Article metadata

"Cooperative strategic games"


 
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1. Title Title of document Cooperative strategic games
 
2. Creator Author's name, affiliation Elon Kohlberg; Harvard Business School
 
2. Creator Author's name, affiliation Abraham Neyman; Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
 
 
3. Subject Subject(s) Strategic games, cooperative games, shapley value, nash variables threats, bribery
 
3. Subject Subject classification C71, C72, C78
 
4. Description Abstract We present a solution concept, called the value, for n-person strategic games with complete or incomplete information (Bayesian games). The value provides an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player; it reflects the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to selectively share information and to make threats against one another. In the special case of games with complete information the value coincides with a solution developed by Shapley, Nash, and Harsanyi, and in two-person Bayesian games it coincides with a solution developed by Kalai and Kalai. Applications of the value in economics have been rare, at least in part because the existing definition (for $n >2$) consists of an ad hoc scheme that does not easily lend itself to computation. We present a simple formula for computing the value and prove that it is the unique function, from n-player games to n-dimensional vectors of payoffs, that satisfies a short list of desirable properties (axioms).
 
5. Publisher Organizing agency, location Econometric Society
 
6. Contributor Sponsor(s)
 
7. Date (YYYY-MM-DD) 2021-07-21
 
8. Type Status & genre Peer-reviewed Article
 
8. Type Type
 
9. Format File format pdf
 
10. Identifier Universal Resource Indicator https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20210825
 
11. Source Journal/conference title; vol., no. (year) Theoretical Economics; Volume 16, Number 3 (July 2021)
 
12. Language English=en en
 
15. Rights Copyright and permissions Authors who publish in Theoretical Economics will release their articles under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given.