TE logo
ISSN (e) 1555-7561
(print) 1933-6837
Theoretical Economics
An open-access journal in economic theory
A journal of the
Econometric Society
Main page Submit a paper Join the Econometric Society
Editorial Board
Editor
  • Simon Board
Coeditors
  • Todd D. Sarver
  • Juuso Toikka
  • Rakesh Vohra
  • Pierre-Olivier Weill
Associate Editors
  • Scott Ashworth
  • Sarah Auster
  • Mariagiovanna Baccara
  • Marco Bassetto
  • Francis Bloch
  • J. Aislinn Bohren
  • Jaroslav Borovicka
  • Benjamin Brooks
  • Christopher P. Chambers
  • Geoffroy de Clippel
  • Rahul Deb
  • Eddie Dekel
  • Laura Doval
  • Piotr Dworczak
  • Federico Echenique
  • Andrew Ellis
  • Ignacio Esponda
  • Alex Frankel
  • Mira Frick
  • Yingni Guo
  • Benjamin Hébert
  • Johannes Hörner
  • Fuhito Kojima
  • Vijay Krishna
  • Pablo Kurlat
  • Stephan Lauermann
  • Benjamin Lester
  • Shengwu Li
  • Elliot Lipnowski
  • Jay Lu
  • George J. Mailath
  • Ezra Oberfield
  • Antonio Penta
  • Marcin Pęski
  • John K.-H. Quah
  • Ariel Rubinstein
  • Philipp Sadowski
  • Florian Scheuer
  • Uzi Segal
  • Ran Spiegler
  • Yves Sprumont
  • Satoru Takahashi
  • Juuso Välimäki
  • Alexander Westkamp
  • Thomas Wiseman

Acknowledgments
Theoretical Economics publishes leading research in economic theory. It is published by the Econometric Society four times a year, in January, May, July, and November. All content is freely available. It is included in the Social Sciences Citation Index.

TE editors' statement following up on the Econometric Society journal editors' plan to address paper length.

Current Issue: Volume 20, Issue 1 (January 2025)

Table of Contents

Articles

Expected balanced uncertain utility
       Simon Grant, Berend Roorda, and Jingni Yang
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1–25
The hazards and benefits of condescension in social learning
       Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Stephan Müller, Farzad Pourbabaee, and Omer Tamuz
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
27–56
Randomized collective choices based on a fractional tournament
       Yves Sprumont
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
57–92
Gradual learning from incremental actions
       Tuomas Laiho, Pauli Murto, and Julia Salmi
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
93–130
In the shadow of shadow banking: a liquidity perspective
       Zehao Liu, Ping He, and Chengbo Xie
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
131–168
Reputation building under uncertain monitoring
       Joyee Deb and Yuhta Ishii
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
169–208
Repeated trade with imperfect information about previous transactions
       Francesc Dilme
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
209–254
Dynamic assignment without money: optimality of spot mechanisms
       Julien Combe, Vladyslav Nora, and Olivier Tercieux
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
255–301
On the limitations of data-based price discrimination
       Haitian Xie, Ying Zhu, and Denis Shishkin
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
303–351
Dynamic economics with quantile preferences
       Luciano I. de Castro, Antonio F. Galvao, and Daniel da Siva Nunes
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
353–425
Through 2016, the order of papers within each issue is the order of receipt of the final versions. From 2017, within each issue papers are ordered by their length.

The print and view links lead to pdf files of the papers with the same content. The format of the versions in the view links is optimized for on-screen viewing.
Papers in this issue have on average been downloaded from 1648 distinct IP addresses. (For each paper, downloads since the paper was first made available as a "Paper to appear" are included in this number.)

PREVIOUS ISSUE      BROWSE ALL ISSUES

Papers to appear

The following papers have been accepted and will appear in future issues. The links below lead to the final accepted papers in their working paper formats. The papers will be copyedited and typeset for publication.

  • Christopher Sandmann and Nicolas Bonneton, Existence of a non-stationary equilibrium in search-and-matching models: tu and ntu
  • Simon Finster, Paul W. Goldberg, and Edwin Lock, Competitive and revenue-optimal pricing with budgets
  • Daniel Rappoport, Evidence and skepticism in verifiable disclosure games
  • Joyee Deb, Aditya V. Kuvalekar, and Elliot Lipnowski, Fostering collaboration
  • Matthew D. Adler, Walter Bossert, Susumu Cato, and Kohei Kamaga, Ex-post approaches to prioritarianism and sufficientarianism
  • Takuo Sugaya and Alexander Wolitzky, Non-recursive dynamic incentives: a rate of convergence approach
  • Malachy J. Gavan and Antonio Penta, Safe implementation
  • Yu Awaya and Vijay Krishna, Commonality of information and commonality of beliefs
  • Ian Ball and Deniz Kattwinkel, Probabilistic verification in mechanism design
  • David R. Agrawal, Adib Bagh, and Mohammed Mardan, Sensitivity versus size: implications for tax competition
  • Alexander Westkamp, Tâtonnement in matching markets
  • Yu Fu Wong, Forward-looking experimentation of correlated alternatives
  • Jaehong Kim, Mengling Li, and Menghan Xu, Priority search with outside options
  • Lester T. Chan, Weight-ranked divide-and-conquer contracts
  • Giulio Principi, Peter P. Wakker, and Ruodu Wang, Antimonotonicity for preference axioms: the natural counterpart to comonotonicity
  • Nicholas Charles Bedard and Jacob K Goeree, Tropical analysis: with an application to indivisible goods
  • Alfred Galichon, Larry Samuelson, and Lucas Vernet, Unified gross substitutes and inverse isotonicity for equilibrium problems
  • Christopher P. Chambers and Federico Echenique, Empirical welfare economics
  • David Dillenberger, Daniel Gottlieb, and Pietro Ortoleva, Stochastic impatience and the separation of time and risk preferences (Supplementary appendix)
  • Kevin Spiritus, Etienne Lehmann, Sander Renes, and Floris T. Zoutman, Optimal taxation with multiple incomes and types
  • Chiara Margaria, Queueing to learn
  • Kazuya Kamiya and So Kubota, An analytical model of search and bargaining with divisible money
  • Marcin Pęski, Random utility coordination games on networks
  • Kenzo Imamura and Yasushi Kawase, Efficient and strategy-proof mechanism under general constraints
  • Yuliyan Mitkov, Private sunspots in games of coordinated attack
  • Simone Galperti and Jacopo Perego, Games with information constraints: seeds and spillovers
  • David McAdams and Yangbo Song, Adoption epidemics and viral marketing
  • Nicolas A. Inostroza and Alessandro Pavan, Adversarial coordination and public information design (Supplementary appendix)
  • Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Scott Duke Kominers, and Ran I. Shorrer, To infinity and beyond: a general framework for scaling economic theories

Register to be notified when issues are published

To be notified of the publication of new issues, please register by completing the form on our registration page.

Privacy Statement

The names and email addresses entered in forms on this website will be used exclusively for the purposes of the journal and will not be made available for any other purpose or to any other party.
  Follow EconTheory on Twitter    Tweet
Open access
Editorial standards
Referee guidelines
Submit a paper
Turnaround
Copyright
Archiving, dissemination, hard copy
Policies
Best paper awards
Annual reports
Journal history
Econometric Society
Main page
Journal Content Search

Advanced search

Browse
  • By Issue
  • By Author
  • By Title
Login

Endorsed by