|
The Foster-Hart measure of riskiness for general gambles
Frank Riedel and Tobias Hellmann |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1–9 |
|
Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents
Madhav Chandrasekher |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 11–49 |
|
Is utility transferable? a revealed preference analysis
Laurens Cherchye, Thomas Demuynck, and Bram De Rock |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 51–65 |
|
Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks
Alexander Wolitzky |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 67–101 |
|
Strategic uncertainty and the ex-post Nash property in large games
Mohammed Ali Khan, Kali P. Rath, Yeneng Sun, and Haomiao Yu |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 103–129 |
|
A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes
Marcin Pęski and Thomas Wiseman |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 131–173 |
|
Breakdowns
Godfrey Keller and Sven Rady |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 175–202 |
|
Three steps ahead
Yuval Heller |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 203–241 |
|
Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection
Daisuke Oyama, William H. Sandholm, and Olivier Tercieux |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 243–281 |
|
Majority runoff elections: strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis
Laurent Bouton and Gabriele Gratton |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 283–314 |
|
Social activity and network formation
Oliver Baetz |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 315–340 |
|
Transparency and price formation
Ayça Kaya and Qingmin Liu |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 341–383 |
|
Serial dictatorship: the unique optimal allocation rule when information is endogenous
Sophie Bade |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 385–410 |
|
Merging with a set of probability measures: a characterization
Yuichi Noguchi |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 411–444 |
|
Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule
Shuhei Morimoto and Shigehiro Serizawa |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 445–487 |
|
Hidden actions and preferences for timing of resolution of uncertainty
Haluk I. Ergin and Todd D. Sarver |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 489–541 |
|
A theory of school choice lotteries
Onur Kesten and Utku Unver |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 543–595 |
|
Price discrimination through communication
Itai Sher and Rakesh Vohra |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 597–648 |
|
Communication and influence
Antoni Calvó-Armengol, Joan de Marti Beltran, and Andrea Prat |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 649–690 |
|
Characterizing the limit set of PPE payoffs with unequal discounting
Takuo Sugaya |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 691–717 |
|
One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining
Dilip Abreu, David G. Pearce, and Ennio Stacchetti |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 719–773 |
|
Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium
Drew Fudenberg and Yuichiro Kamada |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 775–806 |
|
Information diffusion in networks through social learning
Ilan Lobel and Evan D. Sadler |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 807–851 |
|
Gross substitutes and endowed assignment valuations
Michael Ostrovsky and Renato Paes Leme |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 853–865 |
|
Incentive-compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs
Mohit Bhargava, Dipjyoti Majumdar, and Arunava Sen |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Correction 867–885 |
|
Monotonic redistribution of performance-based allocations: a case for proportional taxation
André Casajus |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 887–892 |
|
Maximal revenue with multiple goods: nonmonotonicity and other observations
Sergiu Hart and Philip J. Reny |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 893–922 |
|
Implementation with interdependent valuations
Richard McLean and Andrew Postlewaite |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 923–952 |
|
An interaction-based foundation of aggregate investment fluctuations
Makoto Nirei |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 953–985 |