Table of Contents
Articles
| Bargaining with evolving private information Juan Ortner |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 885–916 |
| The winner-take-all dilemma Kazuya Kikuchi and Yukio Koriyama |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 917–940 |
| Time-consistent fair social choice Kaname Miyagishima |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 941–964 |
| Incentives in matching markets: counting and comparing manipulating agents Somouaoga Bonkoungou and Alexander Nesterov |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 965–991 |
| Optimal allocations with α-MaxMin utilities, Choquet expected utilities, and Prospect Theory Patrick Beissner and Jan Werner |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 993–1022 |
| All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof R. Pablo Arribillaga, Jordi Massó, and Alejandro Neme |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 1023–1061 |
| Collective hold-up Matias Iaryczower and Santiago Oliveros |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 1063–1100 |
| Unrestricted information acquisition Tommaso Denti |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 1101–1140 |
| Strategic investment evaluation Rishabh Kirpalani and Erik Madsen |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 1141–1180 |
| On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion Andrew Mackenzie and Christian Trudeau |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 1181–1223 |
| Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents Ozan Candogan and Philipp Strack |
Abstract PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix 1225–1269 |
| Which misspecifications persist? Drew Fudenberg and Giacomo Lanzani |
Abstract PRINT VIEW 1271–1315 |
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Through 2016, the order of papers within each issue is the order of receipt of the final versions. From 2017, within each issue papers are ordered by their length.
The print and view links lead to pdf files of the papers with the same content. The format of the versions in the view links is optimized for on-screen viewing. | |
