Theoretical Economics

Editorial Board

Acknowledgments

Theoretical Economics publishes leading research in economic theory. It is published by the Econometric Society three times a year, in January, May, and September. All content is freely available. It is included in the Social Sciences Citation Index.

Current Issue: Volume 13, Issue 2 (May 2018)

Table of Contents

Articles

Who's afraid of aggregating money metrics? Kristof Bosmans, Koen Decancq, and Erwin Ooghe	Abstract PRINT VIEW 467–484
Benchmarking Christopher P. Chambers and Alan D. Miller	Abstract PRINT VIEW 485–504
Existence and indeterminacy of markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games Vincent Anesi and John Duggan	Abstract PRINT VIEW 505–526
Rational expectation of mistakes and a measure of error-proneness Shaowei Ke	Abstract PRINT VIEW 527–552
Computational principal agent problems Pablo D. Azar and Silvio Micali	Abstract PRINT VIEW 553–578
The transitive core: inference of welfare from nontransitive preference relations Hiroki Nishimura	Abstract PRINT VIEW 579–606
Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach Anton Kolotilin	Abstract PRINT VIEW 607–636
Exchange rates and monetary spillovers Guillaume Plantin and Hyun Song Shin	Abstract PRINT VIEW 637–666
Collective household welfare and intra-household inequality Jean-Paul Chavas, Martina Menon, Elisa Pagani, and Federico Perali	Abstract PRINT VIEW 667–696
What kind of central bank competence? Alex Frankel and Navin Kartik	Abstract PRINT VIEW 697–728
Span of control, transaction costs and the structure of production chains Tomoo Kikuchi, Kazuo Nishimura, and John Stachurski	Abstract PRINT VIEW 729–760
Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: a necessary and sufficient condition Yuichiro Kamada and Fuhito Kojima	Abstract PRINT VIEW 761–794
Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers Heng Liu	Abstract PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix 795–830
Pareto optimal budgeted combinatorial auctions Phuong Le	Abstract PRINT VIEW 831–868
Alternating-offer bargaining with the global games information structure Anton Tsoy	Abstract PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix 869–931
Through 2016, the order of papers within each issue is the order of receipt of the final versions. From 2017, within each issue papers are ordered by their length. The print and view links lead to pdf files of the papers with the same content. The format of the versions in the view links is optimized for on-screen viewing. Papers in this issue have on average been downloaded from 1025 distinct IP addresses. (For each paper, downloads since the paper was first made available as a "Paper to appear" are included in this number.)

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Papers to appear

The following papers have been accepted and will appear in future issues. The links below lead to the final accepted papers in their working paper formats. The papers will be copyedited and typeset for publication.

José Heleno Faro and Jean-Philippe Lefort, Dynamic objective and subjective rationality
Ryan Tierney, On the manipulability of efficient exchange rules
Joel Sobel, Iterated weak dominance and interval-dominance supermodular games
Shunya Noda, Full surplus extraction and within-period ex post implementation in dynamic environments
Juan I. Block, Drew Fudenberg, and David K. Levine, Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory (Supplementary appendix)
Simone Galperti, A theory of personal budgeting
Manuel Foerster, Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks
Matthew L. Elliott and Francesco Nava, Decentralized bargaining in matching markets: efficient stationary equilibria and the core (Supplementary appendix)
David Martimort, Aggey Semenov, and Lars A. Stole, A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game
Yuichiro Waki, Richard Dennis, and Ippei Fujiwara, The optimal degree of monetary-discretion in a New Keynesian model with private information (Supplementary appendix)
Wojciech Olszewski and Mikhail Safronov, Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors
Christopher Phelan and Aldo Rustichini, Pareto efficiency and identity
Wojciech Olszewski and Mikhail Safronov, Efficient chip strategies in repeated games
Oihane Gallo and Elena Inarra, Rationing rules and stable coalition structures
Rahul Deb and Colin Stewart, Optimal adaptive testing: informativeness and incentives
Gabriel Carroll, On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
Lars Ehlers and Alexander Westkamp, Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities (Supplementary appendix)
Guillaume Rocheteau, Pierre-Olivier Weill, and Russell Wong, A tractable model of monetary exchange with ex-post heterogeneity (Supplementary appendix)
Rongzhu Ke and Christopher Thomas Ryan, A general solution method for moral hazard problems
Nikita Roketskiy, Competition and networks of collaboration
Arjada Bardhi and Yingni Guo, Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent (Supplementary appendix)
Laurens Cherchye, Thomas Demuynck, and Bram De Rock, Transitivity of preferences: when does it matter?

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