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| Dublin Core |
PKP Metadata Items |
Metadata for this document |
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| 1. |
Title |
Title of document |
Contracting over persistent information |
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| 2. |
Creator |
Author's name, affiliation |
Wei Zhao; Renmin University of China |
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| 2. |
Creator |
Author's name, affiliation |
Claudio Mezzetti; School of Economics, University of Queensland |
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| 2. |
Creator |
Author's name, affiliation |
Ludovic Renou; School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary University of London |
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| 2. |
Creator |
Author's name, affiliation |
Tristan Tomala; HEC Paris and GREGHEC |
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| 3. |
Subject |
Subject(s) |
Dynamic, contract, information, revelation, disclosure, sender, receiver, persuasion |
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| 3. |
Subject |
Subject classification |
C73, D82 |
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| 4. |
Description |
Abstract |
We consider a dynamic principal-agent problem, where the sole instrument the principal has to incentivize the agent is the disclosure of information. The principal aims at maximizing the (discounted) number of times the agent chooses the principal's preferred action. We show that there exists an optimal policy, where the principal recommends its most preferred action and discloses information as a reward in the next period, until either this action becomes statically optimal for the agent or the agent perfectly learns the state. |
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| 5. |
Publisher |
Organizing agency, location |
Econometric Society |
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| 6. |
Contributor |
Sponsor(s) |
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| 7. |
Date |
(YYYY-MM-DD) |
2024-05-13 |
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| 8. |
Type |
Status & genre |
Peer-reviewed Article |
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| 8. |
Type |
Type |
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| 9. |
Format |
File format |
pdf
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| 10. |
Identifier |
Universal Resource Indicator |
https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20240917 |
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| 11. |
Source |
Journal/conference title; vol., no. (year) |
Theoretical Economics; Volume 19, Number 2 (May 2024) |
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| 12. |
Language |
English=en |
en |
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| 15. |
Rights |
Copyright and permissions |
Authors who publish in Theoretical Economics will release their articles under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given. |