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PKP Metadata Items |
Metadata for this document |
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| 1. |
Title |
Title of document |
A model of choice from lists |
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| 2. |
Creator |
Author's name, affiliation |
; Tel Aviv University and New York University |
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| 2. |
Creator |
Author's name, affiliation |
; Stanford University |
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| 3. |
Subject |
Subject(s) |
Choice from lists, rational choice, partition independence, weak axiom of revealed preference, satisficing |
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| 3. |
Subject |
Subject classification |
D00 |
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| 4. |
Description |
Abstract |
The standard economic choice model assumes that the decision maker chooses from sets of alternatives. In contrast, we analyze a choice model in which the decision maker encounters the alternatives in the form of a list. We present two axioms similar in nature to the classical axioms of choice from sets. We show that they characterize all the choice functions from lists that involve the choice of either the first or the last optimal alternative in the list according to some preference relation. We then relate choice functions from lists to the classical notions of choice correspondences and random choice functions. |
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| 5. |
Publisher |
Organizing agency, location |
Econometric Society |
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| 6. |
Contributor |
Sponsor(s) |
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| 7. |
Date |
(YYYY-MM-DD) |
2006-03-02 |
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| 8. |
Type |
Status & genre |
Peer-reviewed Article |
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Type |
Type |
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| 9. |
Format |
File format |
pdf
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| 10. |
Identifier |
Universal Resource Indicator |
https://econtheory.org:443/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20060003 |
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| 11. |
Source |
Journal/conference title; vol., no. (year) |
Theoretical Economics; Volume 1, Number 1 (March 2006) |
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| 12. |
Language |
English=en |
en |
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| 15. |
Rights |
Copyright and permissions |
Authors who publish in Theoretical Economics will release their articles under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given. |