Theoretical Economics publishes leading research in economic theory. It is published by the Econometric Society four times a year, in January, May, July, and November. All content is freely available. It is included in the Social Sciences Citation Index.

TE editors' statement following up on the Econometric Society journal editors' plan to address paper length.

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Papers to appear

The following papers have been accepted and will appear in future issues. The links below lead to the final accepted papers in their working paper formats. The papers will be copyedited and typeset for publication.

• Yingni Guo and Eran Shmaya, Costly miscalibration
• Yuval Heller and Arthur J. Robson, Evolution, heritable risk and skewness loving (Supplementary appendix, Supplementary appendix)
• Jay Lu, Random ambiguity
• Fei Li and Peter Norman, Sequential persuasion
• Geoffroy de Clippel, Kfir Eliaz, Daniel Fershtman, and Kareen Rozen, On selecting the right agent
• Juan F. Escobar and Qiaoxi Zhang, Delegating learning
• Manuel Mueller-Frank and Claudia Neri, A general analysis of boundedly rational learning in social networks
• Lucas Siga and Maximilian Mihm, Information aggregation in competitive markets
• Leonie Baumann, A model of weighted network formation
• Paul Heidhues, Botond Koszegi, and Philipp Strack, Convergence in models of misspecified learning
• Luciano Pomatto, Testable forecasts
• David M. Kreps and Walter Schachermayer, Asymptotic synthesis of contingent claims with controlled risk in a sequence of discrete-time markets
• Jianjun Miao, Jieran Wu, and Eric R. Young, Macro-financial volatility under dispersed information (Supplementary appendix)
• Sean Michael Horan, Agendas in legislative decision-making
• Alan D. Miller, Voting in corporations
• Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin, A Maximum Likelihood Approach to Combining Forecasts
• Pietro Dindo and Filippo Massari, The wisdom of the crowd in dynamic economies
• Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, David Dillenberger, and Pietro Ortoleva, An explicit representation for disappointment aversion and other betweenness preferences
• Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks, and Stephen Morris, Countering the winner's curse: optimal auction design in a common value model
• Pathikrit Basu and Federico Echenique, On the falsifiability and learnability of decision theories
• Andreas Asseyer, Collusion and delegation under information control
• Qiang Fu and Zenan Wu, On the optimal design of biased contests (Supplementary appendix)
• David M. Arseneau, David E. Rappoport W., and Alexandros P. Vardoulakis, Private and public liquidity provision in over-the-counter markets
• Sebastian Bervoets, Mario Bravo, and Mathieu Faure, Learning with minimal information in continuous games
• Scott Duke Kominers, John William Hatfield, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky, and Alexander Westkamp, Chain stability in trading networks
• Pierre-André Chiappori and Elisabeth Gugl, Transferable utility and demand functions
• Dmitry Ryvkin and Mikhail Drugov, The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments
• Makoto Nirei, John Stachurski, and Tsutomu Watanabe, Trade clustering and power laws in financial markets (Supplementary appendix)
• Rohan Dutta, Gradual pairwise comparison and stochastic choice

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