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ISSN (e) 1555-7561
(print) 1933-6837
Theoretical Economics
An open-access journal in economic theory
A journal of the
Econometric Society
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Editorial Board
Editor
  • Simon Board
Coeditors
  • Todd D. Sarver
  • Bruno Strulovici
  • Rakesh Vohra
  • Pierre-Olivier Weill
Associate Editors
  • Scott Ashworth
  • Sarah Auster
  • Mariagiovanna Baccara
  • Marco Bassetto
  • Francis Bloch
  • J. Aislinn Bohren
  • Jaroslav Borovicka
  • Benjamin Brooks
  • Christopher P. Chambers
  • Geoffroy de Clippel
  • Rahul Deb
  • Eddie Dekel
  • Laura Doval
  • Piotr Dworczak
  • Federico Echenique
  • Kfir Eliaz
  • Andrew Ellis
  • Ignacio Esponda
  • Alex Frankel
  • Mira Frick
  • Yingni Guo
  • Yuichiro Kamada
  • Fuhito Kojima
  • Vijay Krishna
  • Pablo Kurlat
  • Stephan Lauermann
  • Benjamin Lester
  • Shengwu Li
  • Elliot Lipnowski
  • Jay Lu
  • George J. Mailath
  • Ezra Oberfield
  • Antonio Penta
  • Marcin Pęski
  • Ariel Rubinstein
  • Philipp Sadowski
  • Florian Scheuer
  • Uzi Segal
  • Ran Spiegler
  • Yves Sprumont
  • Juuso Toikka
  • Utku Unver
  • Juuso Välimäki
  • Alexander Westkamp
  • Thomas Wiseman

Acknowledgments
Theoretical Economics publishes leading research in economic theory. It is published by the Econometric Society four times a year, in January, May, July, and November. All content is freely available. It is included in the Social Sciences Citation Index.

TE editors' statement following up on the Econometric Society journal editors' plan to address paper length.

Current Issue: Volume 18, Issue 3 (July 2023)

Table of Contents

Articles

Bargaining with evolving private information
       Juan Ortner
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
885–916
The winner-take-all dilemma
       Kazuya Kikuchi and Yukio Koriyama
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
917–940
Time-consistent fair social choice
       Kaname Miyagishima
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
941–964
Incentives in matching markets: counting and comparing manipulating agents
       Somouaoga Bonkoungou and Alexander Nesterov
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
965–991
Optimal allocations with α-MaxMin utilities, Choquet expected utilities, and Prospect Theory
       Patrick Beissner and Jan Werner
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
993–1022
All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof
       R. Pablo Arribillaga, Jordi Massó, and Alejandro Neme
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1023–1061
Collective hold-up
       Matias Iaryczower and Santiago Oliveros
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1063–1100
Unrestricted information acquisition
       Tommaso Denti
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1101–1140
Strategic investment evaluation
       Rishabh Kirpalani and Erik Madsen
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1141–1180
On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion
       Andrew Mackenzie and Christian Trudeau
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1181–1223
Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents
       Ozan Candogan and Philipp Strack
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
 Supplementary appendix
1225–1269
Which misspecifications persist?
       Drew Fudenberg and Giacomo Lanzani
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1271–1315
Through 2016, the order of papers within each issue is the order of receipt of the final versions. From 2017, within each issue papers are ordered by their length.

The print and view links lead to pdf files of the papers with the same content. The format of the versions in the view links is optimized for on-screen viewing.
Papers in this issue have on average been downloaded from 1202 distinct IP addresses. (For each paper, downloads since the paper was first made available as a "Paper to appear" are included in this number.)

PREVIOUS ISSUE      BROWSE ALL ISSUES

Papers to appear

The following papers have been accepted and will appear in future issues. The links below lead to the final accepted papers in their working paper formats. The papers will be copyedited and typeset for publication.

  • Christopher P. Chambers, Yusufcan Masatlioglu, and Christopher Turansick, Correlated choice
  • Laura Doval and Vasiliki Skreta, Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good
  • Shanglyu Deng, Qiang Fu, Zenan Wu, and Yuxuan Zhu, Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information
  • Peter Wagner and Jan Knoepfle, Relational enforcement (Supplementary appendix)
  • Özgün Ekici, Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects
  • Yiqiu Chen and Markus Möller, Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent
  • Wei Zhao, Claudio Mezzetti, Ludovic Renou, and Tristan Tomala, Contracting over persistent information
  • Paulo Barelli and Srihari Govindan, Existence of monotone equilibria in large double auctions
  • Giorgio Fabbri, Silvia Faggian, and Giuseppe Freni, On competition for spatially distributed resources in networks
  • Soumen Banerjee, Yi-Chun Chen, and Yifei Sun, Direct implementation with evidence
  • Florian Brandl and Felix Brandt, A natural adaptive process for collective decision-making
  • Xu Lang and Debasis Mishra, Symmetric reduced form voting
  • Sanket Patil and Yuval Salant, Optimal sample sizes and statistical decision rules
  • Toomas Hinnosaar, Optimal sequential contests
  • Sarah Auster and Nicola Pavoni, Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness
  • Mengxi Zhang, Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs
  • César Barilla and Duarte Gonçalves, The dynamics of instability
  • Vladyslav Nora and Eyal Winter, Exploiting social influence in networks
  • Yu Chen, Matthew Doyle, and Francisco M. Gonzalez, Wages as signals of worker mobility
  • Yiman Sun, A dynamic model of censorship
  • J. Aislinn Bohren, Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game (Supplementary appendix)
  • Kee-Youn Kang, Digital currency and privacy
  • Francisco Queirós, Asset bubbles and product market competition
  • Vitali Gretschko and Helene Mass, Worst-case equilibria in first-price auctions
  • Maria Betto and Matthew W. Thomas, Asymmetric all-pay auctions with spillovers
  • Xuesong Huang, Sophisticated banking contracts and fragility when withdrawal information is public
  • Annie Liang and Erik Madsen, Data and incentives
  • Paula Onuchic and Debraj Ray, Conveying value via categories
  • Karl Schulz, Aleh Tsyvinski, and Nicolas Werquin, Generalized compensation principle
  • Keisuke Teeple, Surprise and default in general equilibrium
  • Dean Foster and Sergiu Hart, "Calibeating": beating forecasters at their own game
  • Drew Fudenberg, Giacomo Lanzani, and Philipp Strack, Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs
  • Francis Bloch, Kalyan Chatterjee, and Bhaskar Dutta, Attack and interception in networks
  • Mikel Pérez-Nievas, Efficiency with endogenous population growth. Do children have too many rights?
  • Ce Liu, Stability in repeated matching markets (Supplementary appendix)
  • Hugo Hopenhayn and Maryam Saeedi, Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes
  • Gabriel Carroll and Lukas Bolte, Robust contracting under double moral hazard
  • Miltiadis Makris and Ludovic Renou, Information design in multi-stage games
  • Takuo Sugaya and Alexander Wolitzky, Bad apples in symmetric repeated games

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