Table of Contents
Articles
| Approval voting without ballot restrictions Federica Ceron and Stéphane Gonzalez |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 759–775 |
| Simple bets to elicit private signals Aurelien Baillon and Yan Xu |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 777–797 |
| Revenue from matching platforms Philip Marx and James Schummer |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 799–824 |
| Cooperative strategic games Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 825–851 |
| When is a monotone function cyclically monotone? Alexey I. Kushnir and Lev V. Lokutsievskiy |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 853–879 |
| Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility Somouaoga Bonkoungou and Alexander Nesterov |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 881–909 |
| Matching with floor constraints Sumeyra Akin |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 911–942 |
| A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement Simon Loertscher and Claudio Mezzetti |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 943–978 |
| Bounds on price setting Narayana R. Kocherlakota |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 979–1015 |
| Bottleneck links, essential intermediaries and competing paths of diffusion in networks Mihai Manea |
Abstract PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix 1017–1053 |
| Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite-player games Guilherme Carmona and Konrad Podczeck |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 1055–1093 |
| Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions Carolina Manzano and Xavier Vives |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 1095–1137 |
| Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification Yunan Li |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 1139–1194 |
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Through 2016, the order of papers within each issue is the order of receipt of the final versions. From 2017, within each issue papers are ordered by their length.
The print and view links lead to pdf files of the papers with the same content. The format of the versions in the view links is optimized for on-screen viewing. | |
