Theoretical Economics

Editorial Board

Acknowledgments

Theoretical Economics publishes leading research in economic theory. It is published by the Econometric Society four times a year, in January, May, July, and November. All content is freely available. It is included in the Social Sciences Citation Index.

TE editors' statement following up on the Econometric Society journal editors' plan to address paper length.

Current Issue: Volume 16, Issue 4 (November 2021)

Table of Contents

Articles

Local global equivalence in voting models: a characterization and applications Ujjwal Kumar, Souvik Roy, Arunava Sen, Sonal Yadav, and Huaxia Zeng	Abstract PRINT VIEW 1195–1220
Subgame-perfect equilibrium in games with almost perfect information: dispensing with public randomization Paulo Barelli and John Duggan	Abstract PRINT VIEW 1221–1248
Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance Battal Dogan and Lars Ehlers	Abstract PRINT VIEW 1249–1279
Payoff implications of incentive contracting Daniel F. Garrett	Abstract PRINT VIEW 1281–1312
Monitoring experts Yaron Azrieli	Abstract PRINT VIEW 1313–1350
Robust group strategy-proofness Steven Kivinen and Norovsambuu Tumennasan	Abstract PRINT VIEW 1351–1389
Relational communication Anton Kolotilin and Hongyi Li	Abstract PRINT VIEW 1391–1430
Robust sequential search Karl H. Schlag and Andriy Zapechelnyuk	Abstract PRINT VIEW 1431–1470
Renegotiation of long-term contracts as part of an implicit agreement Rumen Kostadinov	Abstract PRINT VIEW 1471–1512
Sustainable debt Gaetano Bloise, Herakles Polemarchakis, and Yiannis Vailakis	Abstract PRINT VIEW 1513–1555
Bayesian privacy Ran Eilat, Kfir Eliaz, and Xiaosheng Mu	Abstract PRINT VIEW 1557–1603
The implications of finite-order reasoning Adam Brandenburger, Alexander Danieli, and Amanda Friedenberg	Abstract PRINT VIEW 1605–1654
Bilateral trade with a benevolent intermediary Ran Eilat and Ady Pauzner	Abstract PRINT VIEW 1655–1714
Through 2016, the order of papers within each issue is the order of receipt of the final versions. From 2017, within each issue papers are ordered by their length. The print and view links lead to pdf files of the papers with the same content. The format of the versions in the view links is optimized for on-screen viewing. Papers in this issue have on average been downloaded from 1110 distinct IP addresses. (For each paper, downloads since the paper was first made available as a "Paper to appear" are included in this number.)

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Papers to appear

The following papers have been accepted and will appear in future issues. The links below lead to the final accepted papers in their working paper formats. The papers will be copyedited and typeset for publication.

Heinrich Harald Nax and Jonathan Newton, Deep and shallow thinking in the long run
Yi Chen, Dynamic delegation with a persistent state
Yu Awaya, Kohei Iwasaki, and Makoto Watanabe, Rational Bubbles and Middlemen
David Delacrétaz, Simon Loertscher, and Claudio Mezzetti, When Walras meets Vickrey
Ken Hendricks and Thomas Wiseman, How to sell in a sequential auction market
José Carlos R. Alcantud, Marco Mariotti, and Roberto Veneziani, Sufficientarianism
Luciano Pomatto, Stable matching under forward-induction reasoning
Manuel Amador and Kyle Bagwell, Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers
Thomas Demuynck and Umutcan Salman, On the revealed preference analysis of stable aggregate matchings
Daniel Bird and Alexander Frug, Monotone contracts
Wenzhang Zhang, Collusion enforcement in repeated first-price auctions (Supplementary appendix)
Daniele Condorelli and Balázs Szentes, Surplus sharing in Cournot oligopoly
Benjamin Lester, Pierre-Olivier Weill, and Julien Hugonnier, Heterogeneity in decentralized asset markets
Ariel Rubinstein and Kemal YILDIZ, Equilibrium in a civilized jungle
Fabien Gensbittel, Marcin Pęski, and Jérôme Renault, Value-based distance between information structures
Ran Weksler and Boaz Zik, Informative tests in signaling environments
Andreas Blume and In-Uck Park, Quid pro quo: friendly information exchange between rivals
Daniel Gottlieb and Humberto Moreira, Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard (Supplementary appendix)
Sofia Moroni, Experimentation in Organizations
Svetlana Kosterina, Persuasion with unknown beliefs
Kevin He, Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal-stopping problems
Sylvain Chassang and Samuel Kapon, Prior-free dynamic allocation under limited liability
Dirk Bergemann and Philipp Strack, Progressive participation
David Martimort and Lars A. Stole, Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models
Itzhak Gilboa and Larry Samuelson, What were you thinking? Decision theory as coherence test
Abhigyan Bose and Souvik Roy, Incentive-compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs : correction
Rahul Deb, Matthew Mitchell, and Mallesh M. Pai, (Bad) reputation in relational contracting
Frederic Koessler, Marie Laclau, Jérôme Renault, and Tristan Tomala, Long information design
Jan Christoph Schlegel, The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions
Alfredo Di Tillio, Ehud Lehrer, and Dov Samet, Monologues, dialogues and common priors
Lukasz Balbus, Pawel Dziewulski, Kevin Reffett, and Lukasz Wozny, Markov distributional equilibrium dynamics in games with complementarities and no aggregate risk
Stephan Lauermann and Asher Wolinsky, A common-value auction with state-dependent participation
Begum Guney and Michael Richter, Games with switching costs and endogenous references
Sean Horan and Yves Sprumont, Two-stage majoritarian choice
Anton Kolotilin, Timofiy Mylovanov, and Andriy Zapechelnyuk, Censorship as optimal persuasion
Efe A. Ok and Gerelt Tserenjigmid, Indifference, indecisiveness, experimentation and stochastic choice
Laura Doval, Dynamically stable matching
Sebastian Gryglewicz and Aaron Kolb, Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes
Teddy Mekonnen and René Leal Vizcaíno, Bayesian comparative statics
Heiner Schumacher and Heidi Christina Thysen, Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations
Umut Dur, Thayer Morrill, and William Phan, Family ties: school assignment with siblings
Chad Fulton, Choosing what to pay attention to
Andrew Ellis, Michele Piccione, and Shengxing Zhang, Equilibrium securitization with diverse beliefs
Afshin Nikzad, Rank-optimal assignments in uniform markets
Mehmet Ekmekci and Stephan Lauermann, Information aggregation in Poisson-elections
Chen Zhao, Pseudo-Bayesian updating
Gaetano Antinolfi, Francesca Carapella, and Francesco Carli, Transparency and collateral: central versus bilateral clearing
William A. Branch, Bruce McGough, and Mei Zhu, Statistical sunspots
Juan Carlos Cordoba and Xiying Liu, Malthusian stagnation is efficient
Martin Hellwig, Incomplete-information games in large populations with anonymity
Paula Onuchic, Informed intermediaries (Supplementary appendix)
Jaehong Kim and Mengling Li, Optimal organ allocation policy under blood-type barriers with the donor-priority rule

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