Table of Contents
Articles
| How to sell in a sequential auction market Ken Hendricks and Thomas Wiseman |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 1451–1471 |
| Which networks permit stable allocations? A theory of network-based comparisons Chen Cheng and Yiqing Xing |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 1473–1499 |
| Deep and shallow thinking in the long run Heinrich Harald Nax and Jonathan Newton |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 1501–1527 |
| Sufficientarianism José Carlos R. Alcantud, Marco Mariotti, and Roberto Veneziani |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 1529–1557 |
| Rational bubbles and middlemen Yu Awaya, Kohei Iwasaki, and Makoto Watanabe |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 1559–1587 |
| Dynamic delegation with a persistent state Yi Chen |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 1589–1618 |
| Stable matching under forward-induction reasoning Luciano Pomatto |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 1619–1649 |
| On the revealed preference analysis of stable aggregate matchings Thomas Demuynck and Umutcan Salman |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 1651–1682 |
| Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima Yi-Chun Chen, Takashi Kunimoto, Yifei Sun, and Siyang Xiong |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 1683–1717 |
| Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers Manuel Amador and Kyle Bagwell |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 1719–1760 |
| The implications of pricing on social learning Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, and Rann Smorodinsky |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 1761–1802 |
| When Walras meets Vickrey David Delacrétaz, Simon Loertscher, and Claudio Mezzetti |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 1803–1845 |
| Collusion enforcement in repeated first-price auctions Wenzhang Zhang |
Abstract PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix 1847–1895 |
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Through 2016, the order of papers within each issue is the order of receipt of the final versions. From 2017, within each issue papers are ordered by their length.
The print and view links lead to pdf files of the papers with the same content. The format of the versions in the view links is optimized for on-screen viewing. | |
