Table of contents
Articles
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Job security, stability and production efficiency
Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg, Ron Lavi, and Rann Smorodinsky |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1–24 |
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A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems
René Kirkegaard |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 25–51 |
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Auction design without quasilinear preferences
Brian Baisa |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 53–78 |
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On the existence of approximate equilibria and sharing rule solutions in discontinuous games
Philippe Bich and Rida Laraki |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 79–108 |
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Dynamic contracting: an irrelevance theorem
Péter Eső and Balázs Szentes |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 109–139 |
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Monopolistic nonlinear pricing with consumer entry
Lixin Ye and Chenglin Zhang |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 141–173 |
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Directives, expressives, and motivation
Toru Suzuki |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 175–210 |
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Sequential voting and agenda manipulation
Salvador Barberà and Anke Gerber |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 211–247 |
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Repeated Nash implementation
Claudio Mezzetti and Ludovic Renou |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 249–285 |
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Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
Marek Pycia and Utku Unver |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 287–329 |
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How do you defend a network?
Marcin Konrad Dziubiński and Sanjeev Goyal |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 331–376 |
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Allais, Ellsberg, and preferences for hedging
Mark Dean and Pietro Ortoleva |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 377–424 |
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Career concerns with exponential learning
Alessandro Bonatti and Johannes Hörner |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 425–475 |