Volume 18, Number 3 ( 2023)

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Table of contents

Articles

Bargaining with evolving private information
        Juan Ortner
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885–916
The winner-take-all dilemma
        Kazuya Kikuchi and Yukio Koriyama
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917–940
Time-consistent fair social choice
        Kaname Miyagishima
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941–964
Incentives in matching markets: counting and comparing manipulating agents
        Somouaoga Bonkoungou and Alexander Nesterov
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965–991
Optimal allocations with ╬▒-MaxMin utilities, Choquet expected utilities, and Prospect Theory
        Patrick Beissner and Jan Werner
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993–1022
All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof
        R. Pablo Arribillaga, Jordi Mass├│, and Alejandro Neme
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1023–1061
Collective hold-up
        Matias Iaryczower and Santiago Oliveros
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1063–1100
Unrestricted information acquisition
        Tommaso Denti
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1101–1140
Strategic investment evaluation
        Rishabh Kirpalani and Erik Madsen
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1141–1180
On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion
        Andrew Mackenzie and Christian Trudeau
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1181–1223
Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents
        Ozan Candogan and Philipp Strack
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 Supplementary Appendix
1225–1269
Which misspecifications persist?
        Drew Fudenberg and Giacomo Lanzani
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1271–1315
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