Volume 1 (2006)

Editorial
        		 PRINT  VIEW
1–2
A model of choice from lists
        Ariel Rubinstein and Yuval Salant 		Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
3–17
Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability
        Jeffrey C. Ely and Marcin Pęski 		Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
19–65
Financial equilibrium with career concerns
        Amil Dasgupta and Andrea Prat 		Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
67–93
Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types
        Yeon-Koo Che and Ian Gale 		Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
95–118
Information, evolution and utility
        Larry Samuelson and Jeroen M. Swinkels 		Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
119–142
Competitive markets with externalities
        Mitsunori Noguchi and William R. Zame 		Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
143–166
Sufficient conditions for stable equilibria
        Srihari Govindan and Robert B. Wilson 		Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
167–206
Competition over agents with boundedly rational expectations
        Ran Spiegler 		Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
207–231
A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets
        Federico Echenique and Jorge Oviedo 		Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
233–273
Topologies on types
        Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg, and Stephen Morris 		Abstract  PRINT  VIEW

 Errata
275–309
Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring
        George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris 		Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
311–340
Regret testing: learning to play Nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent
        Dean Foster and Hobart Peyton Young 		Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
341–367
Ex post implementation in environments with private goods
        Sushil Bikhchandani 		Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
369–393
A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach
        Jacob Glazer and Ariel Rubinstein 		Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
395–410
Optimal auctions with ambiguity
        Subir Bose, Emre Ozdenoren, and Andreas Duus Pape 		Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
411–438
Endogenous incomplete markets, enforcement constraints, and intermediation
        Arpad Abraham and Eva Carceles-Poveda 		Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
439–459
Group formation and voter participation
        Helios Herrera and Cesar Martinelli 		Abstract  PRINT  VIEW

 Errata
461–487