Table of contents
Articles
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An algorithm for two-player repeated games with perfect monitoring
Dilip Abreu and Yuliy Sannikov |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 313–338 |
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Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules
Tilman Börgers and Doug Smith |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 339–360 |
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Strategy-proofness and Pareto-efficiency in quasi-linear exchange economies
Mridu Prabal Goswami, Manipushpak Mitra, and Arunava Sen |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 361–381 |
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Stochastic stability in monotone economies
Takashi Kamihigashi and John Stachurski |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 383–407 |
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Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games
Riccardo Calcagno, Yuichiro Kamada, Stefano Lovo, and Takuo Sugaya |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 409–434 |
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The transfer problem: A complete characterization
Yves Balasko |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 435–444 |
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Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Vincent Anesi and Daniel J. Seidmann |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 445–482 |
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Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information
Ying Chen and Hülya Eraslan |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 483–513 |
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A dynamic theory of electoral competition
Marco Battaglini |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 515–554 |