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ISSN (e) 1555-7561
(print) 1933-6837
Theoretical Economics
An open-access journal in economic theory
A journal of the
Econometric Society
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Editorial Board
Editor
  • Simon Board
Coeditors
  • Federico Echenique
  • Marina Halac
  • Todd D. Sarver
  • Florian Scheuer
Associate Editors
  • Mariagiovanna Baccara
  • Marco Bassetto
  • Francis Bloch
  • J. Aislinn Bohren
  • Jaroslav Borovicka
  • Gabriel Carroll
  • Geoffroy de Clippel
  • Rahul Deb
  • Eddie Dekel
  • Kfir Eliaz
  • Andrew Ellis
  • Ignacio Esponda
  • Alex Frankel
  • Mira Frick
  • Yingni Guo
  • Yuichiro Kamada
  • Frederic Koessler
  • Fuhito Kojima
  • Felix Kubler
  • Pablo Kurlat
  • Stephan Lauermann
  • Benjamin Lester
  • David K. Levine
  • Shengwu Li
  • Jay Lu
  • George J. Mailath
  • Thomas Mariotti
  • Georg Nöldeke
  • Ezra Oberfield
  • Antonio Penta
  • Marcin Pęski
  • Marek Pycia
  • Ariel Rubinstein
  • Philipp Sadowski
  • Uzi Segal
  • Ran Spiegler
  • Yves Sprumont
  • Roland Strausz
  • Juuso Toikka
  • Utku Unver
  • Juuso Välimäki
  • Alexander Westkamp
  • Thomas Wiseman

Acknowledgments
Theoretical Economics publishes leading research in economic theory. It is published by the Econometric Society four times a year, in January, May, July, and November. All content is freely available. It is included in the Social Sciences Citation Index.

TE editors' statement following up on the Econometric Society journal editors' plan to address paper length.

Current Issue: Volume 17, Issue 2 (May 2022)

Table of Contents

Articles

What were you thinking? Decision theory as coherence test
       Itzhak Gilboa and Larry Samuelson
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
507–519
Two-stage majoritarian choice
       Sean Horan and Yves Sprumont
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
521–537
Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes
       Sebastian Gryglewicz and Aaron Kolb
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
539–559
Censorship as optimal persuasion
       Anton Kolotilin, Timofiy Mylovanov, and Andriy Zapechelnyuk
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
561–585
Monologues, dialogues and common priors
       Alfredo Di Tillio, Ehud Lehrer, and Dov Samet
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
587–615
Games with switching costs and endogenous references
       Begum Guney and Michael Richter
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
617–650
Indifference, indecisiveness, experimentation and stochastic choice
       Efe A. Ok and Gerelt Tserenjigmid
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
651–686
Dynamically stable matching
       Laura Doval
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
687–724
Markov distributional equilibrium dynamics in games with complementarities and no aggregate risk
       Lukasz Balbus, Pawel Dziewulski, Kevin Reffett, and Lukasz Wozny
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
725–762
(Bad) reputation in relational contracting
       Rahul Deb, Matthew Mitchell, and Mallesh M. Pai
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
763–800
The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions
       Jan Christoph Schlegel
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
801–839
A common-value auction with state-dependent participation
       Stephan Lauermann and Asher Wolinsky
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
841–881
Long information design
       Frederic Koessler, Marie Laclau, Jérôme Renault, and Tristan Tomala
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
883–927
Incentive-compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs : correction
       Abhigyan Bose and Souvik Roy
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
929–942
Through 2016, the order of papers within each issue is the order of receipt of the final versions. From 2017, within each issue papers are ordered by their length.

The print and view links lead to pdf files of the papers with the same content. The format of the versions in the view links is optimized for on-screen viewing.
Papers in this issue have on average been downloaded from 943 distinct IP addresses. (For each paper, downloads since the paper was first made available as a "Paper to appear" are included in this number.)

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Papers to appear

The following papers have been accepted and will appear in future issues. The links below lead to the final accepted papers in their working paper formats. The papers will be copyedited and typeset for publication.

