Table of Contents
Articles
| Rationing rules and stable coalition structures Oihane Gallo and Elena Inarra |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 933–950 |
| Efficient chip strategies in repeated games Wojciech Olszewski and Mikhail Safronov |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 951–978 |
| Pareto efficiency and identity Christopher Phelan and Aldo Rustichini |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 979–1008 |
| Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities Lars Ehlers and Alexander Westkamp |
Abstract PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix 1009–1042 |
| Transitivity of preferences: when does it matter? Laurens Cherchye, Thomas Demuynck, and Bram De Rock |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 1043–1076 |
| Competition and networks of collaboration Nikita Roketskiy |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 1077–1110 |
| Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent Arjada Bardhi and Yingni Guo |
Abstract PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix 1111–1150 |
| A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game David Martimort, Aggey Semenov, and Lars A. Stole |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 1151–1190 |
| Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors Wojciech Olszewski and Mikhail Safronov |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 1191–1232 |
| Optimal adaptive testing: informativeness and incentives Rahul Deb and Colin Stewart |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 1233–1274 |
| On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences Gabriel Carroll |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 1275–1318 |
| The optimal degree of monetary-discretion in a New Keynesian model with private information Yuichiro Waki, Richard Dennis, and Ippei Fujiwara |
Abstract PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix 1319–1368 |
| A tractable model of monetary exchange with ex-post heterogeneity Guillaume Rocheteau, Pierre-Olivier Weill, and Russell Wong |
Abstract PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix 1369–1424 |
| A general solution method for moral hazard problems Rongzhu Ke and Christopher Thomas Ryan |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 1425–1481 |
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Through 2016, the order of papers within each issue is the order of receipt of the final versions. From 2017, within each issue papers are ordered by their length.
The print and view links lead to pdf files of the papers with the same content. The format of the versions in the view links is optimized for on-screen viewing. | |
