $\|z_k\| \rightarrow 0$, then

$$\|h(u'_k, e_k + z_k) - h(u'_k, e_k)\| \rightarrow 0,$$

because $\text{supp}(\nu)$ is compact, h continuous, and $e_k \rightarrow e(\tau_A)$. Since $\nu_{G_n} \rightarrow \nu$ and thus $\rho_H(\text{supp}(\nu_{G_{n_k}}), \text{supp}(\nu)) \rightarrow 0$, it follows that for every $\epsilon' > 0$ there is a $k_{\epsilon'} \in \mathbb{N}$ such that whenever $k \geq k_{\epsilon'}$, then

$$\|h(G_{n_k}(i), e_k + z_k(i)) - h(G_{n_k}(i), e_k)\| \leq \epsilon'$$

for all $i \in I_{n_k}$, i.e., $\|f_k(i) - f'_k(i)\| \leq \epsilon'$ for all $i \in I_{n_k}$, and thus for some product metric $\tilde{\rho}$ on $\mathcal{U} \times A$ (recall that \mathcal{U} can be regarded as a metric space) we have

$$\tilde{\rho}((G_{n_k}(i), f_k(i)), (G_{n_k}(i), f'_k(i))) \leq \epsilon'$$

for all $i \in I_{n_k}$ whenever $k \geq k_{\epsilon'}$. In view of this, we can conclude, using Billingsley (1968, Theorem 4.1), that the fact that the sequence $\langle \tau'_k \rangle$ of distributions of the maps $G_{n_k} \times f'_k$ converges narrowly to τ implies that the sequence $\langle \tau_k \rangle$ of distributions of the maps $G_{n_k} \times f_k$ converges narrowly to τ , too.

(b) By Lemma 7, given $\nu \in \mathcal{G}$, a sequence $\langle (I_n, G_n) \rangle_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ of finite player games such that $\nu_{G_n} \rightarrow \nu$, $\nu_{G_n} \in \mathcal{M}$ for each n , and $\#(I_n) \rightarrow \infty$ does exist. Putting this fact together with (a) and Lemma 8 proves the theorem. \square

Proof of Theorem 3. Fix $C \in \mathcal{C}$. Let \mathcal{G}^* be defined as in the proof of Theorem 1. Set $\mathcal{G}_C^* = \mathcal{G}^* \cap \mathcal{G}_C$. Then \mathcal{G}_C^* is relatively open in \mathcal{G}_C . As for density, note that the only step in the proof of Lemma 8 which requires perturbation of action set is step (b) there, and this step is not needed if $\nu \in \mathcal{G}_C$. Thus the assertion of Lemma 8 is true with \mathcal{G}_C substituted for \mathcal{G} , and \mathcal{G}_C^* for \mathcal{G}^* ; in particular \mathcal{G}_C^* is dense in \mathcal{G}_C . Now, with the appropriate substitutions, (e) of the proof of Theorem 1 yields the first assertion of Theorem 3, and the proofs of Theorems 2, together with the fact noted in Remark 3, apply to establish the second assertion. \square

6 Appendix

Lemma 9. *Let A be a non-empty subset of \mathbb{R}^n , with dense interior, and $g: A \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$ a continuously differentiable function. Suppose that $g(O)$ affinely spans \mathbb{R}^m whenever O is a non-empty open set in \mathbb{R}^n such that $O \subseteq A$. Then:*

(a) *If A_1, \dots, A_l are non-empty closed subsets of A such that $\text{int } A_i$ is dense in A_i for each $i = 1, \dots, l$, then $\text{int } \sum_{i=1}^l g(A_i)/l$ is dense in $\sum_{i=1}^l g(A_i)/l$ if $l \geq m$.*

(b) *If A' is a non-empty closed subset of A such that $\text{int } A'$ is dense in A' , then $\text{int cog}(A') \neq \emptyset$.*

Proof. (a) Fix an integer $l \geq m$. Let $\tilde{g}: A^l \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$ be the function defined by setting $\tilde{g}(a_1, \dots, a_l) = \sum_{i=1}^l g(a_i)$ for each $(a_1, \dots, a_l) \in A^l$. Then \tilde{g} is continuously differentiable, with derivative $D\tilde{g}(a_1, \dots, a_l) = (Dg(a_1), \dots, Dg(a_l))$ at each $(a_1, \dots, a_l) \in A^l$. Let \tilde{A} be the set of elements of $\text{int } A^l$ at which the derivative of \tilde{g} has rank m . Then \tilde{A} is open. Moreover the restriction of \tilde{g} to \tilde{A} is an open map (see Guillemin and Pollack, 1974, p.25, Exercise 1).