  • Wojciech Olszewski and Ron Siegel, Equilibrium existence in games with ties
  • Antonio Rosato, Loss aversion in sequential auctions
  • Tangren Feng, Axel Niemeyer, and Qinggong Wu, The Limits of Ex Post Implementation without Transfers
  • Andrew Mackenzie and Christian Trudeau, On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion
  • B. Douglas Bernheim and Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed, Pervasive signaling
  • Matteo Escudé and Ludvig Sinander, Slow persuasion (Supplementary appendix)
  • Borys Grochulski and Yuzhe Zhang, Termination as an incentive device
  • Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky, and Takuro Yamashita, Optimal persuasion via bi-pooling
  • Anna Bogomolnaia, Ron Holzman, and Hervé Moulin, On guarantees, vetoes and random dictators
  • Hitoshi Sadakane, Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers
  • Joel P. Flynn, Lawrence D. W. Schmidt, and Alexis Akira Toda, Robust comparative statics for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
  • Yi-Fan Chen, Wen-Tai Hsu, and Shin-Kun Peng, Innovation, firm size distribution, and gains from trade
  • Lutz G. Arnold, On the neutrality of socially responsible investing
  • Christoph Schottmüller, Optimal information structures in bilateral trade
  • Abraham Neyman, Additive valuations of streams of payoffs that satisfy the time value of money principle: characterization and robust optimization
  • Siyang Xiong, Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: complete characterization
  • Uzi Segal, Forall or exists?
  • Chao Huang, Stable matching: an integer programming approach
  • Yi-Chun Chen, Takashi Kunimoto, Yifei Sun, and Siyang Xiong, Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima
  • Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, and Rann Smorodinsky, The Implications of Pricing on Social Learning
  • Chen Cheng and Yiqing Xing, Which networks permit stable allocations? A theory of network-based comparisons
  • Heinrich Harald Nax and Jonathan Newton, Deep and shallow thinking in the long run
  • Yi Chen, Dynamic delegation with a persistent state
  • Yu Awaya, Kohei Iwasaki, and Makoto Watanabe, Rational Bubbles and Middlemen
  • David Delacrétaz, Simon Loertscher, and Claudio Mezzetti, When Walras meets Vickrey
  • Ken Hendricks and Thomas Wiseman, How to sell in a sequential auction market
  • José Carlos R. Alcantud, Marco Mariotti, and Roberto Veneziani, Sufficientarianism
  • Luciano Pomatto, Stable matching under forward-induction reasoning
  • Manuel Amador and Kyle Bagwell, Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers
  • Thomas Demuynck and Umutcan Salman, On the revealed preference analysis of stable aggregate matchings
  • Daniel Bird and Alexander Frug, Monotone contracts
  • Wenzhang Zhang, Collusion enforcement in repeated first-price auctions (Supplementary appendix)
  • Daniele Condorelli and Balázs Szentes, Surplus sharing in Cournot oligopoly
  • Benjamin Lester, Pierre-Olivier Weill, and Julien Hugonnier, Heterogeneity in decentralized asset markets
  • Ariel Rubinstein and Kemal Yildiz, Equilibrium in a civilized jungle
  • Fabien Gensbittel, Marcin Pęski, and Jérôme Renault, Value-based distance between information structures
  • Boaz Zik and Ran Weksler, Informative tests in signaling environments
  • Andreas Blume and In-Uck Park, Quid pro quo: friendly information exchange between rivals
  • Daniel Gottlieb and Humberto Moreira, Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard (Supplementary appendix)
  • Sofia Moroni, Experimentation in Organizations
  • Svetlana Kosterina, Persuasion with unknown beliefs
  • Kevin He, Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal-stopping problems
  • Sylvain Chassang and Samuel Kapon, Prior-free dynamic allocation under limited liability
  • Dirk Bergemann and Philipp Strack, Progressive participation
  • David Martimort and Lars A. Stole, Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models

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