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ISSN (e) 1555-7561
(print) 1933-6837
Theoretical Economics
An open-access journal in economic theory
A journal of the
Econometric Society
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Editorial Board
Editor
  • Ran Spiegler
Coeditors
  • Simon Board
  • Federico Echenique
  • Marina Halac
  • Florian Scheuer
Associate Editors
  • Mariagiovanna Baccara
  • Marco Bassetto
  • J. Aislinn Bohren
  • Jaroslav Borovicka
  • Gabriel Carroll
  • Geoffroy de Clippel
  • Rahul Deb
  • Eddie Dekel
  • Kfir Eliaz
  • Andrew Ellis
  • Ignacio Esponda
  • Alex Frankel
  • Amanda Friedenberg
  • Faruk Gul
  • Yuichiro Kamada
  • Frederic Koessler
  • Felix Kubler
  • Pablo Kurlat
  • Stephan Lauermann
  • Benjamin Lester
  • David K. Levine
  • Shengwu Li
  • Qingmin Liu
  • George J. Mailath
  • Thomas Mariotti
  • Giuseppe Moscarini
  • Georg Nöldeke
  • Antonio Penta
  • Marcin Pęski
  • Andrea Prat
  • Marek Pycia
  • Ariel Rubinstein
  • Philipp Sadowski
  • Todd D. Sarver
  • Uzi Segal
  • Yves Sprumont
  • Roland Strausz
  • Juuso Toikka
  • Utku Unver
  • Juuso Välimäki
  • Thomas Wiseman

Acknowledgments
Theoretical Economics publishes leading research in economic theory. It is published by the Econometric Society four times a year, in January, May, July, and November. All content is freely available. It is included in the Social Sciences Citation Index.

TE editors' statement following up on the Econometric Society journal editors' plan to address paper length.

Current Issue: Volume 16, Issue 1 (January 2021)

Table of Contents

Articles

A model of weighted network formation
       Leonie Baumann
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1–23
Asymptotic synthesis of contingent claims with controlled risk in a sequence of discrete-time markets
       David M. Kreps and Walter Schachermayer
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
25–47
A Maximum Likelihood Approach to Combining Forecasts
       Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
49–71
Convergence in models of misspecified learning
       Paul Heidhues, Botond Koszegi, and Philipp Strack
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
73–99
Voting in corporations
       Alan D. Miller
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
101–128
Testable forecasts
       Luciano Pomatto
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
129–160
Information aggregation in competitive markets
       Lucas Siga and Maximilian Mihm
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
161–196
Chain stability in trading networks
       Scott Duke Kominers, John William Hatfield, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky, and Alexander Westkamp
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
197–234
Agendas in legislative decision-making
       Sean Michael Horan
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
235–274
Macro-financial volatility under dispersed information
       Jianjun Miao, Jieran Wu, and Eric R. Young
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
 Supplementary appendix
275–315
A general analysis of boundedly rational learning in social networks
       Manuel Mueller-Frank and Claudia Neri
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
317–357
Through 2016, the order of papers within each issue is the order of receipt of the final versions. From 2017, within each issue papers are ordered by their length.

The print and view links lead to pdf files of the papers with the same content. The format of the versions in the view links is optimized for on-screen viewing.
Papers in this issue have on average been downloaded from 791 distinct IP addresses. (For each paper, downloads since the paper was first made available as a "Paper to appear" are included in this number.)

PREVIOUS ISSUE      BROWSE ALL ISSUES

Papers to appear

The following papers have been accepted and will appear in future issues. The links below lead to the final accepted papers in their working paper formats. The papers will be copyedited and typeset for publication.

  • Paulo Barelli and John Duggan, Subgame-perfect equilibrium in games with almost perfect information: dispensing with public randomization
  • Yaron Azrieli, Monitoring experts
  • Ran Eilat, Kfir Eliaz, and Xiaosheng Mu, Bayesian privacy
  • Steven Kivinen and Norovsambuu Tumennasan, Robust group strategy-proofness
  • Jaehong Kim and Mengling Li, Optimal organ allocation policy under blood-type barriers with the donor-priority rule
  • Anton Kolotilin and Hongyi Li, Relational communication
  • Karl H. Schlag and Andriy Zapechelnyuk, Robust sequential search
  • Ujjwal Kumar, Souvik Roy, Arunava Sen, Sonal Yadav, and Huaxia Zeng, Local global equivalence in voting models: a characterization and applications
  • Adam Brandenburger, Alexander Danieli, and Amanda Friedenberg, The implications of finite-order reasoning
  • Somouaoga Bonkoungou and Alexander Nesterov, Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility
  • Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman, Cooperative strategic games
  • Carolina Manzano and Xavier Vives, Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions
  • Simon Loertscher and Claudio Mezzetti, A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement
  • Sumeyra Akin, Matching with floor constraints
  • Federica Ceron and Stéphane Gonzalez, Approval voting without ballot restrictions
  • Narayana R. Kocherlakota, Bounds on price setting
  • Philip Marx and James Schummer, Revenue from matching platforms
  • Mihai Manea, Bottleneck links, essential intermediaries and competing paths of diffusion in networks (Supplementary appendix)
  • Alexey I. Kushnir and Lev V. Lokutsievskiy, When is a monotone function cyclically monotone?
  • Yunan Li, Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification
  • Aurelien Baillon and Yan Xu, Simple bets to elicit private signals
  • Guilherme Carmona and Konrad Podczeck, Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite-player games
  • Philippe Jehiel, Communication with forgetful liars
  • Roger B. Myerson, Local agency costs of political centralization
  • Harry Pei, Trust and betrayals: reputational payoffs and behaviors without commitment
  • Yaron Azrieli, Christopher P. Chambers, and Paul J. Healy, Constrained preference elicitation
  • Ignacio Esponda and Demian Pouzo, Equilibrium in misspecified Markov decision processes
  • Olivier Loisel, The implementation of stabilization policy
  • Geoffroy de Clippel and Kareen Rozen, Bounded rationality and limited datasets
  • Yingni Guo and Eran Shmaya, Costly miscalibration
  • Yuval Heller and Arthur J. Robson, Evolution, heritable risk and skewness loving (Supplementary appendix, Supplementary appendix)
  • Jay Lu, Random ambiguity
  • Fei Li and Peter Norman, Sequential persuasion
  • Geoffroy de Clippel, Kfir Eliaz, Daniel Fershtman, and Kareen Rozen, On selecting the right agent
  • Juan F. Escobar and Qiaoxi Zhang, Delegating learning

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