We next show that \tilde{A} is dense in $\text{int } A^l$. We first claim that given any non-empty open and convex set $O \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$ such that $O \subseteq A$, the set C of all column vectors of the matrices $Dg(a)$ as a runs over O linearly spans \mathbb{R}^m . Suppose, if possible, otherwise. Then C is included in a linear subspace L of \mathbb{R}^m with $\dim L < m$. Fix any $a_0 \in O$. Note that as O is convex, we have $ta + (1-t)a_0 \in O$ for all $a \in O$. Consequently, for each $a \in O$ we have

$$g(a) - g(a_0) = \int_{[0,1]} \frac{d}{dt} g(ta + (1-t)a_0) dt = \int_{[0,1]} Dg(ta + (1-t)a_0)(a - a_0) dt \in L.$$

But this implies that $g(O) \subseteq L + \{g(a_0)\}$, contradicting the hypotheses about g .

Let $(a_1, \dots, a_l) \in \text{int } A^l$, and $U \subseteq \text{int } A^l$ a neighborhood of this point. We can assume that U is of the form $O_1 \times \dots \times O_l$ where O_i is convex neighborhood of a_i , $i = 1, \dots, l$. By the previous paragraph we can choose an $a'_1 \in O_1$ such that $Dg(a'_1)$ has a non-zero column vector v_1 . Again by the previous paragraph, we can choose an $a'_2 \in O_2$ such that $Dg(a'_2)$ has a column vector v_2 such that v_1 and v_2 are linearly independent. Continuing in the fashion we find points a'_1, \dots, a'_m such that each matrix $Dg(a'_i)$ has a column vector v_i such that the matrix (v_1, \dots, v_m) has rank m . If $l > m$, let a'_i be an arbitrary point of O_i for $m < i \leq l$. Then the matrix $(Dg(a'_1), \dots, Dg(a'_l))$ has rank m . Thus \tilde{A} is dense in $\text{int } A^l$.

Now let A_1, \dots, A_l be non-empty closed subsets of A , all with dense interior. Then $\text{int}(A_1 \times \dots \times A_l) = \text{int } A_1 \times \dots \times \text{int } A_l \neq \emptyset$, so $\text{int}(A_1 \times \dots \times A_l)$ is dense in $A_1 \times \dots \times A_l$, and thus $\tilde{A} \cap \text{int}(A_1 \times \dots \times A_l)$ is open and dense in $A_1 \times \dots \times A_l$. Because g is continuous, it follows that the set

$$\left\{ \frac{1}{l} \sum_{k=1}^l g(a_k) : (a_1, \dots, a_l) \in \tilde{A} \cap \text{int}(A_1 \times \dots \times A_l) \right\}$$

is dense in $\sum_{i=1}^l g(A_i)/l$, and since \tilde{g} is an open map, it follows that the former set is open. We conclude that $\text{int } \sum_{i=1}^l g(A_i)/l$ is dense in $\sum_{i=1}^l g(A_i)/l$.

(b) By (a), $\text{int } \sum_{i=1}^m g(A')/m \neq \emptyset$, and of course $\sum_{i=1}^m g(A')/m \subseteq \text{cog}(A')$. \square

Lemma 10. *Let A be a non-empty subset of \mathbb{R}^n , with dense interior, let $m = kn$, where $k \in \mathbb{N}$, and let $g: A \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$ be given by setting*

$$g(a) = (a_{(1)}, a_{(1)}^2 \dots a_{(1)}^k, a_{(2)}, a_{(2)}^2 \dots a_{(2)}^k, \dots, a_{(n)}, \dots, a_{(n)}^k)$$

for each $a \in A$, where the subscript (h) means the h th coordinate of a , $h = 1, \dots, n$. Then $g(O)$ affinely spans \mathbb{R}^m whenever O is a non-empty open set in \mathbb{R}^n with $O \subseteq A$.

