Theoretical Economics publishes leading research in economic theory. It is published by the Econometric Society four times a year, in January, May, July, and November. All content is freely available. It is included in the Social Sciences Citation Index.

TE editors' statement following up on the Econometric Society journal editors' plan to address paper length.

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Papers to appear

The following papers have been accepted and will appear in future issues. The links below lead to the final accepted papers in their working paper formats. The papers will be copyedited and typeset for publication.

• Manuel Amador and Kyle Bagwell, Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers
• Thomas Demuynck and Umutcan Salman, On the revealed preference analysis of stable aggregate matchings
• Daniel Bird and Alexander Frug, Monotone contracts
• Wenzhang Zhang, Collusion enforcement in repeated first-price auctions (Supplementary appendix)
• Daniele Condorelli and Balázs Szentes, Surplus sharing in Cournot oligopoly
• Benjamin Lester, Pierre-Olivier Weill, and Julien Hugonnier, Heterogeneity in decentralized asset markets
• Ariel Rubinstein and Kemal YILDIZ, Equilibrium in a civilized jungle
• Fabien Gensbittel, Marcin Pęski, and Jérôme Renault, Value-based distance between information structures
• Ran Weksler and Boaz Zik, Informative tests in signaling environments
• Andreas Blume and In-Uck Park, Quid pro quo: friendly information exchange between rivals
• Daniel Gottlieb and Humberto Moreira, Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard (Supplementary appendix)
• Sofia Moroni, Experimentation in Organizations
• Svetlana Kosterina, Persuasion with unknown beliefs
• Kevin He, Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal-stopping problems
• Sylvain Chassang and Samuel Kapon, Prior-free dynamic allocation under limited liability
• Dirk Bergemann and Philipp Strack, Progressive participation
• David Martimort and Lars A. Stole, Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models
• Itzhak Gilboa and Larry Samuelson, What were you thinking? Decision theory as coherence test
• Abhigyan Bose and Souvik Roy, Incentive-compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs : correction
• Rahul Deb, Matthew Mitchell, and Mallesh M. Pai, (Bad) reputation in relational contracting
• Frederic Koessler, Marie Laclau, Jérôme Renault, and Tristan Tomala, Long information design
• Jan Christoph Schlegel, The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions
• Alfredo Di Tillio, Ehud Lehrer, and Dov Samet, Monologues, dialogues and common priors
• Lukasz Balbus, Pawel Dziewulski, Kevin Reffett, and Lukasz Wozny, Markov distributional equilibrium dynamics in games with complementarities and no aggregate risk
• Stephan Lauermann and Asher Wolinsky, A common-value auction with state-dependent participation
• Begum Guney and Michael Richter, Games with switching costs and endogenous references
• Sean Horan and Yves Sprumont, Two-stage majoritarian choice
• Anton Kolotilin, Timofiy Mylovanov, and Andriy Zapechelnyuk, Censorship as optimal persuasion
• Efe A. Ok and Gerelt Tserenjigmid, Indifference, indecisiveness, experimentation and stochastic choice
• Laura Doval, Dynamically stable matching
• Sebastian Gryglewicz and Aaron Kolb, Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes
• Teddy Mekonnen and René Leal Vizcaíno, Bayesian comparative statics
• Heiner Schumacher and Heidi Christina Thysen, Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations
• Umut Dur, Thayer Morrill, and William Phan, Family ties: school assignment with siblings
• Chad Fulton, Choosing what to pay attention to
• Andrew Ellis, Michele Piccione, and Shengxing Zhang, Equilibrium securitization with diverse beliefs
• Afshin Nikzad, Rank-optimal assignments in uniform markets
• Mehmet Ekmekci and Stephan Lauermann, Information aggregation in Poisson-elections
• Chen Zhao, Pseudo-Bayesian updating
• Gaetano Antinolfi, Francesca Carapella, and Francesco Carli, Transparency and collateral: central versus bilateral clearing
• William A. Branch, Bruce McGough, and Mei Zhu, Statistical sunspots
• Juan Carlos Cordoba and Xiying Liu, Malthusian stagnation is efficient
• Martin Hellwig, Incomplete-information games in large populations with anonymity
• Paula Onuchic, Informed intermediaries (Supplementary appendix)
• Ran Eilat and Ady Pauzner, Bilateral trade with a benevolent intermediary
• Gaetano Bloise, Herakles Polemarchakis, and Yiannis Vailakis, Sustainable debt
• Daniel F. Garrett, Payoff implications of incentive contracting
• Rumen Kostadinov, Renegotiation of long-term contracts as part of an implicit agreement
• Battal Dogan and Lars Ehlers, Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance
• Paulo Barelli and John Duggan, Subgame-perfect equilibrium in games with almost perfect information: dispensing with public randomization
• Yaron Azrieli, Monitoring experts
• Ran Eilat, Kfir Eliaz, and Xiaosheng Mu, Bayesian privacy
• Steven Kivinen and Norovsambuu Tumennasan, Robust group strategy-proofness
• Jaehong Kim and Mengling Li, Optimal organ allocation policy under blood-type barriers with the donor-priority rule
• Anton Kolotilin and Hongyi Li, Relational communication
• Karl H. Schlag and Andriy Zapechelnyuk, Robust sequential search
• Ujjwal Kumar, Souvik Roy, Arunava Sen, Sonal Yadav, and Huaxia Zeng, Local global equivalence in voting models: a characterization and applications
• Adam Brandenburger, Alexander Danieli, and Amanda Friedenberg, The implications of finite-order reasoning

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