Theoretical Economics publishes leading research in economic theory. It is published by the Econometric Society four times a year, in January, May, July, and November. All content is freely available. It is included in the Social Sciences Citation Index.

TE editors' statement following up on the Econometric Society journal editors' plan to address paper length.

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Papers to appear

The following papers have been accepted and will appear in future issues. The links below lead to the final accepted papers in their working paper formats. The papers will be copyedited and typeset for publication.

• Kevin Spiritus, Etienne Lehmann, Sander Renes, and Floris T. Zoutman, Optimal taxation with multiple incomes and types
• Chiara Margaria, Queueing to learn
• Kazuya Kamiya and So Kubota, An analytical model of search and bargaining with divisible money
• Marcin Pęski, Random utility coordination games on networks
• Kenzo Imamura and Yasushi Kawase, Efficient and strategy-proof mechanism under general constraints
• Yuliyan Mitkov, Private sunspots in games of coordinated attack
• Simone Galperti and Jacopo Perego, Games with information constraints: seeds and spillovers
• David McAdams and Yangbo Song, Adoption epidemics and viral marketing
• Nicolas A. Inostroza and Alessandro Pavan, Adversarial coordination and public information design (Supplementary appendix)
• Simon Grant, Berend Roorda, and Jingni Yang, Expected balanced uncertain utility
• Luciano I. de Castro, Antonio F. Galvao, and Daniel da Siva Nunes, Dynamic economics with quantile preferences
• Tuomas Laiho, Pauli Murto, and Julia Salmi, Gradual learning from incremental actions
• Francesc Dilme, Repeated trade with imperfect information about previous transactions
• Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Scott Duke Kominers, and Ran I. Shorrer, To infinity and beyond: a general framework for scaling economic theories
• Yves Sprumont, Randomized collective choices based on a fractional tournament
• Haitian Xie, Ying Zhu, and Denis Shishkin, On the limitations of data-based price discrimination
• Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Stephan Müller, Farzad Pourbabaee, and Omer Tamuz, The hazards and benefits of condescension in social learning
• Julien Combe, Vladyslav Nora, and Olivier Tercieux, Dynamic assignment without money: optimality of spot mechanisms
• Zehao Liu, Ping He, and Chengbo Xie, In the shadow of shadow banking: a liquidity perspective
• Joyee Deb and Yuhta Ishii, Reputation building under uncertain monitoring
• Piotr Dworczak and Anton Kolotilin, The persuasion duality
• Anton Kolotilin and Alexander Wolitzky, Distributions of posterior quantiles via matching
• Juan Passadore and Juan Pablo Xandri Antuna, Robust predictions in dynamic policy games
• Florian Brandl and Felix Brandt, An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium
• Ivan Balbuzanov and Maciej H. Kotowski, The property rights theory of production networks
• Mira Frick and Yuhta Ishii, Innovation adoption by forward-looking social learners
• Jacob M. Nebel, Extensive measurement in social choice
• Philippe Jehiel and Konrad Mierendorff, Auction design with data-driven misspecifications: inefficiency in private value auctions with correlation
• Pavel Kocourek, Jakub Steiner, and Colin Stewart, Boundedly rational demand
• Tymon Tatur, On bargaining norms as solutions to cost-minimization problems

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