TE logo
ISSN (e) 1555-7561
(print) 1933-6837
Theoretical Economics
An open-access journal in economic theory
A journal of the
Econometric Society
Main page Submit a paper Join the Econometric Society
Editorial Board
Editor
  • Ran Spiegler
Coeditors
  • Simon Board
  • Thomas Mariotti
  • Dilip Mookherjee
  • Florian Scheuer
Associate Editors
  • David S. Ahn
  • Gadi Barlevy
  • Marco Bassetto
  • Sylvain Chassang
  • Eddie Dekel
  • Kfir Eliaz
  • Ignacio Esponda
  • Amanda Friedenberg
  • Drew Fudenberg
  • Benjamin Golub
  • Faruk Gul
  • Johannes Hörner
  • Marina Halac
  • Yuichiro Kamada
  • Frederic Koessler
  • Igor Kopylov
  • Felix Kubler
  • Pablo Kurlat
  • Stephan Lauermann
  • Benjamin Lester
  • David K. Levine
  • Qingmin Liu
  • George J. Mailath
  • Giuseppe Moscarini
  • Georg Nöldeke
  • Wojciech Olszewski
  • Guillermo L. Ordoñez
  • Martin J. Osborne
  • Marcin Pęski
  • Andrea Prat
  • Marek Pycia
  • Arthur J. Robson
  • Ariel Rubinstein
  • William H. Sandholm
  • Todd D. Sarver
  • Uzi Segal
  • Yves Sprumont
  • Roland Strausz
  • Tomasz Strzalecki
  • Juuso Toikka
  • Utku Unver
  • Thomas Wiseman

Acknowledgments
Theoretical Economics publishes leading research in economic theory. It is published by the Econometric Society three times a year, in January, May, and September. All content is freely available. It is included in the Social Sciences Citation Index.

Current Issue: Volume 14, Issue 1 (January 2019)

Table of Contents

Articles

Dynamic objective and subjective rationality
       José Heleno Faro and Jean-Philippe Lefort
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1–14
On the manipulability of efficient exchange rules
       Ryan Tierney
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
15–38
Full surplus extraction and within-period ex post implementation in dynamic environments
       Shunya Noda
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
 Supplementary appendix
39–69
Iterated weak dominance and interval-dominance supermodular games
       Joel Sobel
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
71–102
Boundedly rational backward induction
       Shaowei Ke
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
103–134
Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory
       Juan I. Block, Drew Fudenberg, and David K. Levine
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
 Supplementary appendix
135–172
A theory of personal budgeting
       Simone Galperti
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
173–210
Decentralized bargaining in matching markets: efficient stationary equilibria and the core
       Matthew L. Elliott and Francesco Nava
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
 Supplementary appendix
211–251
Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks
       Manuel Foerster
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
253–295
On competitive nonlinear pricing
       Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti, and François Salanié
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
 Supplementary appendix
297–343
Through 2016, the order of papers within each issue is the order of receipt of the final versions. From 2017, within each issue papers are ordered by their length.

The print and view links lead to pdf files of the papers with the same content. The format of the versions in the view links is optimized for on-screen viewing.
Papers in this issue have on average been downloaded from 957 distinct IP addresses. (For each paper, downloads since the paper was first made available as a "Paper to appear" are included in this number.)

PREVIOUS ISSUE      BROWSE ALL ISSUES

Papers to appear

The following papers have been accepted and will appear in future issues. The links below lead to the final accepted papers in their working paper formats. The papers will be copyedited and typeset for publication.

  • Francis Bloch, Bhaskar Dutta, and Mihai Manea, Efficient partnership formation in networks
  • John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky, and Alexander Westkamp, Full substitutability
  • Francisco Silva, Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification
  • Alfred J. M. Duncan and Charles Nolan, Disputes, debt and equity
  • Shinsuke Kambe, An N-person war of attrition with the possibility of a non-compromising type
  • Martin Szydlowski, Incentives, project choice, and dynamic multitasking
  • Simon Loertscher and Cédric Wasser, Optimal structure and dissolution of partnerships
  • Yuichi Yamamoto, Stochastic games with hidden states (Supplementary appendix)
  • Sarah Auster and Piero Gottardi, Competing mechanisms in markets for lemons (Supplementary appendix)
  • Andrew Mackenzie, A foundation for probabilistic beliefs with or without atoms
  • Ignacio Monzon, Observational learning in large anonymous games
  • Yu Awaya and Vijay Krishna, Communication and cooperation in repeated games
  • Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu, and Xianwen Shi, Voting on multiple issues: what to put on the ballot?
  • Pak Hung Au, The loser's curse in the search for advice
  • Jon X. Eguia and Antonio Nicolo, Information and targeted spending
  • Frederic Koessler and Vasiliki Skreta, Selling with evidence
  • Ulrich Doraszelski and Juan F. Escobar, Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games
  • Mikel Pérez-Nievas, José I. Conde-Ruiz, and Eduardo L. Giménez, Efficiency and endogenous fertility
  • Filippo Massari, Market selection in large economies: a matter of luck
  • Martin W. Cripps and Caroline D. Thomas, Strategic experimentation in queues (Supplementary appendix)

Register to be notified when issues are published

To be notified of the publication of new issues, please register by completing the form on our registration page.

Privacy Statement

The names and email addresses entered in forms on this website will be used exclusively for the purposes of the journal and will not be made available for any other purpose or to any other party.
  Follow EconTheory on Twitter    Tweet
Open access
Editorial standards
Referee guidelines
Submit a paper
Turnaround
Copyright
Archiving, dissemination, hard copy
Policies
Annual reports
Journal history
Econometric Society
Main page
Journal Content Search

Advanced search

Browse
  • By Issue
  • By Author
  • By Title
Login

Endorsed by