Table of contents
Articles
|
The Foster-Hart measure of riskiness for general gambles
Frank Riedel and Tobias Hellmann |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1–9 |
|
Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents
Madhav Chandrasekher |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 11–49 |
|
Is utility transferable? a revealed preference analysis
Laurens Cherchye, Thomas Demuynck, and Bram De Rock |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 51–65 |
|
Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks
Alexander Wolitzky |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 67–101 |
|
Strategic uncertainty and the ex-post Nash property in large games
Mohammed Ali Khan, Kali P. Rath, Yeneng Sun, and Haomiao Yu |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 103–129 |
|
A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes
Marcin Pęski and Thomas Wiseman |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 131–173 |
|
Breakdowns
Godfrey Keller and Sven Rady |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 175–202 |
|
Three steps ahead
Yuval Heller |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 203–241 |
|
Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection
Daisuke Oyama, William H. Sandholm, and Olivier Tercieux |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 243–281 |