Volume 19, Number 1 ( 2024)

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Table of contents

Articles

Exploiting social influence in networks
        Vladyslav Nora and Eyal Winter
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1–27
A dynamic model of censorship
        Yiman Sun
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29–60
Worst-case equilibria in first-price auctions
        Vitali Gretschko and Helene Mass
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61–93
Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs
        Mengxi Zhang
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95–129
Digital currency and privacy
        Kee-Youn Kang
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131–167
Asymmetric all-pay auctions with spillovers
        Maria Betto and Matthew W. Thomas
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169–206
Optimal sequential contests
        Toomas Hinnosaar
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207–244
Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness
        Sarah Auster and Nicola Pavoni
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245–284
Sophisticated banking contracts and fragility when withdrawal information is public
        Xuesong Huang
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285–324
Asset bubbles and product market competition
        Francisco Queirós
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325–364
The dynamics of instability
        César Barilla and Duarte Gonçalves
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365–405
Data and incentives
        Annie Liang and Erik Madsen
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407–448
Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game
        J. Aislinn Bohren
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 Supplementary Appendix
449–498
Wages as signals of worker mobility
        Yu Chen, Matthew Doyle, and Francisco M. Gonzalez
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499–549
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