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Dublin Core |
PKP Metadata Items |
Metadata for this document |
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1. |
Title |
Title of document |
Time-consistent fair social choice |
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2. |
Creator |
Author's name, affiliation |
Kaname Miyagishima; Department of Economics, Aoyama Gakuin University |
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3. |
Subject |
Subject(s) |
Time consistency, equity, efficiency, responsibility, social welfare |
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3. |
Subject |
Subject classification |
D60, D64, D71 |
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4. |
Description |
Abstract |
In this paper, we study intertemporal social welfare evaluations when agents have heterogeneous time preferences that are interpersonally noncomparable. We first show that, even if all agents share the same time preferences, there is a conflict between the axioms of Pareto principle, time consistency, and equity requiring society to reduce inequality regardless of the past. We argue that responsibility for past choices should be taken into account and thus the equity axiom is not compelling. Then, we introduce another form of equity that takes the past into consideration and is compatible with time consistency. Using this form of equity and time consistency, we characterize maximin and leximin social welfare criteria that are history-dependent. |
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5. |
Publisher |
Organizing agency, location |
Econometric Society |
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6. |
Contributor |
Sponsor(s) |
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7. |
Date |
(YYYY-MM-DD) |
2023-07-20 |
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8. |
Type |
Status & genre |
Peer-reviewed Article |
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8. |
Type |
Type |
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9. |
Format |
File format |
pdf
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10. |
Identifier |
Universal Resource Indicator |
https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20230941 |
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11. |
Source |
Journal/conference title; vol., no. (year) |
Theoretical Economics; Volume 18, Number 3 (July 2023) |
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12. |
Language |
English=en |
en |
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15. |
Rights |
Copyright and permissions |
Authors who publish in Theoretical Economics will release their articles under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given. |