Table of contents
Articles
Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games
Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau and Richard McLean |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 555–582 |
Search with multi-worker firms
Daron Acemoglu and William B. Hawkins |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 583–628 |
Escaping the repugnant conclusion: rank-discounted utilitarianism with variable population
Geir B. Asheim and Stephane Zuber |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 629–650 |
Repeated games with incomplete information and discounting
Marcin Pęski |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 651–694 |
Nestedness in networks: A theoretical model and some applications
Michael David König, Claudio J. Tessone, and Yves Zenou |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 695–752 |
Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability
Tommy Andersson, Lars Ehlers, and Lars-Gunnar Svensson |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 753–777 |
Second order beliefs models of choice under imprecise risk: non-additive second order beliefs vs. nonlinear second order utility
Raphaël Giraud |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 779–816 |
Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange
Itai Ashlagi and Alvin E. Roth |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 817–863 |
Dynamic contracts when agent's quality is unknown
Julien Prat and Boyan Jovanovic |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 865–914 |
A ranking method based on handicaps
Gabrielle Demange |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 915–942 |