Theoretical Economics

Editorial Board

Acknowledgments

Theoretical Economics publishes leading research in economic theory. It is published by the Econometric Society three times a year, in January, May, and September. All content is freely available. It is included in the Social Sciences Citation Index.

Current Issue: Volume 13, Issue 1 (January 2018)

Table of Contents

Articles

Ranking by rating Yves Sprumont	Abstract PRINT VIEW 1–18
The limit of discounted utilitarianism Adam Jonsson and Mark Voorneveld	Abstract PRINT VIEW 19–38
Inequality reducing properties of progressive income tax schedules: the case of endogenous income Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau and Humberto Llavador	Abstract PRINT VIEW 39–60
On path independent stochastic choice David S. Ahn, Federico Echenique, and Kota Saito	Abstract PRINT VIEW 61–86
High frequency repeated games with costly monitoring Ehud Lehrer and Eilon Solan	Abstract PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix 87–114
Dynamic project selection Arina Nikandrova and Romans Pancs	Abstract PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix 115–144
Temptation with uncertain normative preference John E. Stovall	Abstract PRINT VIEW 145–174
Robust contracting under common value uncertainty Sarah Auster	Abstract PRINT VIEW 175–204
On asymmetric reserve prices Maciej H. Kotowski	Abstract PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix 205–238
Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets Yeon-Koo Che and Olivier Tercieux	Abstract PRINT VIEW 239–272
Inefficient rushes in auctions Angel Hernando-Veciana and Fabio Michelucci	Abstract PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix 273–306
Collusion constrained equilibrium Rohan Dutta, David Knudsen Levine, and Salvatore Modica	Abstract PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix 307–340
Who goes first? Strategic delay under information asymmetry Peter A. Wagner	Abstract PRINT VIEW 341–376
Matching information Hector Chade and Jan Eeckhout	Abstract PRINT VIEW 377–414
Robust multiplicity with a grain of naiveté Aviad Heifetz and Willemien Kets	Abstract PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix 415–465
Through 2016, the order of papers within each issue is the order of receipt of the final versions. From 2017, within each issue papers are ordered by their length. The print and view links lead to pdf files of the papers with the same content. The format of the versions in the view links is optimized for on-screen viewing. Papers in this issue have on average been downloaded from 1340 distinct IP addresses. (For each paper, downloads since the paper was first made available as a "Paper to appear" are included in this number.)

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Papers to appear

The following papers have been accepted and will appear in future issues. The links below lead to the final accepted papers in their working paper formats. The papers will be copyedited and typeset for publication.

Manuel Foerster, Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks
Matthew L. Elliott and Francesco Nava, Decentralized bargaining in matching markets: efficient stationary equilibria and the core (Supplementary appendix)
David Martimort, Aggey Semenov, and Lars A. Stole, A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game
Yuichiro Waki, Richard Dennis, and Ippei Fujiwara, The optimal degree of monetary-discretion in a New Keynesian model with private information (Supplementary appendix)
Wojciech Olszewski and Mikhail Safronov, Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors
Christopher Phelan and Aldo Rustichini, Pareto efficiency and identity
Wojciech Olszewski and Mikhail Safronov, Efficient chip strategies in repeated games
Oihane Gallo and Elena Inarra, Rationing rules and stable coalition structures
Rahul Deb and Colin Stewart, Optimal adaptive testing: informativeness and incentives
Gabriel Carroll, On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
Lars Ehlers and Alexander Westkamp, Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities (Supplementary appendix)
Guillaume Rocheteau, Pierre-Olivier Weill, and Tsz-Nga Wong, A tractable model of monetary exchange with ex-post heterogeneity (Supplementary appendix)
Rongzhu Ke and Christopher Thomas Ryan, A general solution method for moral hazard problems
Nikita Roketskiy, Competition and networks of collaboration
Arjada Bardhi and Yingni Guo, Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent (Supplementary appendix)
Laurens Cherchye, Thomas Demuynck, and Bram De Rock, Transitivity of preferences: when does it matter?
Christopher P. Chambers and Alan D. Miller, Benchmarking
Vincent Anesi and John Duggan, Existence and indeterminacy of markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games
Shaowei Ke, Rational expectation of mistakes and a measure of error-proneness
Phuong Le, Pareto optimal budgeted combinatorial auctions
Alex Frankel and Navin Kartik, What kind of central bank competence?
Pablo D. Azar and Silvio Micali, Computational principal agent problems
Tomoo Kikuchi, Kazuo Nishimura, and John Stachurski, Span of control, transaction costs and the structure of production chains
Jean-Paul Chavas, Martina Menon, Elisa Pagani, and Federico Perali, Collective household welfare and intra-household inequality
Kristof Bosmans, Koen Decancq, and Erwin Ooghe, Who's afraid of aggregating money metrics?
Anton Kolotilin, Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach
Yuichiro Kamada and Fuhito Kojima, Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: a necessary and sufficient condition
Anton Tsoy, Alternating-offer bargaining with the global games information structure
Heng Liu, Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers (Supplementary appendix)
Guillaume Plantin and Hyun Song Shin, Exchange rates and monetary spillovers
Hiroki Nishimura, The transitive core: inference of welfare from nontransitive preference relations

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