Theoretical Economics

Editorial Board

Acknowledgments

Theoretical Economics publishes leading research in economic theory. It is published by the Econometric Society three times a year, in January, May, and September. All content is freely available. It is included in the Social Sciences Citation Index.

Current Issue: Volume 13, Issue 3 (September 2018)

Table of Contents

Articles

Rationing rules and stable coalition structures Oihane Gallo and Elena Inarra	Abstract PRINT VIEW 933–950
Efficient chip strategies in repeated games Wojciech Olszewski and Mikhail Safronov	Abstract PRINT VIEW 951–978
Pareto efficiency and identity Christopher Phelan and Aldo Rustichini	Abstract PRINT VIEW 979–1008
Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities Lars Ehlers and Alexander Westkamp	Abstract PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix 1009–1042
Transitivity of preferences: when does it matter? Laurens Cherchye, Thomas Demuynck, and Bram De Rock	Abstract PRINT VIEW 1043–1076
Competition and networks of collaboration Nikita Roketskiy	Abstract PRINT VIEW 1077–1110
Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent Arjada Bardhi and Yingni Guo	Abstract PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix 1111–1150
A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game David Martimort, Aggey Semenov, and Lars A. Stole	Abstract PRINT VIEW 1151–1190
Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors Wojciech Olszewski and Mikhail Safronov	Abstract PRINT VIEW 1191–1232
Optimal adaptive testing: informativeness and incentives Rahul Deb and Colin Stewart	Abstract PRINT VIEW 1233–1274
On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences Gabriel Carroll	Abstract PRINT VIEW 1275–1318
The optimal degree of monetary-discretion in a New Keynesian model with private information Yuichiro Waki, Richard Dennis, and Ippei Fujiwara	Abstract PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix 1319–1368
A tractable model of monetary exchange with ex-post heterogeneity Guillaume Rocheteau, Pierre-Olivier Weill, and Russell Wong	Abstract PRINT VIEW Supplementary appendix 1369–1424
A general solution method for moral hazard problems Rongzhu Ke and Christopher Thomas Ryan	Abstract PRINT VIEW 1425–1481
Through 2016, the order of papers within each issue is the order of receipt of the final versions. From 2017, within each issue papers are ordered by their length. The print and view links lead to pdf files of the papers with the same content. The format of the versions in the view links is optimized for on-screen viewing. Papers in this issue have on average been downloaded from 1267 distinct IP addresses. (For each paper, downloads since the paper was first made available as a "Paper to appear" are included in this number.)

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Papers to appear

The following papers have been accepted and will appear in future issues. The links below lead to the final accepted papers in their working paper formats. The papers will be copyedited and typeset for publication.

Martin Szydlowski, Incentives, project choice, and dynamic multitasking
Simon Loertscher and Cédric Wasser, Optimal structure and dissolution of partnerships
Yuichi Yamamoto, Stochastic games with hidden states (Supplementary appendix)
Sarah Auster and Piero Gottardi, Competing mechanisms in markets for lemons (Supplementary appendix)
Andrew Mackenzie, A foundation for probabilistic beliefs with or without atoms
Ignacio Monzon, Observational learning in large anonymous games
Yu Awaya and Vijay Krishna, Communication and cooperation in repeated games
Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu, and Xianwen Shi, Voting on multiple issues: what to put on the ballot?
Pak Hung Au, The loser's curse in the search for advice
Jon X. Eguia and Antonio Nicolo, Information and targeted spending
Frederic Koessler and Vasiliki Skreta, Selling with evidence
Ulrich Doraszelski and Juan F. Escobar, Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games
Mikel Pérez-Nievas, José I. Conde-Ruiz, and Eduardo L. Giménez, Efficiency and endogenous fertility
Filippo Massari, Market selection in large economies: a matter of luck
Martin W. Cripps and Caroline D. Thomas, Strategic experimentation in queues (Supplementary appendix)
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti, and François Salanié, On competitive nonlinear pricing (Supplementary appendix)
Shaowei Ke, Boundedly rational backward induction
José Heleno Faro and Jean-Philippe Lefort, Dynamic objective and subjective rationality
Ryan Tierney, On the manipulability of efficient exchange rules
Joel Sobel, Iterated weak dominance and interval-dominance supermodular games
Shunya Noda, Full surplus extraction and within-period ex post implementation in dynamic environments (Supplementary appendix)
Juan I. Block, Drew Fudenberg, and David K. Levine, Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory (Supplementary appendix)
Simone Galperti, A theory of personal budgeting
Manuel Foerster, Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks
Matthew L. Elliott and Francesco Nava, Decentralized bargaining in matching markets: efficient stationary equilibria and the core (Supplementary appendix)

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