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Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces
Attila Ambrus and Satoru Takahashi |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 1–27 |
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Repeated games with incomplete information on one side
Marcin Pęski |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 29–84 |
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Rigidity in bilateral trade with holdup
Rui Zhao |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 85–121 |
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Nonlinear pricing, market coverage, and competition
Huanxing Yang and Lixin Ye |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 123–153 |
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Monotone methods for equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics
Daisuke Oyama, Satoru Takahashi, and Josef Hofbauer |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 155–192 |
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Non-Bayesian updating: A theoretical framework
Larry G. Epstein, Jawwad Noor, and Alvaro Sandroni |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 193–229 |
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Caller Number Five and related timing games
Andreas Park and Lones Smith |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 231–256 |
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Equilibrium concepts in the large-household model
Tao Zhu |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 257–281 |
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"Topologies on types": Correction
Yi-Chun Chen and Siyang Xiong |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 283–285 |
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Subjective expected utility in games
Alfredo Di Tillio |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 287–323 |
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Credible ratings
Ettore Damiano, Hao Li, and Wing Suen |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 325–365 |
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Many inspections are manipulable
Eran Shmaya |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 367–382 |
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Auction design in the presence of collusion
Gregory Pavlov |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 383–429 |
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Contagion through learning
Jakub Steiner and Colin Stewart |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 431–458 |
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Consumer optimism and price discrimination
Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 459–497 |
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Risk taking and gender in hierarchies
Suzanne Scotchmer |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 499–524 |
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Price dispersion and loss leaders
Attila Ambrus and Jonathan Weinstein |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 525–537 |