Theoretical Economics publishes leading research in economic theory. It is published by the Econometric Society three times a year, in January, May, and September. All content is freely available. It is included in the Social Sciences Citation Index.

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Papers to appear

The following papers have been accepted and will appear in future issues. The links below lead to the final accepted papers in their working paper formats. The papers will be copyedited and typeset for publication.

• Anton Kolotilin, Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach
• Yuichiro Kamada and Fuhito Kojima, Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: a necessary and sufficient condition
• Anton Tsoy, Alternating-offer bargaining with the global games information structure
• Heng Liu, Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers (Supplementary appendix)
• Guillaume Plantin and Hyun Song Shin, Exchange rates and monetary spillovers
• Hiroki Nishimura, The transitive core: inference of welfare from nontransitive preference relations
• Ehud Lehrer and Eilon Solan, High frequency repeated games with costly monitoring (Supplementary appendix)
• Maciej H. Kotowski, On asymmetric reserve prices (Supplementary appendix)
• Yeon-Koo Che and Olivier Tercieux, Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets
• Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau and Humberto Llavador, Inequality reducing properties of progressive income tax schedules: the case of endogenous income
• Rohan Dutta, David Knudsen Levine, and Salvatore Modica, Collusion constrained equilibrium (Supplementary appendix)
• David S. Ahn, Federico Echenique, and Kota Saito, On path independent stochastic choice
• Arina Nikandrova and Romans Pancs, Dynamic project selection (Supplementary appendix)
• Aviad Heifetz and Willemien Kets, Robust multiplicity with a grain of naiveté (Supplementary appendix)
• Hector Chade and Jan Eeckhout, Matching information
• Sarah Auster, Robust contracting under common value uncertainty
• John E. Stovall, Temptation with uncertain normative preference
• Adam Jonsson and Mark Voorneveld, The limit of discounted utilitarianism
• Peter A. Wagner, Who goes first? Strategic delay under information asymmetry
• Yves Sprumont, Ranking by rating
• Angel Hernando-Veciana and Fabio Michelucci, Inefficient rushes in auctions (Supplementary appendix)
• Vitor Farinha Luz, Characterization and uniqueness of equilibrium in competitive insurance
• Daniel Barron, Attaining efficiency with imperfect public monitoring and one-sided Markov adverse selection (Supplementary appendix)
• Gökhan Buturak and Özgür Evren, Choice overload and asymmetric regret
• Gaetano Bloise, Herakles Polemarchakis, and Yiannis Vailakis, Sovereign debt and incentives to default with uninsurable risks
• Drew Fudenberg, Gleb Romanyuk, and Philipp Strack, Active learning with a misspecified prior
• Timo Hiller, Friends and enemies: a model of signed network formation (Supplementary appendix)
• Bhaskar Dutta and Rajiv Vohra, Rational expectations and farsighted stability
• Kevin Cooke, Preference discovery and experimentation
• Ziv Hellman and Yehuda Levy, Bayesian games with a continuum of states
• Takeshi Momi, Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods
• David Andolfatto, Ed Nosal, and Bruno Sultanum, Preventing bank runs
• Andreas Hefti, Equilibria in symmetric games: theory and applications (Supplementary appendix)
• Fuhito Kojima and Takuro Yamashita, Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency
• Francisco Alvarez-Cuadrado, Ngo Long, and Markus Poschke, Capital-labor substitution, structural change and growth

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