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Dublin Core |
PKP Metadata Items |
Metadata for this document |
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1. |
Title |
Title of document |
A common-value auction with state-dependent participation |
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2. |
Creator |
Author's name, affiliation |
Stephan Lauermann; Department of Economics, University of Bonn |
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2. |
Creator |
Author's name, affiliation |
Asher Wolinsky; Department of Economics, Northwestern University |
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3. |
Subject |
Subject(s) |
Auction theory, bargaining, competition |
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3. |
Subject |
Subject classification |
D44, D82 |
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4. |
Description |
Abstract |
This paper analyzes a common-value, first-price auction with state-dependent participation. The number of bidders, which is unobservable to them, depends on the true value. For participation patterns with many bidders in each state, the bidding equilibrium may be of a "pooling" type---with high probability, the winning bid is the same across states and is below the ex-ante expected value---or of a "partially revealing" type---with no significant atoms in the winning bid distribution and an expected winning bid increasing in the true value. Which of these forms will arise is determined by the likelihood ratio at the top of the signal distribution and the participation across states. We fully characterize this relation and show how the participation pattern determines the extent of information aggregation by the price. |
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5. |
Publisher |
Organizing agency, location |
Econometric Society |
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6. |
Contributor |
Sponsor(s) |
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7. |
Date |
(YYYY-MM-DD) |
2022-05-05 |
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8. |
Type |
Status & genre |
Peer-reviewed Article |
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8. |
Type |
Type |
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9. |
Format |
File format |
pdf
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10. |
Identifier |
Universal Resource Indicator |
https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20220841 |
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11. |
Source |
Journal/conference title; vol., no. (year) |
Theoretical Economics; Volume 17, Number 2 (May 2022) |
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12. |
Language |
English=en |
en |
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15. |
Rights |
Copyright and permissions |
Authors who publish in Theoretical Economics will release their articles under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given. |