Theoretical Economics

Editorial Board

Acknowledgments

Theoretical Economics publishes leading research in economic theory. It is published by the Econometric Society four times a year, in January, May, July, and November. All content is freely available. It is included in the Social Sciences Citation Index.

TE editors' statement following up on the Econometric Society journal editors' plan to address paper length.

Current Issue: Volume 15, Issue 2 (May 2020)

Table of Contents

Articles

Network structure and naive sequential learning Krishna Dasaratha and Kevin He	Abstract PRINT VIEW 415–444
The no-upward-crossing condition, comparative statics, and the moral-hazard problem Hector Chade and Jeroen M. Swinkels	Abstract PRINT VIEW 445–476
Delegating performance evaluation Igor Letina, Shuo Liu, and Nick Netzer	Abstract PRINT VIEW 477–509
Mechanism design without quasilinearity Tomoya Kazumura, Debasis Mishra, and Shigehiro Serizawa	Abstract PRINT VIEW 511–544
Bundlers' dilemmas in financial markets with sampling investors Milo Bianchi and Philippe Jehiel	Abstract PRINT VIEW 545–582
Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect Dino Gerardi and Lucas Maestri	Abstract PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix 583–623
Multiplier effect and comparative statics in global games of regime change Michal Szkup	Abstract PRINT VIEW 625–667
Equilibrium coalitional behavior Mert Kimya	Abstract PRINT VIEW 669–714
Optimal contracts with a risk-taking agent Daniel Barron, George Georgiadis, and Jeroen M. Swinkels	Abstract PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix 715–761
The construction of national identities Milena Almagro and David Andrés-Cerezo	Abstract PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix 763–810
Dynamic games with (almost) perfect information Wei He and Yeneng Sun	Abstract PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix 811–859
Through 2016, the order of papers within each issue is the order of receipt of the final versions. From 2017, within each issue papers are ordered by their length. The print and view links lead to pdf files of the papers with the same content. The format of the versions in the view links is optimized for on-screen viewing. Papers in this issue have on average been downloaded from 1023 distinct IP addresses. (For each paper, downloads since the paper was first made available as a "Paper to appear" are included in this number.)

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Papers to appear

The following papers have been accepted and will appear in future issues. The links below lead to the final accepted papers in their working paper formats. The papers will be copyedited and typeset for publication.

Luciano Pomatto, Testable forecasts
David M. Kreps and Walter Schachermayer, Asymptotic synthesis of contingent claims with controlled risk in a sequence of discrete-time markets
Jianjun Miao, Jieran Wu, and Eric R. Young, Macro-financial volatility under dispersed information (Supplementary appendix)
Sean Michael Horan, Agendas in legislative decision-making
Alan D. Miller, Voting in corporations
Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin, A Maximum Likelihood Approach to Combining Forecasts
Pietro Dindo and Filippo Massari, The wisdom of the crowd in dynamic economies
Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, David Dillenberger, and Pietro Ortoleva, An explicit representation for disappointment aversion and other betweenness preferences
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks, and Stephen Morris, Countering the winner's curse: optimal auction design in a common value model
Pathikrit Basu and Federico Echenique, On the falsifiability and learnability of decision theories
Andreas Asseyer, Collusion and delegation under information control
Qiang Fu and Zenan Wu, On the optimal design of biased contests (Supplementary appendix)
David M. Arseneau, David E. Rappoport W., and Alexandros P. Vardoulakis, Private and public liquidity provision in over-the-counter markets
Sebastian Bervoets, Mario Bravo, and Mathieu Faure, Learning with minimal information in continuous games
Scott Duke Kominers, John William Hatfield, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky, and Alexander Westkamp, Chain stability in trading networks
Pierre-André Chiappori and Elisabeth Gugl, Transferable utility and demand functions
Dmitry Ryvkin and Mikhail Drugov, The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments
Makoto Nirei, John Stachurski, and Tsutomu Watanabe, Trade clustering and power laws in financial markets (Supplementary appendix)
Takuo Sugaya and Yuichi Yamamoto, Common learning and cooperation in repeated games
Jian Li, Preferences for partial information and ambiguity
Andrew Kloosterman and Peter Troyan, School choice with asymmetric information: priority design and the curse of acceptance
Rohan Dutta, Gradual pairwise comparison and stochastic choice
Jean Guillaume Forand and Jan Zapal, Production priorities in dynamic relationships
Doruk Cetemen, Ilwoo Hwang, and Ayça Kaya, Uncertainty-driven cooperation
Albin Erlanson and Andreas Kleiner, Costly verification in collective decisions
Anqi Li and Ming Yang, Optimal incentive contract with endogenous monitoring technology
Yuval Heller and Amnon Schreiber, Short-term investments and indices of risk
Matthew Kovach, Twisting the truth: foundations of wishful thinking
Elias Tsakas, Robust scoring rules
Mariagiovanna Baccara, SangMok Lee, and Leeat Yariv, Optimal dynamic matching

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