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PKP Metadata Items |
Metadata for this document |
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| 1. |
Title |
Title of document |
Competition over agents with boundedly rational expectations |
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| 2. |
Creator |
Author's name, affiliation |
Ran Spiegler; Tel Aviv University and University College London |
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| 3. |
Subject |
Subject(s) |
Bounded rationality, industrial organization, multi-dimensional pricing, law of small numbers, market exploitation, obfuscation |
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| 3. |
Subject |
Subject classification |
C79, D49, D83 |
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| 4. |
Description |
Abstract |
I study a market model in which profit-maximizing firms compete in multi-dimensional pricing strategies over a consumer, who is limited in his ability to grasp such complicated objects and therefore uses a sampling procedure to evaluate them. Firms respond to increased competition with an increased effort to obfuscate, rather than with more competitive pricing. As a result, consumer welfare is not enhanced and may even deteriorate. Specifically, when firms control both the price and the quality of each dimension, and there are diminishing returns to quality, increased competition implies an efficiency loss which is entirely borne by consumers. |
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| 5. |
Publisher |
Organizing agency, location |
Econometric Society |
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| 6. |
Contributor |
Sponsor(s) |
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| 7. |
Date |
(YYYY-MM-DD) |
2006-06-01 |
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| 8. |
Type |
Status & genre |
Peer-reviewed Article |
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| 8. |
Type |
Type |
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| 9. |
Format |
File format |
pdf
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| 10. |
Identifier |
Universal Resource Indicator |
https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20060207 |
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| 11. |
Source |
Journal/conference title; vol., no. (year) |
Theoretical Economics; Volume 1, Number 2 (June 2006) |
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| 12. |
Language |
English=en |
en |
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| 15. |
Rights |
Copyright and permissions |
Authors who publish in Theoretical Economics will release their articles under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given. |