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| Dublin Core |
PKP Metadata Items |
Metadata for this document |
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| 1. |
Title |
Title of document |
Relational enforcement |
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| 2. |
Creator |
Author's name, affiliation |
Peter Achim; Department of Economics, University of York |
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| 2. |
Creator |
Author's name, affiliation |
Jan Knoepfle; School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary University of London |
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| 3. |
Subject |
Subject(s) |
Relational contracts, Dynamic enforcement, Persistence, Costly inspections |
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| 3. |
Subject |
Subject classification |
C73, D83 |
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| 4. |
Description |
Abstract |
A principal incentivizes an agent to maintain compliance and to truthfully announce any breaches of compliance. Compliance is imperfectly controlled by the agent’s private effort choices, is partially persistent, and is verifiable by the principal only through costly inspections. We show that in principal-optimal equilibria, the principal enforces maximum compliance using deterministic inspections. Periodic inspection cycles are suspended during periods of self-reported noncompliance, during which the agent is fined. We show how commitment to random inspections would benefit the principal, and discuss possible ways for the principal to overcome her commitment problem. |
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| 5. |
Publisher |
Organizing agency, location |
Econometric Society |
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| 6. |
Contributor |
Sponsor(s) |
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| 7. |
Date |
(YYYY-MM-DD) |
2024-05-13 |
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| 8. |
Type |
Status & genre |
Peer-reviewed Article |
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| 8. |
Type |
Type |
|
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| 9. |
Format |
File format |
pdf
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| 10. |
Identifier |
Universal Resource Indicator |
https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/5183 |
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| 11. |
Source |
Journal/conference title; vol., no. (year) |
Theoretical Economics; Volume 19, Number 2 (May 2024) |
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| 12. |
Language |
English=en |
en |
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| 15. |
Rights |
Copyright and permissions |
Authors who publish in Theoretical Economics will release their articles under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given. |