Table of contents
Articles
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How to sell in a sequential auction market
Ken Hendricks and Thomas Wiseman |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1451–1471 |
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Which networks permit stable allocations? A theory of network-based comparisons
Chen Cheng and Yiqing Xing |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1473–1499 |
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Deep and shallow thinking in the long run
Heinrich Harald Nax and Jonathan Newton |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1501–1527 |
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Sufficientarianism
José Carlos R. Alcantud, Marco Mariotti, and Roberto Veneziani |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1529–1557 |
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Rational bubbles and middlemen
Yu Awaya, Kohei Iwasaki, and Makoto Watanabe |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1559–1587 |
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Dynamic delegation with a persistent state
Yi Chen |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1589–1618 |
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Stable matching under forward-induction reasoning
Luciano Pomatto |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1619–1649 |
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On the revealed preference analysis of stable aggregate matchings
Thomas Demuynck and Umutcan Salman |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1651–1682 |
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Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima
Yi-Chun Chen, Takashi Kunimoto, Yifei Sun, and Siyang Xiong |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1683–1717 |
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Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers
Manuel Amador and Kyle Bagwell |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1719–1760 |
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The implications of pricing on social learning
Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, and Rann Smorodinsky |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1761–1802 |
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When Walras meets Vickrey
David Delacrétaz, Simon Loertscher, and Claudio Mezzetti |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1803–1845 |
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Collusion enforcement in repeated first-price auctions
Wenzhang Zhang |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 1847–1895 |