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Orders of limits for stationary distributions, stochastic dominance, and stochastic stability
William H. Sandholm |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1–26 |
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Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics
William H. Sandholm |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 27–50 |
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Nash implementation with little communication
Ilya Segal |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 51–71 |
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Capitalist investment and political liberalization
Roger B. Myerson |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 73–91 |
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Rationalizable voting
Tasos Kalandrakis |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 93–125 |
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Uphill self-control
Jawwad Noor and Norio Takeoka |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 127–158 |
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Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information
David Martimort and Humberto Moreira |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 159–213 |
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Efficiency and marginal cost pricing in dynamic competitive markets with friction
In-Koo Cho and Sean P. Meyn |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 215–239 |
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Competing auctions: finite markets and convergence
Gabor Virag |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 241–274 |
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Strategic experimentation with Poisson bandits
Godfrey Keller and Sven Rady |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 275–311 |
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Symmetry of evidence without evidence of symmetry
Larry G. Epstein and Kyoungwon Seo |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 313–368 |
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A theory of regular Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games: genericity, stability, and purification
Ulrich Doraszelski and Juan F. Escobar |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 369–402 |
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Supermodular mechanism design
Laurent A. Mathevet |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 403–443 |
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Uniform topologies on types
Yi-Chun Chen, Alfredo Di Tillio, Eduardo Faingold, and Siyang Xiong |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 445–478 |
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Dynamic monopoly with relational incentives
Alexander Wolitzky |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 479–518 |