Table of contents
Articles
|
Rationing rules and stable coalition structures
Oihane Gallo and Elena Inarra |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Errata 933–950 |
|
Efficient chip strategies in repeated games
Wojciech Olszewski and Mikhail Safronov |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 951–978 |
|
Pareto efficiency and identity
Christopher Phelan and Aldo Rustichini |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 979–1008 |
|
Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities
Lars Ehlers and Alexander Westkamp |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 1009–1042 |
|
Transitivity of preferences: when does it matter?
Laurens Cherchye, Thomas Demuynck, and Bram De Rock |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1043–1076 |
|
Competition and networks of collaboration
Nikita Roketskiy |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1077–1110 |
|
Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
Arjada Bardhi and Yingni Guo |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 1111–1150 |
|
A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game
David Martimort, Aggey Semenov, and Lars A. Stole |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1151–1190 |
|
Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors
Wojciech Olszewski and Mikhail Safronov |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1191–1232 |
|
Optimal adaptive testing: informativeness and incentives
Rahul Deb and Colin Stewart |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1233–1274 |
|
On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
Gabriel Carroll |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1275–1318 |
|
The optimal degree of monetary-discretion in a New Keynesian model with private information
Yuichiro Waki, Richard Dennis, and Ippei Fujiwara |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 1319–1368 |
|
A tractable model of monetary exchange with ex-post heterogeneity
Guillaume Rocheteau, Pierre-Olivier Weill, and Russell Wong |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 1369–1424 |
|
A general solution method for moral hazard problems
Rongzhu Ke and Christopher Thomas Ryan |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1425–1481 |