Theoretical Economics 16 (2021), 943–978
A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement
Simon Loertscher, Claudio Mezzetti
The price mechanism is fundamental to economics but difficult to reconcile with incentive compatibility. We introduce a double clock auction for a homogeneous good market with multi-dimensional private information and multi-unit traders that is deficit-free, ex post individually rational, constrained efficient, and makes sincere bidding a dominant strategy equilibrium. Under a weak dependence and an identifiability condition, our double clock auction is also asymptotically efficient. Asymptotic efficiency is achieved by estimating demand and supply using information from the bids of traders that have dropped out and following a tatonnement process that adjusts the clock prices based on the estimates.
Keywords: Deficit free, dominant strategy mechanisms, double clock auctions, vcg mechanism
JEL classification: C72, D44, D47, D82
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