Table of contents
Articles
On the falsifiability and learnability of decision theories
Pathikrit Basu and Federico Echenique |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1279–1305 |
Transferable utility and demand functions
Pierre-André Chiappori and Elisabeth Gugl |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1307–1333 |
Gradual pairwise comparison and stochastic choice
Rohan Dutta |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1335–1364 |
Trade clustering and power laws in financial markets
Makoto Nirei, John Stachurski, and Tsutomu Watanabe |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 1365–1398 |
Countering the winner's curse: optimal auction design in a common value model
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks, and Stephen Morris |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1399–1434 |
On the optimal design of biased contests
Qiang Fu and Zenan Wu |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 1435–1470 |
Learning with minimal information in continuous games
Sebastian Bervoets, Mario Bravo, and Mathieu Faure |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1471–1508 |
An explicit representation for disappointment aversion and other betweenness preferences
Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, David Dillenberger, and Pietro Ortoleva |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1509–1546 |
Collusion and delegation under information control
Andreas Asseyer |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1547–1586 |
The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments
Dmitry Ryvkin and Mikhail Drugov |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1587–1626 |
The wisdom of the crowd in dynamic economies
Pietro Dindo and Filippo Massari |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1627–1668 |
Private and public liquidity provision in over-the-counter markets
David M. Arseneau, David E. Rappoport W., and Alexandros P. Vardoulakis |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1669–1712 |