Table of contents
Articles
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Strategic complementarities and unraveling in matching markets
Federico Echenique and Juan Sebastián Pereyra |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1–39 |
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On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions
Jacob Goeree and Yuanchuan Lien |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 41–52 |
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Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals
Jimmy Chan and Wenzhang Zhang |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 53–87 |
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Dynamics in stochastic evolutionary models
David K. Levine and Salvatore Modica |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 89–131 |
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Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget
Justin Burkett |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 133–155 |
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Reputation without commitment in finitely-repeated games
Jonathan Weinstein and Muhamet Yildiz |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 157–185 |
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Fragility of asymptotic agreement under Bayesian learning
Daron Acemoglu, Victor Chernozhukov, and Muhamet Yildiz |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 187–225 |
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Matching to share risk
Pierre-André Chiappori and Philip J. Reny |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 227–251 |
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Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard
Robert Ulbricht |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 253–278 |
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Large deviations and stochastic stability in the small noise double limit
William H. Sandholm and Mathias Staudigl |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 279–355 |
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Efficient networks in games with local complementarities
Mohamed Belhaj, Sebastian Bervoets, and Frédéric Deroïan |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 357–280 |
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Fairness and externalities
Rodrigo A. Velez |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 381–410 |