Theoretical Economics publishes leading research in economic theory. It is published by the Econometric Society four times a year, in January, May, July, and November. All content is freely available. It is included in the Social Sciences Citation Index.

TE editors' statement following up on the Econometric Society journal editors' plan to address paper length.

PREVIOUS ISSUE      BROWSE ALL ISSUES

Papers to appear

The following papers have been accepted and will appear in future issues. The links below lead to the final accepted papers in their working paper formats. The papers will be copyedited and typeset for publication.

• Igor Letina, Shuo Liu, and Nick Netzer, Delegating performance evaluation
• Wei He and Yeneng Sun, Dynamic games with (almost) perfect information (Supplementary appendix)
• Milo Bianchi and Philippe Jehiel, Bundlers' dilemmas in financial markets with sampling investors
• Dino Gerardi and Lucas Maestri, Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect (Supplementary appendix)
• Mert Kimya, Equilibrium coalitional behavior
• Daniel Barron, George Georgiadis, and Jeroen M. Swinkels, Optimal contracts with a risk-taking agent
• Tomoya Kazumura, Debasis Mishra, and Shigehiro Serizawa, Mechanism design without quasilinearity
• Michal Szkup, Multiplier effect and comparative statics in global games of regime change
• Hector Chade and Jeroen M. Swinkels, The no-upward-crossing condition, comparative statics, and the moral-hazard problem
• Krishna Dasaratha and Kevin He, Network structure and naive sequential learning
• Wei Li and Xu Tan, Locally Bayesian learning in networks
• Wojciech Olszewski and Ron Siegel, Performance-maximizing large contests
• Brian Baisa, Efficient multi-unit auctions for normal goods
• Tibor Heumann, Information design and sequential screening with ex post participation constraint (Supplementary appendix)
• Mikhail Golosov and Guido Menzio, Agency business cycles
• Yusufcan Masatlioglu, Daisuke Nakajima, and Emre Ozdenoren, Willpower and compromise effect
• Yi-Chun Chen and Gaoji Hu, Learning by matching
• Fabrizio Germano, Jonathan Weinstein, and Peio Zuazo-Garin, Uncertain rationality, depth of reasoning and robustness in games with incomplete information
• Maciej H. Kotowski, First-price auctions with budget constraints
• Bhaskar Dutta and Hannu Vartiainen, Coalition formation and history dependence
• Brian Baisa and Justin Burkett, Discriminatory price auctions with resale and optimal quantity caps
• Maarten Janssen and Bernhard Kasberger, On the clock of the combinatorial clock auction
• David Austen-Smith, Wioletta Dziuda, Bård Harstad, and Antoine Loeper, Gridlock and inefficient policy instruments
• William H. Sandholm, Segismundo S. Izquierdo, and Luis R. Izquierdo, Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the Centipede game (Supplementary appendix)
• Joyee Deb and Julio Gonzalez-Diaz, Enforcing social norms: Trust-building and community enforcement (Supplementary appendix)
• Michael Richter and Ariel Rubinstein, "Convex preferences": a new definition
• Umut Dur, A. Arda Gitmez, and Özgür Yılmaz, School choice under partial fairness
• Marco Battaglini and Rohit Lamba, Optimal dynamic contracting: the first-order approach and beyond (Supplementary appendix)
• Mehmet Ekmekci and M. Bumin Yenmez, Common enrollment in school choice
• Florian Brandl and Felix Brandt, Justifying optimal play via consistency
• Margaret Meyer, Inés Moreno de Barreda, and Julia Nafziger, Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk
• John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky, and Alexander Westkamp, Full substitutability

Register to be notified when issues are published

To be notified of the publication of new issues, please register by completing the form on our registration page.

Privacy Statement

The names and email addresses entered in forms on this website will be used exclusively for the purposes of the journal and will not be made available for any other purpose or to any other party.