Table of contents
Articles
|
Information aggregation in Poisson-elections
Mehmet Ekmekci and Stephan Lauermann |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1–23 |
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Rank-optimal assignments in uniform markets
Afshin Nikzad |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 25–55 |
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Informed intermediaries
Paula Onuchic |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 57–87 |
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Family ties: school assignment with siblings
Umut Dur, Thayer Morrill, and William Phan |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 89–120 |
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Equilibrium securitization with diverse beliefs
Andrew Ellis, Michele Piccione, and Shengxing Zhang |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 121–152 |
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Choosing what to pay attention to
Chad Fulton |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 153–184 |
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Transparency and collateral: central versus bilateral clearing
Gaetano Antinolfi, Francesca Carapella, and Francesco Carli |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 185–217 |
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Bayesian comparative statics
Teddy Mekonnen and René Leal Vizcaíno |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 219–251 |
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Pseudo-Bayesian updating
Chen Zhao |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 253–289 |
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Statistical sunspots
William A. Branch, Bruce McGough, and Mei Zhu |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 291–329 |
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Optimal organ allocation policy under blood-type barriers with the donor-priority rule
Jaehong Kim and Mengling Li |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 331–369 |
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Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations
Heiner Schumacher and Heidi Christina Thysen |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 371–414 |
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Malthusian stagnation is efficient
Juan Carlos Cordoba and Xiying Liu |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 415–460 |
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Incomplete-information games in large populations with anonymity
Martin Hellwig |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 461–506 |