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| Dublin Core |
PKP Metadata Items |
Metadata for this document |
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| 1. |
Title |
Title of document |
Dynamic assignment without money: optimality of spot mechanisms |
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| 2. |
Creator |
Author's name, affiliation |
Julien Combe; CREST - Ecole polytechnique |
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| 2. |
Creator |
Author's name, affiliation |
Vladyslav Nora; Department of Economics, Nazarbayev University |
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| 2. |
Creator |
Author's name, affiliation |
Olivier Tercieux; Department of Economics, Paris School of Economics |
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| 3. |
Subject |
Subject(s) |
Market design, dynamic matching, course allocation |
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| 3. |
Subject |
Subject classification |
C78, C61, D47, D61 |
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| 4. |
Description |
Abstract |
We study a large market model of dynamic matching with no monetary transfers and a continuum of agents who have to be assigned items at each date. When the social planner can only elicit ordinal agents' preferences, we prove that under a mild regularity assumption, incentive compatible and ordinally efficient allocation rules coincide with spot mechanisms. The latter specify "virtual prices" for items at each date and, for each agent, randomly selects a budget of virtual money at the beginning of time. When the social planner can elicit cardinal preferences, we prove that under a similar regularity assumption, incentive compatible and Pareto efficient mechanisms coincide with Spot Menu of Random Budgets mechanisms. These are similar to spot mechanisms except that, at the beginning of time, each agent chooses within a menu, a distribution over budget of virtual money. |
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| 5. |
Publisher |
Organizing agency, location |
Econometric Society |
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| 6. |
Contributor |
Sponsor(s) |
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| 7. |
Date |
(YYYY-MM-DD) |
2025-01-28 |
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| 8. |
Type |
Status & genre |
Peer-reviewed Article |
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| 8. |
Type |
Type |
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| 9. |
Format |
File format |
pdf
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| 10. |
Identifier |
Universal Resource Indicator |
https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20250255 |
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| 11. |
Source |
Journal/conference title; vol., no. (year) |
Theoretical Economics; Volume 20, Number 1 (January 2025) |
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| 12. |
Language |
English=en |
en |
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| 15. |
Rights |
Copyright and permissions |
Authors who publish in Theoretical Economics will release their articles under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given. |