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Expected balanced uncertain utility
Simon Grant, Berend Roorda, and Jingni Yang |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1–25 |
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The hazards and benefits of condescension in social learning
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Stephan Müller, Farzad Pourbabaee, and Omer Tamuz |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 27–56 |
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Randomized collective choices based on a fractional tournament
Yves Sprumont |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 57–92 |
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Gradual learning from incremental actions
Tuomas Laiho, Pauli Murto, and Julia Salmi |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 93–130 |
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In the shadow of shadow banking: a liquidity perspective
Zehao Liu, Ping He, and Chengbo Xie |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 131–168 |
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Reputation building under uncertain monitoring
Joyee Deb and Yuhta Ishii |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 169–208 |
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Repeated trade with imperfect information about previous transactions
Francesc Dilme |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 209–254 |
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Dynamic assignment without money: optimality of spot mechanisms
Julien Combe, Vladyslav Nora, and Olivier Tercieux |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 255–301 |
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On the limitations of data-based price discrimination
Haitian Xie, Ying Zhu, and Denis Shishkin |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 303–351 |
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Dynamic economics with quantile preferences
Luciano I. de Castro, Antonio F. Galvao, and Daniel da Siva Nunes |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 353–425 |
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Private sunspots in games of coordinated attack
Yuliyan Mitkov |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 427–451 |
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Adoption epidemics and viral marketing
David McAdams and Yangbo Song |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 453–480 |
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Efficient and strategy-proof mechanism under general constraints
Kenzo Imamura and Yasushi Kawase |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 481–509 |
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To infinity and beyond: a general framework for scaling economic theories
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Scott Duke Kominers, and Ran I. Shorrer |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 511–542 |
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Optimal taxation with multiple incomes and types
Kevin Spiritus, Etienne Lehmann, Sander Renes, and Floris T. Zoutman |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 543–581 |
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Random utility coordination games on networks
Marcin Pęski |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 583–622 |
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Queueing to learn
Chiara Margaria |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 623–665 |
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Games with information constraints: seeds and spillovers
Simone Galperti and Jacopo Perego |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 667–711 |
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An analytical model of search and bargaining with divisible money
Kazuya Kamiya and So Kubota |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 713–761 |
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Adversarial coordination and public information design
Nicolas A. Inostroza and Alessandro Pavan |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 763–813 |
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Tropical analysis: with an application to indivisible goods
Nicholas Charles Bedard and Jacob K Goeree |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 815–829 |
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Antimonotonicity for preference axioms: the natural counterpart to comonotonicity
Giulio Principi, Peter P. Wakker, and Ruodu Wang |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 831–855 |
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Weight-ranked divide-and-conquer contracts
Lester T. Chan |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 857–882 |
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Forward-looking experimentation of correlated alternatives
Yu Fu Wong |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 883–909 |
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Empirical welfare economics
Christopher P. Chambers and Federico Echenique |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 911–939 |
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Unified gross substitutes and inverse isotonicity for equilibrium problems
Alfred Galichon, Larry Samuelson, and Lucas Vernet |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 941–971 |
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Tâtonnement in matching markets
Alexander Westkamp |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 973–1006 |
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Sensitivity versus size: implications for tax competition
David R. Agrawal, Adib Bagh, and Mohammed Mardan |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1007–1041 |
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Stochastic impatience and the separation of time and risk preferences
David Dillenberger, Daniel Gottlieb, and Pietro Ortoleva |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1043–1080 |
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Priority search with outside options
Jaehong Kim, Mengling Li, and Menghan Xu |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1081–1134 |