Article metadata

"Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers"


 
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1. Title Title of document Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers
 
2. Creator Author's name, affiliation Manuel Amador; Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
 
2. Creator Author's name, affiliation Kyle Bagwell; Stanford University
 
 
3. Subject Subject(s) Regulation, price caps, delegation theory
 
3. Subject Subject classification L43, L5, D82
 
4. Description Abstract We analyze the Baron and Myerson (1982) model of regulation under the restriction that transfers are infeasible. Extending techniques from the delegation literature to incorporate an ex-post participation constraint, we report sufficient conditions under which optimal regulation takes the form of price-cap regulation. We establish conditions under which the optimal price cap is set at a level such that no types are excluded and show that exclusion of higher cost types can be optimal when these conditions fail. We also provide conditions for the optimality of price-cap regulation when an ex post participation constraint is present and exclusion is infeasible.
 
5. Publisher Organizing agency, location Econometric Society
 
6. Contributor Sponsor(s)
 
7. Date (YYYY-MM-DD) 2022-11-22
 
8. Type Status & genre Peer-reviewed Article
 
8. Type Type
 
9. Format File format pdf
 
10. Identifier Universal Resource Indicator https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/4691
 
11. Source Journal/conference title; vol., no. (year) Theoretical Economics; Volume 17, Number 4 (November 2022)
 
12. Language English=en en
 
15. Rights Copyright and permissions Authors who publish in Theoretical Economics will release their articles under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given.