Theoretical Economics

Editorial Board

Acknowledgments

Theoretical Economics publishes leading research in economic theory. It is published by the Econometric Society four times a year, in January, May, July, and November. All content is freely available. It is included in the Social Sciences Citation Index.

TE editors' statement following up on the Econometric Society journal editors' plan to address paper length.

Current Issue: Volume 18, Issue 1 (January 2023)

Table of Contents

Articles

∀ or ∃? Uzi Segal	Abstract PRINT VIEW 1–13
Optimal persuasion via bi-pooling Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky, and Takuro Yamashita	Abstract PRINT VIEW 15–36
Stable matching: an integer programming approach Chao Huang	Abstract PRINT VIEW 37–63
On the neutrality of socially responsible investing Lutz G. Arnold	Abstract PRINT VIEW 65–95
On guarantees, vetoes and random dictators Anna Bogomolnaia, Ron Holzman, and Hervé Moulin	Abstract PRINT VIEW 97–127
Slow persuasion Matteo Escudé and Ludvig Sinander	Abstract PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix 129–162
Pervasive signaling B. Douglas Bernheim and Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed	Abstract PRINT VIEW 163–196
Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: complete characterization Siyang Xiong	Abstract PRINT VIEW 197–230
Robust comparative statics for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution Joel P. Flynn, Lawrence D. W. Schmidt, and Alexis Akira Toda	Abstract PRINT VIEW 231–265
Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers Hitoshi Sadakane	Abstract PRINT VIEW 267–301
Additive valuations of streams of payoffs that satisfy the time value of money principle: characterization and robust optimization Abraham Neyman	Abstract PRINT VIEW 303–340
Innovation, firm size distribution, and gains from trade Yi-Fan Chen, Wen-Tai Hsu, and Shin-Kun Peng	Abstract PRINT VIEW 341–380
Termination as an incentive device Borys Grochulski and Yuzhe Zhang	Abstract PRINT VIEW 381–419
Optimal information structures in bilateral trade Christoph Schottmüller	Abstract PRINT VIEW 421–461
Through 2016, the order of papers within each issue is the order of receipt of the final versions. From 2017, within each issue papers are ordered by their length. The print and view links lead to pdf files of the papers with the same content. The format of the versions in the view links is optimized for on-screen viewing. Papers in this issue have on average been downloaded from 863 distinct IP addresses. (For each paper, downloads since the paper was first made available as a "Paper to appear" are included in this number.)

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Papers to appear

The following papers have been accepted and will appear in future issues. The links below lead to the final accepted papers in their working paper formats. The papers will be copyedited and typeset for publication.

Maria Betto and Matthew W. Thomas, Asymmetric all-pay auctions with spillovers
Xuesong Huang, Sophisticated banking contracts and fragility when withdrawal information is public
Annie Liang and Erik Madsen, Data and incentives
Paula Onuchic and Debraj Ray, Conveying value via categories
Karl Schulz, Aleh Tsyvinski, and Nicolas Werquin, Generalized compensation principle
Keisuke Teeple, Surprise and default in general equilibrium
Dean Foster and Sergiu Hart, "Calibeating": beating forecasters at their own game
Drew Fudenberg, Giacomo Lanzani, and Philipp Strack, Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs
Francis Bloch, Kalyan Chatterjee, and Bhaskar Dutta, Attack and interception in networks
Mikel Pérez-Nievas, Efficiency with endogenous population growth. Do children have too many rights?
Ce Liu, Stability in repeated matching markets (Supplementary appendix)
Hugo Hopenhayn and Maryam Saeedi, Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes
Gabriel Carroll and Lukas Bolte, Robust contracting under double moral hazard
Miltiadis Makris and Ludovic Renou, Information design in multi-stage games
Takuo Sugaya and Alexander Wolitzky, Bad apples in symmetric repeated games
Tommaso Denti, Unrestricted information acquisition
Kaname Miyagishima, Time-consistent fair social choice
Patrick Beissner and Jan Werner, Optimal allocations with α-MaxMin utilities, Choquet expected utilities, and Prospect Theory
Ozan Candogan and Philipp Strack, Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents (Supplementary appendix)
Kazuya Kikuchi and Yukio Koriyama, The winner-take-all dilemma
Matias Iaryczower and Santiago Oliveros, Collective hold-up
Juan Ortner, Bargaining with evolving private information
Somouaoga Bonkoungou and Alexander Nesterov, Incentives in matching markets: counting and comparing manipulating agents
Drew Fudenberg and Giacomo Lanzani, Which misspecifications persist?
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Jordi Massó, and Alejandro Neme, All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof
Juan Sebastián Pereyra and Francisco Silva, Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
Yair Antler, Multilevel marketing: pyramid-shaped schemes or exploitative scams?
Felix Brandt and Patrick Lederer, Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
Ayça Kaya, Paying with information
Burak Can, Mohsen Pourpouneh, and Ton Storcken, Distance on matchings: an axiomatic approach
Vikram Manjunath and Thayer Morrill, Interview hoarding
Maxwell Allman, Itai Ashlagi, and Afshin Nikzad, On rank dominance of tie-breaking rules
David Dillenberger, R. Vijay Krishna, and Philipp Sadowski, Subjective information choice processes
Paweł Doligalski and Luis E. Rojas, Optimal redistribution with a shadow economy
Rishabh Kirpalani and Erik Madsen, Strategic investment evaluation
Wojciech Olszewski and Ron Siegel, Equilibrium existence in games with ties
Antonio Rosato, Loss aversion in sequential auctions
Tangren Feng, Axel Niemeyer, and Qinggong Wu, The Limits of Ex Post Implementation without Transfers
Andrew Mackenzie and Christian Trudeau, On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion
B. Douglas Bernheim and Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed, Pervasive signaling
Matteo Escudé and Ludvig Sinander, Slow persuasion (Supplementary appendix)
Borys Grochulski and Yuzhe Zhang, Termination as an incentive device
Anna Bogomolnaia, Ron Holzman, and Hervé Moulin, On guarantees, vetoes and random dictators
Hitoshi Sadakane, Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers
Joel P. Flynn, Lawrence D. W. Schmidt, and Alexis Akira Toda, Robust comparative statics for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
Yi-Fan Chen, Wen-Tai Hsu, and Shin-Kun Peng, Innovation, firm size distribution, and gains from trade
Lutz G. Arnold, On the neutrality of socially responsible investing
Christoph Schottmüller, Optimal information structures in bilateral trade
Abraham Neyman, Additive valuations of streams of payoffs that satisfy the time value of money principle: characterization and robust optimization
Siyang Xiong, Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: complete characterization
Chao Huang, Stable matching: an integer programming approach

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