Volume 17, Number 4 ( 2022)

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Table of contents

Articles

How to sell in a sequential auction market
        Ken Hendricks and Thomas Wiseman
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1451–1471
Which networks permit stable allocations? A theory of network-based comparisons
        Chen Cheng and Yiqing Xing
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1473–1499
Deep and shallow thinking in the long run
        Heinrich Harald Nax and Jonathan Newton
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1501–1527
Sufficientarianism
        José Carlos R. Alcantud, Marco Mariotti, and Roberto Veneziani
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1529–1557
Rational bubbles and middlemen
        Yu Awaya, Kohei Iwasaki, and Makoto Watanabe
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1559–1587
Dynamic delegation with a persistent state
        Yi Chen
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1589–1618
Stable matching under forward-induction reasoning
        Luciano Pomatto
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1619–1649
On the revealed preference analysis of stable aggregate matchings
        Thomas Demuynck and Umutcan Salman
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1651–1682
Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima
        Yi-Chun Chen, Takashi Kunimoto, Yifei Sun, and Siyang Xiong
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1683–1717
Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers
        Manuel Amador and Kyle Bagwell
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1719–1760
The implications of pricing on social learning
        Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, and Rann Smorodinsky
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1761–1802
When Walras meets Vickrey
        David Delacrétaz, Simon Loertscher, and Claudio Mezzetti
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1803–1845
Collusion enforcement in repeated first-price auctions
        Wenzhang Zhang
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 Supplementary Appendix
1847–1895
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