Table of contents
Articles
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Efficient incentives with social preferences
Thomas Daske and Christoph March |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 975–999 |
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Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification
Francisco Silva |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1001–1026 |
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Robust relational contracts with subjective performance evaluation
V. Bhaskar, Wojciech Olszewski, and Thomas Wiseman |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1027–1055 |
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Dynamic information preference and communication with diminishing sensitivity over news
Jetlir Duraj and Kevin He |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1057–1086 |
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Correlated choice
Christopher P. Chambers, Yusufcan Masatlioglu, and Christopher Turansick |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1087–1117 |
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Time-consistent implementation in macroeconomic games
Jean Barthelemy and Eric Mengus |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1119–1150 |
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Robust performance evaluation of independent agents
Ashwin Kambhampati |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1151–1184 |
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A theory of fair random allocation under priorities
Xiang Han |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1185–1221 |
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Existence and uniqueness of solutions to the Bellman equation in stochastic dynamic programming
Juan Pablo Rincón-Zapatero |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1223–1260 |
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Stable matching in large markets with occupational choice
Guilherme Carmona and Krittanai Laohakunakorn |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1261–1304 |
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Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences
Charles Louis-Sidois and Leon Andreas Musolff |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1305–1349 |
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Bayesian social aggregation with almost-objective uncertainty
Marcus Pivato and Tchouante Ngamo Elise Flore |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1351–1398 |