Volume 15, Number 4 ( 2020)

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Table of contents

Articles

On the falsifiability and learnability of decision theories
        Pathikrit Basu and Federico Echenique
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1279–1305
Transferable utility and demand functions
        Pierre-AndrĂ© Chiappori and Elisabeth Gugl
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1307–1333
Gradual pairwise comparison and stochastic choice
        Rohan Dutta
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1335–1364
Trade clustering and power laws in financial markets
        Makoto Nirei, John Stachurski, and Tsutomu Watanabe
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 Supplementary Appendix
1365–1398
Countering the winner's curse: optimal auction design in a common value model
        Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks, and Stephen Morris
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1399–1434
On the optimal design of biased contests
        Qiang Fu and Zenan Wu
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 Supplementary Appendix
1435–1470
Learning with minimal information in continuous games
        Sebastian Bervoets, Mario Bravo, and Mathieu Faure
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1471–1508
An explicit representation for disappointment aversion and other betweenness preferences
        Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, David Dillenberger, and Pietro Ortoleva
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1509–1546
Collusion and delegation under information control
        Andreas Asseyer
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1547–1586
The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments
        Dmitry Ryvkin and Mikhail Drugov
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1587–1626
The wisdom of the crowd in dynamic economies
        Pietro Dindo and Filippo Massari
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1627–1668
Private and public liquidity provision in over-the-counter markets
        David M. Arseneau, David E. Rappoport W., and Alexandros P. Vardoulakis
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1669–1712
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