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| Dublin Core |
PKP Metadata Items |
Metadata for this document |
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| 1. |
Title |
Title of document |
Queueing to learn |
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| 2. |
Creator |
Author's name, affiliation |
Chiara Margaria; Department of Economics, Boston University |
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| 3. |
Subject |
Subject(s) |
Queues, experimentation, reneging, congestion, mechanism design |
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Subject |
Subject classification |
C73, D47, D82 |
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| 4. |
Description |
Abstract |
I study the efficient design of a queue to dynamically allocate a scarce resource to long-lived agents. Agents can be served multiple times, and their valuations fluctuate over time with some persistence. Each agent privately learns whether his prevailing valuation is high or low only when served. An agent can decide anytime whether to either join a queue of his choice or renege. I show that it is efficient to elicit agents' private information by offering a simple binary menu (i.e., two customer classes): a first-come, first-served queue, to attract low-value agents, and one in random order, to attract high-value agents. When queueing is costly, offering a single queue may be optimal because of the tradeoff between allocative efficiency and the cost of screening. |
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Publisher |
Organizing agency, location |
Econometric Society |
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Contributor |
Sponsor(s) |
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| 7. |
Date |
(YYYY-MM-DD) |
2025-05-30 |
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| 8. |
Type |
Status & genre |
Peer-reviewed Article |
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| 8. |
Type |
Type |
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| 9. |
Format |
File format |
pdf
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| 10. |
Identifier |
Universal Resource Indicator |
https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20250623 |
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| 11. |
Source |
Journal/conference title; vol., no. (year) |
Theoretical Economics; Volume 20, Number 2 (May 2025) |
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| 12. |
Language |
English=en |
en |
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| 15. |
Rights |
Copyright and permissions |
Authors who publish in Theoretical Economics will release their articles under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given. |