Proof. Fix a non-empty open set $O \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$ with $O \subseteq A$ and choose elements a_1, \dots, a_k in O such that for each coordinate $h = 1, \dots, n$ the points $a_{1,(h)}, a_{2,(h)}, \dots, a_{k,(h)}$ are distinct. Reorder the columns of the matrix $(Dg(a_1), \dots, Dg(a_k))$ so as to get a block diagonal matrix

$$\begin{pmatrix} B_1 & 0 & \dots & 0 \\ 0 & B_2 & \dots & 0 \\ \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots \\ 0 & 0 & \dots & B_n \end{pmatrix}$$

where B_h , $h = 1, \dots, n$, is a $(k \times k)$ -matrix of the form

$$B_h = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 & \dots & 1 \\ 2a_{1,(h)} & 2a_{2,(h)} & 2a_{3,(h)} & \dots & 2a_{k,(h)} \\ 3a_{1,(h)}^2 & 3a_{2,(h)}^2 & 3a_{3,(h)}^2 & \dots & 3a_{k,(h)}^2 \\ \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots \\ ka_{1,(h)}^{k-1} & ka_{2,(h)}^{k-1} & ka_{3,(h)}^{k-1} & \dots & ka_{k,(h)}^{k-1} \end{pmatrix}.$$

Now for each h , the determinant of the matrix B_h is just a positive multiple of the Vandermonde determinant, and thus non-zero because the points $a_{1,(h)}, a_{2,(h)}, \dots, a_{k,(h)}$ are distinct. This shows that the matrix $(Dg(a_1), \dots, Dg(a_k))$ has rank kn , and therefore, since $kn = m$, that $g(O)$ cannot be included in an affine subspace of dimension smaller than m . \square

Lemma 11. *Let K be a non-empty compact subset of \mathbb{R}^n , with dense interior. Then there is a non-decreasing sequence $\langle K_k \rangle$ of non-empty compact subsets of K , all with dense interior, such that $K_k \subseteq \text{int } K$ for each k and both $\rho_H(K, K_k) \rightarrow 0$ and $\rho_H(\partial K, \partial K_k) \rightarrow 0$.*

Proof. For each $k \in \mathbb{N}$, let $K'_k = \{x \in K : \text{dist}(x, \partial K) \geq 1/(k+1)\}$, and $K_k = \text{cl } K'_k$. Then K'_k is open for each k . Also, for sufficiently large k , K'_k is non-empty; we may assume that this is true for each k . Further, $\partial K_k \subseteq \{x \in K : \text{dist}(x, \partial K) = 1/(k+1)\}$ for each k , so, as ∂K is compact, we need only show that given any $y \in \partial K$ and any $\epsilon > 0$, we have $\text{dist}(y, \partial K_k) < \epsilon$ if k is large enough. To see this, fix $y \in \partial K$ and $\epsilon > 0$. As $\text{int } K$ is dense in K , there is an $x \in B(y, \epsilon) \cap \text{int } K$. In particular, there is a $\bar{k} \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $x \in K'_k$ if $k > \bar{k}$. Pick any $k > \bar{k}$. Consider the line segment $Z = \{\lambda x + (1-\lambda)y : 0 \leq \lambda \leq 1\}$. Clearly $Z \subseteq B(y, \epsilon)$. But also, $Z \cap K_k$ is closed, and since $x \in K'_k$ and $y \notin K_k$, Z must contain a boundary point of K_k . \square

The following theorem is a special version of a result due to Mas-Colell (1983).

Theorem 4. *Let $X \subseteq \mathbb{R}^\ell$ and $Y \subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$ be compact convex sets with non-empty interior. Let $\Lambda : X \times Y \rightarrow X \times \mathbb{R}^m$ be a continuous function; write Λ_X for $\text{proj}_X \circ \Lambda$ and Λ_Y for $\text{proj}_{\mathbb{R}^m} \circ \Lambda$. Suppose there is an open set $U \subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$, with $Y \subseteq U$, and a continuously differentiable function $\zeta : U \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$ such that, setting $\gamma = \min\{\|\zeta(y)\| : y \in \partial Y\}$,*

(a) *for some $y^* \in \text{int } Y$, $D\zeta(y^*)$ has full rank and $\zeta(y) = 0$ if and only if $y = y^*$ (so that, in particular, $\gamma > 0$);*

(b) *if $y \in \partial Y$ and $x = \Lambda_X(x, y)$, then $\|\Lambda_Y(x, y) - y - \zeta(y)\| < \gamma$.*

Then Λ has a fixed point, i.e., there is an $(x, y) \in X \times Y$ such that $\Lambda(x, y) = (x, y)$.

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