Theoretical Economics

Editorial Board

Acknowledgments

Theoretical Economics has become a leading field journal in economic theory. On July 1, 2009, the Econometric Society took over the management of the journal from the Society for Economic Theory. The Editorial Board and all the key policies of the journal remain the same. In particular, all content continues to be freely available. The journal now appears with every other issue of Econometrica, three times a year, in January, May, and September.

Current Issue: Volume 5, Issue 2 (May 2010)

Table of Contents

Articles

Uphill self-control	Abstract PRINT VIEW
Jawwad Noor and Norio Takeoka	127–158
Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information	Abstract PRINT VIEW
David Martimort and Humberto Moreira	159–213
Efficiency and marginal cost pricing in dynamic competitive markets with friction	Abstract PRINT VIEW
In-Koo Cho and Sean P. Meyn	215–239
Competing auctions: finite markets and convergence	Abstract PRINT VIEW
Gábor Virág	241–274
Strategic experimentation with Poisson bandits	Abstract PRINT VIEW
Godfrey Keller and Sven Rady	275–311
Papers within each issue are ordered by the date of receipt of the final version. The print and view links lead to pdf files of the papers with the same content. The format of the versions in the view links is optimized for on-screen viewing. Papers in this issue have on average been downloaded from 1049 distinct IP addresses. (For each paper, downloads since the paper was first made available as a "Paper to appear" are included in this number.)

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Papers to appear

The following papers have been accepted and will appear in future issues. The links below lead to the final accepted papers in their working paper formats. The papers will be copyedited and typeset for publication.

Ehud Lehrer and Dov Samet, Agreeing to agree
Fuhito Kojima, Robust stability in matching markets
Taiji Furusawa and Hideo Konishi, Contributing or free-riding? voluntary participation in a public good economy
Philippe Jehiel, Manipulative auction design
Deniz Dizdar, Alex Gershkov, and Benny Moldovanu, Revenue maximization in the dynamic knapsack problem
Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler, On the strategic use of attention grabbers
Ilya R. Segal and Michael D. Whinston, A simple status quo that ensures participation (with application to efficient bargaining)
Sushil Bikhchandani and Uzi Segal, Transitive regret
Satoru Takahashi and Sylvain Chassang, Robustness to incomplete information in repeated games
Andrew Caplin and Mark Dean, Search, choice, and revealed preference
Alexander Wolitzky, Dynamic monopoly with relational incentives
Yi-Chun Chen, Alfredo di Tillio, Eduardo Faingold, and Siyang Xiong, Uniform topologies on types
Laurent A. Mathevet, Supermodular mechanism design
Ulrich Doraszelski and Juan Escobar, A theory of regular Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games: genericity, stability, and purification
Jay Sethuraman, An equivalence result in school choice
Larry G. Epstein and Kyoungwon Seo, Symmetry of evidence without evidence of symmetry

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