Table of contents
Articles
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What were you thinking? Decision theory as coherence test
Itzhak Gilboa and Larry Samuelson |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 507–519 |
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Two-stage majoritarian choice
Sean Horan and Yves Sprumont |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 521–537 |
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Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes
Sebastian Gryglewicz and Aaron Kolb |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 539–559 |
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Censorship as optimal persuasion
Anton Kolotilin, Timofiy Mylovanov, and Andriy Zapechelnyuk |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 561–585 |
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Monologues, dialogues and common priors
Alfredo Di Tillio, Ehud Lehrer, and Dov Samet |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 587–615 |
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Games with switching costs and endogenous references
Begum Guney and Michael Richter |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 617–650 |
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Indifference, indecisiveness, experimentation and stochastic choice
Efe A. Ok and Gerelt Tserenjigmid |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 651–686 |
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Dynamically stable matching
Laura Doval |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 687–724 |
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Markov distributional equilibrium dynamics in games with complementarities and no aggregate risk
Lukasz Balbus, Pawel Dziewulski, Kevin Reffett, and Lukasz Wozny |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 725–762 |
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(Bad) reputation in relational contracting
Rahul Deb, Matthew Mitchell, and Mallesh M. Pai |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 763–800 |
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The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions
Jan Christoph Schlegel |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 801–839 |
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A common-value auction with state-dependent participation
Stephan Lauermann and Asher Wolinsky |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 841–881 |
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Long information design
Frederic Koessler, Marie Laclau, Jérôme Renault, and Tristan Tomala |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 883–927 |
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Incentive-compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs : correction
Abhigyan Bose and Souvik Roy |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 929–942 |