Article metadata

"Time-consistent fair social choice"


 
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1. Title Title of document Time-consistent fair social choice
 
2. Creator Author's name, affiliation Kaname Miyagishima; Department of Economics, Aoyama Gakuin University
 
 
3. Subject Subject(s) Time consistency, equity, efficiency, responsibility, social welfare
 
3. Subject Subject classification D60, D64, D71
 
4. Description Abstract In this paper, we study intertemporal social welfare evaluations when agents have heterogeneous time preferences that are interpersonally noncomparable. We first show that, even if all agents share the same time preferences, there is a conflict between the axioms of Pareto principle, time consistency, and equity requiring society to reduce inequality regardless of the past. We argue that responsibility for past choices should be taken into account and thus the equity axiom is not compelling. Then, we introduce another form of equity that takes the past into consideration and is compatible with time consistency. Using this form of equity and time consistency, we characterize maximin and leximin social welfare criteria that are history-dependent.
 
5. Publisher Organizing agency, location Econometric Society
 
6. Contributor Sponsor(s)
 
7. Date (YYYY-MM-DD) 2023-07-20
 
8. Type Status & genre Peer-reviewed Article
 
8. Type Type
 
9. Format File format pdf
 
10. Identifier Universal Resource Indicator https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20230941
 
11. Source Journal/conference title; vol., no. (year) Theoretical Economics; Volume 18, Number 3 (July 2023)
 
12. Language English=en en
 
15. Rights Copyright and permissions Authors who publish in Theoretical Economics will release their articles under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given.