Table of contents
Articles
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The folk theorem with imperfect public information in continuous time
Benjamin Bernard and Christoph Frei |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 411–453 |
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A model of price discrimination under loss aversion and state-contingent reference points
Juan Carlos Carbajal and Jeffrey C. Ely |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 455–485 |
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Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 487–522 |
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Objective rationality and uncertainty averse preferences
Simone Cerreia-Vioglio |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 523–545 |
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Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
R. Pablo Arribillaga and Jordi Massó |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 547–586 |
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List-rationalizable choice
Kemal Yildiz |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 587–599 |
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Dynamic markets for lemons: performance, liquidity, and policy intervention
Diego Moreno and John Wooders |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 601–639 |
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Savage games
Simon Grant, Idione Meneghel, and Rabee Tourky |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 641–682 |
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Matching with slot-specific priorities: theory
Scott Duke Kominers and Tayfun Sönmez |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 683–710 |
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A characterization of single-peaked preferences via random social choice functions
Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen, and Huaxia Zeng |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 711–733 |
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Stability and incentives for college admissions with budget constraints
Azar Abizada |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 735–756 |