Theoretical Economics

Editorial Board

Acknowledgments

Theoretical Economics publishes leading research in economic theory. It is published by the Econometric Society four times a year, in January, May, July, and November. All content is freely available. It is included in the Social Sciences Citation Index.

TE editors' statement following up on the Econometric Society journal editors' plan to address paper length.

Current Issue: Volume 17, Issue 2 (May 2022)

Table of Contents

Articles

What were you thinking? Decision theory as coherence test Itzhak Gilboa and Larry Samuelson	Abstract PRINT VIEW 507–519
Two-stage majoritarian choice Sean Horan and Yves Sprumont	Abstract PRINT VIEW 521–537
Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes Sebastian Gryglewicz and Aaron Kolb	Abstract PRINT VIEW 539–559
Censorship as optimal persuasion Anton Kolotilin, Timofiy Mylovanov, and Andriy Zapechelnyuk	Abstract PRINT VIEW 561–585
Monologues, dialogues and common priors Alfredo Di Tillio, Ehud Lehrer, and Dov Samet	Abstract PRINT VIEW 587–615
Games with switching costs and endogenous references Begum Guney and Michael Richter	Abstract PRINT VIEW 617–650
Indifference, indecisiveness, experimentation and stochastic choice Efe A. Ok and Gerelt Tserenjigmid	Abstract PRINT VIEW 651–686
Dynamically stable matching Laura Doval	Abstract PRINT VIEW 687–724
Markov distributional equilibrium dynamics in games with complementarities and no aggregate risk Lukasz Balbus, Pawel Dziewulski, Kevin Reffett, and Lukasz Wozny	Abstract PRINT VIEW 725–762
(Bad) reputation in relational contracting Rahul Deb, Matthew Mitchell, and Mallesh M. Pai	Abstract PRINT VIEW 763–800
The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions Jan Christoph Schlegel	Abstract PRINT VIEW 801–839
A common-value auction with state-dependent participation Stephan Lauermann and Asher Wolinsky	Abstract PRINT VIEW 841–881
Long information design Frederic Koessler, Marie Laclau, Jérôme Renault, and Tristan Tomala	Abstract PRINT VIEW 883–927
Incentive-compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs : correction Abhigyan Bose and Souvik Roy	Abstract PRINT VIEW 929–942
Through 2016, the order of papers within each issue is the order of receipt of the final versions. From 2017, within each issue papers are ordered by their length. The print and view links lead to pdf files of the papers with the same content. The format of the versions in the view links is optimized for on-screen viewing. Papers in this issue have on average been downloaded from 1075 distinct IP addresses. (For each paper, downloads since the paper was first made available as a "Paper to appear" are included in this number.)

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Papers to appear

The following papers have been accepted and will appear in future issues. The links below lead to the final accepted papers in their working paper formats. The papers will be copyedited and typeset for publication.

Ayça Kaya, Paying with information
Burak Can, Mohsen Pourpouneh, and Ton Storcken, Distance on matchings: an axiomatic approach
Vikram Manjunath and Thayer Morrill, Interview hoarding
Maxwell Allman, Itai Ashlagi, and Afshin Nikzad, On rank dominance of tie-breaking rules
David Dillenberger, R. Vijay Krishna, and Philipp Sadowski, Subjective information choice processes
Paweł Doligalski and Luis E. Rojas, Optimal redistribution with a shadow economy
Rishabh Kirpalani and Erik Madsen, Strategic investment evaluation
Wojciech Olszewski and Ron Siegel, Equilibrium existence in games with ties
Antonio Rosato, Loss aversion in sequential auctions
Tangren Feng, Axel Niemeyer, and Qinggong Wu, The Limits of Ex Post Implementation without Transfers
Andrew Mackenzie and Christian Trudeau, On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion
B. Douglas Bernheim and Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed, Pervasive signaling
Matteo Escudé and Ludvig Sinander, Slow persuasion (Supplementary appendix)
Borys Grochulski and Yuzhe Zhang, Termination as an incentive device
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky, and Takuro Yamashita, Optimal persuasion via bi-pooling
Anna Bogomolnaia, Ron Holzman, and Hervé Moulin, On guarantees, vetoes and random dictators
Hitoshi Sadakane, Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers
Joel P. Flynn, Lawrence D. W. Schmidt, and Alexis Akira Toda, Robust comparative statics for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
Yi-Fan Chen, Wen-Tai Hsu, and Shin-Kun Peng, Innovation, firm size distribution, and gains from trade
Lutz G. Arnold, On the neutrality of socially responsible investing
Christoph Schottmüller, Optimal information structures in bilateral trade
Abraham Neyman, Additive valuations of streams of payoffs that satisfy the time value of money principle: characterization and robust optimization
Siyang Xiong, Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: complete characterization
Uzi Segal, Forall or exists?
Chao Huang, Stable matching: an integer programming approach
Yi-Chun Chen, Takashi Kunimoto, Yifei Sun, and Siyang Xiong, Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima
Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, and Rann Smorodinsky, The Implications of Pricing on Social Learning
Chen Cheng and Yiqing Xing, Which networks permit stable allocations? A theory of network-based comparisons
Heinrich Harald Nax and Jonathan Newton, Deep and shallow thinking in the long run
Yi Chen, Dynamic delegation with a persistent state
Yu Awaya, Kohei Iwasaki, and Makoto Watanabe, Rational Bubbles and Middlemen
David Delacrétaz, Simon Loertscher, and Claudio Mezzetti, When Walras meets Vickrey
Ken Hendricks and Thomas Wiseman, How to sell in a sequential auction market
José Carlos R. Alcantud, Marco Mariotti, and Roberto Veneziani, Sufficientarianism
Luciano Pomatto, Stable matching under forward-induction reasoning
Manuel Amador and Kyle Bagwell, Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers
Thomas Demuynck and Umutcan Salman, On the revealed preference analysis of stable aggregate matchings
Daniel Bird and Alexander Frug, Monotone contracts
Wenzhang Zhang, Collusion enforcement in repeated first-price auctions (Supplementary appendix)
Daniele Condorelli and Balázs Szentes, Surplus sharing in Cournot oligopoly
Benjamin Lester, Pierre-Olivier Weill, and Julien Hugonnier, Heterogeneity in decentralized asset markets
Ariel Rubinstein and Kemal Yildiz, Equilibrium in a civilized jungle
Fabien Gensbittel, Marcin Pęski, and Jérôme Renault, Value-based distance between information structures
Boaz Zik and Ran Weksler, Informative tests in signaling environments
Andreas Blume and In-Uck Park, Quid pro quo: friendly information exchange between rivals
Daniel Gottlieb and Humberto Moreira, Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard (Supplementary appendix)
Sofia Moroni, Experimentation in Organizations
Svetlana Kosterina, Persuasion with unknown beliefs
Kevin He, Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal-stopping problems
Sylvain Chassang and Samuel Kapon, Prior-free dynamic allocation under limited liability
Dirk Bergemann and Philipp Strack, Progressive participation
David Martimort and Lars A. Stole, Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models

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