Article metadata

"Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes"


 
Dublin Core PKP Metadata Items Metadata for this document
 
1. Title Title of document Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes
 
2. Creator Author's name, affiliation Hugo Hopenhayn; Department of Economics, UCLA
 
2. Creator Author's name, affiliation Maryam Saeedi; Tepper Business School, Carnegie Mellon University
 
 
3. Subject Subject(s) Adverse selection, information design, consumer surplus, producer surplus
 
3. Subject Subject classification D21, D47, D60, D82, L11
 
4. Description Abstract This paper addresses two central questions in markets with adverse selection: How does information impact the welfare of market participants (sellers and buyers)? Also, relatedly, what is the optimal information disclosure policy and how is it affected by the planner’s relative welfare weight on sellers’ surplus versus consumers’ surplus? We find that as a result of improved information, prices become more strongly associated with the true quality of sellers and thus more dispersed. This will result in higher total surplus. Furthermore, we  find that better information has opposing welfare effects on consumers and producers that could lead to limited disclosure depending on the social objective and market characteristics.
 
5. Publisher Organizing agency, location Econometric Society
 
6. Contributor Sponsor(s)
 
7. Date (YYYY-MM-DD) 2023-11-09
 
8. Type Status & genre Peer-reviewed Article
 
8. Type Type
 
9. Format File format pdf
 
10. Identifier Universal Resource Indicator https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/5104
 
11. Source Journal/conference title; vol., no. (year) Theoretical Economics; Volume 18, Number 4 (November 2023)
 
12. Language English=en en
 
15. Rights Copyright and permissions Authors who publish in Theoretical Economics will release their articles under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given.