Theoretical Economics publishes leading research in economic theory. It is published by the Econometric Society four times a year, in January, May, July, and November. All content is freely available. It is included in the Social Sciences Citation Index.

TE editors' statement following up on the Econometric Society journal editors' plan to address paper length.

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Papers to appear

The following papers have been accepted and will appear in future issues. The links below lead to the final accepted papers in their working paper formats. The papers will be copyedited and typeset for publication.

• Toomas Hinnosaar, Optimal sequential contests
• Sarah Auster and Nicola Pavoni, Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness
• Mengxi Zhang, Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs
• César Barilla and Duarte Gonçalves, The dynamics of instability
• Vladyslav Nora and Eyal Winter, Exploiting social influence in networks
• Yu Chen, Matthew Doyle, and Francisco M. Gonzalez, Wages as signals of worker mobility
• Yiman Sun, A dynamic model of censorship
• J. Aislinn Bohren, Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game (Supplementary appendix)
• Kee-Youn Kang, Digital currency and privacy
• Francisco Queirós, Asset bubbles and product market competition
• Vitali Gretschko and Helene Mass, Worst-case equilibria in first-price auctions
• Maria Betto and Matthew W. Thomas, Asymmetric all-pay auctions with spillovers
• Xuesong Huang, Sophisticated banking contracts and fragility when withdrawal information is public
• Annie Liang and Erik Madsen, Data and incentives
• Paula Onuchic and Debraj Ray, Conveying value via categories
• Karl Schulz, Aleh Tsyvinski, and Nicolas Werquin, Generalized compensation principle
• Keisuke Teeple, Surprise and default in general equilibrium
• Dean Foster and Sergiu Hart, "Calibeating": beating forecasters at their own game
• Drew Fudenberg, Giacomo Lanzani, and Philipp Strack, Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs
• Francis Bloch, Kalyan Chatterjee, and Bhaskar Dutta, Attack and interception in networks
• Mikel Pérez-Nievas, Efficiency with endogenous population growth. Do children have too many rights?
• Ce Liu, Stability in repeated matching markets (Supplementary appendix)
• Hugo Hopenhayn and Maryam Saeedi, Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes
• Gabriel Carroll and Lukas Bolte, Robust contracting under double moral hazard
• Miltiadis Makris and Ludovic Renou, Information design in multi-stage games
• Takuo Sugaya and Alexander Wolitzky, Bad apples in symmetric repeated games
• Tommaso Denti, Unrestricted information acquisition
• Kaname Miyagishima, Time-consistent fair social choice
• Patrick Beissner and Jan Werner, Optimal allocations with α-MaxMin utilities, Choquet expected utilities, and Prospect Theory
• Ozan Candogan and Philipp Strack, Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents (Supplementary appendix)
• Kazuya Kikuchi and Yukio Koriyama, The winner-take-all dilemma
• Matias Iaryczower and Santiago Oliveros, Collective hold-up
• Juan Ortner, Bargaining with evolving private information
• Somouaoga Bonkoungou and Alexander Nesterov, Incentives in matching markets: counting and comparing manipulating agents
• Drew Fudenberg and Giacomo Lanzani, Which misspecifications persist?
• R. Pablo Arribillaga, Jordi Massó, and Alejandro Neme, All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof
• Juan Sebastián Pereyra and Francisco Silva, Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
• Yair Antler, Multilevel marketing: pyramid-shaped schemes or exploitative scams?
• Felix Brandt and Patrick Lederer, Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
• Ayça Kaya, Paying with information
• Burak Can, Mohsen Pourpouneh, and Ton Storcken, Distance on matchings: an axiomatic approach
• Vikram Manjunath and Thayer Morrill, Interview hoarding
• Maxwell Allman, Itai Ashlagi, and Afshin Nikzad, On rank dominance of tie-breaking rules
• David Dillenberger, R. Vijay Krishna, and Philipp Sadowski, Subjective information choice processes
• Paweł Doligalski and Luis E. Rojas, Optimal redistribution with a shadow economy
• Rishabh Kirpalani and Erik Madsen, Strategic investment evaluation
• Wojciech Olszewski and Ron Siegel, Equilibrium existence in games with ties
• Antonio Rosato, Loss aversion in sequential auctions
• Tangren Feng, Axel Niemeyer, and Qinggong Wu, The Limits of Ex Post Implementation without Transfers
• Andrew Mackenzie and Christian Trudeau, On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion
• B. Douglas Bernheim and Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed, Pervasive signaling
• Matteo Escudé and Ludvig Sinander, Slow persuasion (Supplementary appendix)
• Borys Grochulski and Yuzhe Zhang, Termination as an incentive device
• Anna Bogomolnaia, Ron Holzman, and Hervé Moulin, On guarantees, vetoes and random dictators
• Hitoshi Sadakane, Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers
• Joel P. Flynn, Lawrence D. W. Schmidt, and Alexis Akira Toda, Robust comparative statics for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
• Yi-Fan Chen, Wen-Tai Hsu, and Shin-Kun Peng, Innovation, firm size distribution, and gains from trade
• Lutz G. Arnold, On the neutrality of socially responsible investing
• Christoph Schottmüller, Optimal information structures in bilateral trade
• Abraham Neyman, Additive valuations of streams of payoffs that satisfy the time value of money principle: characterization and robust optimization
• Siyang Xiong, Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: complete characterization
• Chao Huang, Stable matching: an integer programming approach

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