Volume 15 (2020)

Discriminatory price auctions with resale and optimal quantity caps
        Brian Baisa and Justin Burkett
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1–28
Learning by matching
        Yi-Chun Chen and Gaoji Hu
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29–56
Performance-maximizing large contests
        Wojciech Olszewski and Ron Siegel
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57–88
Uncertain rationality, depth of reasoning and robustness in games with incomplete information
        Fabrizio Germano, Jonathan Weinstein, and Peio Zuazo-Garin
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89–122
Agency business cycles
        Mikhail Golosov and Guido Menzio
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123–158
Coalition formation and history dependence
        Bhaskar Dutta and Hannu Vartiainen
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159–197
First-price auctions with budget constraints
        Maciej H. Kotowski
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199–237
Locally Bayesian learning in networks
        Wei Li and Xu Tan
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239–278
Willpower and compromise effect
        Yusufcan Masatlioglu, Daisuke Nakajima, and Emre Ozdenoren
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
279–317
Information design and sequential screening with ex post participation constraint
        Tibor Heumann
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 Supplementary Appendix
319–359
Efficient multi-unit auctions for normal goods
        Brian Baisa
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361–413
Network structure and naive sequential learning
        Krishna Dasaratha and Kevin He
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415–444
The no-upward-crossing condition, comparative statics, and the moral-hazard problem
        Hector Chade and Jeroen M. Swinkels
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445–476
Delegating performance evaluation
        Igor Letina, Shuo Liu, and Nick Netzer
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477–509
Mechanism design without quasilinearity
        Tomoya Kazumura, Debasis Mishra, and Shigehiro Serizawa
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511–544
Bundlers' dilemmas in financial markets with sampling investors
        Milo Bianchi and Philippe Jehiel
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545–582
Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect
        Dino Gerardi and Lucas Maestri
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 Supplementary Appendix
583–623
Multiplier effect and comparative statics in global games of regime change
        Michal Szkup
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625–667
Equilibrium coalitional behavior
        Mert Kimya
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669–714
Optimal contracts with a risk-taking agent
        Daniel Barron, George Georgiadis, and Jeroen M. Swinkels
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 Supplementary Appendix
715–761
The construction of national identities
        Milena Almagro and David Andrés-Cerezo
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 Supplementary Appendix
763–810
Dynamic games with (almost) perfect information
        Wei He and Yeneng Sun
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 Supplementary Appendix
811–859
Production priorities in dynamic relationships
        Jean Guillaume Forand and Jan Zapal
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861–889
Short-term investments and indices of risk
        Yuval Heller and Amnon Schreiber
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891–921
Costly verification in collective decisions
        Albin Erlanson and Andreas Kleiner
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923–954
Robust scoring rules
        Elias Tsakas
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955–987
Twisting the truth: foundations of wishful thinking
        Matthew Kovach
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989–1022
Uncertainty-driven cooperation
        Doruk Cetemen, Ilwoo Hwang, and Ayça Kaya
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1023–1058
Preferences for partial information and ambiguity
        Jian Li
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1059–1094
School choice with asymmetric information: priority design and the curse of acceptance
        Andrew Kloosterman and Peter Troyan
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1095–1133
Optimal incentive contract with endogenous monitoring technology
        Anqi Li and Ming Yang
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1135–1173
Common learning and cooperation in repeated games
        Takuo Sugaya and Yuichi Yamamoto
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1175–1219
Optimal dynamic matching
        Mariagiovanna Baccara, SangMok Lee, and Leeat Yariv
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1221–1278
On the falsifiability and learnability of decision theories
        Pathikrit Basu and Federico Echenique
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1279–1305
Transferable utility and demand functions
        Pierre-André Chiappori and Elisabeth Gugl
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1307–1333
Gradual pairwise comparison and stochastic choice
        Rohan Dutta
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1335–1364
Trade clustering and power laws in financial markets
        Makoto Nirei, John Stachurski, and Tsutomu Watanabe
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 Supplementary Appendix
1365–1398
Countering the winner's curse: optimal auction design in a common value model
        Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks, and Stephen Morris
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1399–1434
On the optimal design of biased contests
        Qiang Fu and Zenan Wu
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 Supplementary Appendix
1435–1470
Learning with minimal information in continuous games
        Sebastian Bervoets, Mario Bravo, and Mathieu Faure
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1471–1508
An explicit representation for disappointment aversion and other betweenness preferences
        Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, David Dillenberger, and Pietro Ortoleva
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1509–1546
Collusion and delegation under information control
        Andreas Asseyer
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1547–1586
The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments
        Dmitry Ryvkin and Mikhail Drugov
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1587–1626
The wisdom of the crowd in dynamic economies
        Pietro Dindo and Filippo Massari
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1627–1668
Private and public liquidity provision in over-the-counter markets
        David M. Arseneau, David E. Rappoport W., and Alexandros P. Vardoulakis
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1669–1712