|
Lotteries in student assignment: An equivalence result
Parag Pathak and Jay Sethuraman |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1–17 |
|
Search, choice, and revealed preference
Andrew Caplin and Mark Dean |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 19–48 |
|
Robustness to incomplete information in repeated games
Sylvain Chassang and Satoru Takahashi |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 49–93 |
|
Transitive regret
Sushil Bikhchandani and Uzi Segal |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 95–108 |
|
A simple status quo that ensures participation (with application to efficient bargaining)
Ilya Segal and Michael D. Whinston |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 109–125 |
|
On the strategic use of attention grabbers
Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Errata 127–155 |
|
Revenue maximization in the dynamic knapsack problem
Deniz Dizdar, Alex Gershkov, and Benny Moldovanu |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 157–184 |
|
Manipulative auction design
Philippe Jehiel |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 185–217 |
|
Contributing or free-riding? Voluntary participation in a public good economy
Taiji Furusawa and Hideo Konishi |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 219–256 |
|
Robust stability in matching markets
Fuhito Kojima |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 257–267 |
|
Agreeing to agree
Ehud Lehrer and Dov Samet |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 269–287 |
|
Judicial precedent as a dynamic rationale for axiomatic bargaining theory
Marc Fleurbaey and John E. Roemer |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 289–310 |
|
The evolution of decision and experienced utility
Arthur J. Robson and Larry Samuelson |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 311–339 |
|
Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics
Josef Hofbauer and William H. Sandholm |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 341–377 |
|
Dynamic choice under ambiguity
Marciano Siniscalchi |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 379–421 |
|
Intertemporal substitution and recursive smooth ambiguity preferences
Takashi Hayashi and Jianjun Miao |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 423–472 |
|
First-price auctions, Dutch auctions, and buy-it-now-prices with Allais paradox bidders
Daisuke Nakajima |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 473–498 |
|
Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
Ana Mauleon, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, and Wouter Vergote |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 499–521 |