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Strategic complementarities and unraveling in matching markets
Federico Echenique and Juan Sebastián Pereyra |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1–39 |
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On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions
Jacob Goeree and Yuanchuan Lien |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 41–52 |
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Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals
Jimmy Chan and Wenzhang Zhang |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 53–87 |
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Dynamics in stochastic evolutionary models
David K. Levine and Salvatore Modica |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 89–131 |
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Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget
Justin Burkett |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 133–155 |
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Reputation without commitment in finitely-repeated games
Jonathan Weinstein and Muhamet Yildiz |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 157–185 |
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Fragility of asymptotic agreement under Bayesian learning
Daron Acemoglu, Victor Chernozhukov, and Muhamet Yildiz |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 187–225 |
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Matching to share risk
Pierre-André Chiappori and Philip J. Reny |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 227–251 |
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Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard
Robert Ulbricht |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 253–278 |
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Large deviations and stochastic stability in the small noise double limit
William H. Sandholm and Mathias Staudigl |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 279–355 |
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Efficient networks in games with local complementarities
Mohamed Belhaj, Sebastian Bervoets, and Frédéric Deroïan |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 357–280 |
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Fairness and externalities
Rodrigo A. Velez |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 381–410 |
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The folk theorem with imperfect public information in continuous time
Benjamin Bernard and Christoph Frei |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 411–453 |
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A model of price discrimination under loss aversion and state-contingent reference points
Juan Carlos Carbajal and Jeffrey C. Ely |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 455–485 |
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Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 487–522 |
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Objective rationality and uncertainty averse preferences
Simone Cerreia-Vioglio |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 523–545 |
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Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
R. Pablo Arribillaga and Jordi Massó |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 547–586 |
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List-rationalizable choice
Kemal Yildiz |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 587–599 |
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Dynamic markets for lemons: performance, liquidity, and policy intervention
Diego Moreno and John Wooders |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 601–639 |
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Savage games
Simon Grant, Idione Meneghel, and Rabee Tourky |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 641–682 |
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Matching with slot-specific priorities: theory
Scott Duke Kominers and Tayfun Sönmez |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 683–710 |
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A characterization of single-peaked preferences via random social choice functions
Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen, and Huaxia Zeng |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 711–733 |
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Stability and incentives for college admissions with budget constraints
Azar Abizada |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 735–756 |
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Monotone threshold representations
Mira Frick |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 757–772 |
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The importance of being honest
Nicolas Klein |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 773–811 |
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The formation of networks with local spillovers and limited observability
Michael David König |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 813–863 |
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Condorcet meets Ellsberg
Andrew Ellis |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 865–895 |
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A search-theoretic model of the term premium
Athanasios Geromichalos, Lucas M. Herrenbrueck, and Kevin D. Salyer |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 897–935 |
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Negotiation across multiple issues
Gabrielle Gayer and Dotan Persitz |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 937–969 |
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Mechanism design with maxmin agents: theory and an application to bilateral trade
Alexander Wolitzky |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 971–1004 |
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Many-to-many matching and price discrimination
Renato Gomes and Alessandro Pavan |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1005–1052 |
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Innovation vs. imitation and the evolution of productivity distributions
Michael David König, Jan Lorenz, and Fabrizio Zilibotti |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 1053–1102 |
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Transparency and distressed sales under asymmetric information
William Fuchs, Aniko Öry, and Andrzej Skrzypacz |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1103–1144 |
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Rewards and punishments: informal contracting through social preferences
Sylvain Chassang and Christian Zehnder |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 1145–1179 |