Theoretical Economics publishes leading research in economic theory. It is published by the Econometric Society three times a year, in January, May, and September. All content is freely available. It is included in the Social Sciences Citation Index.

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Papers to appear

The following papers have been accepted and will appear in future issues. The links below lead to the final accepted papers in their working paper formats. The papers will be copyedited and typeset for publication.

• Maarten Janssen and Bernhard Kasberger, On the clock of the combinatorial clock auction
• David Austen-Smith, Wioletta Dziuda, Bård Harstad, and Antoine Loeper, Gridlock and inefficient policy instruments
• William H. Sandholm, Segismundo S. Izquierdo, and Luis R. Izquierdo, Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the Centipede game (Supplementary appendix)
• Joyee Deb and Julio Gonzalez-Diaz, Enforcing social norms: Trust-building and community enforcement (Supplementary appendix)
• Michael Richter and Ariel Rubinstein, "Convex preferences": a new definition
• Umut Dur, A. Arda Gitmez, and Özgür Yılmaz, School choice under partial fairness
• Marco Battaglini and Rohit Lamba, Optimal dynamic contracting: the first-order approach and beyond (Supplementary appendix)
• Mehmet Ekmekci and M. Bumin Yenmez, Common enrollment in school choice
• Florian Brandl and Felix Brandt, Justifying optimal play via consistency
• Margaret Meyer, Inés Moreno de Barreda, and Julia Nafziger, Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk
• Francis Bloch, Bhaskar Dutta, and Mihai Manea, Efficient partnership formation in networks
• John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky, and Alexander Westkamp, Full substitutability
• Francisco Silva, Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification
• Alfred J. M. Duncan and Charles Nolan, Disputes, debt and equity
• Shinsuke Kambe, An N-person war of attrition with the possibility of a non-compromising type
• Martin Szydlowski, Incentives, project choice, and dynamic multitasking
• Simon Loertscher and Cédric Wasser, Optimal structure and dissolution of partnerships
• Yuichi Yamamoto, Stochastic games with hidden states (Supplementary appendix)
• Sarah Auster and Piero Gottardi, Competing mechanisms in markets for lemons (Supplementary appendix)
• Andrew Mackenzie, A foundation for probabilistic beliefs with or without atoms
• Ignacio Monzón, Observational learning in large anonymous games (Supplementary appendix)
• Yu Awaya and Vijay Krishna, Communication and cooperation in repeated games
• Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu, and Xianwen Shi, Voting on multiple issues: what to put on the ballot?
• Pak Hung Au, The loser's curse in the search for advice
• Jon X. Eguia and Antonio Nicolo, Information and targeted spending
• Frederic Koessler and Vasiliki Skreta, Selling with evidence
• Ulrich Doraszelski and Juan F. Escobar, Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games
• Mikel Pérez-Nievas, José I. Conde-Ruiz, and Eduardo L. Giménez, Efficiency and endogenous fertility
• Filippo Massari, Market selection in large economies: a matter of luck
• Martin W. Cripps and Caroline D. Thomas, Strategic experimentation in queues (Supplementary appendix)

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